Davies v. Turner, 802 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). · Go Syfert
Davies v. Turner, 802 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
7 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: SHARIN KAYE JOHNSON vs ERIC PAUL JOHNSON (fladistctapp, 2022-11-04)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers.
discussed Cited "see" SHARIN KAYE JOHNSON vs ERIC PAUL JOHNSON
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davies v. Turner, 802 So. 2d 1195, 1195 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (reversing dissolution judgment and remanding for trial court to “explain how it reached its [retroactive child support award] or to conduct further proceedings on this matter”); see also Miller v. Miller, 826 So. 2d 480, 482 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (finding that trial court’s rationale for declining to order retroactive child support lacked sufficient findings and failed to explain its decision).
discussed Cited "see" Salazar v. Salazar
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davies v. Turner, 802 So.2d 1195 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (finding the trial court erred in not making the exemption to be claimed on alternate years conditional on former husband being current with support payments); see Robertson, 712 So.2d at 1141 ("transfer of the dependency exemption to the non-custodial parent is conditioned on that parent being current with support payments").
discussed Cited "see" Wamsley v. Wamsley
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davies v. Turner, 802 So.2d 1195, 1196 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding the trial court erred when it ordered the former spouse to execute a waiver of the dependency exemption without making it conditional on the other former spouse being current with support payments).
discussed Cited "see" Glasgow v. Wolfe
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davies v. Turner, 802 So.2d 1195 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Karpovich v. Karpovich, 739 So.2d 137 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Hamlin v. Hamlin, 722 So.2d 851 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Raehn v. Raehn, 557 So.2d 152, 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
discussed Cited "see" Miller v. Miller
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord Davies v. Turner, 802 So.2d 1195, 1196 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Bardin v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 720 So.2d 609, 611 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Beal v. Beal, 666 So.2d 1054, 1054 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (requiring award where "the child's need and the [father]'s ability to pay existed at the time of the filing of the petition for dissolution"); Campbell v. Campbell, 635 So.2d 44, 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (same where "the child's increased need for support and the former husband's ability to pay the increased child support existed at the time the former wife's petition for modification was filed."); Re…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Fortune v. Fortune
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Additionally, the final judgment must require that the exemption be conditional on the paying spouse’s “being current in his support obligations.” Id.; see also Davies v. Turner, 802 So.2d 1195, 1196 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
Tammy Sue DAVIES, Appellant,
v.
Norman Ray TURNER, Appellee.
1D00-4978.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Jan 4, 2002.
802 So. 2d 1195
Per Curiam.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published

Jed L. Frankel of Phillips, Eisinger, Koss, Rothstein & Rosenfeldt, P.A., Hollywood, for Appellant.

No appearance, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Tammy Sue Davies (wife) challenges a final judgment of dissolution of marriage[*1196] from the former husband, Norman Ray Turner. The wife raises four issues on appeal, three of which have merit and require reversal: 1) Whether the trial court erred in computing the retroactive child support owed by the former husband; 2) whether the trial court erred by allowing the former husband to claim the minor child as a dependent for income tax purposes where the former husband has a history of failing to make child support payments and the final judgment contained no requirement that the former husband be current in child support payments in order to claim the exemption; and 3) whether the trial court erred by failing to award the wife reasonable attorney's fees and costs in light of the wide disparity in income between the parties.

The order on appeal states that the wife shall be entitled to retroactive child support from the date of filing of the wife's petition for dissolution of marriage, February 3, 1999. The court found that there was an arrearage amount of $330, and denied any additional claims for support "based on an offset for childcare calculated and paid by the former husband when there were no childcare costs." The record on appeal, including the testimony, does not support the trial court's finding that the former husband only owed $330 in arrearage notwithstanding the deductions for overpaid childcare costs, and the trial judge does not explain how he reached this figure. We, therefore, must reverse on the issue of retroactive child support payments for the trial court to explain how it reached its determination or to conduct further proceedings on this matter.

Section 61.30(11)(a)8., Florida Statutes states that "the court may order the primary residential parent to execute a waiver of the Internal Revenue Service dependency exemption if the non-custodial parent is current in support payments." The trial court ordered the wife to execute an exemption for each even-numbered year, commencing with 2000. The trial court erred in not making the requirement conditional upon the former husband being current with support payments. Robertson v. Bretthauer, 712 So.2d 1140 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). We, therefore, reverse this portion of the order and remand for the trial court to address this issue.

Finally, in light of the great disparity in income between the parties, we determine that the trial court erred in awarding the wife only $2,500 in attorney's fees. Hamlin v. Hamlin, 722 So.2d 851 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Upon remand, the trial court shall make the appropriate findings in accordance with the dictates of Hamlin in awarding attorney's fees to the wife.

WOLF, KAHN and BENTON, JJ., concur.