Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...As one commentator has noted, "[e]ven when a plaintiff's actual damages include lost profits, there may be a recovery of defendant's profits in an amount equal to (but not more than) the amount by which defendant's profits exceed plaintiff's lost profits." 4 Nimmer § 14.03, at 14-30....

officers of the state, immune from suit under Section 14. 3 See Parker v. Amerson, 519 So

...As one commentator has noted, “[e]ven when a plaintiff’s actual damages include lost profits, there may be a recovery of defendant’s profits in an amount equal to (but not more than) the amount by which defendant’s profits exceed plaintiff’s lost profits.” 4 Nimmer § 14.03, at 14-30....

emulative and shall be served consecutively.” Ala.Code § 14-3-38 (1982) (emphasis added)'. While under this statute

appellant's motion for attorneys' fees pursuant to section 14.3 of the Declaration. We affirm all other issues

adding the Inferences in § 812.022(2)-(6), Fla. Stat. 14.3 DEALING IN STOLEN PROPERTY (ORGANIZING) §

...convenience only and shall not affect the construction hereof.” We therefore give no interpretive effect to the Agreement headings mentioned in this opinion. 41  Paying Agent, segregate and hold in trust as provided in Section 14.03) an amount of money sufficient to pay the Prepayment Price of all the Notes which are to be prepaid on that date....

...Van Gemert, the Supreme Court settled this question by ruling that class counsel are entitled to a reasonable fee based on the funds potentially available to be claimed, regardless of the amount actually claimed. Herbert B. Newberg and Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions § 14.03, at 14-14 (3d ed.1992).10 In addition to the district court's careful consideration of the Johnson factors and awareness that the actual claims made could be less than the gross settlement fund, our conclusion that the award is not an abuse of discretion is supported by the following observations....

increases." Trawick's Florida Practice and Procedure § 14-3 at 210 (1980 Edition). See Airlift International

...It is also significant that the fund itself is considered the best measure of success in common-fund cases and logically can serve as a benchmark from which reasonable fees can be determined. Camden I, 946 F.2d at 774; Conte, §§ 2.05, at 37, 2.07, at 44; 3 H.B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions, § 14.03 at 14-4 (3d ed....

...rd in cases such as this, where the fund is unusually large, can be addressed in a number of ways, including decreasing an otherwise reasonable percentage as the fund increases. Conte, § 2.09 at 55-58; Task Force Report, 108 F.R.D. at 256; Newberg, § 14.03 at 14-14....

63.1-248.2A2 (Michie 1991); Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-202(vii) (1991), id. § 35-1-201 (1988). [2] We

Friedenthal, Kane and Miller, Civil Procedure, § 14.3 (1985). Both claims at issue here are rooted ultimately

...The Court "rul[ed] that class counsel are entitled to a reasonable fee based on the funds potentially available to be claimed, regardless of the amount actually claimed." Waters v. International Precious Metals Corp., 190 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 1999), quoting Herbert B. Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions § 14.03 (3d ed.1992)....

Villa, however, is not defunct. Under Ga.Code Ann. § 14-3-128 (Michie 1994), Georgian Villa’s certificate

...See id. at 63 (only class member to oppose portion of settlement stipulation at fairness hearing “was just angry at the reversionary clause.”). 12 Herbert B. Newberg and Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions § 14.03, at 14-14 (3d ed....

...237, 239 (1985). This is true, the objectors argue, because "the effort necessary to achieve recovery dollars at the high end [is] less onerous, on a sliding scale, than the effort expended for recovering the threshold sums...." Newberg on Class Actions, § 14.03 at 14-14 (3d ed.1992)....

is deemed "significant" as defined in 43 C.F.R. § 14.3(c)(5); and (2) the rule will have an annual economic

P. Trawick, Jr., Florida Practice and Procedure § 14-3 at 267 (2007-08 ed.). Most trial judges use the

Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 14.3 (5th ed.1995). Even before it determines what level

Apportionment, Fla.Bar CLE Basic Estate Planning in Florida § 14.3 (1980).[5] 2. We similarly follow plain statutory

transact business in Georgia as required by O.C.G.A. § 14-3-1502. This statute does not apply to federal

...act where the contractor failed to complete performance is the difference between the contract price and the reasonable cost to complete the improvements in accordance with the contract.”); see also Larry R. Leiby, Florida Construction Law Manual, § 14.03 (1981)....

