Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...1 Pol-skie sought to obtain personal jurisdiction over Seasafe Transport through its wholly owned subsidiary, Seasafe, Inc., a Florida corporation located in Miami. The district court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that the 1984 amendments to Fla.Stat. §§ 48.181 and 48.193 were not applicable and that Seasafe Transport had no connection with Florida sufficient to subject it to jurisdiction under the statutes in effect when the cause of action arose. DISCUSSION Retroactive Application of the 1984 Amendments In 1984, the Florida legislature amended Fla.Stat. §§ 48.081(5), 48.181(3) and 48.193....

...would decide the issue otherwise.” Silverberg v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 710 F.2d 678, 690 (11th Cir.1983). Thus, the district court did not err in declining to apply the 1984 amendments to this case. Jurisdiction under Fla.Stat. §§ 48.181 and 48.193 (1983) Alternatively, Polskie claims that Seasafe Transport is subject to Florida jurisdiction under Fla.Stat. §§ 48.181 and 48.-193 (1983) by virtue of “doing business” in the state....

...The district court did not determine whether Seasafe Transport was doing business in Florida. Instead, it found there was no “connexity” between the Florida activities and the relationship between Pol-skie and Seasafe Transport (R. 221-22). Sections 48.181 and 48.193 (1983) required “connexity” in addition to the “doing business” requirement....

...Polskie was sued by the owners of the lost cargo in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Polskie filed a third-party action against Seasafe Transport which was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. 2 . Prior to the 1984 amendments, section 48.181 provided that: (1) The acceptance by any person or persons, individually, or associated together as a copartnership or any other form or type of association, who are residents of any other state or country, and all foreign corporations...

...nal property, through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers, or distributors to any person, firm, or corporation in this state shall be conclusively presumed to be operating, conducting, engaging in or carrying on a business venture in this state. Fla.Stat. § 48.181 (1983) (emphasis added)....

...gree of control over its subsidiary that the activities of the subsidiary were in fact the activities of the parent within the state is substituted service of process permitted." 340 So.2d at 546 . 17 Although these cases involved Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 48.181, the substituted service of process statute which was in effect before the current long-arm statute was enacted, decisions concerning what constituted doing business under Section 48.181 apply to Section 48.193(1)(a)....

...t ruled that the plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts to show that Doric Navigation, a non-resident defendant, was doing sufficient business in Florida to give rise to a cause of action based upon Florida's long-arm statute, Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 48.181 (West 1969)....

...ocal Miami trade publication. Therefore due process will not be offended by the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over APL. B. Insufficiency of Service of Process In Donnelly v. Kellogg Co., 293 F.Supp. 53 (S.D.Fla.1968), Judge Fulton said that under § 48.181 of the Florida Statutes one may serve the Secretary of State of Florida as the agent of a foreign corporation when the cause of action arose out of a transaction or operation connected with or incidental to the activities of the foreign corporation in Florida....

...er to further its general course of business in shipping justifies the use of Florida's substituted service of process upon the secretary of state. As recited in International Graphics ". . . the intent of the Legislature in enacting Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A., (was) that any individual or corporation who has exercised the privilege of practicing a profession or otherwise dealing in goods, services or property, whether in a professional or nonprofessional capacity, within the State in anticipation of economic gain, be regarded as operating a business or business venture for the purpose of service of process under Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A., in suits resulting from their activity within the State." This legislative intent, as well as defendant's activities within Florida for pecuniary benefit, permit the use of substituted service of process....

...show a general course of business activity in the State for pecuniary benefit.” Dinsmore v. Martin Blumenthal Assocs., 314 So. 2d 561, 564 (Fla. 1975) (emphasis added) (construing materially identical statutory language in Florida’s service-of-process statute, Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1)).8 7 The Frasers do not contend on appeal that J&B Tours falls under any of the statute’s other provisions for specific jurisdiction, and we agree that it does not. 8 “Florida’s long-arm statute i...

...m statute". The trial judge dismissed the complaint upon a finding that the defendants did not have the minimal contacts in Florida sufficient to subject them to substitute service. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, reversed relying upon § 48.181, Fla. Stat., which provides: "48.181 Service on nonresident engaging in business in state (1) The acceptance by any person or persons, individually, or associated together as a copartnership or any other form or type of association, who are residents of any other state or country...

...ts pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.191(1), it is necessary to determine whether the individual or corporate defendant, was carrying on a business or business venture in this State. The activities of the person sought to be served pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1) must be considered collectively and show a general course of business activity in the State for pecuniary benefit. DeVaney v. Rumsch, 228 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1969). A nonresident defendant, which engages the services of brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors, can be doing business in this State pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1) if the nonresident defendant, through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors was engaged in a course of conduct in Florida for the purpose of realizing a pecuniary benefit. Even if the activities of the defendant were not sufficient to constitute a business or business venture pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1), jurisdiction over the person of a defendant can still be acquired under Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3) if such defendant sells, consigns or leases within this State personal property through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors. If Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3) is complied with, even a single sale, consignment or lease raises a conclusive presumption that the defendant is operating, conducting, engaging in or carrying on a business venture in this State. Thus, a defendant may be carrying on a business venture pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3), although that defendant is not carrying on a business or business venture pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1). The method of service under Fla. Stat. § 48.181 (3) is identical to that explained under Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1). Turning now to the applicability of Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1), the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant was conducting a general course of business activity in this State....

...Greenwald, 149 So.2d 586 (Fla.3d DCA 1963). The record does not reflect any acts taken by the plaintiff in this State on behalf of the defendants. We do not hold that plaintiff cannot, by appropriate proof, meet its burden to show applicability of Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1). We merely hold that plaintiff has failed to do so. Upon a proper showing, plaintiff should be afforded a further opportunity to attempt service pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1). Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3) applies only if a nonresident person, firm or corporation "sells, consigns, or leases by any means whatsoever tangible or intangible personal property ...". Defendants contend that the personal property, to-wit: the stock, was exchanged, not sold, and therefore Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3) cannot be used to acquire jurisdiction over the defendants....

...Based on the statement of legislative intent in the preamble, we reject defendant's contention that "exchange" does not fall within the ambit of "sells, consigns, or leases by any means whatsoever ...". In addition to requiring defendant to be a nonresident person selling intangible personal property, Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3) also requires the sale to be "through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors ...". This requirement was first interpreted in Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Rand, 144 So.2d 512 (Fla.3d DCA 1962), wherein the plaintiff attempted to obtain service of process under Fla. Stat. § 47.16 (now Fla. Stat. § 48.181) on a foreign corporation which published magazines and sold them to independent contractors in Florida, *565 which sold the magazines to newsstands, which in turn sold them to the general public. In the holding that there was no jurisdiction over the defendant publishing company, the court stated: "In order to authorize service under § 47.16(1) [now § 48.181(1)], upon the Secretary of State as provided by § 47.30 [now § 48.161], the party attempting to perfect such service must demonstrate either (1) that the foreign corporation has some degree of control over the personal property referred to in § 47.16(2) [now § 48.181(3)] supra, in the hands of the `brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors' selling or distributing the personal property in this State or (2) that the foreign corporation has some degree of control over the `brokers, jobbers, wholesaler...

...n carrier or mail to independent wholesalers or dealers throughout the United States, one of which was located in Florida. In holding that the Canadian newspaper publisher was not amenable to substitute service or process in Florida under Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3) because it had not been shown that the defendant had some degree of control over the wholesalers or distributors who were selling the property in Florida or over the property in their hands, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Talcott v....

...the law in Florida because of (1) a subsequent amendment to the Long Arm Statute and (2) a subsequent case decided by the Supreme Court of Florida, DeVanney v. Rumsch, Fla. 1969, 228 So.2d 904, which plaintiffs read as broadening the application of Section 48.181. We think Fawcett is alive and well in Florida. "The changes in former Section 47.16 in effect at the time Fawcett was decided and present Section 48.181, insofar as the issue in the instant case is concerned, *566 are changes in phraseology only....

...esalers and distributors in the state." Even though this Court has not expressly adopted the views in the cases cited herein, such views have been the established law in this State. We adopt these views and refuse to expand the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3). Furthermore, we hold that the requisite control, as explained herein, is also applicable to § 48.181(1), where the nonresident is doing business through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors. Applying the established interpretation of Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3) to the facts in the case at bar, the plaintiff must carry the burden of showing that the defendant has some degree of control over the plaintiff broker or control over the stock in the hands of the broker. Unless this is done, Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3) cannot be relied upon to acquire jurisdiction over the defendant....

...By retaining ownership of the property, the seller can change or cancel the listing, even though such action may result in further litigation. Therefore, the requirement that the business be conducted "through a broker" has been satisfied. The final requirement of Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3) is that property be sold, leased or consigned to any "person, firm or corporation in this state"....

...satisfied. The gist of plaintiff's argument is that the residence of the purchaser is determinative of the question of whether defendant is selling property to a person or corporation in this State. Under the plaintiff's interpretation of Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3), a person in California who sells personal property through a broker in California to a person vacationing in California will be susceptible to jurisdiction in Florida if the vacationer happens to be a Florida resident....

...Such an interpretation would render the statute unconstitutional. Cases from the District Courts of Appeal and Federal courts have been cited by the parties for the proposition that if the brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors are doing business under § 48.181(1), and the nonresident defendant has control over the brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors, then the nonresident is doing business in Florida under Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3). The facts in the case at bar illustrate the fallacy of such an argument. In this case, the broker is a business broker in Florida doing business under § 48.181(1), and the nonresident defendant has control over the broker; however, no facts were presented to show that the business conducted by the broker in Florida was conducted for the benefit of the nonresident defendant, as opposed to other clients of the broker....

...t takes place in this State. The general rules of the law of contracts control the determination as to the place of sale, lease or consignment. Since the exchange agreement was executed in Illinois, and the closing took place in Illinois, Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3) cannot be utilized to acquire jurisdiction over the defendants....

...corporation," which provides in pertinent part: Process against any corporation may be served in accordance with Chapter 48 and Chapter 49. Turning to Chapter 48, plaintiff refers the Court to the appropriate long-arm statutes. *1166 The first one, Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1979) provides: The acceptance by any person or persons, individually, or associated together as a copartnership or any other form or type of association, who are residents of any other state or country, and all f...

...The acceptance of the privilege is signification of the agreement of the persons and foreign corporations that the process against them which is so served is of the same validity as if served personally on the persons or foreign corporations. (emphasis supplied) In addition to Section 48.181, in 1973 the Florida legislature enacted a second long-arm statute, Section 48.193, which substantially duplicates the operative language of the older statute and provides in pertinent part: Any person, whether or not a citizen or resi...

...Compare Youngblood v. Citrus Association of the New York Cotton Exchange, 276 So.2d 505 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), cert. denied, 285 So.2d 26 (Fla.1973) and Bank of Wessington v. Winters Government Securities Corporation, 361 So.2d 757 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (discussing § 48.181, Fla.Stat....

...Otto Candies, Inc., 405 F.Supp. 1235 (N.D.Fla.1975); Donnelly v. Kellogg Company, 293 F.Supp. 53 (S.D.Fla.1968). [4] Since the language of the newer long-arm statute (i. e. § 48.193) is not materially different from that contained in the older act (§ 48.181) with respect to jurisdiction based upon business contacts with the state, the restrictive Florida approach is equally applicable no matter which jurisdictional basis is invoked....

...ountry, including Florida, it is not unreasonable that defendant could have anticipated defending itself in this forum as a result of its activities in this state. After evaluating the nature and scope of the contacts required by Florida Statutes, §§ 48.181 and 48.193, the Court concludes that jurisdiction thereunder, when applied to these facts, does not offend federal notions of due process....

