v.
LFC Medical Center, Inc., etc.
Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed June 5, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D22-1547 Lower Tribunal No. 16-5512 CC ________________
United Automobile Insurance Company, Appellant, vs.
LFC Medical Center, Inc., etc., Appellee.
An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Lawrence D. King, Judge.
Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., and Scott A. Cole, and Francesca M. Stein, for appellant.
Christian Carrazana, P.A., and Christian Carrazana, for appellee.
Before FERNANDEZ, GORDO and LOBREE, JJ.
GORDO, J.
United Automobile Insurance Company (“United”) appeals an order entering final judgment in favor of LFC Medical Center, Inc. (“LFC”). We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). We reverse.
United alleges the trial court erred in granting LFC’s motion for summary judgment because: (1) the insured failed to submit to an examination under oath (“EUO”), a condition precedent under the policy; (2) United did not anticipatorily breach the policy; and (3) the Independent Medical Examination Report created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether LFC’s bills were reasonable, related and necessary. Based on the record before us, we find the trial court erred 1 in granting summary judgment in favor of the insured as United put forward sufficient evidence that the insured breached the policy by not attending the EUO,2 and there remained genuine issues of material fact. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a); see also Himmel v. Avatar Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 257 So. 3d 488, 492 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (“If . . . the insured . . . provides an explanation for its noncompliance, a fact question is presented for resolution by a jury.” (quoting Haiman v. Fed. Ins. Co., 798 So. 2d 811, 812 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001))); Morley v. Trafalgar Devs. of Fla., Ltd., 455 So. 2d 391, 394 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (noting whether the party claiming anticipatory repudiation “was in fact ready, willing and able to perform is a question of fact which precludes final summary adjudication of the issue.”); Est. of Wolfe through Maass v. 224 Via Marila, LLC, 338 So. 3d 912, 917-18 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (holding the trial court’s conclusion on whether there was an anticipatory breach “was a factual determination for the trier of fact, and, . . . it was not appropriate for summary judgment, as disputed issues of fact remain”).
[*2]Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[*3]