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 51-2 (2018); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-03-02 (2018); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3101.01 (2018);

purchase price. 3A Bender’s Uniform Comm. Code Serv., § 14.-03[2] (1983). There is no dispute that the Jaegars

Carter agreements void and inadmissible). . Section 14.3(A) of the Code of Regulations provided that

announcements. Docket No. 82, Ex. F at 8. Chapter 14, Section 14-3 entitled "To Record Greetings and Announcements"

language of the first sentence of article I, section 14. 3. In doing so, the trial court followed the

instant situation simply is not contemplated by § 14(3) of the LHWCA. The petitioners argue.that

Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 14.3 (5th ed.1995). Even before it determines what level

however, is not defunct. Under Ga.Code Ann. § 14- 3-128 (Michie 1994), Georgian Villa's certificate

...3 Beneficiary, in the case of his death), as soon as practicable after the Participant’s Event Date” (here, Marvin Crowder’s date of death). A “Beneficiary” under the Plan is “the person or persons described in Section 14.03 of the Plan who are to receive upon the Participant’s death a Plan benefit, if any, as may be provided under Article 8 (Distribution) . . . of the Plan.” The heart of this dispute involves the interpretation of Section 14.03, which further defines who is a “Beneficiary.” Section 14.03 provides that “[t]he term Beneficiary as used in the Plan means a person or persons last so designated by a Participant on a form submitted to the Plan Recordkeeper and satisfactory to the Administrative Committee in its sole discr...

...representative of such Participant, if any has qualified within fifteen (15) months from the date of his death or, if no personal representative has so qualified, any heirs at law of the Participant whose whereabouts are known by the Administrative Committee.” Section 14.03, however, contains a marriage exception....

...d by the Internal Revenue Service). Beneficiary designations must be received by the Plan prior to the death of a Participant. No other Beneficiary designation other than as provided herein shall be valid. The term “Spouse” in Section 14.03 is defined in Section 1.54 of the Plan as “the person to whom the Participant is Married.” The term “Married” in Section 14.03 is defined in Section 1.34 of the Plan as “having entered into a marriage that is lawful under state law, including marriage between individuals of the same sex.” The Summary Plan Description (“SDP”) explains that, if a...

.... payment of [the Participant’s] account will be made to [his] estate.” We now outline the relevant facts. B. Benefits Distribution to Ms. Prince as the Designated Beneficiary In 2004, Marvin married Wanda. During the marriage, Marvin never affirmatively designated Wanda to be a beneficiary. However, under Section 14.03, Wanda Crowder “automatically” became the beneficiary during their marriage. In 2011, the Crowders separated, and, on June 23, 2014, Wanda Crowder filed a complaint for divorce....

...d been divorced for 16 months at the time of his death.” Upon further appeal, the Committee, like the Subcommittee before it, determined that Wanda Crowder was not Marvin Crowder’s Beneficiary under the terms of the Plan, in particular Section 14.03, governing who is a “Beneficiary,” and Sections 1.34 and 1.54, defining the terms “Married” and “Spouse.” The Committee acknowledged that the Crowders were still married when Marvin Crowder submitted the form designating Ms....

...undertaking our own de novo review, we agree with the district court that the Committee correctly denied Wanda Crowder benefits because she was not a “Beneficiary” under the Plan at the time of her ex-husband’s death. As the district court determined, Section 14.03 of the Plan governs whether Wanda Crowder was Marvin Crowder’s “Beneficiary” when he died. See Liberty Life Assurance Co., 358 F.3d at 1302. Under the first sentence of Section 14.03, the “Beneficiary” is the “person or persons last so designated by a Participant on a form submitted to the Plan Recordkeeper and satisfactory to the Administrative Committee in its sole discretion.” The parties agree that Ma...