...§ 48.193(1)(g). Plaintiffs in products liability actions typically utilize § 48.193(1)(f) to acquire jurisdiction over a nonresident manufacturer. It thus appears that § 48.193 was enacted to broaden jurisdiction to areas not previously covered by § 48.181....

...Mallard, supra at 241 and n.3. This development has eliminated the necessity of choosing between a state or federal interpretation of the statutes. The result should now be the same under either construction. [5] This is so only when jurisdiction is obtained under § 48.181 or 48.193(1)(a)....

...ncing the plaintiffs' rights to forums with the burdens connected with requiring Nissan-Japan to submit to the jurisdiction of the forum courts. SPECIFIC STATE LONG-ARM STATUTES Florida [72-1159-Civ-CA] Plaintiff relies primarily on Florida Statutes § 48.181 and secondarily on § 42.182 for providing jurisdiction over Nissan-Japan to the Courts in Florida....

...itrust claims. [30] Thus, it is appropriate to look to these long-arm statutes in this inquiry. Plaintiff urges that the contacts of Nissan-Japan treated elsewhere within this memorandum opinion constitute doing or transacting business under F. S.A. § 48.181....

...diary, Nissan-USA. Given the strictness in recognizing corporate separateness and identity by the Fifth Circuit and Florida, this Court finds that Nissan-USA is not the "alter ego" of Nissan-Japan. [32] However, this Court finds that Florida Statute § 48.181 provides for jurisdiction over Nissan in Florida courts since Nissan-Japan is carrying on a business or business venture within Florida as these terms are applied within Florida and by virtue of the control Nissan-Japan can potentially exercise over the affairs of Nissan-USA within Florida. Transacting business through intermediaries under § 48.181(3) was at issue in Talcott v....

...[33] Talcott was a libel case in which the libelous publication was printed in Canada but distributed through independent wholesalers in Florida. The Fifth Circuit relied on Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Rand, [34] for the proposition that foreign publishers should be amenable to the jurisdiction of Florida courts under § 48.181(3) only if they retain some degree of control over the distributors or over the property in their hands. However, DeVaney v. Rumsch, [35] broadened § 48.181....

...[37] *852 It cannot be questioned that Nissan-Japan has derived substantial pecuniary benefit from sales of its automobiles in Florida. Consequently, the DeVaney pecuniary benefit test has been met. Also, the cause of action arises out of or is incidental to the activities of Nissan-Japan in Florida since under F.S.A. § 48.181(3) Nissan-Japan is conclusively presumed to be carrying on a business venture in Florida because Nissan-USA is a wholesaler or distributor through which Nissan-Japan is selling its product and any injury due to alleged price fixing would arise out of the sale of Datsuns in Florida. Another approach is determining whether the corporation is doing or transacting business in Florida because of the control it exercises over Nissan-USA. This control approach comes within the meaning of § 48.181....

...Watts [38] was a wrongful death action against a foreign manufacturer with a wholly owned subsidiary doing business in Florida. Despite the formal separateness of the companies the Deere & Co. Court held the manufacturer subject to jurisdiction under Fla. Stat. § 47.16 [the predecessor of § 48.181] due to the degree of control the parent was capable of exerting over the operations and policies of the subsidiary since many of the same people held offices in both corporations....

...is capable of asserting substantial control over the affairs of its subsidiary. [39] For this reason and the profits Nissan-Japan derives from the sales of its products in Florida the substituted service on the Florida Secretary of State provided for by Fla. Stat. § 48.181 was proper....

...148 (E.D.N.Y.1971); Albert Levine Assoc. v. Bertoni & Cotti, 314 F.Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y.1970); Chemical Specialties Sales Corp. v. Basic, Inc., 296 F.Supp. 1106 (D. C.Conn.1968; Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa-Romeo S. p. A., 244 F.Supp. 70 (S.D. N.Y.1965). [31] § 48.181 Service on nonresident engaging in business in state....

...Savoy Electronics, 290 F.Supp. 240 (S.D.Fla.1967). [33] 427 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1970). [34] 144 So.2d 512 (3rd D.C.A.Fla.1962). [35] 228 So.2d 904 (Fla.1969). [36] DeVaney was a medical malpractice case in which the question to be answered was whether § 48.181 applied to persons practicing a profession in the State as well as to those engaging in business in the State....

...ael, and the trial court directed that the motion for attorney's fees would be treated as a third-party claim. *488 The Motion For Attorney's Fees—Round 2 Security Pacific then re-served the Visolys under the Non-Resident Businessman's Statute. See § 48.181, Fla....

...ses of the dominant corporation." Id. at 733 (quoting Baker v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 181 (5th Cir.1981))(emphasis added); see also Aquila Steel Corp. v. Fontana, 585 So.2d 426, 427 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)(addressing substituted service under section 48.181 and whether fact that party served was wholly-owned subsidiary of party for whom service was intended, court states: "Only where there is a showing by plaintiff that the parent corporation exercised such a degree of control over its su...

...It involves the tragic death of a South Florida boy in a swimming lagoon at the Atlantis, which is an international tourist attraction in close proximity to South Florida, marketed heavily in Florida, and where 14% of all guests are from Florida. iii. § 48.181(3) Finally, plaintiff alleges that defendants come within the purview of § 48.181(3), which provides that a party who "sells, consigns, or leases ......

...Island Vacations for reservations and bookings services. Thus, if this provision operates to confer personal jurisdiction in this case at all, it does so only with respect to Sun Bahamas. The parties' briefs regarding this issue address only whether § 48.181(3) confers general or specific personal jurisdiction and, consequently, whether a showing of "connexity" is also required....

...Because the parties have not briefed these issues nor developed the factual record on these points, and because the Court has determined that both defendants' are subject to general personal jurisdiction under 48.193(2), the Court need not, and therefore does not, reach plaintiff's alternative theory under 48.181(3)....

...Atlantic Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., 325 So.2d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), and Lyster v. Round, 276 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). Elmex and Lyster, however, are inapplicable to the case at bar because those two cases construed a different long-arm statute (Section 48.181) than the one now before us. The provisions of Section 48.181 apply to nonresident persons who "carry on a business or business venture in this state." Those words were interpreted by Elmex and Lyster as requiring a continuous, systematic activity with the forum by the out-of-state business enterprise. The statutory language of Section 48.193, however, is much broader in scope than that of Section 48.181....

...tions of citizenship contained in Holder's Counterclaim which Gappa and Rackstraw assailed in their motion. Moreover, even under Florida law a plaintiff may invoke personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant by pleading either the language of § 48.181, see Fla. R.Civ.P. 1.070(i); see also Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla.1989), or by alleging sufficient substantive facts to support personal jurisdiction under § 48.181....

...udice and a decision of a District Court of Appeal or of the Supreme Court, regardless of which statute may have been the basis for the decision sub judice. Since petitioner has shown that the decision sub judice had to be based on either Fla. Stat. § 48.181 or § 48.182, and such decision if based upon § 48.181 would conflict with Fawcett Publications, Inc....

...s, or control over the personal property in the hands of brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors, before a nonresident can be held to be doing business in this State through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1) or § 48.181(3)....

...The decision sub judice conflicts with Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Rand, supra , and Dinsmore v. Blumenthal, supra . Whereas a parent company has "control" over a subsidiary, a manufacturer does not necessarily have "control" over a sole distributor. Fla. Stat. § 47.16(2) [now § 48.181(3)] was enacted as a legislative response to Berkman v. Ann Lewis Shops, Inc., 246 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.1957) affg., 142 F. Supp. 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), wherein it was held that Fla. Stat. § 47.16(1) [now § 48.181(1)] was inadequate to serve as a basis to assert jurisdiction in this State over a parent company whose subsidiary was doing business in this State. We do not hold that respondent cannot, by appropriate proof, meet its burden of proof to show applicability of Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1) or § 48.181(3)....

...We merely hold that respondent has failed to do so. Upon a proper showing, respondent should be afforded a further opportunity to attempt service. Having reached the conclusion that petitioner failed to sustain the propriety of substitute service pursuant to § 48.181, we must decide whether petitioner is subject to jurisdiction under § 48.182 which provides: "48.182 Service on nonresidents committing a wrongful act outside the state which causes injury within the state....

...ld be embodied in the district court's decision to affirm without opinion. An analysis of the opinion indicates that it has ruled on each of the following areas of law. (1) The majority finds as a fact that the plaintiff has not yet properly invoked Section 48.181(3), Florida Statutes, because the element of "control" has not been proved on the record before us....

...Duncan, Gainesville, for respondents. BOYD, Justice. This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, reported at 218 So.2d 238. The decision sought to be reviewed holds that Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A., providing for constructive service of process "does not apply to persons practicing a profession in this State in contrast to engaging in business in this State." Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A., provides: "The acceptance by any person or persons, individually, or associated together as a copartnership or any other form or type of association, who are residents of any other state or country, and all foreign corporations, an...

...of carrying on * * * personal business activity in this state for * * * pecuniary benefit or livelihood." The District Court of Appeal, Third District, in McCarthy v. Little River Bank & Trust Co., [2] upheld service of process under Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A., on an individual who came into the state to participate in the proceeds of an uncle's estate. The Court held: [3] "There is no question that the provision of Fla. Stat. § 48.181, F.S.A....

...ong others, are specifically referred to in the Statutes, and regulated as, "professions." Presumably the decision under review would result in anyone having professional status being immune from constructive service of process under Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A., for torts resulting from their acts. We hold the intent of the Legislature in enacting Florida Statute § 48.181, *907 F.S.A., to be that any individual or corporation who has exercised the privilege of practicing a profession or otherwise dealing in goods, services or property, whether in a professional or nonprofessional capacity, within the State in anticipation of economic gain, be regarded as operating a business or business venture for the purpose of service under Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A., in suits resulting from their activity within the State....

...ployment and conduct of carrying on business activity in the State for pecuniary benefit. The District Court reversed the trial court and ordered any service of process had, or attempted, against respondent quashed on the ground that Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A., was "inapplicable to a nonresident who has been engaged in only a profession in Florida and not a business * * *." This holding made it unnecessary for the District Court to pass on the efficacy of successive efforts to obtain service under the Statute without filing new actions....

...failure to comply with the Statute. The same judge who entered the two prior orders quashing service and dismissing the complaint as to Dr. Rumsch, also entered the order under review allowing additional time to perfect service under Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A....

...There is no contention that the original complaint is defective or that Dr. Rumsch's rights have been adversely affected in this procedure. Under the circumstances we hold it unnecessary for petitioners to have refiled after each attempted service under Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A....

...where the breach occurs. Croker v. Powell, 115 Fla. 733, 156 So. 146 (1934). The question of whether the defendant is "conducting a business or business venture" in Florida is irrelevant because service is being made under Section 48.193 rather than Section 48.181....

...19, 1965. Florida Statutes *420 § 48.182, F.S.A. (set out supra footnote 2), sought to be used to obtain service on the defendant, was enacted in 1970 and has an effective date of July 1, 1970. Service attempted under Florida Statutes § 48.161 and § 48.181, F.S.A. was quashed by the United States District Court. No question has been raised on appeal or in this certificate concerning § 48.161 or § 48.181....

...t isolated activity within this state, all within the meaning of paragraphs 48.193(1)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes (1989), as well as subsection 48.193(2) of the same statute. We disagree. Florida decisions under the closely related provisions of subsection 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1989), as well as section 48.193, have held that the presence of a subsidiary corporation within Florida is not enough, without more, to subject a non-Florida parent corporation to long-arm jurisdiction within this state. See MacMillan-Bloedel, Ltd. v. Canada, 391 So.2d 749 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (§ 48.181); see also Phillips v....

...rsuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.191(1), it is necessary to determine whether the individual or corporate defendant, was carrying on a business or business venture in this State. The activities of the person sought to be served *760 pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1) must be considered collectively and show a general course of business activity in the State for pecuniary benefit. DeVaney v. Rumsch, 228 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1969). A non-resident defendant, which engages the services of brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors, can be doing business in this State pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1) if the nonresident defendant, through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors was engaged in a course of conduct in Florida for the purpose of realizing a pecuniary benefit." Id....

...[3] See also Electro Engineering Products Co. Inc. v. Lewis, 352 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1977); Gonas, Florida's Long Arm Statutes: Federal Versus State Construction, 52 Fla.B.J. 292 (1975). [4] The reference to Section 48.191(1) is erroneous; the citation should be to Section 48.181(1). Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1971) and Section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1975) have the same language, "operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or business venture in this state." Therefore, interpretation of the language in Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1971) likewise would be applicable to Section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1975).

...The court granted Harrington's motion for vacatur and relief from judgment and granted the dissolution of garnishment and sanctions. The court found that Labbee failed to properly plead "the actual statutory language or allegations of the ultimate facts" under section 48.181, Florida Statutes (2003), thereby failing to invoke jurisdiction over Harrington....

...Ltd., 752 So.2d 582, 584 (Fla.2000); Northwestern Aircraft Capital Corp. v. Stewart, 842 So.2d 190, 193 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). The issue on appeal is whether Labbee's complaint is facially sufficient in setting forth jurisdictional allegations giving rise to the use of substituted service on the Secretary of State under section 48.181. [2] This issue requires us to accept *682 all allegations in the complaint as true and confine our review to the four corners of the pleading. See Cintron v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 681 So.2d 859, 860-61 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Section 48.181, one of Florida's long-arm statutes, permits Florida's Secretary of State to accept service on behalf of nonresidents who engage in or carry on a business or business venture in the state. ß 48.181, Fla....

...sidents to the jurisdiction of Florida courts when the nonresidents engage in the foregoing business activity, but also applies to nonresidents who engage in tortious acts in Florida. ß 48.193(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). Furthermore, sections 48.193 and 48.181 "provide different methods for acquiring personal jurisdiction over non-residents." A.B.L. Realty Corp. v. Cohl, 384 So.2d 1351, 1353 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). While section 48.181 permits service to be effected on the Secretary of State, section 48.193 contemplates personal service. Id. Since Labbee served Harrington through the use of substituted service upon the Secretary of State, our review is limited to whether Labbee made the necessary jurisdictional allegations under section 48.181....

...seeking to invoke the provisions of the long-arm statute. Elmex, 325 So.2d at 61. To determine whether long-arm jurisdiction is appropriate for substituted service, the complaint must either plead a basis for jurisdiction pursuant to the language of section 48.181 or allege sufficient jurisdictional facts to satisfy the statute....

...Strasser Constr. v. Linn, 97 So.2d 458, 459 (Fla.1957). To effect valid substituted service of process, Labbee's complaint must sufficiently allege that Harrington operated, conducted, engaged in, or carried on a business or business venture in this state. See ß 48.181, Fla....

...l property for profit until he sold it to Labbee. Accepting these allegations as true, we find that both the renting of the property and the sale of such an investment property sufficiently describes a business venture. The legislative intent behind section 48.181 was to regard non-residents who have availed themselves of the privilege of "dealing in goods, services, or property, whether in a professional or nonprofessional capacity, within the State in anticipation of economic gain," as operating a business or business venture....

...The second issue is whether Labbee's allegation that Harrington was a resident of Puerto Rico sufficiently satisfies the requirement of pleading that a person must be a resident of any other state or country, or a resident of the state who subsequently becomes a nonresident or conceals his whereabouts. See ß 48.181, Fla. Stat. (2003). Pleading that Harrington is a resident of Puerto Rico is the factual equivalent of pleading that Harrington is a "resident[] of any other state or country." ß 48.181, Fla....

...2d DCA 1980); Arvanetes v. Gilbert, 143 So.2d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)(noting that a lease attached to complaint was part of the complaint for all purposes). We find that Labbee met her burden of sufficiently alleging ultimate facts to invoke jurisdiction under section 48.181....

...We reverse the order dismissing Labbee's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and reinstate the final judgment in favor of Labbee in the amount of $18,923. Reversed. NOTES [1] Subsequently, both Bazo and Cobo were dismissed from the lawsuit. [2] Section 48.181 states, in relevant part: (1) The acceptance by any person or persons, individually or associated together ..., who are residents of any other state or country, and all foreign corporations, and any person who is a resident of the stat...

...constitutes an appointment by the persons and foreign corporations of the Secretary of State of the state as their agent on whom all process in any action or proceeding against them, ... arising out of any transaction or operation connected with or incidental to the business or business venture may be served. ß 48.181, Fla....

...(Doc. 26) For the reasons stated below, the motion to reconsider and the motion to quash service of process are GRANTED. I. Procedural Background On May 26, 1989, plaintiffs attempted to serve Nissan Ltd. with process pursuant to Sections 48.161 and 48.181, Florida Statutes (1987), which provide for a method of substituted service of process....

...l of documents abroad, then the Hague Service Convention applies." At ___, 108 S.Ct. at 2108, 100 L.Ed.2d at 731. The applicable Florida law here comes from Section 48.161, Florida Statutes (1987), "Method of substituted service on nonresident," and Section 48.181, "Service on nonresident engaging in business in state." The latter section provides that where a defendant engages in business within Florida, the Secretary of State is the agent for process in any action involving such business. § 48.181(1), Fla.Stat....

...Therefore, I interpret the Convention to disallow direct service by mail. The plaintiffs' service is inadequate under the Convention. IV. Use of Nissan U.S.A. as Agent For Process Consideration of this issue also requires that I review the application of Section 48.181(3), Florida Statutes (1987). That section, together with subsection 48.181(1), provides that if a nonresident defendant does business in the forum through "brokers, jobbers, wholesalers, or distributors," then service on such jobber, distributor, etc., is proper as service on an agent for process....

...Atlantic Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 325 So.2d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). In McCurdy, the court, after ruling that plaintiff had not met the burden of "clearly proving that [defendant] was amenable to substituted service of process pursuant to F.S. § 48.181," held that the motion below to quash should have been granted. McCurdy, supra, 340 So.2d at 546. Since plaintiffs have not alleged any facts which would support finding Nissan U.S.A. as Nissan, Ltd.'s agent under Section 48.181(3), that provision is inapplicable....

...Frye of Trenam, Simmons, Kemker, Scharf & Barkin, Tampa, for appellee-McDowell Mfg. Co. WALDEN, Judge. This is an interlocutory appeal by plaintiff-appellant, whose complaint against the non-resident McDowell Manufacturing Co., defendant-appellee, was dismissed on grounds the court had no jurisdiction under F.S. 48.181 (1973) and F.S. 48.193 (1973) We reverse. The pertinent statutory sections are: "48.181 Service on nonresident engaging in business in state "(1) The acceptance by ......

...distributors in Florida for at least five years, and grossed thereby at least $13,000 per year. It is proven by defendant, by its own statement, that it received a pecuniary benefit from the transactions. That is evidence of "doing business" under F.S. 48.181 (1973), DeVaney v....

...1971), the affidavit states there were several acts here. The defendant not having made a showing that jurisdiction should not attach under the Florida long arm statute, the plaintiff was under no burden to present counter affidavits in addition to its complaint. Defendant contends F.S. 48.181(3), supra, did not apply, claiming a distinction between selling "to" distributors and selling "through" them. However, defendant's representative came to Florida to see plaintiff about the products plaintiff had bought; defendant's interest in its product extended through the distributor to the ultimate purchaser. We find the requirements of F.S. 48.181(3), supra, were fully met for jurisdiction to attach....

...48.193(1)(g) to give the trial court jurisdiction over the defendant to consider, among other items of the complaint, the validity of the claimed contract. We make no decision upon the validity of the contract; that consideration remains the sole prerogative of the trial court at this stage of the proceeding. We hold that F.S. 48.181 and 48.193 (1973) apply to render appellee subject to jurisdiction....

...or the merchandise in question. The trial court entered a judgment and order denying defendant's motion to dismiss, essentially concluding that the plaintiff carried its burden of presenting facts sufficient to justify substituted service under sec. 48.181, F.S....

...Kephart v. Pickens, Fla.App. 1972, 271 So.2d 163. [3] Although defendant seeks a reversal predicated primarily upon the contention that a single sale of goods to a Florida corporation does not constitute "doing business" within the meaning of sec. 48.181, F.S., we do not perceive the disposition of this appeal to turn upon this determination....

...The issue to be resolved is whether the plaintiff has met the burden of presenting facts sufficient to justify substituted service of process so as to withstand a motion to dismiss, i.e. has the plaintiff alleged (and proven) all requisite jurisdictional facts justifying the applicability of the long-arm statute, sec. 48.181, F.S....

...[3] It is well settled that an appeal court will affirm an order of the trial court on appeal consistent with any theory revealed by the record, regardless of the reason stated in the order under review. [4] The statute invoked by the plaintiff in this cause, § 48.181, F.S., provides for substituted service of process upon nonresidents operating, conducting, engaging in or carrying on "a business or business venture in the state"....

...ed to avoid a declaration of unconstitutionality or grave doubts on that score. Armstrong v. City of Edgewater, 157 So.2d 422 (Fla. 1963). Therefore, we determine that the requirements of doing business and connexity as delineated in Florida Statute § 48.181 (1971), F.S.A., must be read in pari materia with Florida Statute § 48.081 (1971), F.S.A....

...seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. Zirin v. Charles Pfizer & Co., supra. This party must show, when attempting to serve a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in the State of Florida, that the requirements of Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A....

...contacts. Wherefore, as appellants argue that connexity is not required, while in fact it is required, and as no showing of connexity has been made, service cannot be sustained under Florida Statute § 48.081, F.S.A., when read in pari materia with § 48.181 (1971)....

...Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957). [2] See, e.g., Cal. Code Civ.P. § 410.10 (Supp. 1971). [3] See Bayitch, Conflict of Laws, Florida 1968-69, 24 U.Miami L.Rev. 434, 454 (1970). [4] See cases cited note 1, supra. [5] See Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1) (1971), F.S.A....

...The pertinent act of contracting to insure property or risk located within this state did not occur within Florida. The statute does not appear to require this by its language. Such a construction would be more apposite for the "doing business" statute, F.S. § 48.181 (1977), rather than the "long-arm" statute, F.S....

...The flight attendants, now certified as a class, sued numerous defendants (TMA included) for strict liability, implied warranty, negligence, fraud and misrepresentation and conspiracy to misrepresent and to commit fraud. [2] In the instant case, the flight attendants relied on sections 48.181(3) and 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1991) as the basis for long-arm jurisdiction over TMA. Section 48.181(3) deems a person, firm or corporation *941 to be engaged in substantial activities and conducting business in this state if tangible or intangible personal property is sold, consigned or leased through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors....

...n the second amended complaint. The plaintiffs' failure to respond with a counter-affidavit or other sworn proof [5] establishing the basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction defeated the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over TMA pursuant to section 48.181(3)....

...The Association will respond to unsolicited requests for information or publications from Florida residents, although such requests have been few in number. Having seven members of a non-profit trade association within Florida does not rise to the level of doing business in Florida for purposes of sections 48.181 and 48.193, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...arises from that activity. § 48.193(2), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1984) (emphasis supplied) (codifying in part ch. 84-2, § 3, Laws of Fla.). On May 30, 1984, the plaintiffs refiled their actions. [2] The plaintiffs served AMC and Jeep pursuant to sections 48.181 and 48.194, Florida Statutes (1983) (as amended by chapter 84-2, Laws of Florida)....

