Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...to be of great public importance: (A) IS A NON-SETTLING DEFENDANT IN A CASE TRIED UNDER SECTION 768.81(3) ENTITLED TO SETOFF OR REDUCTION OF HIS APPORTIONED SHARE OF THE DAMAGES, AS ASSESSED BY THE JURY, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 768.041(2), 46.015(2) OR 768.31(5)(a), BASED UPON SUMS PAID BY SETTLING DEFENDANTS IN EXCESS OF THEIR APPORTIONED LIABILITY AS DETERMINED BY THE JURY? (B) DOES THE RULE AS TO SETOFF APPLY EQUALLY TO BOTH ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES? Id....

...0,000, representing the total amount paid by the settling defendants. The trial court denied the requested setoff. On appeal, TMRMC contended that the trial court erred in denying the requested setoff. The district court of appeal held that sections 46.015(2), 768.041(2), and 768.31(5), *251 Florida Statutes (1991) (the setoff statutes), required that "the $300,000 paid in settlement by other defendants must be applied in reduction of the total damage award returned by the jury." Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Ctr., Inc., 634 So.2d at 658....

...The setoff provisions, which were enacted *253 before section 768.81, presuppose the existence of multiple defendants jointly liable for the same damages. Consequently, the setoff provisions do not apply to noneconomic damages for which defendants are only severally liable. Section 46.015 provides, in pertinent part: (1) A written covenant not to sue or release of a person who is or may be jointly and severally liable with other persons for a claim shall not release or discharge the liability of any other person who may be liable for the balance of such claim....

...n release or covenant not to sue to any person in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment. § 46.015, Fla. Stat. (1989) (emphasis added). Section 46.015 clearly applies to "a person who is or may be jointly and severally liable with other persons for a claim." Id. (emphasis added). A defendant sued under section 768.81 may not be jointly liable with other defendants for noneconomic damages. Thus, section 46.015 does not apply to noneconomic damages....

...OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur. WELLS, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which KOGAN, J., concurs. ANSTEAD, J., concurs specially with an opinion. *255 WELLS, Justice, concurring specially. I concur with the majority's reconciliation of sections 46.015(2), 768.31(5), and 768.81(3), Florida Statutes (1991), in this case in which the parties stipulated that the settling defendants would remain on the verdict form although Fabre v....

...ANSTEAD, Justice, specially concurring. While I concur in the majority's opinion because it makes very good sense, I have some concern that the legislature has not acted to express or clarify its intent as to the continuing application of the provisions of sections 46.015(2), 768.31(5)(a), and 768.041(2), Florida Statutes (1991), in view of the enactment of section 768.81(3), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...mant's fiance, who was found to be 85% responsible for the claimant's injury. As a practical matter, of course, this right to "contribution" is also limited, as all tort rights are, by the financial solvency of the contributing tortfeasors. Sections 46.015(2), 768.31(5)(a), and 768.041(2) are actually parts of the legislative contribution scheme....

...Since the "problem" of a tortfeasor paying more than his fair share has been eliminated by the enactment of section 768.81(3), the "solution" to the problem by the scheme of contribution and setoff is no longer needed. The underlying purpose of the contribution scheme and sections 46.015(2), 768.31(5)(a), and 768.041(2) is simply no longer served in such a case....

...It would be far better, however, since this is an area in which the legislature has broad discretion and authority, and has been very active, for the legislature to expressly indicate the limitations on the continuing use of the contribution scheme, including the setoff provisions of sections 46.015(2), 768.31(5)(a), and 768.041(2)....

...City’s counterclaim award the sum the City had recovered when it settled its previous CERCLA lawsuit against the A&E defendants, who had shipped waste to the Munisport site while it was being used as a landfill. Specifically, Blasland sought the setoff under Florida Statutes § 46.015(2), which allows for setoff in non-tort cases....

...has delivered a written release or covenant not to sue to any person in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment. Fla. Stat.§ 46.015(2). The City’s position is that the statute’s plain language requires the party seeking a setoff to introduce a copy of the release from the prior litigation....

...The district court, however, set off only the A&E settlement amount, and Blasland does not complain about the court’s decision not to set off the Berger settlement amount. 14 to sue to any person in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for. . . .” Fla. Stat. § 46.015(2)....

