The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)
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To effect service on a state, a municipal corporation, or any other state-created governmental organization, a plaintiff must either “deliver[ ] a copy of the summons and of the complaint to its chief executive officer” or “serv[e] a copy of each in the manner prescribed by that state's law for serving a summons or like process on such a defendant.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(j)(2). Florida Statute § 48.111 provides the relevant rules for service of process upon a state agency within the state of Florida.The City of Winter Park asserts that Felton failed to perfect service because Gonzalez is not its “chief executive officer,” nor an official listed in § 48.111. To this, Felton offers no response. Felton's return of service does not constituteprimafacie evidence that service was sufficient, once the City points to a flaw on its face. The return indicates that Maribel Gonzalez was a “designated employee for Winter Park Police Department.” (ECF 1-3 at 34). But a police department employee (M.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2006) (An official capacity claim against a state official may be effected under the rules for individual capacity suits.”); Echevarria-Gonzalez v. Gonzalez-Chapel, 849 F.2d 24, 28-30 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that Rule 4(e) governed service of suit against state official in his official capacity). DiCarlo argues that Rule 4(j)(2) applies-a conclusion that Felton does not challenge. Accordingly, the Court assumes arguendo that Rule 4(j)(2) is the exclusive avenue for service in an official capacity suit. is not a designated official who may accept service for a municipal corporation under § 48.111. Kosnitzky v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., No. 10-23929-CIV, 2011 WL… On November 13, 2016, plaintiff tried for the first time to serve Jackson with the complaint. Plaintiff, however, did not serve the head of the agency as required by section 48.111 and section 768.28(7), Florida Statutes, thus service on Jackson was improper. On December 5, 2016, plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint against Jackson for negligence and strict vicarious liability. On December 15, 2016, plaintiff again tried to serve Jackson, but did not properly serve Jackson for the same reason as before. The trial court thus quashed service on April 10, 2017. Finally, on July 12, 2017, plaintiff properly served Jackson. Thereafter, the parties litigated the issue of whether plaintiff's action was a medical malpractice action or a negligence action. An appeal was taken to this Court, and on August 1, 2018, this Court decided it was a negligence security case and not a medical malpractice one. Simmons v. Jackson Mem'l Hosp., 253 So. 3d 59 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018). After remand to the trial court, Jackson filed its Answer and Affirmative Defenses to the amended complaint on September 17, 2018. Jackson denied in its answer that plaintiff complied with the conditions precedent of… The individuals are sued in their official and individual capacities. Therefore, service of process must conform with Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(i)(2) (registered or certified mail to the employee) and Fla. Stat. § 48.111(2) (service on public employee) for an employee sued officially, and Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e) and Fla. Stat. § 48.031 for service on the “usual place of abode” of an individual. For Glenn Siegel and Rhonda Leonard, the documents were left with Samantha Dipiazza only, and neither defendant was personally served or served at their homes. (Docs. ## 36, 38.) The objections are overruled.Nevertheless, even had Ms. DiPiazza been aware of the contents, a customer service specialist is not authorized to accept service on behalf of a county or an individual. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2); Fla. Stat. § 48.111; Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e); Fla. Stat. § 48.031. The statutes quoted by the Court in its Order denying Plaintiff's Request for Entry of Default explicitly identify the persons authorized to accept service on behalf of a county or an individual. (See Doc. 41 at 2-3, 4-5). Plaintiff's failure to attempt to properly serve any of the enumerated individuals despite the Court's instructions to do so, appears to be willful.Section 48.111( 2) provides, in relevant part, that "[p]rocess against any public agency ... not a body corporate or having a governing board or commission shall be served on the ... chief executive officer of the agency." This section applies to civil actions against DCF to make records available for inspection. See Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fams. v. Sun-Sentinel, Inc., 865 So. 2d 1278, 1285-86 (Fla. 2004) (holding that trial court erred in denying DCF's motion to dismiss in action to obtain public records where plaintiff failed to comply with several rules and statutes, including section 48.111( 2), concerning service on a public agency); cf. Kelly v. Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 233 F.R.D. 632, 634 (S.D. Fla. 2005) ("Plaintiff commenced a civil action against the DCF and pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.111( 2) Plaintiff was required to serve the Summons and the Complaint on the DCF's chief executive officer."). As DCF was not served in compliance with section 48.111( 2), we reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to grant DCF's motion to dismiss. The dismissal shall be without prejudice to Mr. Panno to refile his complaint and… Alternatively, under Florida law, when suing the Department of Revenue, process must be served on the executive director of the Department. Fla. Stat. § 48.111(3). Therefore, a plaintiff could also serve the executive director of the Department of Revenue to comply with Rule 4(j)(2)(B).Here, Plaintiff filed his Affidavit/Proof of Service on Defendant Lee County, Florida on April 18, 2018. Doc. 15. The Affidavit indicates a process server served the Summons, Verified Complaint, Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Incorporated Memorandum of Law, and their exhibits on "Jane Doe (Refused Name)." Doc. 15-1. Although the Affidavit identifies Jane Doe as an employee authorized to accept service, it does not state that Jane Doe is the County's chief executive officer, a member of the governing commission, or in any other position specifically authorized to accept service under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Florida law. See id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2); Fla. Stat. § 48.111(1). The Affidavit also does not state that Lee County's chief executive officer or any officials specified under § 48.111 were unavailable. See Morris,2010 WL 2836623, at *2 (citing Abele v. City of Brooksville, 273 F. App'x 809, 811 (11th Cir. 2008)). Further, because Plaintiff does not oppose Lee County's motion, he cannot possibly meet his burden of establishing service was proper.In any case, it appears that Pouyeh did not properly serve the defendants under federal or Florida law. With regard to the individual defendants, Pouyeh did not personally deliver the summonses, or leave the summonses at the individuals' usual places of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1)-(2); Fla. Stat. § 48.031(1)(a). Pouyeh also failed to properly serve the Trust, a public body corporate, because he did not leave the summons with the CEO, president, vice president, or any member of the Trust's governing board. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2)(A); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48.111(1)(a)-(c).. . . . § 48.111(2). . . .