...a law. [4] The plaintiffs' actions do not arise out of AMC's and Jeep's activities in Florida — the accident occurred in the Cayman Islands and the Jeep CJ-5 was neither manufactured nor sold in Florida. Prior to the 1984 amendments, both sections 48.181 and 48.193 required that there be a "connexity" between the cause of action and the defendant corporation's activities in Florida....

...ress and unequivocal statement" from the legislature indicating a different intent. [6] See Fleeman, 342 So.2d at 818. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's order denying *275 AMC and Jeep's motions to dismiss is reversed. Reversed. NOTES [1] Section 48.181(3) was amended in the following manner: (3) Any person, firm, or corporation which sells, consigns, or leases by any means whatsoever tangible or intangible personal property, through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers, or distributors to a...

...l be conclusively presumed to be both engaged in substantial and not isolated activities within this state, and operating, conducting, engaging in or carrying on a business or business venture in this state. Ch. 84-2, § 2, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 48.181(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1984)). It is not clear, and we need not decide, what effect, if any, the amendments of chapter 84-2 will have on the "engrafted" requirement of section 48.181 that the cause of action arise out of the foreign corporation's business activities in Florida. See, e.g., General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hickory Springs Mfg. Co., 388 So.2d 264 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Manus v. Manus, 193 So.2d 236 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966) (construing § 47.16, Fla. Stat. (1965) (predecessor to § 48.181)). Courts have held that section 48.181 (titled " Service on nonresident engaging in business in state" (emphasis supplied)) provides a basis for establishing personal jurisdiction over non-residents independent from the bases provided by section 48.193 (which is titled "Acts subjecting persons to jurisdiction of courts of state" (emphasis supplied))....

...1969, 228 So.2d 904, holding that the "professional-business" distinction made in connection with the imposition of ethical and moral obligations on professional persons had no validity and was not applicable insofar as the constructive-service statute, Section 48.181, Fla....

...1st DCA 1973), the court held that an isolated act which, from any objective viewpoint, could not be held to constitute the operation, conduct, engagement in or carrying on a business or business venture, is not sufficient to activate the provisions of Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Petersburg, for appellee. BOARDMAN, Acting Chief Judge. Appellee/plaintiff filed a complaint based on a contract to sell a business located in Florida. He attempted to serve appellant/defendant, who was residing in California at that time, under Sections 48.161 and 48.181, Florida Statutes....

...It is well established that Florida's long-arm statute is to be strictly construed. Lyster v. Round, 276 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973); Wm. E. Strasser Const. Corp. v. Linn, 97 So.2d 458 (Fla. 1957). To perfect service pursuant to Sections 48.161 and 48.181, Florida Statutes, the complaint must allege the jurisdictional requirements prescribed by the statute....

...and that the defendant is either a resident of a foreign state or country, a resident of Florida who subsequently becomes a nonresident, or a resident of Florida who conceals his whereabouts. See O'Connell v. Loach, 203 So.2d 350 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967), Section 48.181, Florida Statutes....

...nted Mr. David's motion and quashed the attempted service by publication. On June 14, 2000, Mr. Massey filed a motion for leave to file a second amended *232 complaint in order to add allegations that would permit service of Mr. David under sections 48.181(1) and 48.193, Florida Statutes (2000), viz., that Mr....

...The order also directed the clerk to issue an alias summons for Mr. David. On July 18, 2001, almost a month after entry of summary judgment for Ruden McClosky on the amended complaint, [10] Mr. Massey filed an affidavit of compliance indicating that he had met the requirements for service under section 48.181(1). Following service pursuant to section 48.181(1), Mr....

...o provide any information regarding Rodriguez. Consequently, having been unable to comply with the requirements of section 48.081, Kurzbard served Mecca, a domestic corporation, through substituted service on Florida's Secretary of State pursuant to section 48.181, Florida Statutes (2005), one of Florida's long-arm statutes....

...nts prescribed by the applicable long-arm statute. See Labbee, 913 So.2d at 682 ("To determine whether long-arm jurisdiction is appropriate for substituted service, the complaint must either plead a basis for jurisdiction pursuant to the language of section 48.181 or allege sufficient jurisdictional facts to satisfy the statute."); see also Weiler v....

...Furthermore, "long-arm statutes are strictly construed and require the plaintiffs to clearly bring themselves within the ambit of the statutes." Id. at 682-83. In this instance, since Kurzbard served Mecca through substituted service on the Secretary of State pursuant to section 48.181, we must determine whether Kurzbard made the necessary jurisdictional allegations in his complaint to clearly bring himself within the ambit of the statute. Section 48.181, Florida Statutes, permits Florida's Secretary of State to accept service on behalf of a nonresident defendant or a resident defendant who subsequently becomes a non-resident or who conceals his or her whereabouts and who engages in or carries on a business venture in the state. § 48.181, Fla....

...Accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, as we are required to do, Labbee, 913 So.2d at 682, Mecca is a Florida corporation, and thus, the portion of the statute accepting service on behalf a non-resident defendant is inapplicable to this case. Consequently, the only way for Kurzbard to avail himself of section 48.181 was to properly plead that Mecca, through its officers or agents, was concealing its whereabouts....

...the registered office open from 10:00 a.m. to 12 noon each day, except Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays; and (3) keep one or more registered agents on whom process may be served during these designated hours. § 48.091, Fla. Stat. (2005). [2] Section 48.181 states, in relevant part: (1) The acceptance by any person or persons, individually or associated together as a copartnership or any other form or type of association, who are residents of any other state or country, and all foreign co...

...constitutes an appointment by the persons and foreign corporations of the Secretary of State of the state as their agent on whom all process in any action or proceeding against them, or any of them, arising out of any transaction or operation connected with or incidental to the business or business venture may be served. § 48.181(1), Fla....

...Appellees instituted this action in the Circuit Court of Volusia County praying for judgment against appellant for the full amount of the check held by them. They obtained constructive service of process on appellant under the long-arm statute of our state pursuant to the provisions of F.S. Section 48.181(1), F.S.A., as follows: "The acceptance by any person or persons, individually, or associated together as a copartnership or any other form or type of association, who are residents of any other state or country, and all foreign corpor...

...ealing in goods, services or property, whether in a professional or nonprofessional capacity, within the State in anticipation of economic gain, be regarded as operating a business or business venture for the purpose of service under Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A., in suits resulting from their activity within the State....

...ited in order to demonstrate the applicability of the statute. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that on the record before us the trial court erred in holding that process has been constructively served on appellant under the provisions of F.S. Section 48.181(1), F.S.A., and that the court has jurisdiction over his person....

...o file the requisite affidavit of compliance in accordance with Section 48.161, Florida Statutes (1977); and (b) insufficient facts were alleged in the complaint to justify the use of substituted service over a nonresident doing business in Florida. § 48.181, Fla....

...isdictional and completion of service without it is not sufficient. Secondly, the plaintiff's bare allegation that the defendant was "doing business in Florida" is insufficient to render the defendant amenable to substituted service of process under Section 48.181, supra....

...2d DCA 1978). Failure to do so requires quashal of the service of process. Defendant's second contention in its motion to dismiss was that the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to justify jurisdiction under the substituted service of process statute, Section 48.181, supra, or the long-arm statute, Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...However, we distinguish that case from the present in that a motion for continuance at least requests temporal relief and is therefore more than a "neutral and innocuous piece of paper." [3] Decisions concerning what constituted doing business under Section 48.181 should apply to Section 48.193(1)(a)....

...ts pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.191(1), it is necessary to determine whether the individual or corporate defendant, was carrying on a business or business venture in this State. The activities of the person sought to be served pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1) must be considered collectively and show a general course of business activity in the State for pecuniary benefit. DeVaney v. Rumsch, 228 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1969). A non-resident defendant, which engages the services of brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors, can be doing business in this State pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1) if the nonresident defendant, through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors was engaged in a course of conduct in Florida for the purpose of realizing a pecuniary benefit." Id....

...[3] See also Electro Engineering Products Co. Inc. v. Lewis, 352 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1977); Gonas, Florida's Long Arm Statutes: Federal Versus State Construction, 52 Fla.B.J. 292 (1975). [4] The reference to Section 48.191(1) is erroneous; the citation should be to Section 48.181(1). Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1971) and Section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1975) have the same language, "operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or business venture in this state." Therefore, interpretation of the language in Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1971) likewise would be applicable to Section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1975).

...the merchandise in question. The trial court entered a judgment and order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss, essentially concluding that the plaintiff carried its burden of presenting facts sufficient to justify substituted service under sec. 48.181, F.S....

...It is well settled that an appeal court will affirm an order of the trial court on appeal consistent with any theory revealed by the record, regardless of the reason stated in the order under review. . The statute invoked by the plaintiff in this cause, § 48.181, F.S., provides for substituted service of process upon nonresidents operating, conducting, engaging in or carrying on “a business or business venture in the state”....

...Green, Jr., Wesley A. Fink, Daytona Beach, for appellees. BOYER, Chief Judge. Appellant, named as defendant in a negligence action filed by appellees, appeals from an order denying its motion to quash substituted service of process effected under F.S. § 48.181, one of Florida's "longarm" statutes....

...nt. Plaintiffs, citing Elmex Corp. v. Atlantic Federal Savings & Loan Association, Fla. App. 4th 1976, 325 So.2d 58, successfully argued before the trial court that the allegations of their complaint were sufficient to invoke the application of F.S. § 48.181....

...1975, 324 So.2d 625, 627, to the contrary, control of VWoA by appellant may not be inferred merely from the status of the former as a wholly owned subsidiary of the latter. Thus, because appellees did not maintain their burden of clearly proving that appellant was amenable to substituted service of process pursuant to F.S. § 48.181, the motion to quash should have been granted....

...In addition, the out-of-state corporation utilized Florida attorneys and accountants in preparation for the uncompleted closing on the sale of the stock. The court, in Compuguide, found these contacts insufficient to invoke the provisions of Florida Statute § 48.181(1) (service upon a nonresident engaged in business in Florida). The operative langauge of section 48.181(1) has been found to be identical to the language of section 48.193(1)(a), the statute at issue here. Cases interpreting section 48.181(1) have been deemed to be applicable to section 48.193(1)(a)....

...The plaintiff filed its complaint against Travel Coach, Inc., a Florida corporation, Horace and one Robertson, seeking to recover the sum of $25,174.49 alleged to be due, owing and unpaid. Service of process on Horace, a nonresident, was made pursuant to Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...r proceeding against them * * * arising out of any transaction or operation connected with or incidental to the business or business venture * * *". Defendant contends that he was not engaged in a business or a business venture within the meaning of Section 48.181, so that service of process thereunder was insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court....

...The individual acts of the defendant, either when considered alone or coupled with the activities of Travel Coach, create sufficient minimum contacts so as to make the defendant amenable to process consistent with traditional notions of justice and fair play. Affirmed. WALDEN and OWEN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] "48.181 Service on nonresident engaging in business in state....

...m state result in consequences within the state. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957). See discussion, infra. [3] Provisions formerly contained in F.S. Section 47.16, F.S.A., are now embodied in F.S. Section 48.181, F.S.A.

...We find merit in appellant's attack on jurisdiction for the reasons hereafter stated. Much attention has been given by the parties to the sufficiency of "minimum contacts" within the State of Florida by the appellant to establish it was "doing business" within the contemplation of Section 48.181(1) [1] or 48.193(1)(a), [2] Florida Statutes; *857 also as to whether or not the failure of payment constituted a breach of contract within the purview of 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes....

...On remand this will, of necessity, again be addressed by the trial court. It should also be noted that this is not a case involving constructive service of process under Chapter 49, Florida Statutes. The complaint alleges one or more of the grounds for long arm jurisdiction of the appellant under either Section 48.181 or 48.193....

