green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 4×
39.7 score
G Cite
Treatment trajectory · 1922 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1922
1974
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
ARTHUR SAGER v. MADALINA BLANCO AND RICARDO F. BLANCO
he courts hold the master liable for damages caused thereby, even though the servant, who has the sole custody and control thereof, is at the time acting willfully, wantonly, and in disobedience to his master's order.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Anthony Newton v. Caterpillar Financial Services Corporation
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
it is idle to say that the legislature imposed all these restraints, regulations, and restrictions upon the use of automobiles, if they were not dangerous agencies which the legislature felt it was its duty to regulate and restrain for the protection of the public.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Newton v. Caterpillar Financial Services Corporation
(3×)
also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
it is idle to say that the legislature imposed all these restraints, regulations, and restrictions upon the use of automobiles, if they were not dangerous agencies which the legislature felt it was its duty to regulate and restrain for the protection of the public.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Rippy v. Shepard
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
it is idle to say that the legislature imposed all these restraints, regulations, and restrictions upon the use of automobiles, if they were not dangerous agencies which the legislature felt it was its duty to regulate and restrain for the protection of the public.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Bruce Kyle Emerson v. Kyle Michael Lambert
(5×)
also: Cited "see"
That century-old common-law rule of tort liability, as applied to traffic accidents, provides that “[t]he owners of automobiles in this state are bound to observe statutory regulations of their use, and assume liability commensurate with the dangers to which [they] or their agents subject others in using the automobiles on the public highway[s],” and accordingly, “[t]he principles of the common law do not permit [an automobile’s] owner . . . to authorize another to use such instrumentality on the public highways without imposing upon such owner liability for [the automobile’s] neglig…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cindy Thayer v. Randy Marion Chevrolet Buick Cadillac, LLC
We, then, must determine what it means to rent or lease a vehicle. 2 “Florida’s dangerous instrumentality doctrine imposes strict vicarious liabil- ity upon the owner of a motor vehicle who voluntarily entrusts that motor vehicle to an individual whose negligent operation causes damage to anoth- er.” Aurbach v. Gallina, 753 So. 2d 60, 62 (Fla. 2000) (citing S. Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629, 637 (Fla. 1920)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Robert L. Christensen v. Mary Jo Bowen
S. Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629, 634 (1920) (quoting Barmore v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Rippy v. Shepard
(24×)
also: Cited "see"
The First District's opinion conflicts with our precedent set forth in Meister v. Fisher, 462 So.2d 1071, 1072 (Fla.1984), where we held that the dangerous instrumentality doctrine can apply to motor vehicles other than automobiles that have the ability to cause serious injury, and Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629, 636 (1920), where we concluded that the weight, speed, and mechanism of an automobile or motor vehicle make it peculiarly dangerous when in operation.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Vreeland v. Ferrer
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
Id. at 632, 635 (quoting Anderson v. So.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc.
Through that doctrine, Florida common law “imposes strict vicarious liability upon the owner of a motor vehicle who voluntarily entrusts that motor vehicle to an individual whose negligent operation causes damage to another.” Aurbach v. Gallina, 753 So.2d 60, 62 (Fla.2000) (citing Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629, 637 (1920)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Edwards v. CA Motors, Ltd.
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
The supreme court in Anderson held that the owner of an automobile a "highly dangerous agency" must be "liable for any injury which might be committed through [a permissive user's] negligence." Id. at 636.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
John Morrell & Co. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.
“Florida’s dangerous instrumentality doctrine imposes strict vicarious liability upon the owner of a motor vehicle who voluntarily entrusts that motor vehicle to an individual whose negligent operation causes damage to another.” Aurbach v. Gallina, 753 So.2d 60, 62 (Fla.2000) (citing Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629, 637 (1920)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Dupuis v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc.
(2×)
S. Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629, 631 (1920).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Festival Fun Parks, LLC v. Gooch
(2×)
The Florida Supreme Court first applied the dangerous instrumentality doctrine to automobiles in Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629, 631-34 (Fla.1920).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Diebel v. S.B. Trucking Co.
Corp. 675 So.2d 577, 580 (Fla.1996) (quoting Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629, 638 (1920)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Toombs v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc.
NOTES [1] In the complaint, Toombs, as next friend, also sought damages for personal injuries suffered in the accident by Stuttard's daughter, Bethan. [2] The dangerous instrumentality doctrine "imposes strict vicarious liability upon the owner of a motor vehicle who voluntarily entrusts that motor vehicle to an individual whose negligent operation causes damage to another." Aurbach v. Gallina, 753 So.2d 60, 62 (Fla.2000) (citing Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629, 637 (1920)). [3] The petitioner raises a collateral issue regarding the propriety of the trial court's …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Brown v. National Car Rental System, Inc.