...equirement that the party seeking a setoff introduce the written settlement into evidence. The statute merely says that a setoff is required “if any person shows the court. . .” that there was a release delivered in a prior lawsuit. Fla Stat. § 46.015(2) (emphasis added)....

...Instead, what matters is that the City sued for those sums in the A&E lawsuit, and the defendants in that lawsuit paid the City to settle it. The Florida setoff statute allows an award to be reduced by a setoff of compensation “of the damages sued for,” Fla. Stat. § 46.015(2), not just for damages a party was entitled to recover....

...a release or covenant not to sue, or that any defendant has been dismissed by order of the court shall not be made known to the jury." As we noted in Rowe v. Leichter, 561 So.2d 647, 648 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), "[t]hese provisions appear in substantially similar form in section 46.015 of the statutes entitled `Release of parties.'" Section 46.015(3), Florida Statutes (2000) provides: "The fact that a written release or covenant not to sue exists or the fact that any person has been dismissed because of such release or covenant not to sue shall not be made known to the jury." In...

...Florida law, which was borrowed by the bankruptcy court, provides a traditional rule of single satisfaction with an unusual variation. Like the law of most states, Florida law prevents a party from recovering twice for the same damages. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 46.015(2)....

...hese damages from 1988. With regard to the County's point on cross-appeal, we affirm the trial court's reduction of the County's damage award by the $2,750,000 in pretrial settlements received from the architect and masonry construction company. See § 46.015(2), Fla....

...Since the "problem" of a tortfeasor paying more than his fair share has been eliminated by the enactment of section 768.81(3), the "solution" to the problem by the scheme of contribution and setoff is no longer needed. The underlying purpose of the contribution scheme and sections 46.015(2), 768.31(5)(a), and 768.041(2) is simply no longer served in such a case....

...or corporation in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment and enter judgment accordingly. Section 46.015, Florida Statutes (2000), provides, in pertinent part: (1) A written covenant not to sue or release of a person who is or may be jointly and severally liable with other persons for a claim shall not release or discharge the liability of any other person who may be liable for the balance of such claim....

...r the amount of the damages paid by another party. No authority for that proposition was cited by the trial court and no such authority has been cited to us by appellee. Nor do we conclude that the proposition is valid in this case. To the contrary, section 46.015(2), Florida Statutes (1983), provides: At trial, if any person shows the court that the plaintiff, or his legal representative, has delivered a written release or covenant not to sue to any person in partial satisfaction of the damages...

...hereby First Union agreed to pay Acadia $1 million cash, to assign Acadia $3,116,000 in mortgage receivables, and to transfer to Acadia 900,606 shares of Class A TIGI stock. In calculating the Case 320 final judgment, the trial court determined that section 46.015(2) of the Florida Statutes required that the Tompkinses receive setoffs for the funds Acadia received pursuant to its pretrial settlements because the settlements were for the single loss Acadia suffered as a result of TIGI's default on its loan obligation. Section 46.015(2) of the Florida Statutes (1997), provides in relevant part: 46.015 Release of parties.— (1) A written covenant not to sue or release of a person who is or may be jointly and severally liable with other persons for a claim shall not release or discharge the liability of any other person who may be liable for the balance of such claim....

...sfaction of the damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment. (Emphasis added). Acadia argues that the setoff provisions of section 46.015(2) apply only if the settling parties could have been found to have been jointly and severally liable with the party requesting setoff....

...d in crediting each settlement as of the date the settlement was paid, contending that instead the settlements should have been credited as of the date the final judgment was entered in Case 320. To support this claim Acadia relies on the wording of section 46.015(2) of the Florida Statutes (1997), which provides that a setoff is to be "from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment." (Emphasis added)....

...It appears that this precise issue has not yet been addressed by any Florida appellate court. However, the Fourth District Court, in Centex-Rooney Construction Co., Inc. v. Martin County, 706 So.2d 20 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 718 So.2d 1233 (Fla.1998), has applied a setoff under section 46.015(2), Florida Statutes (1997), by deducting the amount of the setoff before calculating the interest due on the damage award....

...e 320. To have done otherwise would *739 have resulted in an award of postjudgment interest on money which had already been received by Acadia. In affirming the trial court's ruling, we recognize that the purpose of the setoff provision contained in section 46.015(2) is to prevent an award of double damages and that this purpose would be obviated if we were to construe the statute to mean that Acadia could collect and hold the settlement monies while at the same time accruing interest on the judgment....