...fendants’ motion to dismiss. 12 affirmatively designated Wanda Crowder as his Beneficiary by submitting the proper form to Fidelity, the Plan’s recordkeeper, as required in the first sentence of Section 14.03.4 Thus, the only way Wanda Crowder is entitled to Marvin Crowder’s plan benefits is if she was the automatic spousal beneficiary under Section 14.03 when Marvin Crowder died. The problem for Wanda Crowder is Section 14.03 indicates that the automatic spousal designation applies only “if the Participant is Married” and only “during such marriage.” In other words, Wanda Crowder was the automatic spousal beneficiary only as long as she remained m...

...These cases, like Kennedy, do not address the circumstances or plan terms presented here and therefore provide little in the way of guidance. 13 after the divorce decree was signed, Wanda Crowder was not a Beneficiary under Section 14.03 and was not entitled to her ex-husband’s plan benefits.5 Crowder argues that the phrase “during the marriage” in Section 14.03 refers only to the participant’s ability to change the automatic spousal designation and not to the duration of the automatic spousal designation. Crowder contends that this interpretation is required by Section 14.03’s express reference to “regulations issued by the Internal Revenue Service.” Crowder says this reference expressly incorporated Treasury Regulation 26 C.F.R....

...Thus, while other sections of Delta’s Plan address QDROs, we need not discuss them. Nothing herein should be construed as ruling on a QDRO. 14  Crowder’s construction conveniently ignores that Section 14.03 merely requires that a Spouse’s written consent to the Participant’s waiver of the automatic spousal beneficiary designation be “in conformance with” IRS regulations. Section 14.03 does not require any other terms, apart from the written consent requirement, to be interpreted according to Treasury Department regulations. Therefore, Section 14.03 does not incorporate wholesale the regulatory requirements for survivor annuities for spouses and former spouses, much less Treasury Regulation § 1.401(a)-20, Q&A-25(b)(3) in particular, which has nothing to do with spousal consent. There is no merit to Crowder’s contention that Q&A-25(b)(3) required the Committee to interpret “during the marriage” in the way she suggests. As the defendants aptly point out, Crowder’s interpretation of Section 14.03—that once married, the automatic spousal designation survives divorce and lasts until the Participant’s death unless the Participant affirmatively designates a Beneficiary after the divorce—requires some language in § 14.03’s marriage exception to be changed and other language to be added....

...would also require the Plan’s definition of the term Spouse in Section 1.54 to be 15 changed to “the person to whom the Participant is or has been Married,” so that it also includes former spouses. Crowder’s interpretation of Section 14.03 not only requires reading words into the provision, but also raises additional unanswered questions, such as whether the Participant must also obtain his former spouse’s written consent to affirmatively change the Beneficiary to someone else and what happens if the Participant marries again. Contrary to Crowder’s argument, the phrase “during the marriage” in Section 14.03’s marriage exception does indeed refer to the duration of the automatic spousal designation....

...st visited May 11, 2020); see Alexandra H., 833 F.3d at 1307 (explaining that ERISA plan terms are generally given their “plain and ordinary meaning”). By the Plan’s plain terms, a Spouse’s status as an automatic spousal beneficiary under Section 14.03 lasts only 16 “throughout the continuance or course of” the marriage to the Participant and thus necessarily ceases when that marriage ends in divorce.6 Crowder’s contention that this interpretation of § 14.03 conflicts with the SPD lacks merit....

...how it is resolved, Wanda Crowder is still not a Beneficiary under the Plan and is not entitled to benefits. Even assuming arguendo that Marvin Crowder’s affirmative designation of Ms. Prince was premature and invalid when it was made 6 Because the terms of Section 14.03 are clear rather than ambiguous, there is no merit to Crowder’s argument that we must construe that provision against the drafter and in her favor. 7 Marvin Crowder appears to have taken this advice in the SPD to heart...

...Delta (incorrectly as it turned out) that he was divorced. 17 before the final divorce decree and remained so after the final divorce decree up to the time of his death, that would not entitle Wanda Crowder to plan benefits. Under Section 14.03 of the Plan, if, at the time of the Participant’s death, “no [affirmative] designation is made” and the Participant is not married, then the Beneficiary is the Participant’s “personal representative” or “any heirs at law...

...benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B) because, accepting the allegations in her complaint as true, she was neither Marvin Crowder’s affirmatively designated Beneficiary nor married to Marvin Crowder at the time of his death. Thus, Wanda Crowder was not a “Beneficiary” under Section 14.03 of the Plan as a matter of law. C....