...ly required by Section 48.194. The record only shows that service of process was duly made and evidenced on the Secretary of State. Jurisdiction of the Florida courts over a nonresident "doing business" in this state is authorized by either Sections 48.181(1) or 48.193(1)(a). If the plaintiff chooses substituted service on the Secretary of State under Section 48.181(1), then perfection of such substituted service requires full compliance with one of the alternative methods provided by Section 48.161....

...The lower court erred in denying appellant's motions to dismiss and quash service of process. The final judgment is therefore set aside and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. HOBSON, Acting C.J., and DANAHY, J., concur. NOTES [1] 48.181 Service on nonresident engaging in business in state....

...sident foreign corporation in this instance. In our opinion, plaintiff's attempted service was defective under these circumstances and the court below did not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant. Plaintiff's reliance upon Sections 48.081 [1] and 48.181(1) [2] is misplaced, since *603 the purported service of process failed to comply with the requirements of these statutes....

...We have recently reaffirmed the established law that a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that the non-resident defendant was doing business in Florida and that the cause of action sued upon arose out of such business before jurisdiction attaches under Section 48.181(1)....

...iction where there was no showing that the corporation had been doing business in Florida or that the cause of action arose from the corporation's activities in this state. The court held that the "connexity" requirement for service of process under Section 48.181(1) applied equally as well to Section 48.081(1). Likewise, in the instant case, there has been no showing that service was properly effected under either Sections 48.081(1) or 48.181(1)....

...d the alleged injuries sufficient to support their contention that this Court has jurisdiction over the Defendants. In addition, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have not properly asserted jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant under Fla.Stat. § 48.181 (long-arm statute), as they have made an insufficient showing of Defendants doing business in Florida....

...Scott Kirk, Orlando, for appellant. Sidney H. Parrish, Winter Park, for appellees. *750 SHARP, Judge. Mac Millan-Bloedel, Ltd., a Canadian business organization, appeals the lower court's determination that it had personal jurisdiction over Mac Millan pursuant to section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1979), or section 48.182, Florida Statutes (1973)....

...the plaintiff's injury in Florida. However, it is well established that section 48.193 applies only to causes of action which accrued after its effective date: July 1973. [2] Since the plaintiff was injured in 1972, section 48.193 is not applicable. Section 48.181 has no time application problems in this case, but it requires a finding that the non-resident party sought to be served was engaging in business in Florida, or was making intrastate sales directly in Florida or through jobbers it "controlled." This statute provides: (1) The acceptance by any person or persons ......

...ducting, engaging in or carrying on a business venture in this state. Interstate or international sales to persons in Florida, no matter how numerous and ongoing, do not establish engaging in business or a business venture in Florida for purposes of section 48.181, [3] unless the nonresident is shown to have "control" or to have exercised "control" over the person selling the goods in Florida. [4] Mac Millan's doing business through its Florida subsidiary is the sole element established in this record on that point. That is an insufficient basis to support a finding of "doing business" or "control" for purposes of section 48.181....

...Atlas Van Lines, a foreign corporation doing business in Florida, brings this interlocutory appeal from the denial of its motion to vacate [1] a default judgment in favor of appellee. We reverse. The relevant facts are undisputed. Appellee-plaintiff utilized the "substituted service" authorized by § 48.181, F.S.A., (the "long arm" statute) when suing a foreign corporation....

...This is a diversity suit for malicious prosecution, abuse of prosecution, and invasion of privacy. The law of Florida is applicable. The other defendants, including the Church, for purposes of this motion, have been served. On September 8, 1981 plaintiffs filed an affidavit of compliance with Florida Statute 48.181, which in relevant part is as follows: 48.181 Service on nonresident engaging in business in state (1) The acceptance by any person or persons individually, or associated together as a copartnership or any other form or type of association, who are residents of any other state or country,...

...Olen, 449 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1971). Even if the statute is strictly construed, the Court finds that plaintiffs' evidence supporting allegations of jurisdiction herein outweighs defendants' counter evidence and justifies constructive service in Florida pursuant to Fla.Stat. 48.181....

...venture in Florida, or to have an office or agency in the state." The inquiry concerns the nature, not extent, of a defendant's activities in the state. Florida courts have shown a willingness to liberally construe "business venture" under Fla.Stat. 48.181....

...Upon consideration of the file as a whole, including but not limited to the particular evidence reviewed above, the Court is convinced that plaintiffs have met the burden of alleging and sufficiently establishing those material facts which support constructive service of process in Florida pursuant to Fla.Stat. 48.181....

...FERGUSON, Judge (concurring to certification). Although I would adhere to the position that this case, based on an interpretation of Section 48.193(1)(f)2, Florida Statutes (1981), does not present the same question as was before the court in General Tire, which was decided under Section 48.181, I agree to certify the question as one of great public importance....

...Florida, if at all, was by independent contractors. The court granted the motion to quash service and dismissed. The complaint was twice amended and plaintiff then obtained substituted service of process on the Florida Secretary of State pursuant to Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...ot belong in Florida. The record does not clearly reflect which provision of the Florida long-arm statute the plaintiff sought to employ in bringing the defendants within the jurisdiction of the court. The summonses directed to the defendants recite Section 48.181 as authority for their issuance; the affidavit filed by plaintiff to show compliance with statutory requirements relating to substituted service on non-residents refers to Sections 48.181 and 48.193....

...For service to be effective under Section 48.193, the defendant must be personally served out-of-state pursuant to Section 48.194. Since the defendants were not personally served, jurisdiction could not have been acquired via Section 48.193. Nor was service effective under Section 48.181, which was the provision actually relied upon by plaintiff....

...fering to sell the book to 500 alumni, [2] that the book was made available for sale by catalog mail order through bookstores within the state, and that a copy of the book may be found in the Dade County Public Library. The jurisdictional test under Section 48.181 was recently articulated by this court in Caribe & Panama Investments v....

...3d DCA 1979): We have recently reaffirmed the established law that a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that the non-resident defendant was doing business in Florida and that the cause of action sued upon arose out of such business before jurisdiction attaches under Section 48.181(1) ......

...Second, the legislature may want to consider what steps should be authorized when (as may become increasingly common) the process server is prevented by security personnel or other security measures from reaching the defending party's residence or place of work. IV. The plaintiffs also served defendant under section 48.181, Florida Statutes, which provides for service of process on a nonresident engaged in business in Florida. The defendant moved to quash this service as well. Section 48.181 allows service on the secretary of state where, among other things, individuals "associated together as a copartnership or any other form or type of association, who are residents of any other state or country ... carry on a business or business venture in this state...." Id. § 48.181(1)....

...hip which was involved in the development of a Florida shipping center. However, the defendant's deposition refutes this claim. The defendant is not himself a limited partner of New Bermor. [3] The plaintiffs argue that service was permissible under section 48.181 because the defendant is also an officer and director of the Florida corporation which serves as the general partner of the Florida limited partnership....

...Although several issues have been raised on appeal, the issue of proper service is dispositive. All parties agree that the appellants were not served individually with process. They all agree that service was attempted pursuant to § 48.161, Florida Statutes (1991) and § 48.181, Florida Statutes (1991). These statutes allow for substitute service on nonresidents of the State of Florida. Section 48.181 is sometimes called the "long arm" statute....

...use of action, there was no jurisdiction and substituted service was not perfected. Even if Ruthenberg had made the correct allegations, he still failed to meet the requirements of section 48.161 for effecting substitute service. Sections 48.161 and 48.181 must be read together for service to be effective....

...ion packages in homes they own in Hernando County. He argues that they are required to register with the Secretary of State and designate a registered agent. Since no agent was appointed, Ruthenberg had to proceed with substitute service pursuant to section 48.181....

...Ruthenberg never alleged that the cause of action arose out of the appellants' business activities within the state. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Jamison, 353 So.2d 1269, 1270 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Failure to make this allegation means that the appellants are not amenable to substituted service of process under section 48.181....

...It is the latter under which the trial court now apparently asserts jurisdiction over her person. According to the affidavit of compliance filed by the attorney for plaintiff Graves, substituted service was effected under the provisions of Sections 48.161 and 48.181, Florida Statutes. Section 48.181 allowed substituted service of process on nonresidents engaged in business in the state and obviously has no application to the instant case....

...The trial court refused to quash service of process on the defendant bank. The bank takes this interlocutory appeal. The issue presented for review is whether substituted service of process made on a national bank as a foreign corporation under Florida's long-arm statute [Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1975)] should be quashed where the complaint fails to allege any facts tending to show that (1) the national bank was doing business or conducting a business venture in Florida, and (2) the cause of action sued up...

...The complaint fails to allege that Chase Manhattan committed any of these acts in Florida while doing business or conducting a business venture in Florida. Chase Manhattan moved to quash the substituted service of process made upon it for failure to comply with Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...the laws of the United States, that its principal office was in New York City, and that it had no offices, branches, employees or records in Florida. The plaintiff filed no affidavits or other sworn proof. The trial court denied the motion to quash. Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1975), provides for substituted service of process on a foreign corporation who carries on a business or business venture in this state for "any action or proceeding against them, or any of them, arising out of an...

...Loach, 194 So.2d 700 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); Lake Erie Chemical Co. v. Stinson, 162 So.2d 545 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964). See also James v. Kush, 157 So.2d 203 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963). In the instant case, the plaintiff's complaint falls woefully short of invoking Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1975), sufficient to withstand a motion to quash the substituted service of process....

...closing date. As a result of these charges, a lien was placed against the Cohls' apartment. The Cohls filed suit in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit of Florida. [1] Service of *1353 process was obtained by serving the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Realty Corp., Benedetto Nuzzo and Leon Goldapple filed a special appearance for the purpose of contesting the court's jurisdiction over their persons. The trial court denied the motion as to all defendants and this appeal ensued. Before moving to the main issue, it should be noted that plaintiffs elected to proceed under Section 48.181 as opposed to Section 48.193. Section 48.181 specifically deals with non-residents who engage in or carry on a business or business venture in the state....

...e.g., the commission of a tort within the state, which will also subject non-residents to the jurisdiction of Florida courts. Of particular significance in this case is the fact that the statutes provide for different methods of service of process. Section 48.181 holds that certain enumerated conduct ......

...An affidavit of the officer shall be filed, stating the time, manner, and place of service. The court may consider the affidavit, or any other competent evidence, in determining whether service has been properly made. It is readily apparent that Sections 48.181 and 48.193 provide different methods for acquiring personal jurisdiction over non-residents. Section 48.181 permits process to be served upon the Secretary of State, while 48.193 requires process to be served in the usual manner upon an individual, albeit out of state....

...The allegations in the complaint suggest that plaintiffs might have proceeded under either statute. However, the record discloses that all three defendants were served by substituted service of process through the office of the Secretary of State. Thus, we limit our review to the perspective of Section 48.181 and look to see whether plaintiffs have shown that defendants carried on or engaged in a business or business venture within the state....

...aint. We therefore accept all the plaintiffs' allegations as true and center our attention on whether these allegations contain sufficient jurisdictional facts to obtain personal jurisdiction over all or any of the defendants. To successfully employ Section 48.181, plaintiffs must show that defendants operated, conducted, engaged in, or carried on a business or business venture in this state....

...This distinction was highlighted by the court in State ex rel. Weber v. Register, 67 So.2d 619, 620 (Fla. 1953): There is a vast difference between the words "a business" and the words "business venture" as used in Section 47.16, [the predecessor to Section 48.181], supra....

...Arguably, such an allegation might subject an individual to long-arm jurisdiction under Section 48.193, Florida *1356 Statutes (1979), (the commission of the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation within the state), but plaintiffs chose not to pursue this path. Thus, we too confine our inquiry to Section 48.181 and look for allegations that either party individually engaged in a business or business venture within the state....

