Miracle House Corp. v. Haige, 96 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1957). · Go Syfert
Search
Miracle House Corp. v. Haige, 96 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1957). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
32 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Symcon Development Group Corp. v. Passero (fladistctapp, 2017-05-31)
Treatment trajectory · 1957 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1957 1991 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Symcon Development Group Corp. v. Passero (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
In other words, the interest must be that created by a claim to the demand in suit or some part thereof, or a claim to, or lien upon, the property or some part thereof, which is the subject of litigation.” Miracle House Corp. v. Haige, 96 So.2d 417, 418 (Fla. 1957) (quoting Morgareidge v. Howey, 75 Fla. 234 , 78 So. 14, 15 (1918)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Castro Convertible Corporation v. Julie Ann Castro
5th Cir. · 1979 · confidence medium
The interest claimed cannot be merely an indirect interest in the case but “must be that created by a claim to the demand in suit or some part thereof, or a claim to, or lien upon, the property or some part thereof, which is the subject of litigation.” Miracle House Corp. v. Haige, 96 So.2d 417, 418 (Fla.1957), quoting Morgareidge v. Howey, 75 Fla. 234 , 78 So. 14, 15 (1918).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jefferson Realty of Fort Lauderdale, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co.
Fla. · 1969 · confidence medium
Weed, Architect, Inc. v. Horning, 1947, 159 Fla. 847 , 33 So.2d 648 , and Miracle House Corporation v. Haige, Fla. 1957, 96 So.2d 417 .
cited Cited "see" Pollekoff v. Blumenthal
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Miracle House Corporation v. Haige, 96 So.2d 417 (Fla.1957).
discussed Cited "see" BRICKELL BAY CONDOMINIUM ASSOC. INC. v. Forte
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
Klang & Son, Inc. v. Milar Galleries, Inc., 328 So.2d 510 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Blue Cross of Florida, Inc. v. O'Donnell, 230 So.2d 706 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); compare Faircloth v. Mr. Boston Distiller Corporation, 245 So.2d 240 (Fla. 1970); Oster v. Cay Construction Company, 204 So.2d 539 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967) (mere indirect interest not sufficient for intervention); (2) as is evident from the assignment, the developers' only real interest in the outcome of their action against Aetna is to recover damages sufficient to offset a judgment obtained against them on a promissory note by Aetna, whereas, by…
cited Cited "see" Castro Convertible Corporation v. Julie Ann Castro
5th Cir. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Miracle House Corp. v. Haige, 96 So.2d 417 (Fla.1957). 2 The district court specifically held Castro Convertible had no direct interest in the subject matter of the litigation before it.
discussed Cited "see" Vogel v. Smith
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Miracle House Corporation v. Haige, 96 So.2d 417 (Fla.1957); Buckley Towers Condominium, Inc. v. Millis, 352 So.2d 585 (Fla.3d DCA 1977); cert. denied, 360 So.2d 1247 (Fla.1978); Coral Bay Property Owners’ Association v. City of Coral Gables, 305 So.2d 853 (Fla.3d DCA 1974); and Fla.R.
cited Cited "see" Buckley Towers Condominium, Inc. v. Millis
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See Miracle House Corporation v. Haige, 96 So.2d 417 (Fla.1957); Riviera Club v. Belle Mead Development Corp., 141 Fla. 538 , 194 So. 783 (1959); Coral Bay Prop.
discussed Cited "see" Carbonell v. American International Pictures, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1975 · signal: see · confidence high
See Miracle House Corporation v. Haige, Fla. 1957, 96 So.2d 417 ; Morris and Esher, Inc. *419 v. Olympia Enterprises, Inc., Fla.App. 1967, 200 So.2d 579 ; Mullray v. Aire-Lok Co., Inc., Fla.App. 1968, 216 So.2d 801 ; Highland Insurance Company v. Walker Memorial Sanitarium and Benevolent Association, Fla.App. 1969, 225 So.2d 572 .
cited Cited "see" Fountain v. Rettby
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1973 · signal: see · confidence high
See Miracle House Corp. v. Haige, Fla. 1957, 96 So.2d 417 .
discussed Cited "see" Division of Administration v. Rice
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1973 · signal: accord · confidence high
In other words, the interest must be that created by a claim to the demand in suit or some part thereof, or a claim to, or lien upon, the property or some part thereof, which is the subject of litigation.” Morgareidge v. Howey, 75 Fla. 234 , 78 So. 14, 15 (1918); accord, Miracle House Corp. v. Haige, 96 So.2d 417 (Fla.1957); Oster v. Cay Construction Co., 204 So.2d 539 (Fla.App.1967).
cited Cited "see, e.g." CITIBANK, NA v. Blackhawk Heating
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1981 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Miracle House Corporation v. Haige, 96 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1957).
MIRACLE HOUSE CORPORATION, Appellant,
v.
Agnes HAIGE, Lander Haige, Enar Haige, Allan Haige, and George K. Kickliter, Receiver, Appellees.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jul 10, 1957.
96 So. 2d 417
Roberts.
Cited by 20 opinions  |  Published

