Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

Accordingly, the trial court concluded that section 7.2 of the Primary Declaration would not be enforceable

...ipton to support a claim of false designation of origin, "[s]uch a claim may be supported ... by further acts on the part of the infringer falsely representing itself as the owner of the work"); cf. Jerome Gilson, Trademark Protection and Practice § 7.02[5], at 7-26 & n....

appellant failed to give notice of breach. Ala.Code § 7-2-607(3)(a) provides that the “buyer must within a

781 F.2d 1569, 1570 (11th Cir.1986). Ala.Code § 7-2-201(1) (1984) states in pertinent part “a contract

arising under the Plan. . . ." (R.15-216 at CC426 § 7.2(b)(2).[1]) The Committee also has the "exclusive

to a four year statute of limitations, Ala.Code § 7-2-725. What was not clear, prior to the Alabama Supreme

Thus, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 7.2(c) (1985), states: What happens if a defendant refuses

Second, Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 7(2). It is for this reason that the mere physical

Mangiaracina, Antitrust Law Handbook § 7:2 (2014) (“For the most part ... the [Federal Trade

Code of Alabama defines express warranty at section 7-2-313: (1) Express warranties by the seller are

Neb.Const. Art. III, § 24; N.J.Const. Art. IV, § 7(2); and, N.Y.Const. Art. I, § 9(2). The New York amendment

2 W. LeFave, Search and Seizure § 7.2 (1978). The Court’s latest decision affecting

...mber of billboards and their location. Compare LDC § 7.01.01(A) (restricting new billboards to designated locations, and stating that no increase in the total number of billboards shall be permitted "unless fully compliant with this Code") with LDC § 7.02.01(A) (limiting on-premise ground signs to four per location, but placing no limits on the number of building signs such as marquee and canopy signs)....

...It states, "[i]f any of the provisions of this Code, including [provisions] pertaining to permitting new Billboards is found unconstitutional... all provisions pertaining to allowing and permitting new Billboards shall be deemed voided in totality and no new Billboards shall be allowed." 2. ON-PREMISE SIGNS 17 Part 7.02 regulates on-premise signs. On-premise signs are generally limited to 150 square feet. See LDC § 7.02.01(B). Those within 500 feet of the interstate are allowed up to 300 square feet of advertising space. See LDC § 7.02.02(B)....

...1382 , 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000) (noting that "there may be cases in which banning the means of expression so interferes with the message that it essentially bans the message"). 12 Additionally, "permit applications for on-premise signs shall be in accordance with Part 7.02.00," which sets forth requirements for on-premise signs. LDC §§ 7.00.01, 7.02.01 13 In Thomas , the Supreme Court upheld a permitting scheme whereby "the object of the permit system ( as plainly indicated by the permissible grounds for permit denial ) is not to exclude communication of a particular content, but to coordinate multiple uses of limited space, to assure preservation of ......

govern. State law provides a rate of 7%. O.C.G.A. § 7-2-4. Appellant, however, concedes that admiralty

incorporated the findings of the HCCB study. Section 7(2) of the Act contains a statement of legislative

...1996) (noting that although a copyright notice is insufficient under Lipton to support a claim of false designation of origin, “[s]uch a claim may be supported . . . by further acts on the part of the infringer falsely representing itself as the owner of the work”); cf. Jerome Gilson, Trademark Protection and Practice § 7.02[5], at 7-26 & Montgomery has stated a claim for false designation of origin....

opposite sex who is a husband or a wife. 1 U.S.C. § 7 [2] Florida Statutes § 741.212, Marriages between

Article 2 “applies to transactions in goods.” § 7-2-102. The Code defines the term “goods" broadly to

later *10 adopted constitutional provision, Art. V, § 7(2), which authorizes an additional County Judge in

Farnsorth, Farnsworth on Contracts, § 7.2 at 194 (1990). The rule does not purport to exclude

behavior and has been held to be protected under § 7.2 “The right of employees to wear union insignia at

cited in this opinion. See Ala.Code § 7-2-302; Ohio Rev.Code Ann, § 1302.15. Consequently

implied warranty of merchantability, Ala. Code § 7-2-314(2)(c), Cowan must establish that her shoe was

Guardians of my infant Children.” 5 . Section 7(2) of the Guardianship Act grants a mother the

...The district court found that because Trucks’s policy did not require drivers to return the 1% of load revenue directed towards lodging if they chose to sleep in the sleeping berths in the trucks, Trucks failed this third requirement as well. Trucks relies on Rev. Proc. 90-60 § 7.02, which requires accountable per diem allowances to ask that employees return the per diem allowance for “days of travel not substantiated,” as opposed to costs not substantiated....