....A. DOWNEY, Judge. Appellant, Derrick Waverly Moo Young, sued appellees, Air Canada and Venezolana International de Aviacion, S.A., both foreign corporations, in the Broward County circuit court and attempted to obtain service of process pursuant to Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...e attempts were equally unsuccessful. Thereafter, as *939 the record indicates, during a sixty-day extension of Rule 4(j)’s 120-day period for service granted by the district court, Manufacturers perfected substituted service pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 48.181(1) (1991), 2 which stated in pertinent part: • The acceptance by any person ......

...4 We conclude that Rule 4 provided both substituted service and personal service as a means for Manufacturers to perfect service of process and that Manufacturers has established a prima facie case of perfecting substituted service under Fla.Stat. § 48.181(1)....

...2 .In stating that Manufacturers has perfected substituted service under Florida law, we mean, as we indicate infra, that Manufacturers has established a prima facie case that it has done so. 3 . Manufacturers perfected substituted service under Fla.Stat. 48.181(1) by using the procedure set forth in Fla.Stat....

...mplaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. We reverse the trial court's order because Szilagyi failed to establish that WCTU is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of Florida under Florida's long-arm jurisdiction statute, specifically sections 48.181 and 48.193, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...1983); Compania Anonima Simantob v. Bank of Am. Int'l, 373 So.2d 68, 71 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 383 So.2d 1192 (Fla. 1980). A plaintiff may only invoke the court's jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant by means of substituted service pursuant to section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1983), when the defendant engages in business activities within the state....

...ase to another railroad company, ended up in this state and was involved in an accident. It is obvious that such contact does not amount "to operat[ing], conduct[ing], engag[ing] in, or carry[ing] on a business or business venture in the state... ." § 48.181(1), Fla....

...carrying on of a business or business venture is not sufficient to activate the [long-arm] statute."). Once WCTU made a prima facie showing in its motion to dismiss that it conducts no business in the state, has no offices or agents in Florida, see § 48.181(2), Fla. Stat. (1983), and did not lease the boxcar through any broker, jobber, wholesaler or distributor to "any person, firm, or corporation" in Florida, § 48.181(3), the burden shifted to Szilagyi to prove the jurisdictional allegations of her complaint....

...jurisdiction over the person by opposing affidavits, testimony or documents."). Consequently, the trial court erred in denying WCTU's motion to quash the service of process made in accordance with section 48.161, Florida Statutes (1983), pursuant to section 48.181....

...Consequently, the court should have granted WCTU's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(f)(2). Since Szilagyi failed to meet her burden of proving the jurisdictional allegations of her complaint after WCTU had made a prima facie showing that the jurisdiction asserted under both sections 48.181 and 48.193, Florida Statutes (1983), was improper, the trial court erred in denying WCTU's motion to quash service and dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction....

...The Fourth District refused to accept this interpretation, finding that to do so would turn every case into a "constitutional problem of defining, according to the facts of each particular case `minimum contacts.'" Id. at 508. The court held that the requirements of doing business and connexity raised in section 48.181 must be read in pari materia with section 48.081, and stated: Under this construction, Florida Statute § 48.081, F.S.A....

...seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. Zirin v. Charles Pfizer & Co., supra. This party must show, when attempting to serve a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in the State of Florida, that the requirements of Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A....

...Dixon, Bradford, Williams, McKay & Kimbrell, and James F. Crowder, Jr., Miami, for appellees. Before PEARSON, BARKDULL and SWANN, JJ. SWANN, Judge. Robert McCarthy takes this interlocutory appeal from a Circuit Court order which denied his motion to quash service of process served under Fla. Stat. § 48.181, F.S.A....

...the Hialeah-Miami Springs Bank was liable for such loss. The Hialeah-Miami Springs Bank filed a third party complaint against Robert McCarthy seeking indemnity against any damage it might be required to pay and served process on him under Fla. Stat. § 48.181, F.S.A....

...y realizing pecuniary benefit, or otherwise accomplishing an object, or doing a single act for such purpose with the intention of thereby initiating a series of such acts." (Emphasis added) * * * There is no question that the provision of Fla. Stat. § 48.181, F.S.A....

...watch and ring. We conclude that he was engaged in a series of similar acts done for the purpose of realizing a pecuniary benefit within the State of Florida or otherwise accomplishing an object and that service of process upon him under Fla. Stat. § 48.181, F.S.A....

...The contract of guaranty had been entered into by appellant and the Bank of America International of Florida in Dade County in 1977. Appellant specifically contends that the trial court erred in denying its motions because (a) Simantob was not engaged in a business or a business venture within the meaning of § 48.181, Florida Statutes (1977), [2] so that service of process pursuant to § 48.161, Florida Statutes (1977) [3] was insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and (b) the allegations contained in the affidavit filed by the appell...

...w the propriety of substituted service of process under the long-arm statute. After careful review of the record in this cause, we have determined that the execution of the guaranty by Simantob constitutes "doing business" under the long-arm statute § 48.181 since the said act initiated and was an integral part of a series of obligations owed by other parties to the plaintiff bank....

...e motions to dismiss and abate the action; defendant failed to make the proper showing and the jurisdictional facts were properly taken as true for the purpose of resolving the motions. Affirmed. NOTES [1] Hereinafter referred to as "Simantob." [2] "48.181 Service on nonresident engaging in business in state "(1) The acceptance by any person or persons, individually, or associated together as a copartnership or any other form or type of association, who are residents of any other state or countr...

...Hyman, Jr., Miami, for appellee. Before HAVERFIELD, C.J., and PEARSON and HENDRY, JJ. PEARSON, Judge. The question presented by this appeal is whether the attempted substituted service of the plaintiff/appellee upon the defendant/appellant, pursuant to Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1977), was sufficient to secure jurisdiction of the defendant....

...ns was issued and returned unexecuted by an individual who is not shown to have been appointed by the court. Another summons was issued with directions to serve the Secretary of State as the defendant's statutory resident agent, pursuant to Sections 48.181 and 48.161, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Appellant urges that no ground for substituted service under the statute appears *317 in the record. Appellee urges that the issuance of three summonses, all of which were returned unserved, is sufficient to show that defendant was concealing his whereabouts as set forth as a basis for substituted service in Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...[1] The law firm served process on Waxoyl by substituted service on the secretary of state. See § 48.161, Fla. Stat. (1995). The law firm took the position that Waxoyl was a nonresident which was engaging in business or a business venture within Florida. See id. § 48.181(1)....

...se. McLean Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Winslow Loudermilk Corp., 469 So.2d 217, 218 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (citations omitted). It is our view that on this record, there is an adequate showing that Waxoyl was engaged in business within Florida for purposes of section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...In doing so, Waxoyl was furthering its own business interests. See Nichols v. Paulucci, 652 So.2d 389, 393-94 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). We think these activities amount to the conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in Florida for purposes of section 48.181(1), where the present lawsuit arises out of that same transaction....

...[the defendant] might be called upon to defend an action in Florida.” Id. The parties dispute which Florida long-arm statute applies. Plaintiff Orlando Peruyero (“Peruyero”) cites several of Florida’s long-arm statutes&emdash; Fla. Stat. § 48.181 , § 48.182, § 48.193, and § 47.16&emdash; that confer personal jurisdiction over Defendant BAE (“BAE”)....

...These claims were consolidated for pre-trial purposes and are consolidated for purposes of this appeal. Although the six complaints do not specify a sole basis upon which personal jurisdiction is predicated, in the hearing before the trial judge and on appeal, appellees have exclusively relied on Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes, [1] to confer personal jurisdiction over the nonresident appellant. The requisites for service under section 48.181(1) are as follows: First, "a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that the non-resident defendant was doing business in Florida." Caribe & Panama Investments v....

...this state, reference must be made to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.120(f), requiring that "averments of time and place are material... ." It argues, among other things, that because the dates of product exposure anteceded the effective date of section 48.181(1), or its predecessor, the statute must be deemed inapplicable as a means of asserting jurisdiction....

...The court explained that "allegations of time and place are necessary ... only where their absence renders a pleading so vague and ambiguous that the defendant cannot adequately frame an answer." Id. at 912. We agree and adopt the Copeland analysis to the issue raised. An additional requirement for service under section 48.181(1) is that a plaintiff must allege "that the cause of action sued upon arose out of such business before jurisdiction attaches under section 48.181(1)." Caribe & Panama Investments, 375 So.2d at 603....

...doing of business in Florida and the cause of action sued upon. We have considered the remaining points and determine them to be without merit and therefore affirm. [4] Affirmed in part and reversed in part. SMITH and NIMMONS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 48.181(1), authorizing service on a nonresident defendant engaging in business in this state, provides: The acceptance by any person or persons, individually, or associated together as a copartnership or any other form or type of association,...

...No appearance for Appellee. QUINCE, Judge. Joyce Newberry appeals the trial court's order denying her motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We reverse because the complaint does not allege sufficient facts to allow substituted service pursuant to section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...The dog that bit Ms. Rife is owned by Ms. Newberry but has no connection with the business except it was kept on the business premises during Ms. Newberry's absence. Service of process for Ms. Newberry was made on the Secretary of State pursuant to section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1991). Section 48.181 provides that a nonresident who accepts the benefits of doing business in Florida appoints the Secretary of State as agent for service of process in any action arising out of, connected with, or incident to the business venture. We find Joyce Newberry does not meet the criteria for substituted service on the Secretary of State. In order to serve a nonresident pursuant to section 48.181, the complaint must allege specific facts which show that the defendant is conducting business in Florida and that the cause of action arose from business activities within this state....

...is not amenable to suit in the manner attempted here. See Unterman v. Brown, 169 So.2d 522 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964). Neither the allegations in the complaint nor the evidence presented at the hearing permits Rife to obtain jurisdiction over Newberry under section 48.181....

...This is an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion to quash and dismiss the appellee's third party complaint on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the appellant. *666 The appellee sought to obtain jurisdiction over the appellant pursuant to the provisions of Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...ecific acts done by the appellant within the state. The only allegations applicable to jurisdiction were those which stated that appellant was a resident of Indiana and engaged in business in Florida. In order to serve a foreign resident pursuant to Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1975), the complaint must adequately allege that the cause of action arose from business activities conducted within this state....

...1977); National League for Nursing v. Bluestone, 388 So.2d 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Although the allegations of the plaintiffs' complaints might support substituted service of process through the office of the Secretary of *241 State as provided in Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1981), our review of the order denying the defendants' motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants is limited to whether the jurisdictional requisites of Section 48.193, necessary predicates to service under Section 48.194, have been met....

...The deal was closed in Chicago, and appellant, having not received its commission, instituted this action in the Dade County Circuit Court. Substituted service of process was obtained upon the defendants pursuant to the "long-arm" statute, Fla. Stat. §§ 48.181, 48.182 and 48.161, F.S.A.; however, on May 3, 1973 the trial court quashed process as to all defendants....

...minimal contacts between the non-resident defendants and the state of Florida did not exist to enable a Florida court to exercise jurisdiction comporting with due process standards of substantial justice and fair play. Appellant relies on Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1), F.S.A....

...h is insufficient to constitute carrying on a business or business venture in this state. See Lyster v. Round, Fla.App. 1973, 276 So.2d 186; Hayes v. Greenwald, Fla.App. 1963, 149 So.2d 586. We think this line of argument ignores the clear effect of Section 48.181(3), supra....

...substituted *484 service. Cf. Clark v. Realty Investment Center, Inc., Fla.App. 1971, 252 So.2d 589. We think that it does. In Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Rand, Fla.App. 1962, 144 So.2d 512, this court stated that in order to obtain service under § 48.181(3) it must be demonstrated that either (1) a foreign corporation has some degree of control over the personal property in the hands of a broker selling or distributing the personal property in this state or (2) the foreign corporation has s...

