Younghans v. State, 90 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1956). · Go Syfert
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Younghans v. State, 90 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1956). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
156 citation events (53 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: OSMAN LOPEZ v. THE STATE OF FLORIDA (fladistctapp, 2022-11-30)
Treatment trajectory · 1956 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1956 1991 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) OSMAN LOPEZ v. THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
In doing so, the court shall examine the factors enunciated in Younghans v State, 90 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 1956), and, in the event post-trial release is again denied, reduce its reasons to writing.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DAVID MICHAEL CARNRIGHT v. THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
App. P. 9.140(h)(4). 2 Younghans v. State, 90 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 1956) (explaining factors to be considered in evaluating whether to grant release pending appeal). 2 ANALYSIS A trial court’s authority to grant post-trial release is governed by Rule 3.691(a), which provides in pertinent part: A defendant who has been sentenced for the commission of any non-capital offense for which bail is not prohibited under section 903.133, Florida Statutes, may be released, pending review of the conviction, at the discretion of either the trial or appellate court, applying the principles enunciated in …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DEVIN TRAVON MAYS v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
Pursuant 1 Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.691(a) requires the trial court to apply the principles enunciated in Younghans: “A defendant who has been adjudicated guilty of the commission of any non-capital offense for which bail is not prohibited under section 903.133, Florida Statutes, may be released, pending review of the conviction, at the discretion of either the trial or appellate court, applying the principles enunciated in Younghans v. State, 90 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1956).” Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.691(b) requires written findings when a trial court denies post-trial r…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Petersen v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
As discussed in Younghans, supra, ... if an appeal is' taken “merely for delay, bail should be refused; but, if taken in good faith, on grounds not frivolous but fairly debatable, in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court, then petitioners should be admitted to bail.” ... [I]h determining whether an appeal is frivolous and taken only for delay; consideration may be given to “thé character of the case, the trial, and the assignments of errors.” ; Younghans v. State, 90 So.2d 308, 310 (Fla.1956) (quoting U.S. v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657, 662 (7th Cir.1926)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Younghans v. State, 90 So.2d 308, 309 (Fla.1956).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McGlade v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
"The exercise of a sound judicial discretion in this respect means that `the adjudication is to be governed by a given standard of judicial action,' and such discretion implies `judgment directed by circumspection,' to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case." Younghans, 90 So.2d at 309-310 (internal citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cruz v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
Following review of appellant’s expedited motion for appeal bond and/or motion to review denial of appeal bond and the response thereto, the order denying the appellant supersedeas is vacated and remanded to the trial court to admit the appellant to bail pending review in accordance with Younghans v. State, 90 So.2d 308, 310 (Fla.1956) and make written findings in accordance with the criminal rule.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rowe v. State
Fla. · 1982 · confidence medium
This Court considered this statute "a legislative declaration of the rule developed by judicial decision." Younghans v. State, 90 So.2d 308, 309 (Fla. 1956).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In the Interest of Doe
Haw. · 1976 · confidence medium
W'ith respect to the quality of the appeal, the standard so adopted was that the appeal be found to have been "taken in good faith, on grounds not frivolous but fairly debatable”, as expressed in Younghans v. State, 90 So.2d 308, 310 (Fla. 1956).
cited Cited "see" Lundy v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Younghans, 90 So.2d at 310 .
cited Cited "see" Peacock v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Younghans v. State, 90 So.2d 308 (Fla.1956).
cited Cited "see" Rodriguez v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Younghans v. State, 90 So.2d 308 (Fla. 1956).
cited Cited "see" Hancock v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Younghans v. State, 90 So.2d 308 (Fla. 1956).
cited Cited "see" In Re Holland
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Younghans v. State, 90 So.2d 308 (Fla. 1956); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.691; Fla.App.
discussed Cited "see" Greene v. State (2×)
Fla. · 1970 · signal: see · confidence high
See Younghans v. State, 90 So.2d 308 (Fla. 1956) and Stalnaker v. State, 126 Fla. 407 , 171 So. 226 (1936). [3] Younghans v. State, 90 So.2d 308 (Fla. 1956). [4] Floyd v. State, 79 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1955). [5] See cases listed in Annots., 19 A.L.R. 807 (1922), 77 A.L.R. 1235 (1932), and 45 A.L.R. 458 (1926). [6] See, e.g., Bowman v. United States, 85 S.Ct. 232 , 13 L.Ed.2d 171 (1964); Sellers v. Georgia, 374 F.2d 84 (5th Cir.1967); United States ex rel.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Stephanie Kraft v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see also · confidence low
P. 3.691(a); see also Younghans v. State, 90 So.2d 308 (Fla.1956) (setting forth factors a judge might consider in determining whether a defendant should be imprisoned during the pendency of an appeal).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Cunningham v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1982 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Younghans v. State, 90 So.2d 308 (Fla. 1956).
Samuel A. YOUNGHANS, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Oct 31, 1956.
90 So. 2d 308
Roberts.
Cited by 104 opinions  |  Published

