State v. MacKey, 719 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1998). · Go Syfert
State v. MacKey, 719 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1998). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“t is undoubtedly important for the trial court to have the benefit of a properly calculated scoresheet when making a sentencing decision. however, it does not necessarily follow that all cases involving scoresheet errors must be automatically reversed for resentencing.”
25 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Lemon (fla, 2002-06-06)
Treatment trajectory · 1998 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1998 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 15 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State v. Lemon
Fla. · 2002 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
t is undoubtedly important for the trial court to have the benefit of a properly calculated scoresheet when making a sentencing decision. however, it does not necessarily follow that all cases involving scoresheet errors must be automatically reversed for resentencing.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brooks v. State
Fla. · 2007 · confidence medium
As we have noted before, "[e]ven in those cases involving scoresheet errors apparent from the record, [this Court] ha[s] previously held that `it does not necessarily follow that all cases involving scoresheet errors must be automatically reversed for resentencing.'" Maddox, 760 So.2d at 103 (quoting State v. Mackey, 719 So.2d 284, 284 (Fla.1998)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Anderson
Fla. · 2005 · confidence medium
The Appropriate Standard As we have recognized, it is "undoubtedly important for the trial court to have the benefit of a properly calculated scoresheet when making a sentencing decision." State v. Mackey, 719 So.2d 284, 284 (Fla. 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Maddox v. State
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
Even in those cases involving scoresheet errors apparent from the record, we have previously held that “it does not necessarily follow that all cases involving scoresheet errors must be automatically reversed for resentencing.” State v. Mackey, 719 So.2d 284, 284 (Fla.1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Maddox v. State
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
Even in those cases involving scoresheet errors apparent from the record, we have previously held that "it does not necessarily follow that all cases involving scoresheet errors must be automatically reversed for resentencing." State v. Mackey, 719 So.2d 284, 284 (Fla.1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Heggs v. State
Fla. · 2000 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Freeman v. State, 616 So.2d 155, 156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (affirming denial of the defendant's motion to correct sentence, even in light of this Court's decision in State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1 (Fla.1993), because the defendant failed to allege that "he could not have been habitualized without the amendments effected by chapter 89-280"); cf. State v. Mackey, 719 So.2d 284, 284-85 (Fla.1998), (affirming fifteen-year sentence that departed from 1991 *628 guidelines—even though the trial court should have calculated the sentence using the 1994 guidelines—because the fifteen-year sent…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rubin v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
In State v. Mackey, 719 So.2d 284, 285 (Fla.1998), the supreme court disapproved a rule of per se reversal in cases involving scoresheet errors.
discussed Cited "see" Fernandez v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Mackey, 719 So.2d 284, 284 (Fla.1998) (holding that it is “undoubtedly important for the trial court to have the benefit of a properly calculated scoresheet when making a sentencing decision”).
discussed Cited "see" Gill v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Mackey, 719 So.2d 284, 285 (Fla.1998) (rejecting per se reversal rule for scoresheet errors in case where grounds for upward departure were not challenged and incorrect guidelines scoresheet utilized by trial court "provided for a lower recommended sentencing range" than correct scoresheet); Hines v. State, 587 So.2d 620, 621 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (upholding upward departure sentence notwithstanding improper assessment of additional victim injury points on scoresheet and stating that "we find beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial judge would have imposed the same departure sentenc…
cited Cited "see" Braggs v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Mackey, 719 So.2d 284 (Fla.1998); Rubin v. State, 734 So.2d 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). [5] See American Heritage Dictionary 1174 (3d ed.1992).
cited Cited "see" Cardali v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Mackey, 719 So.2d 284 (Fla. 1998); Rubin v. State, 734 So.2d 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).
cited Cited "see" Isom v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mackey v. State, 703 So.2d 1183, 1185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), quashed in part, 719 So.2d 284 (Fla.1998).
discussed Cited "see" Harbican v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Mackey, 719 So.2d 284 (Fla.1998) (holding that where trial court uses improperly calculated scoresheet when sentencing defendant resulting in sentence that is lower than rec ommended guidelines sentence, resentenc-ing not required).
cited Cited "see" Langford v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Mackey, 719 So.2d 284 (Fla.1998); Kelly v. State, 706 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Jordan v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see also · confidence low
"This is because the trial court may well not wish to depart, or to depart so extensively, from a guidelines sentence which is presumably substantially lower than the one which it previously considered...." Moore v. State, 519 So.2d 22, 23 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); see also Mackey v. State, 703 So.2d 1183, 1185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), review granted, No. 92,179, 719 So.2d 284 (Fla. May 19, 1998); Rubin v. State, 697 So.2d 161, 162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), review granted, No. 91,270, 721 So.2d 716 (Fla. Mar. 17, 1998); Smith v. State, 678 So.2d 1374, 1376 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). [2] This was evidently in respons…
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
Joseph MACKEY, Respondent.
92179.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Sep 24, 1998.
719 So. 2d 284
Per Curiam.
Cited by 19 opinions  |  Published

