Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 2004). · Go Syfert
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Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 2004). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“while it is true that a foreclosure action and an acceleration of the balance due based upon the same default may bar a subsequent action on that default, an acceleration and foreclosure predicated upon subsequent and different .defaults present a separate and distinct issue.”
357 citation events (357 in the last 25 years) across 22 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Hicks v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (fladistctapp, 2015-11-13)
Treatment trajectory · 2004 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2004 2015 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Hicks v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
while it is true that a foreclosure action and an acceleration of the balance due based upon the same default may bar a subsequent action on that default, an acceleration and foreclosure predicated upon subsequent and different .defaults present a separate and distinct issue.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Bissonnette (2×) also: Cited "see"
Conn. App. Ct. · 2025 · confidence medium
We find persua- sive the statement of the Supreme Court of Florida that the ‘‘ends of justice require that the doctrine of res judicata not be applied so strictly so as to prevent mort- gagees from being able to challenge multiple defaults on a mortgage.’’ Singleton v. Greymar Associates, 882 So. 2d 1004, 1008 (Fla. 2004); see id. (‘‘[w]e can find no valid basis for barring mortgagees from challenging subsequent defaults on a mortgage and note solely because they did not prevail in a previous attempted foreclosure based upon a separate alleged default’’); see also Cenlar FSB v.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Armstrong v. U.S. Bank National Association (2×) also: Cited "see"
M.D. Fla. · 2024 · confidence medium
Thus, the Court recognized that the doctrine of res judicata will “not necessarily bar successive foreclosure suits, regardless of whether or not the mortgagee sought to accelerate payments on the note in the first suit.” Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So.2d 1004, 1008 (Fla. 2004).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Charles D. Finch v. U.S. Banik, N.A. (2×)
Me. · 2024 · confidence medium
Corp. v. Milligan, 234 F. App’x 21, 24 (3d Cir. 2007); Cenlar FSB v. Malenfant, 151 A.3d 778, 791-93 (Vt. 2016); Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004, 1007-08 (Fla. 2004); Afolabi v. Atl.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Polao, R. v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2020 · confidence medium
In support thereof, the Bank relies upon cases from other jurisdictions such as Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So.2d 1004, 1008 (Fla. 2004), Fairbank’s Capital Corp. v. Milligan, 234 Fed.Appx. 21 (3d Cir. 2007), and Afolabi v. Atlantic Mortgage & Investment Corp., 849 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 2006), for the proposition that subsequent and separate defaults under the note create a new and independent right in the mortgagee to accelerate payment on the note in a subsequent foreclosure.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) U.S. Bank v. Davis, K. (2×)
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2020 · confidence medium
The Third Circuit noted that dismissal with prejudice constitutes a decision on the merits for purposes of res judicata, but the Court held that res judicata did not bar the claim before it: In Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So.2d 1004, 1008 (Fla. 2004), the Florida Supreme Court held that ‘the doctrine of res judicata does not necessarily bar successive foreclosure suits, regardless of whether or not the mortgagee sought to accelerate payments on the note in the first suit.... [T]he subsequent and separate alleged default created a new and independent right in the mortgagee to accelerate…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) U.S. Bank v. Davis, K. (2×)
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2020 · confidence medium
The Third Circuit noted that dismissal with prejudice constitutes a decision on the merits for purposes of res judicata, but the Court held that res judicata did not bar the claim before it: In Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So.2d 1004, 1008 (Fla. 2004), the Florida Supreme Court held that ‘the doctrine of res judicata does not necessarily bar successive foreclosure suits, regardless of whether or not the mortgagee sought to accelerate payments on the note in the first suit.... [T]he subsequent and separate alleged default created a new and independent right in the mortgagee to accelerate…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Faulkner v. M&T BANK
