Florida Statutes

Fla. Stat. § 39.0136 (2025)

Time limitations; continuances.

✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session

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39.0136 Time limitations; continuances.—

(1) The Legislature finds that time is of the essence for establishing permanency for a child in the dependency system. Time limitations are a right of the child which may not be waived, extended, or continued at the request of any party except as provided in this section.

(2)(a) All parties and the court must work together to ensure that permanency is achieved as soon as possible for every child through timely performance of their responsibilities under this chapter.

(b) The department shall ensure that parents have the information necessary to contact their case manager. When a new case manager is assigned to a case, the case manager must make a timely and diligent effort to notify the parent and provide updated contact information.

(3) The time limitations in this chapter do not include:

(a) Periods of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the child’s counsel, guardian ad litem, or attorney ad litem, if one is appointed. The court must consider the best interests of the child when determining periods of delay under this section.

(b) Periods of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request of any party if the continuance is granted:

1. Because of an unavailability of evidence that is material to the case if the requesting party has exercised due diligence to obtain evidence and there are substantial grounds to believe that the evidence will be available within 30 days. However, if the requesting party is not prepared to proceed within 30 days, any other party may move for issuance of an order to show cause or the court on its own motion may impose appropriate sanctions, which may include dismissal of the petition.

2. To allow the requesting party additional time to prepare the case and additional time is justified because of an exceptional circumstance.

(c) Reasonable periods of delay necessary to accomplish notice of the hearing to the child’s parent or legal custodian; however, the petitioner shall continue regular efforts to provide notice to the parents during the periods of delay.

(4) Notwithstanding subsection (3), in order to expedite permanency for a child, the total time allowed for continuances or extensions of time, including continuances or extensions by the court on its own motion, may not exceed 60 days within any 12-month period for proceedings conducted under this chapter. A continuance or extension of time may be granted only for extraordinary circumstances in which it is necessary to preserve the constitutional rights of a party or if substantial evidence exists to demonstrate that without granting a continuance or extension of time the child’s best interests will be harmed.

(5) Notwithstanding subsection (3), a continuance or an extension of time is limited to the number of days absolutely necessary to complete a necessary task in order to preserve the rights of a party or the best interests of a child.

History.—s. 4, ch. 2006-86; s. 2, ch. 2019-128; s. 9, ch. 2024-70.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 11 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 2007–2025 · leading case: A.m., the Mother v. Dept. of Child. & Families, 223 So. 3d 312 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).

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A.m., the Mother v. Dept. of Child. & Families, 223 So. 3d 312 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). · cites it 2× “2015); see also § 39.0136(1), Fla. Stat. (2015) (“The Legislature finds that time is of the essence for establishing permanency for a child in the dependency system.”

A.S., the Father v. Dep't of Child. & Families, J.A., & Guardian Ad Litem Prog., 162 So. 3d 335 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). · cites it 2× “” § 39.0136(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). Our resolution of this case is not at odds with the legislature’s intent of timely establishing permanency as the trial court and DCF have set procedures to expedite petitions for termination of parental rights.”

D.H. Ex Rel. J.R. v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 12 So. 3d 266 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). · cites it 2× “See § 39.0136(1), (2)(b)1. & (3), Fla. Stat. (2007); R.”

RS v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 956 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). · cites it 6× “Section 39.0136 was specifically intended "to outline the time limitations applicable to dependency cases.”

C.J. v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 9 So. 3d 750 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). “See § 39.0136. The actions and attitudes displayed by the Department in this case are ones we cannot and do not condone.”

M.L. v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 227 So. 3d 142 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). “§ 39.0136(1), Florida Statutes (2016). He deserved permanency, and the trial-court did not abuse its discretion by not further delaying the proceedings to accommodate a potential biological father.”

In the Interest of Sp, Mr, Jr, & Mr, Minor Child.: Idp v. The State of Wyoming, 2025 WY 101 (Wyo. 2025). “2015); see also § 39.0136(1), Fla. Stat. (2015) (“The Legislature finds that time is of the essence for establishing permanency for a child in the dependency system.”

B.a., the Mother v. Dep't of Child. & Families (Fla. 4th DCA 2021). · cites it 2× “, § 39.0136(1), Fla. Stat. (2019) (“The Legislature finds that time is of the essence for establishing permanency for a child in the dependency system.”

Florida Dep't of Child. & Families v. Foster Parents of K.J. (Fla. 3d DCA 2025). · cites it 2× “(quoting § 39.0136(1), Fla. Stat.). We have jurisdiction.”

In Re Dj, 9 So. 3d 750 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). “See § 39.0136. The actions and attitudes displayed by the Department in this case are ones we cannot and do not condone.”

S.L. v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 182 So. 3d 744 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). · cites it 2× “215(g); § 39.0136(1), Fla. Stat. (2014) (“[T]ime is of the essence for establishing permanency for a child in the dependency system.”

— 39.0136(1) — 9 cases

A.m., the Mother v. Dept. of Child. & Families, 223 So. 3d 312 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). “2015); see also § 39.0136(1), Fla. Stat. (2015) (“The Legislature finds that time is of the essence for establishing permanency for a child in the dependency system.”

A.S., the Father v. Dep't of Child. & Families, J.A., & Guardian Ad Litem Prog., 162 So. 3d 335 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). “” § 39.0136(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). Our resolution of this case is not at odds with the legislature’s intent of timely establishing permanency as the trial court and DCF have set procedures to expedite petitions for termination of parental rights.”

D.H. Ex Rel. J.R. v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 12 So. 3d 266 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). “See § 39.0136(1), (2)(b)1. & (3), Fla. Stat. (2007); R.”

RS v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 956 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). “Section 39.0136 was specifically intended "to outline the time limitations applicable to dependency cases.”

— 39.0136(2)(b)(1) — 1 case

RS v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 956 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). “Section 39.0136 was specifically intended "to outline the time limitations applicable to dependency cases.”

— 39.0136(3) — 1 case

RS v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 956 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). “Section 39.0136 was specifically intended "to outline the time limitations applicable to dependency cases.”

— 39.0136(4) — 1 case

RS v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 956 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). “Section 39.0136 was specifically intended "to outline the time limitations applicable to dependency cases.”

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