...The dispute resolution process in the Master Group Service Agreement provides in § 7.01 that a dispute "relating to the performance of this Agreement by PacifiCare and Member" shall first be submitted to an internal dispute resolution process to resolve the dispute in a non-adjudicative setting. § 7.02 provides that any dispute that is not resolved through the dispute resolution process described in § 7.01 "shall have the matter resolved by binding arbitration by a single arbitrator." JAMS/Endispute shall arbitrate, and its rules shall govern....

...Plaintiff's remaining argument, that the dispute is beyond the scope of the arbitration clause, is also rejected. Plaintiff argues, by focusing on the language of § 7.01, that the arbitration clause is limited to the denial of claims relating to the performance of the agreement. § 7.02 only mandates arbitration for disputes "not resolved by the above appeals and dispute resolution processes...." Plaintiff posits that her allegations concerning systemic *1007 violations by PacifiCare (that speak to violations of RICO and ERISA) are not covered by the arbitration clause. PacifiCare counters by highlighting the preamble of § 7.02, "Any claim, controversy, dispute or disagreement...." The difficulty with Plaintiff's argument is two-fold. First, this Court is not persuaded that the arbitration clause at issue is limited only to denial of claims, particularly in view of the broad, all-encompassing preamble of § 7.02....

...... Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate parties but are general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion." Bowling, 394 So.2d at 174, n. 17 (quoting from 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Section 7.02 at 413)....

the district court should have applied Ala.Code § 7-2-103(l)(b) (1975). The code imposes and defines a

Cases Under Chapter 15 of the BANKRUPTCY Code, § 7[2], at 70 (2008)). Thus, it was within the bankruptcy

Article V, Florida Constitution emerged. We quote Section 7(2), Article V, to point out that it is obviously

...hor discusses the question of filling and gasoline stations and garages for some 32 pages showing the holdings of the courts over the nation under various circumstances in zoning businesses of this type. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law, Volume 1, Section 7.02 summarizes the reasoning of the various State Courts in this regard as set out in the brief of appellant as follows: "The validity of every Zoning Ordinance is to be tested as applied to a particular piece of property at a particular time....

a 4-year statute of limitations, see Ala. Code § 7-2-725. The dispute is about when the claims arose

the committee of this discretion fail. Because section 7.2(b) of the plan gives the committee discretion

LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 7.2(c)(1982), quoting, People v. Ellis, 65 Cal.2d 529

and Adult Services Program Supervisors. Id. at § 7-2(c). Although the manual does not detail the monitoring

Thus, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 7.2(c) (1985), states: What happens if a defendant refuses

McGovern, Kurtz and Rein, Wills, Trusts and Estates § 7.2 (1988). At another time, when asked why his sister

43 Unless excluded or modified (Section 7-2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable

may stand with the invalid portion excised. Section 7(2) of the act is a severability clause: If any

needed to be negligible. Disclosure Statement, § 7.2. The Supreme Court has rejected this type of argument:

paragraph (1)(b) of Section 7-2-103." Sec. 8-20-3(7), Code of Alabama (1975). Section 7-2-103(1)(b) is the

contraband, see generally 3 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 7.2(d) (2d ed. 1987), they are inapposite to this case

violation of written rules and policies including section 7-2.13, F.A.C. and sections 2M and 13F of the Division

to a four year statute of limitations, Ala.Code § 7-2-725. What was not clear, prior to the Alabama Supreme

Disputed Claim becomes an Allowed Claim." (CP 204, § 7.2).[2] C. The Adversary Proceeding to Invalidate the

that the act shall take effect August 1, 1974, Section 7(2) specifically provides: [N]otwithstanding the

ongoing enterprise." Stock Purchase Agreement, § 7.2.1. A perusal of Count II, the breach of third party

bargain creates an express warranty....” Ala. Code § 7-2-313(l)(a) (1975). The complaint alleges that “Lumber

similarly does not protect NEAPCO. . Ala. Code § 7-2-316(2) (1984). . R. Anderson, 3 Uniform Commercial

incorporated the findings of the HCCB study. Section 7(2) of the Act contains a statement of legislative

therewith. [emphasis added] Sections 7.1.2 and § 7.2.2. state in pertinent part as follows: 7.1.2 Accuracy