Bankr. E.D. Pa. · 2020 · confidence medium
This is so because a “subsequent and separate alleged default created a new and independent right in the mortgagee to accelerate payment on the note in a subsequent foreclosure action.” Id. at 23 (quoting Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So.2d 1004, 1007 (Fla. 2004)); accord Mortg.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Linda Coty Bullock v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
The servicer’s position is amply supported by settled case law, including Bartram v. U.S. Bank National Association in which the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed that “when a second and separate action for foreclosure is sought for a default that involves a separate period of default from the one alleged in the first action, the case is not necessarily barred by res judicata.” 211 So. 3d 1009, 1016 (Fla. 2016) (quoting Singleton v. Greymar Assoc., 882 So. 2d 1004, 1006-07 (Fla. 2004)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Paul A. Green v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC
11th Cir. · 2019 · confidence medium
Compared to other debt, mortgage debt is “unique” in its nature, due to the “continuing obligations of the parties in that relationship.” See Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004, 1007 (Fla. 2004).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Connie L. Mielke and Blair C. Mielke v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, etc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
In this case, the Mielkes do not dispute Deutsche Bank’s ability to foreclose on their property after their subsequent default, but argue instead that the bank lacks standing because 1 The Florida Supreme Court’s reasoning in Bartram was predicated on the “recognition of the unique nature of the mortgage obligation and the continuing obligations of the parties in that relationship [and that] [i]f res judicata prevented a mortgagee from acting on a subsequent default even after an earlier claimed default could not be established, the mortgagor would have no incentive to make future timely…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hayes v. Reverse Mortgage Solutions
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Id. at 1007-08 (citation omitted).
examined Cited as authority (rule) PROVIDENT FUNDING ASSOCIATES, L. P. v. M D T R, AS TRUSTEE (3×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Id. at 1005.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gonzalez v. Federal National Mortgage Assoc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Mellon, 198 So. 3d 1140, 1142 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (quoting Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004, 1008 (Fla. 2004)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) U.S. Bank v. Amaya
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
We agree. “‘[A] subsequent and separate alleged default create[s] a new and independent right in the mortgagee to accelerate payment on the note in a subsequent foreclosure action.’” Bartram v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 211 So. 3d 1009, 1019 (Fla. 2016) (quoting Singleton v. Greymar Associates, 882 So. 2d 1004, 1008 (Fla. 2004)). “[W]ith each subsequent default, the statute of limitations runs from the date of each new default providing the mortgagee the right . . . to accelerate all sums then due under the note and mortgage,” i.e., “filing a successive foreclosure action premis…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Deutsche Bank v. Forester
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
“While it is true that a foreclosure action and an acceleration of the balance due based upon the same default may bar a subsequent action on that default, an acceleration and foreclosure predicated upon subsequent and different defaults present a separate and distinct issue.” Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004, 1007 (Fla. 2004) (citations omitted). “[E]ach subsequent default accruing after the dismissal of an earlier foreclosure action creates a new cause of action.” Bartram v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass'n, 211 So. 3d 1009, 1020 (Fla. 2016).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Federal National v. Cook (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
In Singleton v. Greymar Associates, 882 So. 2d 1004, 1008 (Fla. 2004), the Florida Supreme Court addressed res judicata in the foreclosure context and held that “res judicata does not necessarily bar successive foreclosure suits, regardless of whether or not the mortgagee sought to accelerate payments on the note in the first suit.” In that case, a “subsequent and separate alleged default created a new and independent right in the mortgagee to accelerate payment on the note in a subsequent foreclosure action.” 882 So. 2d at 1008 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miller Designs v. US Bank