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Richard L. Polin, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, for Petitioner.

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Marti Rothenberg, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

We have for review the decision in Mackey v. State, 703 So.2d 1183 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), which certified conflict with Hines v. State, 587 So.2d 620 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). We have jurisdiction. See art. V., § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

Mackey was convicted of the first-degree murder and aggravated child abuse of his girlfriend's two-year-old daughter. The trial court imposed a life sentence for the murder conviction and a fifteen-year departure sentence for the child abuse conviction. On appeal, Mackey raised several errors regarding his convictions. The only issue raised regarding his sentences was that the trial court erred in using a 1991 scoresheet, rather than a 1994 scoresheet, in imposing the fifteen-year departure sentence for the aggravated child abuse.

The Third District affirmed Mackey's convictions but reversed and remanded for resentencing on the child abuse conviction, stating as follows:

We agree that the court used an incorrect scoresheet; the crimes were committed in April 1994. "A `trial court must have the benefit of a properly prepared scoresheet before it can make a fully informed decision on whether to depart from the recommended guideline sentence.'" Rubin v. State, 697 So.2d 161, 162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).

Mackey, 703 So.2d at 1185. The Third District certified conflict with Hines, which affirmed a departure sentence imposed on the basis of an improperly calculated scoresheet, finding that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence notwithstanding the scoresheet error.

The State concedes that the trial court improperly utilized a 1991 scoresheet, rather than a 1994 scoresheet, in calculating Mackey's guidelines sentence for aggravated child abuse. However, the State argues against a per se rule of reversal for resentencing in cases of scoresheet errors.

We agree that it is undoubtedly important for the trial court to have the benefit of a properly calculated scoresheet when making a sentencing decision. However, it does not necessarily follow that all cases involving scoresheet errors must be automatically reversed for resentencing. This case demonstrates[*285] that a per se reversal rule is unnecessary.

Here, the 1991 guidelines scoresheet utilized by the trial court provided for a lower recommended sentencing range for Mackey's offense than the 1994 guidelines. The 1991 scoresheet provided for a recommended sentencing range of 4.5 to 9 years for Mackey's offense, whereas the 1994 guidelines, which should have been used, would have provided a recommended sentencing range of 9.5 to 15.8 years. Thus, the trial court entered a departure sentence of fifteen years because it assumed that a guidelines sentence could be no greater than 9 years—the upper end of the 1991 guidelines range. In this case, if the trial court had "the benefit of a properly prepared scoresheet," id., the scoresheet would have indicated a maximum guidelines sentence of 15.8 years, rather than a maximum guidelines sentence of nine years. With the benefit of the correct scoresheet, there would have been no need for the trial court to have departed from the guidelines— unless it determined that an even greater sentence than fifteen years was warranted.

Here the defendant may have actually benefitted from the use of the erroneous scoresheet. Therefore, to the extent that Mackey stands for a per se rule of reversal in every instance where the trial court has utilized an erroneous scoresheet, we disapprove of Mackey and approve Hines. That portion of the district court's decision that vacated the sentence is quashed. On remand, we direct that the fifteen-year sentence should be affirmed.[1]

It is so ordered.

HARDING, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN, WELLS, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.

1 This opinion does not address the Criminal Appeals Reform Act, specifically subsections 924.051(1)(a), (b), (3) and (7), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), or Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b). These provisions were not addressed in the Third District's opinion and not raised by the State below. Because the sentencing predated the enactment of both, these provisions are clearly inapplicable.