...Power & Light Co., 254 So.2d 540 (Fla. 1971). [4] Campo was cited with evident approval by the District Court of Appeal in Royal, 205 So.2d at 310. It has also been roundly criticized. 2 Harper and James, Law of Torts, 1542 (1956); 1 Frumer and Friedman, Products Liability, § 7.02 (1975); See also Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 Yale L.J....

1 Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation § 7:2 (2d ed.) (footnotes omitted). The doctrine

subject only to reasonable notice. See Ala.Code § 7-2-309(2), (3) (1984). 15 We

54 The relevant statute, Ala.Code Section 7-2-725 (1975), provides in pertinent part that:

501 F.Supp.2d at 805; Attorney-Client Privilege § 7.2.1 (“Because of the ease with which e-mail technology

agreements between them (as more fully set forth in Section 7.2) outside the scope of this one-year limitation

...to enforce DER's related rules and regulations under section 120.69(1)(a). BACKGROUND On September 27, 1982, appellant filed the above-mentioned alternative actions in the Twelfth Judicial Circuit in Sarasota County. Appellant alleged: (1) section 27.02, Florida Statutes (1981), [3] when read in conjunction with article V, section 17, Florida Constitution (1968), [4] gave him authority to file the civil action for damages and penalties, and section 120.69(1)(a) gave him authority to file the al...

...1), [8] with respect to the administrative action. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the case under advisement and then later issued its final order on December 22, 1982. In that order, the court specifically ruled: (1) section 27.02 is merely enabling legislation for article V, section 17 of the Florida Constitution and simply "authorizes a state attorney to bring criminal and civil actions, but does not give special authority to bring an action [pursuant to section 403.141...

...2(1)(b). It is from this order that the state attorney appeals. ISSUES In this appeal, we have discerned the following two related and important issues which merit our discussion: (1) whether a state attorney has independent authority under section 27.02 (or any other statute) to institute in his judicial circuit and on behalf of the state a civil action for damages and penalties pursuant to section 403.141(1) for alleged violations of section 403.161(1) occurring in his circuit, and (2) whether...

...e conditions creating the violation or other appropriate corrective action. (Emphasis supplied). Accordingly, we must analyze appellant's assertions in light of the relevant statutory provisions. Discussion Appellant essentially argues that section 27.02 when read in conjunction with article V, section 17 [13] grants him the authority to independently initiate a section 403.141(1) civil action on behalf of the state....

...today's burgeoning environmental problems that are inevitable with commercial development, we, nevertheless, reject appellant's novel contention with respect to this issue. We reach this conclusion after examining article V, section 17 and section 27.02 together, as well as determining the legislature's intention with respect to this issue as evidenced by the enactment of various statutes relating to the authority of state attorneys and by the enactment of certain sections of Chapter 403....

...Rather, only a specific general law can grant him the power to file such a suit. Such a construction of article V, section 17 is consistent with the scope of authority traditionally granted to and exercised by a state prosecuting attorney. Furthermore, we hold that section 27.02 contrary to appellant's contention, is not such a specific general law but only broadly sets forth, as its heading indicates, a state attorney's general duties....

...[2] Section 7 states: "It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its natural resources and scenic beauty. Adequate provision shall be made by law for the abatement of air and water pollution and of excessive and unnecessary noise." [3] Section 27.02 provides: "The state attorney shall appear in the circuit and county courts within his judicial circuit and prosecute or defend on behalf of the state all suits, applications, or motions civil or criminal, in which the state is a party......

...The legislature has also specifically granted a state attorney authority to institute other civil actions on behalf of the state if an action is referred to or delegated to him by a particular state agency or official. See §§ 106.25(4)(a); 161.071; 206.07; 206.22; 207.022; 253.05; 402.17(5); 501.052; 526.10; 542.15; 585.36; 586.09(1), Fla....