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Co. Americas v. Beauvais, 188 So. 3d 938, 941 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (en banc) (holding that even though a lender’s right to foreclose a previously accelerated loan balance was barred by the statute of limitations, the lender was not barred from initiating foreclosure based on different acts if the new foreclosure action was brought within the applicable statute of limitations); Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004, 1007 (Fla. 2004) (lender permitted to maintain a separate action for foreclosure for a default which occurred after acceleration on an earlier default).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bollettieri Resort Villas Condominium Association, Inc. v. the Bank of New York Mellon, etc. (2×)
Fla. · 2017 · confidence medium
In the latter context, Florida courts have created a special rule that can allow a second suit between the same parties based upon “the unique nature of the mortgage obligation and the continuing obligations of the parties in that relationship,” Singleton v. Greymar Associates, 882 So. 2d 1004, 1007 (Fla. 2004), and equitable principles.
examined Cited as authority (rule) HSBC Bank USA, National Ass'n ex rel. Registered Holders of Nomura Home Equity Home Loan, Inc. v. Estate of Petercen (3×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Bartram, 211 So.3d at 1017 . (“Our recognition in Singleton that each new default presented a separate cause of action was based upon the acknowledgement that because foreclosure is an equitable remedy, ‘[t]he ends of justice require that the doctrine of res judicata not be applied so strictly so as to prevent mortgagees from being able to challenge multiple defaults on a mortgage.’” (alteration in original)) (quoting Singleton v. Greymar Assoc., 882 So.2d 1004, 1018 (Fla. 2004)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) HSBC BANK USA , NATIONAL ASSOC., ETC. v. THE ESTATE OF CHLOE ANN PETERSEN (3×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Bartram, 211 So. 3d at 1017 . (“Our recognition in Singleton that each new default presented a separate cause of action was based upon the acknowledgement that because foreclosure is an equitable remedy, ‘[t]he ends of justice require that the doctrine of res judicata not be applied so strictly so as to prevent mortgagees from being able to challenge multiple defaults on a mortgage.’” (alteration in original)) (quoting Singleton v. Greymar Assoc., 882 So. 2d 1004, 1018 (Fla. 2004)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Federal National Mortgage Association v. Patricia W. Deschaine
Me. · 2017 · confidence medium
Accordingly, even assuming a borrower’s invocation of the right to reinstate renders acceleration ineffective, that did not occur in this case. [¶30] Finally, relying on case law from other jurisdictions, see, e.g., Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004, 1006-08 (Fla. 2004); Cenlar FSB v. Malenfant, 151 A.3d 778, 785-92 (Vt. 2016), Fannie Mae urges us to abandon our holding in Johnson, arguing that we misunderstood the effect of a dismissal with prejudice on subsequent foreclosure actions.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marlene Dorta v. Citibank National Association
11th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
The court reinforced its holding from Singleton v. Greymar Ass’n, 882 So.2d 1004, 1007 (Fla. 2004) (stating that “[w]hile it is time that a foreclosure action and an acceleration of the balance due based upon the same default may bar a subsequent action on that default, an acceleration and foreclosure predicated upon subsequent and different defaults presents a separate and distinct issue”), upon which the district court in the present case relied.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Federal National Mortgage Association v. Patricia W. Deschaine
Me. · 2017 · confidence medium
Accordingly, even assuming a borrower’s invocation of the right to reinstate renders acceleration ineffective, that did not occur in this case. [¶ 30] Finally, relying on case law from other jurisdictions, see, e.g., Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So.2d 1004, 1006-08 (Fla. 2004); Cenlar FSB v. Malenfant, 151 A.3d 778, 785-92 (Vt. 2016), Fannie Mae urges us to abandon our holding in Johnson , arguing that we misunderstood the effect of a dismissal with prejudice on subsequent foreclosure actions.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bank of New York Mellon Corp. v. Anton