...226 (1915); see also Fla.Stat. § 95.051 (1975). Defendant Itkin's affidavit (filed September 18, 1975) shows that he was "doing business" in Florida at the time of the alleged malpractice, and was therefore amenable to service of process under Fla.Stat. § 48.181....

...While these allegations do not track the language of any specific long-arm statute, see Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.070(i), Georgia Bus's counsel asserts on appeal, without contradiction, that the only statutory basis for long-arm jurisdiction argued below was section 48.181, Florida Statutes....

...ices, Inc., maintained a contract of liability insurance over its fleet of vehicles through a liability insurance agency located in Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida. The trial court concluded that it had personal jurisdiction of Georgia Bus under section 48.181, Florida Statutes....

...First Florida Business Consultants, 338 So.2d 561, 562 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976). Moreover, to perfect service pursuant to the long-arm statutes, the complaint must allege the jurisdictional requirements prescribed by the statutes. Id. Before service may be effected under section 48.181, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that the nonresident defendant was doing business in Florida and that the cause of action sued upon arose out of such business. This is known as the "connexity" requirement. Nicolet, Inc. v. Benton, 467 So.2d 1046, 1048-9 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). We find that the connexity requirement of section 48.181(1) was not sufficiently alleged in the complaints, nor did appellees offer sufficient proof below satisfying the connexity requirement....

...there any other evidence that such contract, should it exist, contemplates any Florida activity or relationship whatsoever. Accordingly, we agree with Georgia Bus that the trial court erred in sustaining personal jurisdiction over Georgia Bus under section 48.181(1), because the complaints fail to allege the jurisdictional requirements prescribed by the statute and because appellees failed to introduce the evidentiary facts necessary to support the statutory requirements when the complaint was attacked by motion to dismiss....

...ion. The motion to dismiss and the evidence adduced in the sworn affidavit in support thereof established a prima facie showing that the defendant's conduct and actions did not make it amenable to service of process under Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.181, F.S....

...Fowler, White, Burnett, Hurley, Banick & Strickroot and Ronald P. Weil, Miami, for appellees. Before BARKDULL, HENDRY and JORGENSON, JJ. PER CURIAM. Mega Trading, Ltd., a Florida limited partnership, sued Jack Klein, a New Jersey resident. Service of process was made pursuant to Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...m despite an extension of time to perfect service. As a result, Delancy proceeded to seek substituted service. Delancy filed an amended complaint, which stated the necessary requirements for substituted service in compliance with sections 48.161 and 48.181, Florida Statutes, and further filed a motion for another extension of time to *79 perfect service....

...reabouts. In response, Delancy argued that the substituted service was sufficient. The trial court quashed service of process, and dismissed the complaint finding that the affidavit did not demonstrate due diligence. This appeal ensued. II. ANALYSIS Section 48.181(1) provides for substituted service on residents who conceal their whereabouts and engage in a business in Florida....

...ssing the complaint. Reversed and remanded. NOTES [1] The amended Complaint alleged that Tobias owned and operated an apartment business in Miami-Dade County, but that Delancy had been unable to serve Tobias as he was concealing his whereabouts. [2] Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes, provides that any person doing business in this state is amenable to service of process on the Secretary of State if that person is concealing his or her whereabouts: [A]ny person ......

...The affidavit further recited that the manager reported by telephone call to affiant and stated that the defendants live in Peru but he had instructions from them not to write to them or contact them in any way. Appellee then attempted to effect substituted service of process under F.S. 48.161 and F.S. 48.181, F.S.A....

...cts showing that defendants or any one of them were subject to such statutory authorized service of process. Appellee relies on the affidavit which alleges concealment by appellants of their whereabouts for service of process under F.S. 48.161 and F.S. 48.181, F.S.A....

...implementation as the law in Florida. Plaintiff’s service of process upon Defendant was valid if it was perfected prior to November 1, 2013, in accordance with one of the three options indicated. This would include service according to sections 48.161 and 48.181, Florida Statutes, because the Hague Convention did not yet apply between the U.S. and Colombia, and strict compliance with the IASC was not required. Substitute service under sections 48.161, 48.171 and 48.181 In certain circumstances, substitute service of process may be effected upon either a nonresident or a party who conceals his or her whereabouts. The method for effecting substitute process on parties is outlined in sections 48.161, 48.171 and 48.181. Section 48.161 requires substituted service be evidenced by: (1) registered or certified mailing to the nonresident of (a) a notice of such substituted service and (b) a copy of the process, which must be evidenced by (c) the filing of th...

...return showing service on the nonresident within or without the state of Florida. § 48.161, Fla. Stat. (2013); Conde v. Prof'l Mediquip of Fla., Inc., 436 So. 2d 322, 323 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (citing P.S.R. Assocs. v. Artcraft- Heath, 364 So. 2d 855, 857-58 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)). Section 48.181 sets forth the jurisdictional requirements for substituted service of process....

...These requirements are that “the defendant conducts business in Florida and is either a (1) non-resident, (2) resident of Florida who subsequently became a non-resident, or (3) resident of Florida concealing his or her whereabouts.” Pinero v. Yam Margate, L.L.C., 825 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1265 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (citing § 48.181, Fla....

...Under Florida law, to serve a foreign corporation that is alleged to be doing business within the State of Florida, a plaintiff must serve the summons and complaint on the Florida Secretary of State and on the foreign corporation at its overseas offices. See Fla. Stat. §§ 48.181(1), 48.161; McClenon, 726 F.Supp....

...Therefore, under Schlunk, the Hague Service Convention applies, and CMSA must be served pursuant to the Convention. B. Service Upon a Subsidiary [3] Plaintiffs claim they have properly served CMSA through its Florida subsidiaries, CMSI and CMMS. Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 3. Florida Statutes sections 48.181(3) and 48.181(1), provide that if a nonresident defendant does business in the forum through "brokers, jobbers, wholesalers, or distributors," then service through such an entity is proper as service on an agent of process....

...Plaintiffs have merely relied upon the fact that CMSI and CMMS are subsidiaries of CMSA, and thus have not met their burden of proving proper service of process. Further, because Plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts that would support a finding that CMSI or CMMS are agents of CMSA under Section 48.181, that section is inapplicable....

...to conform to the provisions of the [Hague Service Convention]." Therefore, regardless of whether CMSA is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court, CMSA must still be served pursuant to the Hague Service Convention. [4] Pursuant to Florida Statutes § 48.181(2), Florida law provides for serving process on a particular agent designated by a foreign corporation who is doing business in the state. However, in this case, service was made on the registered agent of CMSI and CMMS, subsidiaries of CMSA. However, CMSA has not designated CMSI or CMMS's agent as its agent for service of process in Florida. Therefore, section 48.181(2) is inapplicable....

...Appellees Henry Duzinski and Irene Duzinski are the parents of Andrew Duzinski. They filed suit in the Circuit Court of Okaloosa County, alleging that defendant, appellant here, was subject to service of process under Florida's "long-arm statutes", specifically F.S. 48.161, 48.181 and 48.182....

...not doing business in the State of Florida at the time of the act complained of, but who subsequently commenced doing business in this State and was doing business at the time suit was filed, subject to service of process pursuant to Florida Statute 48.181 or any other applicable statute? An excellent discussion of Florida's "long-arm statutes" is found in an opinion of our sister court of the Fourth District in Youngblood v....

...1957, 97 So.2d 458; Young Spring & Wire Corp. v. Smith, supra; Zirin v. Charles Pfizer & Co., Sup.Ct.Fla. 1961, 128 So.2d 594; Viking Superior Corporation v. W.T. Grant Company, supra; and Eder Instrument Co. v. Allen, Fla.App.3rd 1971, 253 So.2d 902) Florida Statute 48.181 (Florida Statutes 1971) reads (insofar as material to the issues herein involved) as follows: "(1) The acceptance by * * * all foreign corporations * * * of the privilege extended by law to nonresidents and others to operate, conduct, engage i...

...hat the appellees failed to prove that appellant, prior to the happening of the event giving rise to this action, operated, conducted, engaged in, or carried on a business or business venture in this State or had an office or agency in the State. (F.S. 48.181(1)) They also failed to prove that appellant, prior to said event, sold, consigned, or leased any tangible or intangible personal property, through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors to any person, firm or corporation in the State. (F.S. 48.181 (3)) Appellees do not even claim that appellant had or has a resident agent or officer in the State. (F.S. 48.181(2)) It is noted that the statute (48.181(1)) specifically restricts service upon the Secretary of State to actions or proceedings "arising out of any transaction or operation connected with or incidental to the business or business venture"....

...oing business within this State invalid and ineffectual. * * *" 128 So.2d at pages 599-600) In Giannini Controls Corporation v. Eubanks, Sup.Ct.Fla. 1966, 190 So.2d 171, the Supreme Court considered former Florida Statute 47.16, the predecessor of F.S. 48.181, here involved, and there, discussing Zirin v....

...a again, in Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Simari, Sup.Ct.Fla. 1966, 191 So.2d 427, discussing the same statutes as heretofore mentioned (former F.S. 47.17, the predecessor of F.S. 48.081, F.S. 1971; and former F.S. 47.16, the predecessor of F.S. 48.181, Florida Statutes 1971) held that those statutes were intended to apply "only to obligations or causes of action which arose out of the activities of the corporation in the State", resting their decision on the due process provision of the Constitution of the United States....

...or cause connected with the activities of this foreign corporation in this state, we cannot reach the question of whether or not this foreign corporation was doing business in this state." (193 So.2d at pages 237-238) (For other cases holding that F.S. 48.181, Florida Statutes 1971, is applicable only to suits resulting from the foreign corporation's activities within the State, see Viking Superior Corporation v....

...1969, 228 So.2d 904 and Eder Instrument Co. v. Allen, Fla. App.3rd 1971, 253 So.2d 902, and the numerous cases and authorities therein cited) Appellees urge that although they failed to prove that appellant was doing business in the State of Florida, within the meaning of F.S. 48.181, Florida Statutes 1971, at the time of the incident giving rise to the cause of action, nevertheless upon it being proven that appellant subsequently commenced doing business in the State the statute became applicable, and the appellant subject to service of process thereunder....

...which did not arise out of the corporation's business or activities in the State, then a subsequent commencement of doing business in the State after accrual of the cause of action cannot afford a basis for substituted service under Florida Statute 48.181 (formerly F.S....

...tate of Florida at the time of the act complained of but which subsequently commenced doing business in this State and was doing business in this State at the *645 time suit was filed, is not subject to service of process pursuant to Florida Statute 48.181. Appellees next contend that even if service could not be effected pursuant to F.S. 48.181, Florida Statutes 1971, nevertheless service was properly effected pursuant to Florida Statute 48.182, Florida Statutes 1971....

...seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. Zirin v. Charles Pfizer & Co., supra. This party must show, when attempting to serve a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in the State of Florida, that the requirements of Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A....