...From the record it appears that in July, 1994, certain Dade County voters sought a recall election to remove District 7 County Commissioner Maurice Ferre from office. The petition was not certified because it lacked the requisite number of signatures. See § 7.02(2), Art....

...The trial court's reliance on Hardemon v. Leahy, 642 So.2d 28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), is misplaced. Hardemon did not involve a Charter provision founded on specific constitutional grant of power and did not discuss the Charter. The trial court additionally erred in holding that § 7.02(7) of Art....

...s the voters' rejection. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's order decertifying the recall petition with directions to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint seeking declaratory relief. Reversed and remanded with directions. NOTES [1] Section 7.02(7) of Art....

...ment of the grounds for recall, and limits the grounds for removal to malfeasance, misfeasance, neglect of duty, drunkenness, incompetence, permanent inability to perform official duties, and conviction of a felony involving moral turpitude. [3] See § 7.02, Art, 7, Dade County Charter (no requirement that petition state grounds for recall)....

...VIII of the 1885 Florida Constitution provides for a home rule charter in Dade County, and specifically grants the Board of County Commissioners the right to "provide a method for the recall of any commissioner." § 11(1)(i), Art. VIII, Fla. Const. (1885). [5] See § 7.02, Art....

paragraph (l)(b) of Section 7-2-103.” § 8-20-3(7), Code of Alabama (1975). Section 7-2-103(l)(b) is the

its discretionary authority to decide claims. Id. § 7.2(b)(3). Broadspire is the Administrative Services

to borrow for the limited purposes stated in Section 7.2 of its Certificate and Agreement of Limited Partnership;

...mplaint may contain a prayer for process to attach the defendant’s goods and chattels, or credits and effects in the hands of garnishees ... 'if the defendant shall not be found within the district, (emphasis supplied). Citing Local Admiralty Rule 7.02(a), Ship Agencies and claimant/owner Sturgeon Atlantic argue that because their counsel asserted for the first time at the post-attachment hearing that he was authorized to receive and accept service of process in the Middle District of Florida...

...f of both Ship Agencies and Sturgeon Atlantic, and Capt. *1426 Singh who asserts he was then President of Ship Agencies who could be served in the district [Doc. # 18, Ex. “A” and “B”]) precludes a Rule B attachment. ■ Local Admiralty Rule 7.02(a) provides that in an in personam action, a defendant shall be considered “not found within the district” if it cannot be served within the district as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Advisory Notes to the Local Admiralty and Maritime Rules state that Section 7.02(a) “codifies- the governing law of this circuit as set forth- in Labanca v....

...abanca test has not been met. It is only if the answer to the first question of “minimum contacts” is in the affirmative, that inquiry proceeds to the second level of whether defendant can be served in the district. Clearly, Local Admiralty Rule 7.02(a) addresses only the second prong of the Labanca test....

...# 21), is insufficient to preclude Supplemental B attachment. This isolated and post-attachment presence of an officer for service within the district is not the type of “ongoing presence within the District which was intended under Supplemental Admiralty Rule B and Local Admiralty Rule 7.02(a)”....

§ 3(5); Dkt. 119, ¶ 4(1); see also Ch. 2001-299 § 7(2). Having acquired a certificate, a person must then

constitute "special circumstances" under Ala.Code Section 7-2-714(2) (1975),4 so that the rental value of the

some intensity... ." 3 La Fave, Search and Seizure § 7.2(c) (2d ed. 1987). The search of Langer's automobile

enumerated controlled substance in § 893.135(1), Fla. Stat.)7, 2. The defendant actually [sold] [purchased]

...case basis. Moreover, we are unable to reconcile the majority decision in Lingle with the recent holding of the Supreme Court in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 2425, which was cited merely as "cf." by the Lingle majority. [6] Section 7.02 of the labor agreement provides that the "functions of the arbitrator shall be to interpret and apply the Agreement and he shall have no power to add to or subtract from or to modify any of the terms of the Agreement." [7] Judge Ripple's...

pursuant to the policy of the state in Article II, Section 7. (2) The Everglades Sugar Fee shall expire twenty-five

580 (Ala.1989). The relevant statute, Ala.Code Section 7-2-725 (1975), provides in pertinent part that:

...veral others directly contradict Coalsales' sole source interpretation. [22] Of the thirty-two provisions referenced *1277 by Coalsales, only six seem to support Coalsales' position: Sections 2.05, 5.02, and 9.01; Section 5.08; and Sections 6.02 and 7.02....