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Id. at 1021 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) BRANDON DEPICCIOTTO and DAWN DEPICCIOTTO v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel is applicable in this case because Nationstar’s 2014 action was predicated upon “subsequent and different defaults,” which presented a “separate and distinct issue.” See Singleton v. Greymar Associates, 882 So.2d 1004, 1007-08 (Fla. 2004) (concluding that “the doctrine of res judicata does not necessarily bar successive foreclosure suits,” and explaining that while “a foreclosure action and an acceleration of the balance due based upon the same default may bar a subsequent action on that default, an acceleration and foreclosure predi…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Libardo Gomez v. Household Finance Corporation, III (3×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
Bartram, 211 So.3d at 1019 (citing Singleton v. Greymar Assoc., 882 So.2d 1004, 1008 (Fla. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
examined Cited as authority (rule) SC14-1266 & SC14-1305 Lewis Brooke Bartram v. U.S. Bank National Association, etc. and the Plantation at Ponte Vedra v. U.S. Bank National Association, etc. and Gideon M.G. Gratsiani v. U.S. Bank National Association, etc. – Corrected Opinion (7×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. · 2017 · confidence medium
Singleton, 882 So. 2d at 1007-08 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lopez and Sardinas v. Jpmorgan Chase Bank
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Ass’n, No. SC14-1265, — So.3d -, -, 2016 WL 6538647 , at *8 (Fla. Nov. 3, 2016) (“[A] ‘subsequent and separate alleged default created a new and independent right in the mortgagee to accelerate payment on the note in a subsequent foreclosure action.’) [Singleton v. Greymar Associates, 882 So.2d 1004, 1008 (Fla.2004) ]”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lopez and Sardinas v. Jpmorgan Chase Bank
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Ass'n, No. SC14-1265, 2016 WL 6538647 , at *8 (Fla. Nov. 3, 2016) (“[A] ‘subsequent and separate alleged 8 default created a new and independent right in the mortgagee to accelerate payment on the note in a subsequent foreclosure action.’ ) [Singleton v. Greymar Associates, 882 So.2d 1004, 1008 (Fla. 2004)]”).
examined Cited as authority (rule) & SC14-1266 & SC14-1305 Lewis Brooke Bartram v. U.S. Bank National Association, etc. & The Plantation at Ponte Vedra v. U.S. Bank National Association, etc. & Gideon M.G. Gratsiani v. U.S. Bank National Association, etc. (15×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. · 2016 · confidence medium
Singleton, 882 So.2d at 1007-08 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bollettieri Resort Villas Condominium Association, Inc. v. The Bank of New York Mellon (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Each “alleged default ereate[s] a new and independent right in the mortgagee to accelerate payment on the note in a subsequent foreclosure action.” Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So.2d 1004, 1008 (Fla.2004), Accordingly, the bank’s complaint was sufficient to establish that foreclosure could be based on any of the missed payments since the initial breach and was therefore not barred by the statute of limitations.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Anthony v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC
M.D. Fla. · 2016 · confidence medium
Singleton, 882 So.2d at 1007 (emphasis added).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, Etc. v. Beauvais (10×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Singleton allows for multiple actions for individual defaults with accompanying accelerations. .In Singleton , the Florida Supreme Court held that “successive foreclo sure suits, regardless of whether or not the mortgagee sought to accelerate payments on the note in the. first suit,” were not barred if, as here, the second suit was predicated on a. new default, because a “subsequent, and separate alleged default create[s] a new default and independent right in the mortgagee to accelerate payment on the note in a subsequent foreclosure action.” Singleton, 882 So.2d at 1008 (emphasis add…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Brown
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
In Singleton , the Florida Supreme Court recognized “the unique nature of the mortgage obligation and the continuing obligations of the parties in that relationship.” 882 So.2d at 1007 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Robinson
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
E.g., Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So.2d 1004, 1005 (Fla.2004); Star Funding Solutions, LLC v. Krondes, 101 So.3d 403, 403 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); see also PNC Bank, N.A. v. Neal, 147 So.3d 32, 32 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stern v. Bank of America Corp.
M.D. Fla. · 2015 · confidence medium
July 29, 2014) (“While any claims relating to individual payment defaults that are more than five years old may be subject to the statute of limitations, each payment default that is less than five years old creates a basis for a subsequent foreclosure or acceleration action.”); Singleton v. Greymar Associates, 882 So.2d 1004, 1008 (Fla.2004) (“In this case the subsequent and separate alleged default created a new and independent right in the mortgagee to accelerate payment on the note in a subsequent foreclosure action.”); Evergrene Partners, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 143 So.3d 954, 956…