...On appeal, the district court noted that the legislature had abrogated the common law rule in Florida that a release of one or more joint obligors discharges the liability of any and all other joint and several obligors for instruments executed after June 23, 1980. § 46.015, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1980). [2] However, since the agreement in the instant case was executed prior to that date, the district court affirmed based on Florida law prior to the adoption of section 46.015. The court found Penza v. Neckles, 344 So.2d 1282 (Fla. 1977), to be controlling, "however much we may incline to the opposite view." 405 So.2d at 273. Because the legislature had expressed its intention to change the rule by enacting section 46.015, however, the court believed there may have been a change in the law and certified the following *227 question as one of great public importance: Does a written release executed prior to June 23, 1980, of one joint and several obligor...

...Reconsideration of Penza has convinced this Court of the necessity in the instant case for correcting the "dead error" of that decision and to remedy an obvious injustice. Further support for this view is evidenced by the fact that the legislature has expressed its dissatisfaction with the rule by its enactment of section 46.015, supra which abrogated the common law doctrine for documents executed after June 23, 1980....

...es, the Court today abrogates a common law rule without any analysis of the reasons for the rule and without any discussion of the principles governing judicial modification of the common law as embodied in legal precedent. Prior to the enactment of section 46.015, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...This was so even where the release specifically reserved to the obligee the right to proceed against the remaining joint and several obligors. Penza v. Neckles, 344 So.2d 1282 (Fla. 1977). The legislature has now abrogated this doctrine by the enactment of section 46.015....

...ner placed into escrow. The confession of judgment was returned to Willits when petitioner received the $70,000. Petitioner did not dismiss its case against Willits, but did agree to execute a general release at the conclusion of the litigation. [2] 46.015 Release of parties....

...As the court stated, "even if the number of dollars recoverable by plaintiff from bank and Peat Marwick were not identical, all the damages recoverable by plaintiff from Peat Marwick were also recoverable by plaintiff from bank." Peat Marwick contends that the trial court's decision is supported by the law of setoff and that section 46.015(2) Fla....

...I cannot say that it is undisputed on this record that the appellants received at least the full amount of the claim for the embezzlement. I would agree, however, that the amount received from the bank should be allowed as a set-off against any amount eventually recovered for the embezzlement loss, against the appellee. See § 46.015, Fla....

...On the counterclaim, I believe a factual issue still exists as to whether the services sued for were made necessary by the accountant's own negligence and whether the appellants may have waived their right to refuse payment of the claim for that reason. NOTES [1] Section 46.015 Fla....

...2) agreement of the parties that the second contract or agreement takes the place of the first obligation. Miami Nat'l Bank, 366 So.2d at 1204; United Bonding Ins. Co. v. Southeast Regional Builders, Inc., 236 So.2d 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970). See also § 46.015, Fla....

...he owner of the vehicle Felgenhauer was driving. There is no dispute that the owner's settlement was on any basis other than the owner's vicarious liability for Felgenhauer's actions under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Sections 768.041 and 46.015, Florida Statutes (2001), provide for a set-off of settlements in negligence actions....

...would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment and enter judgment accordingly. (3) The fact of such a release or covenant not to sue, or that any defendant has been dismissed by order of the court shall not be made known to the jury. Section 46.015 contains almost identical language. Under sections 768.041 and 46.015 a defendant is entitled to a set-off of the sum the plaintiff received from a tortfeasor who was vicariously liable for the *1045 defendant's acts....

...184, 187 (1933); Skaf's Jewelers, Inc. v. Antwerp Import Corp., 150 So.2d 260, 262 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963); Jojo's Clubhouse, Inc. v. DBR Asset Mgmt., Inc., 860 So.2d 503, 504 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). However, in tort actions allowing for a set-off under sections 768.041 and 46.015, set-off is not an affirmative defense to be considered by the jury but is a determination regarding damages to be made by the court after the verdict is rendered. Sections 768.041 and 46.015 specifically provide that the fact of the settlement is not to be made known to the jury....

...In all cases in which a jury is required to fix damages, the court shall instruct the jury that the plaintiff shall not recover such special damages for personal injury protection benefits paid or payable. This section, unlike sections 768.041 and 46.015, expressly requires a jury [2] determination regarding the set-off of benefits paid....