...urces. However, the presence in the contract of greater detail regarding particular sources does not preclude other sources, nor does it detract from the plain language obligating Coalsales to supply coal. Finally, Coalsales argues Sections 6.02 and 7.02 indicate that the parties "anticipated" Coalsales would supply a blend of coal from Source A and Source B....

...and unambiguously stating their intentions within the contract. [21] Coalsales identifies these thirty-two provisions as Sections 2.05, 2.06, 2.07, 2.10, 2.12, 2.16, 2.20, 2.22, 2.23, 2.27, 2.28, 2.30, 2.34, 5.02, 5.03, 5.08, 6.02, 6.04, 6.05, 7.01, 7.02, 8.01, 8.02, 9.01, 9.04, 9.06, 9.07, 11.01, 14.02, 14.06, 15.01, and 19.01....

...ion Source A or Source B. Coalsales also refers to Sections 6.04, which describes Source C, and 6.05, which describes "other sources," as support for its sole source interpretation. Finally, Coalsales refers to Sections 2.22, 2.23, 2.30, 6.02, 7.01, 7.02, 9.07 and 15.01, which either mention sources other than Source A and Source B directly or refer to Sections 6.04 and 6.05....

...ther than fixed. [23] Section 6.02 provides, in relevant part: "It is anticipated that the approximate Annual Quality under this Agreement from Source A (Section 6.04) will be 1,000,000 Tons and from Source B (Section 6.04) 900,000 tons." Similarly, Section 7.02 provides, in relevant part: "It is anticipated that the primary source of coal under this Agreement shall be a blend of coals from Source A and Source B." (emphasis added)....

Plan (the "Confirmation Date"). See Plan at p. 30, § 7.2. The Tax Sharing Agreement was not included on Exhibit

...federal courts require notice and hearing where the charge involves criminal guilt or individual disgrace it must be said that the recall provision in question must, by its terms, provide for notice of the charges or fail as being unconstitutional. Section 7.02 fails to provide for notice of the charges and therefore is unconstitutional. Intervenor asserts that, assuming arguendo the unconstitutionality of Section 7.02, there has been no violation of plaintiff’s right to notice because there was affixed to each petition a letter stating the grounds for recall. Exhibits A and B to Answer of Intervenor. This argument is totally without merit because the Court can look only to Section 7.02....

...t be conditioned upon waiver of constitutional right to due process. 21 Nor can plaintiff bé estopped by his having been on the Commission when the petition forms were approved. In accepting election to office, plaintiff must be held to be aware of Section 7.02 but having found that Section 7.02 is unconstitutional, the Court cannot bind plaintiff to any form of waiver....

...Leather-man be and the same is hereby permanently enjoined from proceeding with the canvassing and certification of the recall petition presently in his possession seeking the recall of plaintiff Alex Gordon; and (2) That, pursuant to Title 28 U.S. C.A. Sections 2201 and 2202, Section 7.02 of the Home Rule Charter for Metropolitan Dade County adopted on May 21,1957 and recorded in Official Records Book 182 at page 667 of the Public Records of Dade County, Florida is hereby declared to be unconstitutional for the reason that, and to the limited extent that, it fails to require some form of notice of the reasons for recall. . Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 , 88 S.Ct. 391 , 19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967). . Section 7.02, Home Rule Charter for Metropolitan Dade County adopted on May 21, 1957 and recorded in Official Records Book 182 at page 667 of the Public Records of Dade County, Florida. . See, Article VIII, Section 11 of the Florida Constitution of 1885, and Article VIII, Section 6 of the Florida Constitution of 1968, F.S.A. . Sec. 7.02....

...filled at the next regular election or at a special election called for that purpose. . Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 , 91 S.Ct. 507 , 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971). . The sole authority cited to the Court which supports the constitutionality of Section 7.02 is the Opinion of the Attorney General for the State of Wisconsin (Jan....

...Johnson, 182 So.2d 244 (Fla.1966). . Fla.Const, art. 8, § 6 (1968), retaining Fla.Const. art. 8, § 11 (i) (1885). . DuBose v. Kelly, 132 Fla. 548 , 181 So. 11 (1938). . Id. . Supra, note 9. . See, Richard v. Tomlinson, supra; Piver v. Stallman, supra. . According to the terms of Section 7.02 (6), once the official is recalled he cannot challenge any defect in the recall petition....