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re Rogers Townsend & Thomas, PC
N.C. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Id. at 1007-08 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Edward Whiddon, Holly Whiddon
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Rather, dismissal of the 2010 case “simply placed [the parties] back in the same contractual relationship with the same continuing obligations.” Singleton v. Greymar Associates, 882 So. 2d 1004, 1007 (Fla. 2004).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Edward Whiddon, Holly Whiddon
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Rather, dismissal of the 2010 case “simply placed [the parties] back in the same contractual relationship with the same continuing obligations.” Singleton v. Greymar Associates, 882 So.2d 1004,1007 (Fla.2004).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) LNB-017-13, LLC v. HSBC Bank USA
S.D. Fla. · 2015 · confidence medium
The Court’s holding in Lopez was in reliance on the Supreme Court of Florida’s holding in Singleton v. Greymar Associates, 882 So.2d 1004, 1008 (Fla.2004), which held that res judicata does not bar a mortgagee from bringing successive foreclosure actions, even if the mortgagee had previously sought to accelerate payments.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Deutsche Bank v. Beauvais
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Singleton, 882 So. 2d at 1007 (emphasis added.) Res judicata is not the issue in the instant case because the dismissal of the Initial Action was without prejudice, and therefore the borrower here (unlike the borrower in Singleton) did not “prevail in the foreclosure action by demonstrating that she was not in default” nor was there “an adjudication denying acceleration and foreclosure” such that the parties “are simply placed back in the same contractual relationship with the same continuing obligations.” Id.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Rodriguez v. Bank of America, N.A. (3×)
S.D. Fla. · 2014 · confidence medium
In Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So.2d 1004, 1005 (Fla.2004), mortgagee Greymar Associates brought two foreclosure actions against the mortgagor.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 2010-3 SFR Venture, LLC v. Garcia (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Therefore, as the bank correctly asserts, the trial court erroneously quieted title in that a valid and enforceable mortgage does not constitute a cloud on title. “[T]he doctrine of res judicata does not necessarily bar successive foreclosure suits, regardless of whether or not the mortgagee sought to accelerate payments on the note in the first suit.” Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So.2d 1004, 1008 (Fla.2004).
cited Cited as authority (rule) U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Bartram
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So.2d 1004, 1005 (Fla.2004).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Romero v. Suntrust Mortgage, Inc.
S.D. Fla. · 2014 · confidence medium
The Supreme Court of Florida in Singleton v. Greymar Associates held that res judicata does not bar a mortgagee from bringing successive foreclosure actions, even if the mortgagee had previously sought to accelerate payments. 882 So.2d 1004, 1008 (Fla.2004).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wilmington Trust Company v. Karen Anne Sullivan-Thorne
Me. · 2013 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So.2d 1004, 1008 (Fla.2004) (“We can find no valid basis for barring mortgagees from challenging subsequent defaults on a mortgage and note solely because they did not prevail in a previous attempted foreclosure based upon a separate alleged default.”); Afolabi v. Atl.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kaan v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
S.D. Fla. · 2013 · confidence medium
Id. at 1007-08 (internal citations omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Star Funding Solutions, LLC v. Krondes
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So.2d 1004, 1005 (Fla.2004).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Swan Landing Development, LLC v. Florida Capital Bank, N.A.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
(Emphasis added.) 3 Foreclosure of a mortgage is an equitable remedy, see, e.g., Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So.2d 1004, 1008 (Fla.2004); Smiley v. Manufactured Hous.
Gwendolyn SINGLETON, et vir., Petitioners,
v.
GREYMAR ASSOCIATES, Respondent.
SC03-936.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Sep 15, 2004.
882 So. 2d 1004
Per Curiam.
Cited by 103 opinions  |  Published
Pinpoint authority: bottom 48%