...rt the beneficiary's claims. It was instead bottomed on the court's conclusion that the beneficiary lacked standing to bring its own independent claim against the dealer, Prudential-Bache. [2] Appellant makes no contention on this appeal that either section 46.015 or 768.041, Florida Statutes (1991), prevent the settlement with the estate of the trustee from operating to release or extinguish the right of the beneficiary to continue with the suit against the dealer....

...urt shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment and enter judgment accordingly. § 768.041(2), Fla. Stat. (2012) (emphasis added); accord § 46.015(2), Fla. Stat....

...y incline to the opposite view. We therefore affirm. Because we perceive the possibility of a change in the judicial attitude in the area of commercial transactions (the legislature having expressed its intention that the rule be changed by enacting Section 46.015, Florida Statutes (1980)) and because we consider the issue to be one of great public importance, we again certify the following question in updated form to our Supreme Court: Does a written release executed prior to June 23, 1980, of...

...than $70,000.00. Unless we are compelled to reach this result we should not do so, especially since the appellees have been free to seek contribution from Willits and his company. The legislature has now acted to avoid such harsh results by enacting Section 46.015, Florida Statutes (1980) which provides that a release of one joint obligor shall not affect the liability of another joint obligor....

...tate court defendants released Arai as well. See Williams v. Arai, 731 F.Supp. 1557 (1990). In making that determination, the district court declined to apply two Florida statutes relating to the release of tort-feasors. The first statute, Fla.Stat. § 46.015(1), effective June 23, 1980, governs the release of defendants facing joint and several liability: A written covenant not to sue or release of a person who is or may be jointly and severally liable with other persons for a claim shall not r...

...the state court defendants did not believe they were entitled to contribution from Arai because they were not paying Arai’s portion of the Williamses’ injuries. In light of these two considerations, coupled with the plain meaning of Fla.Stat. §§ 46.015(1), 768.-041(1), and 768.31(5), 3 prohibiting the release of non-party tortfeasors, we reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of Arai....

...partial satisfaction of the damages sued for, [e.s.] the court shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment and enter judgment accordingly."); see also § 46.015(2), Fla....

...The appellees therefore consented to these material alterations in their guaranty and have waived any right to a discharge because of them. Appellees also argue that the release of one co-guarantor operates as a release of all. This common law rule has been abrogated by § 46.015, Florida Statutes (1983) [1] for documents executed after June 23, 1980....

...courts.' " Cornerstone SMR, Inc. v. Bank of Am., N.A. , 163 So.3d 565 , 568 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (quoting D'Angelo v. Fitzmaurice , 863 So.2d 311 , 314 (Fla. 2003) ). Setoffs for collateral recoveries are available pursuant to sections 768.041(2) and 46.015(2) of the Florida Statutes, (2015). Both sections contain nearly identical language, however, section 46.015 is located in the civil practice and procedure title of the Florida Statutes and section 768.041 is located in the torts title. Because the instant case was founded in contract and not in tort, the court found that section 46.015(2) was the controlling statute. To that end, section 46.015(2) provides that if a defendant demonstrates that a plaintiff has released "any person in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment." § 46.015(2), Fla....

...Buyers argue that this determination was erroneous because the scope of damages they sought against the subcontractors should be dictated by what they could have actually recovered against the subcontractors, not what they claimed in their complaint. The law suggests otherwise. The plain language of section 46.015(2) establishes that when determining whether to apply a settlement as a setoff, the court must determine if the settlement was made "in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for." § 46.015(2), Fla....

...Accordingly, when making a setoff decision, it does not matter what the party was actually entitled to recover, "[i]nstead, what matters is [what the plaintiff] sued for." Blasland, Bouck & Lee, Inc. v. City of N. Miami , 283 F.3d 1286 , 1296 (11th Cir. 2002) (interpreting section 46.015(2) )....

...The Stoevers reached a settlement with the extermination company, but were unable to settle with Vedder. Consequently, the Stoevers filed an action for damages against Vedder. Prior to trial, the Stoevers moved for an order in limine excluding evidence of their settlement with the extermination company. Citing sections 46.015(3) [1] and 768.041(3), [2] Florida Statutes (1995), the motion in limine asserted that it would be improper to allow Vedder to inform the jury of the settlement....