NOTES [1] Under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, "one who authorizes and permits an instrumentality that is peculiarly dangerous in its operation to be used by another on the public highway, is liable in damages for injuries to third persons caused by the negligent operation of such instrumentality on the highway by one so authorized by the owner." Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So.2d 1363, 1364 (Fla.1990)(quoting Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 468 , 86 So. 629, 638 (Fla. 1920)). [2] The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws lists the following fac…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Marshall v. Gawel
Under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, "one who authorizes and permits an instrumentality that is peculiarly dangerous in its operation to be used by another on the public highway, is liable in damages for injuries to third persons caused by the negligent operation of such instrumentality on the highway by one so authorized by the owner." Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So.2d 1363, 1364 (Fla.1990)(quoting Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 468 , 86 So. 629, 638 (Fla.1920)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Douglas
See, e.g., Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So.2d 922, 924-25 (Fla. 1976); Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 460 , 86 So. 629, 636 (1920).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Canull v. Hodges
Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629, 638 (1920) (e.s.).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Abdala v. World Omni Leasing, Inc.
In Kraemer we observed that the application of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine to automobiles originated in Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 *333 Fla. 441, 468, 86 So. 629, 638 (1920), wherein this Court stated: [O]ne who authorizes and permits an instrumentality that is peculiarly dangerous in its operation to be used by another on the public highway, is liable in damages for injuries to third persons caused by the negligent operation of such instrumentality on the highway by one so authorized by the owner.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Raynor v. De La Nuez
In Kraemer, this Court made the following observations regarding the dangerous instrumentality doctrine in Florida: Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine originated in the case of Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 468 , 86 So. 629, 638 (1920), in which this Court said: [O]ne who authorizes and permits an instrumentality that is peculiarly dangerous in its operation to be used by another on the public highway, is liable in damages for injuries to third persons caused by the negligent operation of such instrumentality on the highway by one so authorized by the owner. ... .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.
Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine originated in the case of Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 468 , 86 So. 629, 638 (1920), in which this Court said: [O]ne who authorizes and permits an instrumentality that is peculiarly dangerous in its operation to be used by another on the public highway, is liable in damages for injuries to third persons caused *1365 by the negligent operation of such instrumentality on the highway by one so authorized by the owner.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Harding v. Allen-Laux, Inc.
(2×)
Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 450 , 86 So. 629, 638 (1920) (on petition for rehearing).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Meister v. Fisher
Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629, 638 (1920).
discussed
Cited "see"
Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company v. David W. Schroeder, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Gail S. Schnell, and Susana Alcala
See Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629, 631 (Fla. 1920) (applying the dangerous instrumentality doctrine to the owners of automobiles in Florida); Depriest v. Greeson, 213 So. 3d 1022 . 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (explaining the dangerous instrumentality doctrine). 2 The plaintiffs below did not appeal the summary final judgment entered for Appellees.
discussed
Cited "see"
NATALIE SAUNDERS-PINNOCK v. COLONIAL FREIGHT SYSTEMS, INC.
See Pullman v. Johnson, 543 So. 2d 231, 231 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (“The trailer portion of a tractor-trailer rig is not a dangerous instrumentality for the purpose of applying the vicarious liability policy enunciated in Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629 (1920).”); see also Edwards v. ABC Transp.
examined
Cited "see"
ARTHUR SAGER v. MADALINA BLANCO AND RICARDO F. BLANCO
(3×)
See S. Cotton, 86 So. at 634 (“[T]he courts hold 11 liability is imposed by mere reason of the consensual entrustment of the vehicle in the hands of the driver, the Burch court declined to adopt a per se distinction between negligent, quasi-intentional, and intentional conduct.
discussed
Cited "see"
Chandler v. Geico Indemnity Co.
Aurbach v. Gallina, 753 So.2d 60, 62 (Fla.2000); see Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629, 638 (1920) (“[Ojne who authorizes and permits an instrumentality that is peculiarly dangerous in its operation to be used by another on the public highway is liable in damages for injuries to third persons caused by the negligent operation of such instrumentality on the highway by one so authorized by the owner.”).
cited
Cited "see"
Saullo v. Douglas
See Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629 (1920); Edwards v. ABC Transp.
cited
Cited "see"
Enterprise Leasing Co. South Central, Inc. v. Hughes
See Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629 (1920).
cited
Cited "see"
Morales v. Coca-Cola Co.
See Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629, 637 (1920).
cited
Cited "see"
Dockery v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co.
See Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629, 637 (1920).
cited
Cited "see"
Muzzio v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.
See Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629 , 636 (1920).
cited
Cited "see"
Allstate Indem. Co. v. Wise
See S. Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629 (1920).
cited
Cited "see"
Rodriguez-Cespedes v. Creative Leasing, Inc.
See Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629, 638 (1920). .
cited
Cited "see"
Northern Trust Bank of Florida, N.A. v. Construction Equipment International, Inc.
See Southern Cotton Oil Company v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629 (Fla.1920).
cited
Cited "see"
Proprietors Ins. Co. v. Valsecchi
See Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629 (1920). [4] § 6.
cited
Cited "see"
Demshar v. AAACon Auto Transport, Inc.
See Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629 , 16 A.L.R. 255 (1920); Crenshaw Bros.
discussed
Cited "see"
Parker v. State
See Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629 (1920). [5] Sharp v. State, 120 So.2d 206 (2 Fla.App. 1960). [6] Getsie v. State, 193 So.2d 679 (4 Fla.App. 1966). [7] Tipton v. State, 97 So.2d 277 (Fla. 1957).
cited
Cited "see"
Ray v. Earl
See, Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 457 , 86 So. 629 (1920); Raydel Ltd. v. Medcalfe, 178 So.2d 569, 572 (Fla. 1965).
cited
Cited "see"
Georgia Southern & Florida Ry. Co. v. SEVEN-UP BOTT. CO. SE GEORGIA
See Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 1920, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629 , 16 A.L.R. 255 .
cited
Cited "see"
Hutchins v. Frank E. Campbell, Inc.
See Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 1920, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629 , 16 A.L.R. 255 ; Seaboard Air Line Ry.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Rosado v. Daimlerchrysler Financial Services Trust
(2×)
Villanueva v. Youngblood, 927 So.2d 955 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2006); see also Southern Cotton, 86 So. at 637 .
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Garcia Ex Rel. Estate of Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc.
Villanueva v. Young-blood, 927 So.2d 955 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2006); see also Southern Cotton, 86 So. at 637 .
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Michel
See also Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 , 86 So. 629 ; Warner v. Goding, 91 Fla. 260 , 107 So. 406 ; Florida East Coast Ry Co. v. Anderson, 110 Fla. 290 , 148 So. 552 ; Dowdell v. Beasley, 205 Ala. 130 , 87 So. 18 ; Crady v. Greer, 183 Ky. 675 , 210 S. W. 167 ; Jackson v. DeBardelaben, 22 Ala. App. 615 , 118 So. 504 .
Bessie Ormond, in Error
v.
The State of Florida, in Error
v.
The State of Florida, in Error
12. B. Sehallern, for Plaintiff in Error;, Van G. Swearingen, Attorney General, and Worth W. Trammiell, Assistant, for the State.
Browne, Ellis, Taylor, West, Whitfield.
Published
West, J.
Plaintiff in error was informed against upon a charge of assault with the intent to commit the offense of murder in the first degree. There was a motion to quash the information upon the grounds that it (1) charged no offense; (2) ivas vague and indefinite; (8) was argumentative and stated conclusions of law; and (4) did[*726] not sufficiently inform plaintiff in error of the charge intended to be made against her so that she could properly prepare her defense. This motion was overruled. Upon a trial of the case a verdict of guilty as charged was returned by the jury dnd sentence was imposed by the court. Thereupon a motion in arrest of judgment was made. The grounds of this motion are that the information (1) charges no offense; and (2) does not allege facts sufficient to constitute the offense attempted to be charged. This motion was also overruled and writ of error was taken. There were other proceedings, but the assignments of error challenge only the two rulings mentioned.
The only question presented is whether the information contains allegations sufficient to charge the offense of assault with intent to commit murder in the first degree under the statute, and the specific contention as stated in the brief is that “the intent is the gist of the offense and the information fails to charge the intent with certainty.” So much of the information as is necessary to be set out for a proper consideration of this question is as follows: “that Bessie Ormond, laborer, late of the County of Dade, and State of Florida, on the 13th day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty, in the County and State aforesaid, unlawfully and from a premeditated design to effect the death of one Eliza Bragg, with a certain deadly weapon, to-wit, an open razor, which she, the said Bessie Ormond then and there had and held, in and upon the said Eliza Bragg, an assault did make, and did then and there cut, stab and wound the said Eliza Bragg, unlawfully feloniously and from a premediated' design to effect the death of her the said Eliza Bragg, whereby and by force of the statute,” etc.
[*727] This court has held that an indictment for the offense of assault with intent to commit murder which alleges that the assault was made “unlawfully and from a premeditated design to effect the death” of the person assaulted, sufficiently alleges the statutory “intent” to commit the felony of murder. Johnson v. State, 53 Fla. 45, 43 South. Rep. 779; Barebr v. State, 52 Fla. 5, 42 South. Rep. 86. Under this rule the indictment in this case is not amenable to the objection urged against it, and the judgment must therefore be affirmed.
Affirmed.
Browne, C. J., and Taylor, Whitfield and Ellis, J. J., concur.