[*1005] William Chennault of Chennault Attorneys and Counsellors at Law, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Petitioner.

Mark Evans Kass, Miami, FL, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

We have for review Singleton v. Greymar Associates, 840 So.2d 356 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), which expressly and directly conflicts with the decision in Stadler v. Cherry Hill Developers, Inc., 150 So.2d 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the reasons set out below we approve the decision in Singleton and hold that a dismissal with prejudice in a mortgage foreclosure action does not necessarily bar a subsequent foreclosure action on the same mortgage.

PROCEEDINGS TO DATE

Greymar Associates brought two consecutive foreclosure actions against Gwendolyn Singleton alleging default on a mortgage and note between the parties. Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 840 So.2d 356, 356 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). The first action was predicated on an alleged default that the mortgagors had failed to make payments due from September 1, 1999 to February 1, 2000. Id. After the mortgagee, Greymar, failed to appear at a case management conference, the circuit court dismissed the foreclosure action with prejudice.[1]Id. Subsequently, a second foreclosure action was brought alleging a default that the mortgagors had failed to make payments from April 1, 2000, onward. Id. The circuit court eventually entered a summary final judgment of foreclosure for the mortgagee in the second suit, rejecting the defense that the prior dismissal barred relief in the second action. Id.

On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed the circuit court's decision, finding that "[e]ven though an earlier foreclosure action filed by appellee was dismissed with prejudice, the application of res judicata does not bar this lawsuit.... The second action involved a new and different breach." Id. To support its decision, the Fourth District quoted its holding in a similar previous case, which stated: "`[A] final adjudication in a foreclosure action[*1006] that also prays for a deficiency judgment on the underlying debt may, but does not necessarily, bar a subsequent action on the debt.'" Id. (quoting Capital Bank v. Needle, 596 So.2d 1134, 1138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)). Singleton petitioned this Court for jurisdiction, citing express and direct conflict between the Fourth District's decision and the Second District's decision in Stadler v. Cherry Hill Developers, Inc., 150 So.2d 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963).

Stadler also involved two successive foreclosure actions. Id. at 469. In the first action, the circuit court dismissed the complaint with prejudice upon the defendants' motion because the plaintiffs did not take testimony within the time period provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a second action alleging that the mortgagor had again defaulted on the note. Id. at 469-70. ("Their complaint was essentially identical to that in the first suit except a default of payment due in August, 1960, rather than the May default was alleged."). The Second District reversed a judgment of foreclosure and held that res judicata prohibited the bringing of the second action. Id. at 472-73. The Second District discussed the fact that the existence of the acceleration clause was key to their analysis:

The essential question is whether the election to accelerate put the entire balance, including future installments at issue. If it was at issue then the second action seeks the same relief under the same contract and is predicated on a failure to comply with the same requirement. There can be no doubt that the accelerated balance was at issue and that the prayer of the complaint sought, not one interest installment, but the entire amount due. Accordingly, it seems clear that the actions are identical.
....
The cause of action in both suits being identical, the doctrine of res judicata is, as the learned chancellor held, applicable.

Id. at 472-73. We have accepted jurisdiction to review the conflict between the holdings in these cases.

RES JUDICATA IN FORECLOSURE CASES

The Fourth District has consistently taken the position that res judicata does not prevent mortgagees from foreclosing on a mortgage in successive foreclosure cases when the alleged dates of default are different. See Singleton, 840 So.2d at 356; Capital Bank v. Needle, 596 So.2d at 1138; see also Olympia Mortgage Corp. v. Pugh, 774 So.2d 863, 867 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ("A comparison of the two foreclosure actions reveals that the facts necessary to establish a default in the first foreclosure action differ from the facts necessary to establish a default in the second foreclosure action."); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Badra, 765 So.2d 251, 254 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ("The doctrine of res judicata has no applicability where there was no adjudication on the merits in the first suit and where the relief in the second suit was not the same relief sought in the first suit.").

In contrast, the Second District's holding in Stadler shows that it takes a stricter and more technical view of mortgage acceleration elections. See 150 So.2d at 472 ("While it is axiomatic that a suit for one installment payment does not preclude suit for a later installment on a divisible contract, the scant authority found seems unanimous in the view that an election to accelerate puts all future installment payments in issue and forecloses successive suits.").