...stify certiorari review. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Carter, 680 So.2d 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Lucas, 411 So.2d 1369 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). PETITION DENIED. DAUKSCH and PETERSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 46.015(3) provides: The fact that a written release of covenant not to sue exists or the fact that any person has been dismissed because of such release or covenant not to sue shall not be made known to the jury....

...8  While Case No. 16-2008-CA-005588 sounded in contract, joint and several liability is still key. See Osheroff v. Rauch Weaver Millsaps & Co., 882 So. 2d 503, 506 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). “Florida law regarding setoffs is found in sections 46.015(2), 768.041(2), and 768.31(5), Florida Statutes (1997).” D’Angelo v. Fitzmaurice, 863 So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. 2003) (footnotes omitted). Pertinent here is section 46.015(2), which provides: At trial, if any person shows the court that the plaintiff, or his or her legal representative, has delivered a written release or covenant not to sue to any person in...

...damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment. (Emphasis supplied.) With respect to section 46.015(2) and the other provisions, our supreme court has said: “Each of these statutes presupposes the existence of multiple defendants jointly and severally liable for the same damages.” D’Angelo, 863 So....

...Alabama courts, "weighing the legal arguments and policy considerations on each side of the issue." We have a different question to decide in the present case, a question of statutory construction. Wells held that Florida's setoff statutes, sections 46.015(2) and 768.041(2), Florida Statutes (1997), not common law, controlled setoff questions pertaining to economic damages recovered in negligence suits. The setoff statutes focus on whether a release has been given in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for. Section 46.015(2), Florida Statutes (1997), provides: At trial, if any person shows the court that the plaintiff, or his or her legal representative, has delivered a written release or covenant not to sue to any person in partial satisfaction of the...

...Whether the settlement was "too high" or "too low," he would be awarded the full amount of the economic damages the jury determined he had sustained less only a setoff for economic damages already paid him. For this reason, we have no qualms about giving effect to the legislative intent expressed in sections 46.015(2) and 768.041(2), Florida Statutes (1997), as Wells contemplates....

...have plagued the proper administration of justice in tort cases...." Wells v. Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 659 So.2d 249, 255 (Fla.1995)(Wells, J., concurring specially). I conclude that the majority opinion's interpretation of sections 46.015(2) and 768.041(2), Florida Statutes (1997), to require a set-off of settlement proceeds where the jury finds the settling defendant without liability is contrary to the construction of those statutes in Wells. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent to the holding of the majority opinion on the set-off issue. I concur with the majority's holding on the judicial estoppel issue. *425 In Wells, the supreme court interpreted sections 46.015(2) and 768.041(2), Florida Statutes, holding that those set-off statutes do not apply to noneconomic damages, but do apply to economic damages for which parties continue to be subject to joint and several liability....

...ration in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment and enter judgment accordingly. See also § 46.015, Fla....

...Provisions Relating to Releases. Plaintiffs argue that the common law rule that releases all tortfeasors on the release of one tortfeasor was abrogated with Florida's enactment of various statutory provisions. With regard to tortfeasors who are jointly and severally liable, section 46.015(1) of the Florida Statutes provides: A written covenant not to sue or release of a person who is or may be jointly and severally liable with other persons for a claim shall not release or discharge any other person who may be liable for the balance of such claim....

...Therefore, we certify as one of great public importance the following questions: (A) IS A NON-SETTLING DEFENDANT IN A CASE TRIED UNDER SECTION 768.81(3) ENTITLED TO SETOFF OR REDUCTION OF HIS APPORTIONED SHARE OF THE DAMAGES, AS ASSESSED BY THE JURY, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 768.041(2), 46.015(2) OR 768.31(5)(a), BASED UPON SUMS PAID BY *660 SETTLING DEFENDANTS IN EXCESS OF THEIR APPORTIONED LIABILITY AS DETERMINED BY THE JURY? (B) DOES THE RULE AS TO SETOFF APPLY EQUALLY TO BOTH ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES? REVERSED and REMAN...

...[3] The amount the trial court awarded in total was $509,267.70. There was a miscalculation in arriving at this figure. Ninety percent of the total damages is $516,467.70; when $9,000 is added to that sum and $17,000 is subtracted, the total becomes $508,467.70. [4] Section 46.015(2), Florida Statutes (1991), reads: (2) At trial, if any person shows the court that the plaintiff, or his legal representative, has delivered a written release or covenant not to sue to any person in partial satisfaction of the damage...