“Determination of Clinical Privileges,” and section 7.2-2 is specifically titled “Basis for Privileges

its discretionary authority to decide claims. Id. § 7.2(b)(3). Broadspire is the Administrative Services

that amending the Master Plan is possible.2 Section 7.02, “Restrictions and Exceptions,” of Article 7

obscene, pornographic, [or] immoral character. See § 7.02.02 (emphasis added). Also prohibited was any sign

the study of law as specified in Article V, Section 7 2, the filing fee shall be $60.00 $75.00. Section

Cir.1989). According to Ala.Code § 7-2-601(a), if goods do not conform to a contract, the

notices of default. C. Arbitration Provision Section 7.02.(d) of the Agreement exempts from arbitration

pursuant to the policy of the state in Article II, Section 7. (2) The Everglades Sugar Fee shall expire twenty-five

“unless fully compliant with this Code”) with LDC § 7.02.01(A) (limiting on-premise ground signs to four

Redish, Summary Judgment: Federal Law and Practice § 7.2 (2023). But the 10-day rule was superseded

subject only to reasonable notice. See Ala.Code § 7-2-309(2), (3) (1984). We review the grant or denial

1943). . 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 7.02. . See City of Miami v. Walker, Fla.App. 1964

Thus, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedures § 7.2(c) (1985), states: What happens if a defendant refuses

limitations under the UCC is four years. See Ala. Code § 7- 2-725(1); O.C.G.A. § 11-2-725. Starting with

calling for an election in Dade County pursuant to section 7.02 of the Charter of Metropolitan Dade County,

protecting the state’s natural resources, article II, section 7,2 and we also *1076acknowledge the efforts of the

reversion. See, Chapter 59-1658 of Laws of Florida, Section 7(2)(g). The Court also takes judicial notice of

2000, D.E. 58-2. D.E. 47-13 at 1. Id. at 13 (§ 7.2.2.4.6.3). Id. at 2. Id. at 3. See Deposition

a 4-year statute of limitations, see Ala. Code § 7-2-725. The dispute is about when the claims arose

requirements of Part I, Ch. 287, F.S. AS TO QUESTION 3: Section 7(2)(b), Ch. 92-277, Laws of Florida,12 provides:

language, “Any other termination” as used in Section 7.2 of the Agreement is plain and unambiguous and

DCA 2008)). The association argues that Section 7.2 of the Declaration, which obligates the association

E. Allen Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts, § 7.2 at 194 (1990). The rule does not purport to exclude

with respect to goods of that kind.” Ala. Code § 7-2-314 (1975). “Merchantability” refers to a product’s

benefits under the Plan is determined under section 7.2 of the Plan. This is dependant upon the employee's

DCA 1984); 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure (2d Ed.), § 7.2(d), p. 56.

Maureen A. Sullivan, Limited Liability Companies § 7:2 (2024) (“The LLC statutes do not mandate distributions

responsibilities of such Unit Owners. (Ex. 16 at § 7.2.) A similar provision is in the Bylaws of the Association

of the trial court. Initially, Chapter 59-1658, § 7(2) (g), is at best vague as to the interest acquired

buildings have certain parking available. Moreover, Section 7-2 D. of the ordinance provides that "no existing

the use of the property.” Uniform Partnership Act § 7(2). Therefore, the fact that Ms. Simmons “shared”

” 1 Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation § 7:2 (2d ed.) (footnotes omitted). The doctrine

constitute “special circumstances” under Ala.Code Section 7-2-714(2) (1975),4 so that the rental value of the

ordinance in the City of Sunrise Charter, Article VII, § 7.02, which reads in part: “Any police officer of the

requirement as well. Trucks relies on Rev. Proc. 90-60 § 7.02, which requires accountable per diem allowances

period of time as said Trustee as in office. Section 7.2(8) details the trustees’ powers as follows: Specific

challenge the validity on constitutional grounds of § 7.02 of the Dade County Home Rule Charter which provides

addition to the causes for dissolution set forth in Section 7.2(c)[[2]], the Partnership shall be dissolved in