...Page: 4 of 20 Beneficiary, in the case of his death), as soon as practicable after the Participant’s Event Date” (here, Marvin Crowder’s date of death). A “Beneficiary” under the Plan is “the person or persons described in Section 14.03 of the Plan who are to receive upon the Participant’s death a Plan benefit, if any, as may be provided under Article 8 (Distribution) . . . of the Plan.” The heart of this dispute involves the interpretation of Section 14.03, which further defines who is a “Beneficiary.” Section 14.03 provides that “[t]he term Beneficiary as used in the Plan means a person or persons last so designated by a Participant on a form submitted to the Plan Recordkeeper and satisfactory to the Administrative Committee in its sole discr...

...representative of such Participant, if any has qualified within fifteen (15) months from the date of his death or, if no personal representative has so qualified, any heirs at law of the Participant whose whereabouts are known by the Administrative Committee.” Section 14.03, however, contains a marriage exception....

...d by the Internal Revenue Service). Beneficiary designations must be received by the Plan prior to the death of a Participant. No other Beneficiary designation other than as provided herein shall be valid. The term “Spouse” in Section 14.03 is defined in Section 1.54 of the Plan as “the person to whom the Participant is Married.” The term “Married” in Section 14.03 is defined in Section 1.34 of the Plan as “having entered into a marriage that is lawful under state law, including marriage between individuals of the same sex.” The Summary Plan Description (“SDP”) explains that, if a...

.... payment of [the Participant’s] account will be made to [his] estate.” We now outline the relevant facts. B. Benefits Distribution to Ms. Prince as the Designated Beneficiary In 2004, Marvin married Wanda. During the marriage, Marvin never affirmatively designated Wanda to be a beneficiary. However, under Section 14.03, Wanda Crowder “automatically” became the beneficiary during their marriage. In 2011, the Crowders separated, and, on June 23, 2014, Wanda Crowder filed a complaint for divorce....

...d been divorced for 16 months at the time of his death.” Upon further appeal, the Committee, like the Subcommittee before it, determined that Wanda Crowder was not Marvin Crowder’s Beneficiary under the terms of the Plan, in particular Section 14.03, governing who is a “Beneficiary,” and Sections 1.34 and 1.54, defining the terms “Married” and “Spouse.” The Committee acknowledged that the Crowders were still married when Marvin Crowder submitted the form designating Ms....

...undertaking our own de novo review, we agree with the district court that the Committee correctly denied Wanda Crowder benefits because she was not a “Beneficiary” under the Plan at the time of her ex-husband’s death. As the district court determined, Section 14.03 of the Plan governs whether Wanda Crowder was Marvin Crowder’s “Beneficiary” when he died. See Liberty Life Assurance Co., 358 F.3d at 1302. Under the first sentence of Section 14.03, the “Beneficiary” is the “person or persons last so designated by a Participant on a form submitted to the Plan Recordkeeper and satisfactory to the Administrative Committee in its sole discretion.” The parties agree that Ma...

... Case: 19-12342 Date Filed: 06/26/2020 Page: 13 of 20 affirmatively designated Wanda Crowder as his Beneficiary by submitting the proper form to Fidelity, the Plan’s recordkeeper, as required in the first sentence of Section 14.03.4 Thus, the only way Wanda Crowder is entitled to Marvin Crowder’s plan benefits is if she was the automatic spousal beneficiary under Section 14.03 when Marvin Crowder died. The problem for Wanda Crowder is Section 14.03 indicates that the automatic spousal designation applies only “if the Participant is Married” and only “during such marriage.” In other words, Wanda Crowder was the automatic spousal beneficiary only as long as she remained m...

...ittle in the way of guidance. 13  Case: 19-12342 Date Filed: 06/26/2020 Page: 14 of 20 after the divorce decree was signed, Wanda Crowder was not a Beneficiary under Section 14.03 and was not entitled to her ex-husband’s plan benefits.5 Crowder argues that the phrase “during the marriage” in Section 14.03 refers only to the participant’s ability to change the automatic spousal designation and not to the duration of the automatic spousal designation. Crowder contends that this interpretation is required by Section 14.03’s express reference to “regulations issued by the Internal Revenue Service.” Crowder says this reference expressly incorporated Treasury Regulation 26 C.F.R....