...contacts. Wherefore, as appellants argue that connexity is not required, while in fact it is required, and as no showing of connexity has been made, service cannot be sustained under Florida Statute § 48.081, F.S.A., when read in pari materia with § 48.181 (1971)....

amenable to substituted service of process under Section 48.181, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the long arm statute

Suroor is amenable to suit in Florida under section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1995). Therefore, the trial

the statutes. Id. at 508 (footnote omitted). Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1983) provides in part:

this action." (Emphasis added.) Similarly, Section 48.181(1) authorizes personal jurisdiction of a foreign

accomplished pursuant to the provisions of F.S. § 48.181 (1969), F.S.A. Reader's Digest, by appropriate

occupancy under the lease in Jacksonville, Section 48.181, Florida Statutes, the trial court separately

or 48.181(3), and not from § 48.193. Fla.Stat. § 48.181 states, in relevant part, the following: (1) The

subject to substituted service of process under § 48.181(1), Florida Statutes. We agree and affirm. The

jurisdiction over [Pomerantz] pursuant to Florida Statute § 48.181 or § 48.193. ...” Purcell, on authority of Florida

notice of this action because Castle Pools used section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1991), or the "long arm

on the appellee was attempted pursuant to F.S. § 48.181, F.S.A. which provides for all foreign corporations

insurance company then effected service pursuant to section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1993), which authorizes

plaintiffs have conceded error. Pursuant to section 48.181, Florida Statutes (2003), the plaintiffs properly

the original summons, had not been achieved. Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1981), authorizes use of

the Florida Secretary of State pursuant to section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (2012). That statute permits

personal jurisdiction over Firestone under either section 48.181 or section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1981)

Specifically, Green Emerald argued that under section 48.181, Fannie Mae’s substitute service of process

appellants. The then existing Florida long-arm statute, § 48.181, Florida Statutes, provided no means for obtaining

appellant is subject to service of process under § 48.181, Fla. Stat., F.S.A. The plaintiff-appellees, Mr

service of process on defendant under F.S. 48.161, F.S. 48.181 and F.S. 48.182. Defendant filed a motion to

substituted service of process under either Section 48.181, F.S. or 48.193, F.S., apparently to no avail

jurisdiction over Core and Cherokee. By alleging § 48.181(3) and § 48.193(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989), inter

case on the Florida Secretary of State under Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1977), as the method

Florida Statutes. Under the old long-arm act, F.S. § 48.181, acceptance of the privilege "to operate, conduct

48.181 and 48.193, Florida Statutes (1979). Section 48.181 basically provides for the acquisition of in

service upon the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1977), after counsel for

upon Citizens and Southern Bank pursuant to F.S. § 48.181 F.S.A. Thereafter, appellant filed its motion

against Mrs. McGee, a nonresident served under Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1967), F.S.A. but who never

process upon the Secretary of State pursuant to § 48.181, Fla. Stat. and (2) service of process upon one

have been performed pursuant to Florida Statutes § 48.181, titled "Service on Nonresident Engaging in Business

not subject appellant to jurisdiction under section 48.181, 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Cf., Batavia

argument that Florida's current long arm statutes, § 48.181 and § 48.193, Fla.Stat. (1983), could not confer

jurisdiction to attach under either that enactment or section 48.181 it was necessary that there be connexity between

to section 48.181,Florida Statutes (2014). When substituted service is made under section 48.181,the

” § 48.081(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010); see also § 48.181(2), Fla. Stat. (2010) (“If a foreign corporation

Florida through a distributor and, thus, under F.S. § 48.181(3), F.S. A., would be presumed to be doing business

Caribbean was Island Sea-Faris’ broker, relying on section 48.181(3), Florida Statutes (2007). By its terms,

Plaintiffs attempt to serve Defendant under Fla. Stat. § 48.181 through service of process on the Florida’s SOC

rule. For instance, as relevant to this case, section 48.181, Florida Statutes (2012), authorizes substitute

620.169, Florida Statutes (2002). However, section 48.181, Florida Statutes (2002), does not require

business and the cause of action, we must reverse. § 48.181, Fla.Stat. (1989). On remand, appellee should

181 or 48.193, Florida Statutes (1979).[1] Section 48.181(1) provides: 48.181 Service on nonresident

given the term "business" as used in F.S. 1967, Section 48.181, F.S.A., in the case of DeVaney v. Rumsch,

serving the Secretary of State in accordance with Section 48.181, supra. The non-resident defendants moved to

that (1) substituted service of process under Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1979), utilized in the present

in order to effectuate service under Fla. Stat. § 48.181, F.S.A. We agree. This statute must be strictly

had not been effectively made pursuant to F.S.A. § 48.181. We hold that the affidavits on file are sufficient

requirements of Florida's long-arm statute, F.S. Section 48.181, F.S.A., which applies to nonresident persons

respondents under Florida's long-arm statute, Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1975). No response has been

by serving the Secretary of Státe pursuant to § 48.181, Florida Statutes, F.S. A.; and secondly, by serving

interpreting the Florida long-arm statute (Section 48.181, Florida Statutes) to allow suit against a

amended complaint for nonpayment pursuant to section 48.181, Florida Statutes (Supp.1984), in an attempt

Florida Statute § 48.181. “In order to serve a nonresident defendant pursuant to section 48.181, the complaint

over a non-resident defendant under Fla.Stat. § 48.181 (long-arm statute), as they have made an insufficient

that § 48.081 F.S.A. is read in pari materia with § 48.181, F.S.A., Youngblood v. Citrus Assoc. of N.Y. Cotton

on Florida's secretary of state, pursuant to section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1995). Farouki then moved

case is insufficient. The plaintiff relied on section 48.181, Florida Statutes (2005). The plaintiff argues

defendant pursuant to Florida Statutes § 48.161 and § 48.181, which provide for substituted service on a person

applicability of the Florida Long Arm Statute § 48.181 and § 48.193. The burden of proof in such a cause

process through the Secretary of State under Section 48.181(1), Fla. Stat. (1987). We reverse, however

Appellant defendants were served in Texas under section 48.181, Florida Statutes (2003), by substituted service

who is doing business in the state. Fla.Stat. § 48.181(2) (1989). However, in this case, service was

suit by substituted service of process under Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1975), because the accident

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes, provides for substituted

service on the Secretary of State pursuant to section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (2016). We reverse for

action. The long-arm statute in this case is section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1979), which provides for

Service of process was attempted pursuant to § 48.181, Fla.Stat. This section provides for service on

in the State of Florida within the meaning of § 48.181, Fla.Stats., F.S.A. The incident giving rise to

Mexican corporation on April 27th per Fla.Stat. § 48.181. Two interrelated issues are thereby raised: (1)

service of process based on noncompliance with section 48.-181, Florida Statutes (Supp.1984). After a hearing

of the State of Florida in accordance with section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1981).1 Appel-lee did

section 48.161. Northwest apparently relied on section 48.181, Florida Statutes, rather than section 48.-193(l)(d)

of State, pursuant to the long-arm statute. Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (2001). The record on

through the secretary of state is also authorized by § 48.181. See American Motors Corp. v. Abrahantes, 474

business in this state. As such, pursuant to section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes, Florida’s Secretary of

through ownership of stock of the corporation. By § 48.181 Fla.Stat., F.S.A., the engaging in business in

individuals, and particularly section 48.071 and section 48.181 and chapter 49, and after examining the record

justify service upon these defendants under Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1979) (in effect since 1957)

Secretary of State under the provisions of section 48.181, which accepted service on 818's behalf. Neiman

business in this state within the meaning of F.S. § 48.181, F.S.A. See Woodring v. Crown Engineering Co.

time of the accrual of the cause of action, or Section 48.181, still in effect, could be utilized by appel-lee

buy-sell arrangement. Ceco relies upon Fla.Stat. § 48.181, F.S.A. and Continental Copper & Steel Indus,

business within this state may be served pursuant to § 48.181, Fla.Stat. We hold that such a defendant is not

Thogus Products Company, Inc., pursuant to Section 48.181, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., commonly known as

whether substituted service could be made under Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1977), which provides for

business venture in Florida, within the meaning of Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1979), so as to establish

6-10, citing cases which discuss Fla. Stat. Section 48.181(3) (presumption of substantial business activities)

Marine, Ltd., 258 So.2d 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); § 48.-181, Fla.Stat. (1983); see also Kravitz v. Gebrueder

the Florida Secretary of State pursuant to section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (2020), was not authorized

trial court’s finding of jurisdiction under section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1991), but reverse that

Although these cases involved Fla. Stat.Ann. § 48.181, the substituted service of process statute which

that attempted service of process under F. S.A. § 48.181 was not effective. The controlling question of

CURIAM. Affirmed. § 48.161(1), Fla.Stat. (1995); § 48.181(1), Fla.Stat. (1995); New England Rare Coin Galleries

motions to dismiss is reversed. Reversed. . Section 48.181(3) was amended in the following manner: (3)

substituted service which was obtained upon him under § 48.181, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., as having engaged in business

jurisdiction of a foreign manufacturer under Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1975). Plaintiff’s proof

Bottling Co. v. McDaniel, 78 So.2d 100 (Fla.1955) and § 48.181(3), Fla.Stat. (1985). DOWNEY, ANSTEAD and WALDEN

quash service of process under Florida Statutes § 48.181, F.S.A. 228 So.2d 451. Petitioner contends that

of the Legislature in enacting Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A. [which concerns constructive service and

supports the service of process under the terms of Section 48.181(3), F.S.1967, F.S.A., which provides: “Any

foreclosure action. 3 . See section 48.181(1) of the Florida Statutes, which authorizes

the basis for long-arm jurisdiction over TMA. Section 48.181(3) deems a person, firm or corporation *941to

on Florida’s Secretary of State, pursuant to section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1995). As this court

Service was attempted pursuant to the provisions of § 48.181, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. We affirm. The appellee, Investment

the business or business venture may be served. § 48.181(1), Fla. Stat. (2010) (emphasis added). Here,

Machinery Company. The trial court relied on section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1983)1 and the requirement

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant under Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1977). The motions were

the persons or foreign corporations. Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1). “This statute provides that a defendant may

*520compels the conclusion that the provisions of Section 48.181(3), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., as construed

a business or business venture” in this state. § 48.181 Fla.Stat., F.S.A. Said non-residents moved to

long-arm jurisdiction over General pursuant to section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1999), we reverse. In its

through the Florida Secretary of State under section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (2014), was insufficient

pursuant to section 48.193(l)(a) we must look to section 48.181 which provides for service on a nonresident

Secretary of State on September 3, 2020. See § 48.181, Fla. Stat. (2020) (providing the requisites

jurisdictional facts to bring the action within section 48.181, which allows service of process on non-residents

appellant with process under the provisions of Section 48.181, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. After this second

Inc., 401 So.2d 1163 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), and section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1981), see Horace v. American

à-vis DNA subjected it to jurisdiction under section 48.181(3). This is a theory which GRS abandoned. Thus

service under Florida s Long Arm” Statute, Section 48.181 (formerly Section 47.16), Florida Statutes

connexity requirement of the pri- or statute. Section 48.181 required that a plaintiff demonstrate that

subject to jurisdiction under Fla.Stat. § 48.181 (1957). Section 48.181 of the Florida Statutes reads: (3)

personam jurisdiction over the appellees under Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1977), which the appellant

perfect substituted service of process, pursuant to § 48.181, Fla.Stat. The appellant has provided this court

subject to service of process under that section or § 48.181. See Excel Handbag Co., Inc. v. Edison Brothers

addressed is that relating to jurisdiction. Section 48.-181, Florida Statutes (1975), provides as follows:

Labbee dealt with another long-arm statute, section 48.181, Florida Statutes (2003), that also applies

v. McCurdy, 340 So.2d 544 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); § 48.181(1), Fla.Stat. (1981).

process on the Secretary of State, pursuant to § 48.181(1) Fla.Stat., F.S.A., is effective upon a foreign

Florida, was attempted via the long arm statute, Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1969). See also Section

ground that it was not subject to service under Section 48.181(1) and (2), Florida Statutes (1975). Having

DCA 2010) (holding that service pursuant to section 48.181(1), which allows for substitute service on

connexity. We do this upon the authority of section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1983); section 48.193, Florida

foreign defendants pursuant to the provisions of Section 48.181 of the Florida Statutes (1983). The record

the defendant under the “long arm statute”, Section 48.181, Florida Statutes. In support of the defendant’s

cases. *483The remaining long arm statute is section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1983). This statute requires

process on the Secretary of State by virtue of § 48.-181(1), F.S.1971. But the trial court simultaneously

conducting business in Florida within the terms of section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes; nevertheless, the rationale