[*418] Holland, Betts & Hobson, St. Petersburg, for appellant.

Wm. C. Kaleel and Luke R. Kaleel, St. Petersburg, for appellees.

ROBERTS, Justice.

The sole issue here is the propriety of the lower court's order denying the petition of appellant to intervene in a cause therein pending in which the appellees were contesting their respective rights in and to certain property.

Rule 3.4, Fla.Rules Civ.Proc. 1954, 31 F.S.A., provides that "Anyone claiming an interest in pending litigation may at any time be permitted to assert his right by intervention, but the intervention shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding, unless otherwise ordered by the court in its discretion." This rule is derived from Equity Rule 9, which was the same as Sec. 9 of the Chancery Act, Sec. 63.09, Fla. Stat. 1949, F.S.A. In construing the statute from which the rule derived, this court said in Morgareidge v. Howey, 1918, 75 Fla. 234, 78 So. 14, 15, that

"It has generally been held that the interest which will entitle a person to intervene under this provision must be in the matter in litigation, and of such a direct and immediate character that the intervener will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. In other words, the interest must be that created by a claim to the demand in suit or some part thereof, or a claim to, or lien upon, the property or some part thereof, which is the subject of litigation."

Here, the appellant had a very real interest in a parcel of the property in litigation by virtue of a contract of purchase and sale thereof executed in its favor by one of the appellees. The determination of the rights of the appellees would have a direct effect on the rights of the appellant under its contract. All the parties and the res were before the court; and in view of the aim of the rules to allow liberal joinder of parties and claims and the policy of equity to grant complete relief and avoid a multiplicity of suits, we think the lower court had full authority to allow the intervention and decide the issue therein made. See Switow v. Sher, 1939, 136 Fla. 284, 186 So. 519, 525, holding that an intervenor's cross-bill raising a new issue is proper "where some special circumstances such as insolvency and nonresidence exist, which render it necessary to depart therefrom in order to avoid irreparable injury." Cf. also Singletary v. Mann, 1946, 157 Fla. 37, 24 So.2d 718, 166 A.L.R. 904; Bancroft v. Allen, 1937, 128 Fla. 14, 174 So. 749; Tallentire v. Burkhart, 1942, 150 Fla. 137, 7 So.2d 326.

In view of the court's proposal to approve a sale of the subject property by the receiver and the absence from the country of the appellee who executed the contract of purchase and sale in favor of appellant, we think there can be no doubt that the appellant will be irreparably injured by the denial of its request for intervention in the pending litigation.

We hold, therefore, under the authority of the above-cited cases, that intervention could and should have been allowed to the appellant and that it was error not to do so.

The order appealed from is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings[*419] not inconsistent with the opinions herein expressed.

It is so ordered.

TERRELL, C.J., and DREW, THORNAL and O'CONNELL, JJ., concur.