...ciary duty to DG. On appeal, CBRE raises several issues, only one of which warrants reversal. CBRE rightly argues that the trial court erred in refusing its request for setoff. Setoff determinations are governed by sections 768.041 and 46.015, Florida Statutes. These provisions are “nearly identical”; section 768.041(2) applies to tort actions, while section 46.015(2) applies to all other actions, including actions on contracts. Addison Constr. Corp. v. Vecellio, 240 So. 3d 757, 764 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). Section 46.015(2), Florida Statutes, states: At trial, if any person shows the court that the plaintiff, or his or her legal representative, has delivered a written release or covenant not to sue to any person in partial sat...

...Where a settlement agreement is involved, the law is particularly clear: “The fact that a written release or covenant not to sue exists or the fact that any person has been dismissed because of such release or covenant not to sue shall not be made known to the jury.” § 46.015(3), Fla....

...information to show that the claims arise from the same injury. . . . If on appeal Wal–Mart is determined to be entitled to a set-off, the case can be remanded for the trial court to allow discovery of the settlement amounts and to set-off these amounts from the final judgment."). See § 46.015(2), Fla....

...information to show that the claims arise from the same injury. . . . If on appeal Wal–Mart is determined to be entitled to a set-off, the case can be remanded for the trial court to allow discovery of the settlement amounts and to set-off these amounts from the final judgment."). See § 46.015(2), Fla....

...claims and damages as the Appellants—settled the claims against them and were dismissed with prejudice from the suit. We reverse and remand with directions for the trial court to setoff from the final judgment the pre-trial settlement involving these co-defendants. See § 46.015, Fla....

...ration in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment and enter judgment accordingly. See also § 46.015, Fla....

similar form in section 46.015 of the statutes entitled “Release of parties”. Section 46.015(3) provides:

...We also reverse and remand for further proceedings on the cross-appeal issue wherein the trial court improperly set off the settlement amounts received from the other defendants against the noneconomic damages awarded to the Estate pursuant to sections 46.015 and 768.041, Florida Statutes (2002)....

...Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the judgment and remand for the trial court to enter an amended final judgment in accordance herewith. . Lastly, the trial court erred in setting off the settlement amounts received from the other defendants against the non-economic damage award pursuant to sections 46.015 and 768.041. Section 46.015(2) states the following: At trial, if any person shows the court that the plaintiff, or his or her legal representative, has delivered a written release or covenant not to sue to any person in partial satisfaction of the damages sued f...

...udgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment. 4 However, the supreme court in Wells v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center, Inc., 659 So.2d 249, 253 (Fla.1995), specifically held that sections 46.015 and 768.041 do not apply to noneconomic damages....

...Valdes claimed against the Hospital differed from those claimed against his former partners. Whether caused by the Hospital's sole wrongdoing or in conjunction with wrongdoing on the part of his former partners, Dr. Valdes suffered the same damages, i.e., his lost wages. Section 46.015, Florida Statutes, directs that a court set off the proceeds of any settlement with "any person in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for." Because Dr....

...lower courts.’” Cornerstone SMR, Inc. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 163 So. 3d 565, 568 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (quoting D’Angelo v. Fitzmaurice, 863 So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. 2003)). Setoffs for collateral recoveries are available pursuant to sections 768.041(2) and 46.015(2) of the Florida Statutes, (2015). Both sections contain nearly identical language, however, section 46.015 is located in the civil practice and procedure title of the Florida Statutes and 8 section 768.041 is located in the torts title. Because the instant case was founded in contract and not in tort, the court found that section 46.015(2) was the controlling statute. To that end, section 46.015(2) provides that if a defendant demonstrates that a plaintiff has released “any person in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment.” § 46.015(2), Fla. Stat....

...Buyers argue that this determination was erroneous because the scope of damages they sought against the subcontractors should be dictated by what they could have actually recovered against the subcontractors, not what they claimed in their complaint. The law suggests otherwise. The plain language of section 46.015(2) establishes that when determining whether to apply a settlement as a setoff, the court must determine if the settlement was made “in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for.” § 46.015(2), Fla. Stat....

...Accordingly, when making a setoff decision, it does not matter what the party was actually entitled to recover, “[i]nstead, what matters is [what the plaintiff] sued for.” Blasland, Bouck & Lee, Inc. v. City of N. Miami, 283 F. 3d 1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2002) (interpreting section 46.015(2))....

