Carter v. State, 787 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). · Go Syfert
Search
Carter v. State, 787 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
8 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: West v. State (fladistctapp, 2011-08-15)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) West v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Lang v. State, 856 So.2d 1105, 1106 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (addressing the appellant’s challenge to the imposition of a public defender’s lien in a rule 3.800(b) motion, reversing because the trial court failed to advise the appellant of his right to a hearing to contest the amount, and remanding to allow the appellant an opportunity “to be heard on the fee.”); Carter v. State, 787 So.2d 193, 193 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (reversing and remanding “to allow appellant an opportunity to contest the imposition of the public defender lien,” *991 where the lack of a hearing at sentenci…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Harder v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Carter v. State, 787 So.2d 193, 193-94 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lang v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] See Maddox v. State, 760 So.2d 89 , 109 (Fla.2000) ("Presently, rule 3.800(b) provides defendants with an opportunity to contest the erroneous imposition of costs...."); Carter v. State, 787 So.2d 193, 193 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (reversing and remanding "to allow appellant an opportunity to contest the imposition of the public defender lien," where lack of hearing at sentencing as to amount had been argued on motion under Rule 3.800(b)); see generally Nicholson v. State, 846 So.2d 1217, 1219 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) ("Rule 3.800 expressly applies to any `sentencing error.' We think a sentenc…
discussed Cited "see" Seneca Levail Addison v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See Carter v. State, 787 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (holding that a trial court cannot impose a special condition of probation not announced at the sentencing hearing).
cited Cited "see" Burch v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Carter v. State, 787 So.2d 193, 194 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Justice, 674 So.2d at 125 (Fla.1996).
cited Cited "see" Roberts v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Carter v. State, 787 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); see also Justice v. State, 674 So.2d 123, 126 (Fla.1996).
Doyle CARTER, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
1D00-833.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
May 15, 2001.
787 So. 2d 193
Per Curiam.
Cited by 7 opinions  |  Published

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Fred Parker Bingham II, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Thomas D. Winokur, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

We affirm appellant's conviction and sentence in all respects, except the imposition of the $50 public defender lien and the special condition of appellant's probation that he "bear the costs" of random urinalysis drug testing. Appellant challenged the imposition of these costs in a postsentencing motion, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2), on grounds that neither of these costs had been orally pronounced by the trial court at the time of sentencing. We agree that the inclusion of these unannounced costs in the written judgment was error. See State v. Williams, 712 So.2d 762, 764 (Fla. 1998)("[T]he requirement that a defendant[*194] pay for drug testing is a special condition of probation which the trial court must pronounce orally at sentencing."); Dodson v. State, 710 So.2d 159, 160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)("[A] public defender's fee cannot be imposed without notice and an opportunity to be heard to contest the amount."), opinion quashed on grounds that error had not been properly preserved, State v. Dodson, 760 So.2d 145 (Fla.2000). We, therefore, reverse the imposition of these costs and remand to the trial court with directions to strike the special condition of probation requiring appellant to "bear the costs" of the random urinalysis, and to allow appellant an opportunity to contest the imposition of the public defender lien. On remand, the trial court may not reimpose the special condition requiring appellant to pay for the urinalysis drug testing. See Justice v. State, 674 So.2d 123, 126 (Fla. 1996)("[W]e hold that where a sentence is reversed because the trial court failed to orally pronounce certain special conditions of probation which later appeared in the written sentence, the court must strike the unannounced conditions and cannot reimpose them upon re-sentencing.").

BOOTH, WOLF and LEWIS, JJ., concur.