We agree with the position of the Fourth District that when a second and separate action for foreclosure is sought[*1007] for a default that involves a separate period of default from the one alleged in the first action, the case is not necessarily barred by res judicata. See Capital Bank, 596 So.2d at 1138 ("[W]e do not believe that dismissal of the foreclosure action in this case barred the subsequent action on the balance due on the note."). In Capital Bank, after reviewing the case law on the issue, the court concluded:

Our reading of the case law set out above leads us to conclude that a final adjudication in a foreclosure action that also prays for a deficiency judgment on the underlying debt may, but does not necessarily, bar a subsequent action on the debt. For instance, if the plaintiff in a foreclosure action goes to trial and loses on the merits, we do not believe such plaintiff would be barred from filing a subsequent foreclosure action based upon a subsequent default. The adjudication merely bars a second action relitigating the same alleged default. A dismissal with prejudice of the foreclosure action is tantamount to a judgment against the mortgagee. That judgment means that the mortgagee is not entitled to foreclose the mortgage. Such a ruling moots any prayer for a deficiency, since a necessary predicate for a deficiency is an adjudication of foreclosure. There was no separate count in the Capital Bank complaint seeking a separate recovery on the promissory note alone.
Accordingly, we do not believe the dismissal of the foreclosure action in this case barred the subsequent action on the balance due on the note.

Id. at 1134; see also Frumkes v. Mortgage Guarantee Corp., 173 So.2d 738, 740-41 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965) ("Denial of an application for deficiency decree for jurisdictional reasons as distinguished from equitable grounds is not res judicata so as to bar an action thereon at law.")

While it is true that a foreclosure action and an acceleration of the balance due based upon the same default may bar a subsequent action on that default, an acceleration and foreclosure predicated upon subsequent and different defaults present a separate and distinct issue. See Olympia Mortgage Corp., 774 So.2d at 866 ("We disagree that the election to accelerate placed future installments at issue."); see also Greene v. Boyette, 587 So.2d 629, 630 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding that a mortgagee can successfully recover twice on one mortgage for multiple periods of default because the payments were different "installments"). For example, a mortgagor may prevail in a foreclosure action by demonstrating that she was not in default on the payments alleged to be in default, or that the mortgagee had waived reliance on the defaults. In those instances, the mortgagor and mortgagee are simply placed back in the same contractual relationship with the same continuing obligations. Hence, an adjudication denying acceleration and foreclosure under those circumstances should not bar a subsequent action a year later if the mortgagor ignores her obligations on the mortgage and a valid default can be proven.

This seeming variance from the traditional law of res judicata rests upon a recognition of the unique nature of the mortgage obligation and the continuing obligations of the parties in that relationship. For example, we can envision many instances in which the application of the Stadler decision would result in unjust enrichment or other inequitable results. If res judicata prevented a mortgagee from acting on a subsequent default even after an earlier claimed default could not be established, the mortgagor would have no incentive to make future timely payments on the note. The adjudication of the earlier default would essentially insulate her[*1008] from future foreclosure actions on the note — merely because she prevailed in the first action. Clearly, justice would not be served if the mortgagee was barred from challenging the subsequent default payment solely because he failed to prove the earlier alleged default.

We must also remember that foreclosure is an equitable remedy and there may be some tension between a court's authority to adjudicate the equities and the legal doctrine of res judicata. The ends of justice require that the doctrine of res judicata not be applied so strictly so as to prevent mortgagees from being able to challenge multiple defaults on a mortgage. See deCancino v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 283 So.2d 97, 98 (Fla.1973) ("[T]he doctrine [of res judicata] will not be invoked where it will work an injustice...."). We can find no valid basis for barring mortgagees from challenging subsequent defaults on a mortgage and note solely because they did not prevail in a previous attempted foreclosure based upon a separate alleged default.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that the doctrine of res judicata does not necessarily bar successive foreclosure suits, regardless of whether or not the mortgagee sought to accelerate payments on the note in the first suit. In this case the subsequent and separate alleged default created a new and independent right in the mortgagee to accelerate payment on the note in a subsequent foreclosure action. Thus, we approve the Fourth District's decision in Singleton, and disapprove of the Second District's holding in Stadler.

It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.

1 The petitioners' brief relates that the circuit court dismissed the first action due to the respondent's failure to appear at the case management conference. Additionally, the petitioners' brief states that both foreclosure actions sought to accelerate the entire indebtedness against the petitioners. The respondent does not challenge these assertions.