...Close also asserted that, without the setoff, the District would obtain a double recovery. The District responded that Close was not entitled to a setoff because, among other things: (1) the settlement agreement precluded Close from claiming a setoff; (2) section 46.015(2), Florida Statutes (2022), did not apply because a bond action was never filed and Surety was never a litigant in the breach of contract action; and (3) the settlement was for damages under the performance bond, not for damages the j...

...However, the trial court entered a directed verdict in their favor after the verdict, and we affirm that ruling without discussion. 2 568 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (quoting D’Angelo v. Fitzmaurice, 863 So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. 2003)). Setoffs in contract claims are governed by section 46.015(2), which provides that if a plaintiff has released “any person in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for, the court shall [setoff] this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment.” Addison Constr. Corp. v. Vecellio, 240 So. 3d 757, 764 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (quoting § 46.015(2), Fla....

...3 any claims related to the bond, Surety paid the District $1,000,000. These are the exact same damages that the District sued Close to recover. The District argues that Surety’s payment does not fall within section 46.015(2)’s “sued for” language because the District did not sue Surety on the bond and Surety never became a defendant in the breach of contract action....

...ith Surety. Those damages are the same regardless of whether the District sued Surety. Contrary to the District’s argument, the setoff statute applies where a plaintiff releases “any person”—the statute is not limited to only litigants. § 46.015(2), Fla....

...In addition, State Farm is denying liability, and a setoff, if any, would not come into play until the jury found State Farm liable and determined the amount of damages. Any setoff argument would be presented to the trial court after the verdict. See § 46.015(2), Fla. Stat. (2014). The statute prohibits informing the jury of a release or that any person has been dismissed because of such release. § 46.015(3); see also Holmes v....

...s. Appellants then filed their motion for an order to require Megabank to satisfy the judgment against appellants. The trial court denied the appellants’ motion supplying the impetus of this appeal. Appellants, while acknowledging the existence of section 46.015, Florida Statutes (1987), and Stephen Bodzo Realty, Inc. v. Willits International Corporation, 428 So.2d 225 (Fla.1983), advance and advocate the argument that section 46.015, Florida Statutes, and Bodzo address pre-trial matters only....

...ly intended its holding to apply to post-trial releases as shown by the court’s express receding from Pen-za, which involved a post-trial release. Further, the Florida Legislature expressed its dissatisfaction with this common law rule by enacting section 46.015(1), Florida Statutes, which provides, “[a] written covenant not to sue or release of a person who is or may be jointly and severally liable with other persons for a claim shall not release or discharge the liability of any other person who may be liable for the balance of such claim.” The Florida Supreme Court focused on the common law rule in Bodzo and corrected its “dead error” of adherence to that rule. We find that section 46.015(1), Florida Statutes, and Bodzo have done away with the distinction between pre-trial and post-trial releases and affirm the order appealed.

...Florida legislature, not the “public policy” preferred by the federal judiciary. If Florida chooses to deny a defendant the ability to counterclaim against, or to set off, an FCCPA violation, the Florida legislature can say so. 9 See Fla. Stat. § 46.015 (governing setoff for a covenant not to sue); § 679.340 (governing setoff against a deposit account); § 766.118(7) (governing setoff for non-economic damages in medical malpractice actions); § 768.041 (governing setoff for a covenant not to sue in a tort action); cf....

...3d at 1234-35 (citations omitted). In the instant petition, American Prime contends this exception applies, because the denial of discovery of the settlement amounts wholly eviscerates its affirmative defense of setoff. Under Florida law, setoff is statutorily circumscribed. See § 46.015(2), Fla....

...shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff 6  would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment and enter judgment accordingly. Similarly, section 46.015(2), Florida Statues, contains the following provision: At trial, if any person shows the court that the plaintiff, or his or her legal representative, has delivered a written release or covenant not to sue to any pe...

...person in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment.” § 46.015(2), Fla....

...affirmative defense or the right is waived. See JoJo’s Clubhouse, Inc. v. DBR Asset Mgmt., Inc., 860 So. 2d 503, 504 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). And, the plain text of the setoff statutes clearly dictates that the non-settling defendant establish the right to setoff at trial. See § 46.015(2), Fla....

