Sanchez-Llorens, Judge.

Law Offices of Jimmy De La Espriella, and Javier A. Finlay, for appellant.

Fox Rothschild LLP, John R. Herin, Jr., Victor G. Sanabria; Geraldine Bonzon-Keenan, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Daniel Frastai, Assistant County Attorney, for appellees.

Before SCALES, MILLER, and GORDO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Miami-Dade County, Fla., Code of Ordinances, ch. 2, art. XIII, § 2-96.1 (2023) (“From and after September 16, 1960, all traffic engineering services shall be performed by the traffic and transportation department, and such department shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all traffic control devices in both the incorporated and unincorporated areas of the county, and shall have exclusive jurisdiction to exercise the powers, duties and functions set forth herein.”); Miami-Dade County, Fla., Code of Ordinances, ch. 2, art. XIII, § 2-95.1(g) (2023) (“The department shall assume full responsibility for the operation, maintenance[,] and replacement of all existing signs[,] signals, and markings now in use in the several municipalities . . . .”); see also Polite v. State, 116 So. 3d 270, 275 (Fla. 2013) (“[I]n Florida, the witness’s testimony as to the correctness of the [recorded] statement is essential to the admission of the evidence.”); Robles v. Metropolitan Dade County, 802 So. 2d 453, 454 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (upholding sovereign immunity based on emergency exception where county “had to choose between different actions, each of which posed a potential threat to the public”); Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So. 2d 732, 738 n.3 (Fla. 1989) (“The way in which government agents respond to a serious emergency is entitled to great deference, and may in fact reach a level of such urgency as to be considered discretionary and not operational.”).