...them. Nothing herein should be construed as ruling on a QDRO. 14  Case: 19-12342 Date Filed: 06/26/2020 Page: 15 of 20 Crowder’s construction conveniently ignores that Section 14.03 merely requires that a Spouse’s written consent to the Participant’s waiver of the automatic spousal beneficiary designation be “in conformance with” IRS regulations. Section 14.03 does not require any other terms, apart from the written consent requirement, to be interpreted according to Treasury Department regulations. Therefore, Section 14.03 does not incorporate wholesale the regulatory requirements for survivor annuities for spouses and former spouses, much less Treasury Regulation § 1.401(a)-20, Q&A-25(b)(3) in particular, which has nothing to do with spousal consent. There is no merit to Crowder’s contention that Q&A-25(b)(3) required the Committee to interpret “during the marriage” in the way she suggests. As the defendants aptly point out, Crowder’s interpretation of Section 14.03—that once married, the automatic spousal designation survives divorce and lasts until the Participant’s death unless the Participant affirmatively designates a Beneficiary after the divorce—requires some language in § 14.03’s marriage exception to be changed and other language to be added....

...15  Case: 19-12342 Date Filed: 06/26/2020 Page: 16 of 20 changed to “the person to whom the Participant is or has been Married,” so that it also includes former spouses. Crowder’s interpretation of Section 14.03 not only requires reading words into the provision, but also raises additional unanswered questions, such as whether the Participant must also obtain his former spouse’s written consent to affirmatively change the Beneficiary to someone else and what happens if the Participant marries again. Contrary to Crowder’s argument, the phrase “during the marriage” in Section 14.03’s marriage exception does indeed refer to the duration of the automatic spousal designation....

...st visited May 11, 2020); see Alexandra H., 833 F.3d at 1307 (explaining that ERISA plan terms are generally given their “plain and ordinary meaning”). By the Plan’s plain terms, a Spouse’s status as an automatic spousal beneficiary under Section 14.03 lasts only 16  Case: 19-12342 Date Filed: 06/26/2020 Page: 17 of 20 “throughout the continuance or course of” the marriage to the Participant and thus necessarily ceases when that marriage ends in divorce.6 Crowder’s contention that this interpretation of § 14.03 conflicts with the SPD lacks merit....

...how it is resolved, Wanda Crowder is still not a Beneficiary under the Plan and is not entitled to benefits. Even assuming arguendo that Marvin Crowder’s affirmative designation of Ms. Prince was premature and invalid when it was made 6 Because the terms of Section 14.03 are clear rather than ambiguous, there is no merit to Crowder’s argument that we must construe that provision against the drafter and in her favor. 7 Marvin Crowder appears to have taken this advice in the SPD to heart...

... Case: 19-12342 Date Filed: 06/26/2020 Page: 18 of 20 before the final divorce decree and remained so after the final divorce decree up to the time of his death, that would not entitle Wanda Crowder to plan benefits. Under Section 14.03 of the Plan, if, at the time of the Participant’s death, “no [affirmative] designation is made” and the Participant is not married, then the Beneficiary is the Participant’s “personal representative” or “any heirs at law...

...benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B) because, accepting the allegations in her complaint as true, she was neither Marvin Crowder’s affirmatively designated Beneficiary nor married to Marvin Crowder at the time of his death. Thus, Wanda Crowder was not a “Beneficiary” under Section 14.03 of the Plan as a matter of law. C....

...The Rule is intended to permit “a defending party to join an absentee for the purpose of deflecting to that absentee all or part of its potential liability to the plaintiff on the underlying claim.” 3 James William Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 14.03[1] (3d ed....

Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 14.3 (4th ed. 1991). The Supreme Court has used equal

deemed necessary for the people of the district. Section 14(3) of Ch. 72-568, supra, authorizes the district

possession of the card. Colo. Const, art. XVIII, § 14(3). . Colorado should e-mail the records to chambers

agent, or legal representative.” See also 28 C.F.R. § 14.3(b). And as we USCA11 Case: 21-10401 Date