...At mediation, the plaintiffs settled with all defendants except Wal-Mart. Id. Citing its entitlement to a setoff of the amounts paid by the settling defendants, Wal-Mart sought to compel the plaintiffs to disclose the settlement amounts they had been paid by the settling defendants. Id. After 4 § 46.015(2), Fla....

...art is in conflict with any other provision of the Florida Statutes, such other provision shall apply.” Ergo, to the extent section 768.81(3) conflicts with the statutory provisions establishing the substantive right to a setoff (i.e., sections 46.015(2), 768.041(2), and 768.31(5)(a)), the right to such a setoff endures. Because I find Strachan’s suggestion that the Legislature abolished the right to setoff highly dubious, and because Allen cites Strachan as persuasive authority...

...corporation in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment and enter judgment accordingly.” Section 46.015(2), Florida Statutes (2010), includes a nearly-identical provision that, for purposes of this case, operates in the same way as section 768.041(2)....

...Seller and Quality Built, the trial court should have reviewed the settlement agreement’s terms before denying the Seller’s motion for setoff. We reverse on that issue and affirm on all other issues raised. “Setoffs are generally governed by sections 46.015 and 768.041, both of which require setoffs as to amounts received from a joint tortfeasor.” Philip Morris USA Inc....

...1st DCA 1985) (discussing section 768.041(2), Florida Statutes); see also Centex-Rooney Constr. Co. v. Martin Cnty., 706 So. 2d 20, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (affirming trial court’s reduction of damage award by amounts received in pretrial settlements, pursuant to section 46.015(2), Florida Statutes). “[W]hen making a setoff decision, it does not matter what the party was actually entitled to recover.” Addison Constr....

be liable for the balance of the claim. See Section 46.015, Florida Statutes (Supp.1980), and Stephen

...1st DCA 2014) (holding that awards of attorney’s fees “fall outside the category of what might constitute fundamental error in a civil case”). Moreover, since we affirmed the trial court’s statutory interpretation determining that neither section 46.015, Fla....

...11, 2012), opinion withdrawn, 99 So. 3d 630 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). When the trial court issued its Fees Order, Philip Morris moved to apply a setoff of the total fees award in the amount of the Reynolds’ settlement, arguing a setoff was required under sections 46.015 and 768.041, Florida Statutes (2020), to prevent Gore from receiving an unreasonable double recovery....

...tion 768.79, Florida Statutes (2020). The trial court then entered a final judgment on attorney’s fees and costs, including prejudgment interest, in the total amount of $2,515,086.53. This appeal and cross-appeal followed. Application of sections 46.015 and 768.041 to motions to setoff attorney’s fees “Whether the trial court awarded a proper set-off is a pure question of law reviewed de novo, and ‘no deference is given to the judgment of the lower courts.’” Cornerstone SMR, Inc....

...The issue presented is whether a non-settling defendant in a civil action is entitled to reduce an attorney’s fees award pursuant to a PFS by the amount previously paid by a settling defendant toward their separate PFS. The trial court denied Phillip Morris such a reduction after analyzing sections 46.015 and 768.041. Setoffs are generally governed by sections 46.015 and 768.041, both of which require setoffs as to amounts received from a joint tortfeasor. Grobman v....

...“The set- off provision in section 768.041(2) ‘was designed to prevent duplicate or overlapping compensation for identical damages.’” Cornerstone SMR, 163 So. 3d at 569 (quoting Gordon v. Marvin M. Rosenberg, D.D.S., P.A., 654 So. 2d 643, 644 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)). Section 46.015 provides in relevant part: (1) A written covenant not to sue or release of a person who is or may be jointly and severally liable with other persons for 3  a claim shall not rele...

...or covenant not to sue to any person in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment. § 46.015(1)–(2), Fla....

...any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment and enter judgment accordingly. § 768.041(1)–(2), Fla. Stat. (2020). The trial court correctly found the language in neither section 46.015 nor section 768.041 applied to provide a setoff for the attorney’s fees paid by Reynolds....

...tation of Amendment 4, The Voting Restoration Amendment, 288 So. 3d 1070, 1078 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012)). 4  Sections 46.015(2) and 768.041(2) do not support Philip Morris’ motion for a setoff, because they apply only to the “satisfaction of the damages sued for.” The plain language of those statutes clearly specifies an intention to apply to damages and not attorney’s fees....