. . . . § 48.111. Florida courts require that the statutory method of service be strictly followed. . . . establish that the Interim Acting City Manager was a proper recipient of service of process under F.S.A. § 48.111 . . . Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(j)(2); F.S.A. § 48.111. . . . . § 48.111 or a statement that the Interim Acting City Manager is a proper recipient in the absence of . . .
. . . Subdivision (a) is amended to conform rule 1.140 to the statutory requirements of sections 48.111, 48.121 . . . business in the state), 48.081 (service on corporation), 48.101 (service on dissolved corporations), 48.111 . . . Subdivision (a) is amended to conform form 1.902 to the statutory requirements of sections 48.111, 48.121 . . .
. . . . § 48.111(2). . . . Stat. § 48.111(2). . . .
. . . Section 48.111(2), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that “[pjroeess against any public agency, board . . .
. . . . § 48.111(2) (2002). The statutory method of service is exclusive and must be strictly followed. . . . Stat. § 48.111(2) Plaintiff was required to serve the Summons and the Complaint on the DCF’s chief executive . . . Fla. 2004) (dismissing action against the DCF for failure to comply with proper service pursuant to § 48.111 . . . Stat. § 48.111(2). . . .
. . . Section 48.111(2), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that “[pjrocess against any public agency, board . . .
. . . business in the state), 48.081 (service on corporation), 48.101 (service on dissolved corporations), 48.111 . . .
. . . business in the state), 48.081 (service on corporation), 48.101 (service on dissolved corporations), 48.111 . . .
. . . . § 48.111. . . .
. . . business in the state), 48.081 (service on corporation), 48.101 (service on dissolved corporations), 48.111 . . .
. . . Service of process was not accomplished on any of the city officials designated in subsection 48.111( . . . complaint to add the City as a defendant, and to serve process on the City in accordance with subsection 48.111 . . .
. . . Florida Statute § 48.111, which applies to service on public agencies and officers, does not require . . .
. . . business in the state), §-48.081 (service on corporation), §-48.101 (service on dissolved corporations), §-48.111 . . .
. . . business in the state), § 48.081 (service on corporation), § 48.101 (service on dissolved corporations), § 48.111 . . .
. . . . § 48.111(l)(a), Fla.Stat. (1983); Baynard v. Windom, 63 So.2d 773 (Fla.1952). . . .
. . . Section 48.111, Florida Statutes, establishes the method for service of process on public agencies, and . . .
. . . , Fla.Stat., which provides: “48.111 Service on public agencies and officers.— (1)Process against any . . . It is clear from the language of § 48.111, supra, that the persons mentioned in the return and the person . . . would have been proper under § 47.20, Fla.Stat. which was in effect until 1967, the requirements of § 48.111 . . . service made on the city clerk without asserting the absence of any of the officials specified in § 48.111 . . .
. . . . § 48.111(3) (1973) and Fla.Stat. § 49.021 (1973). . . .
. . . The controlling statute for service on public agencies and officers is § 48.111, F.S.A. . . . Section 48.111(1) (a), F.S.A., reads as follows: “(1) Process against any municipal corporation, agency . . . Section 48.111(2), F.S.A. provides: “(2) Process against any public agency, board, commission or department . . . It is obvious that § 48.111(1) (a) provides a proper manner of effectuating service upon a department . . . commission; thus, the majority reliance on § 48.111(2) is misplaced. . . . Service of process upon the Bro-ward County Health Department is controlled by § 48.111(2), F.S., which . . .
. . . . §§ 48.111 and 120.071. 4. . . .