[*309] Robert C. Lane and Curtiss B. Hamilton, Miami, for appellant.

Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and Joseph P. Manners, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

ROBERTS, Justice.

This is an application for bail pending an appeal to this court from a judgment convicting appellant of a criminal offense, the appellant having been unsuccessful in the trial court in obtaining his release on bail pending the appeal.

Section 9, Declaration of Rights, of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A., provides that "All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses where the proof is evident or the presumption great." But it was early settled in the jurisprudence of this State that admission to bail, after conviction, is not a matter of right but rests in the sound judicial discretion of the trial court. (And see Ch. 29932, Laws 1955, amending Section 903.01, Fla. Stat. 1955, F.S.A., which we interpret to be a legislative declaration of the rule developed by judicial decision.) The exercise of sound judicial discretion in this respect[*310] means that "`the adjudication is to be governed by a given standard of judicial action,' In re Jeffries' Estate, 136 Fla. 410, 181 So. 833, 838, and such discretion implies `judgment directed by circumspection,' to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Towle v. State ex rel. Fisher, 3 Fla. 202, 214; Dixie Music Co. v. Pike, 135 Fla. 671, 185 So. 441, 447." Floyd v. State, Fla. 1955, 79 So.2d 778, 780. We do not find, however, that this court has heretofore established a clear "`standard of judicial action'" by which trial courts may be guided in the exercise of their discretion as to admitting to bail after conviction.

An excellent discussion of the question of admission to bail after conviction appears in United States v. Motlow, 7 Cir., 10 F.2d 657, 662. It was there stated by Mr. Justice Butler, sitting as Circuit Justice, that if an appeal is taken "merely for delay, bail should be refused; but, if taken in good faith, on grounds not frivolous but fairly debatable, in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court, then petitioners should be admitted to bail." It was also said in that case that, in determining whether an appeal is frivolous and taken only for delay, consideration may be given to "the character of the case, the trial, and the assignments of errors."

We think the above quoted statement by Mr. Justice Butler is a fair and reasonable "`standard of judicial action'" and suggest that the trial courts apply it in deciding whether the ends of justice require that a person be imprisoned during the pendency of an appeal. Of course, the purpose of bail is to secure the attendance of the accused to answer the charge against him; and if there are circumstances to indicate that the accused will flee and thus evade punishment if his conviction is affirmed, the trial judge may properly exercise his discretion against the allowance of bail. Thus, in addition to the question of whether the appeal is taken "in good faith, on grounds not frivolous but fairly debatable," the trial judge might consider (1) the habits of the individual as to respect for the law, (2) his local attachments to the community, by way of family ties, business, or investments, (3) the severity of the punishment imposed for the offense, and any other circumstances relevant to the question of whether the person would be tempted to remove himself from the jurisdiction of the court. In a case where the term of imprisonment imposed is short, the trial court might also consider whether the denial of bail would render nugatory the right to appeal from the judgment of conviction. Cf. Patterson v. United States, 75 S.Ct. 256, 99 L.Ed. 1296.

It is also suggested that, in disallowing bail after conviction, the trial judge should state his reasons for denying bail. It is axiomatic that the exercise of judicial discretion should never be arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable; and where the discretion is exercised in favor of denying to a person a basic and fundamental right, the reasons for so doing should be sound and they should be clearly stated.

Since the learned trial judge did not have before him our views in this respect at the time he denied the appellant's application for bail, we think he should be given an opportunity to re-evaluate the matter in the light of the opinions herein expressed. Accordingly, we relinquish jurisdiction of the cause temporarily and remand it to the trial court with directions to reconsider, at his earliest convenience, the application for bail in the light of the legal concepts set forth herein. Cf. Cash v. State, Fla. 1954, 73 So.2d 903.

It is so ordered.

DREW, C.J., and O'CONNELL and BUFORD, JJ., concur.