The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title VI
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

Chapter 61
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE; SUPPORT; TIME-SHARING

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F.S. 61.56

61.56 Definitions.—As used in this part, the term:

(1) “Collaborative attorney” means an attorney who represents a party in a collaborative law process.

(2) “Collaborative law communication” means an oral or written statement, including a statement made in a record, or nonverbal conduct that:

(a) Is made in the conduct of or in the course of participating in, continuing, or reconvening for a collaborative law process; and

(b) Occurs after the parties sign a collaborative law participation agreement and before the collaborative law process is concluded or terminated.

(3) “Collaborative law participation agreement” means an agreement between persons to participate in a collaborative law process.

(4) “Collaborative law process” means a process intended to resolve a collaborative matter without intervention by a tribunal and in which persons sign a collaborative law participation agreement and are represented by collaborative attorneys.

(5) “Collaborative matter” means a dispute, a transaction, a claim, a problem, or an issue for resolution, including a dispute, a claim, or an issue in a proceeding which is described in a collaborative law participation agreement and arises under chapter 61 or chapter 742, including, but not limited to:

(a) Marriage, divorce, dissolution, annulment, and marital property distribution.

(b) Child custody, visitation, parenting plan, and parenting time.

(d) Parental relocation with a child.

(e) Parentage and paternity.

(f) Premarital, marital, and postmarital agreements.

(6) “Law firm” means:

(a) One or more attorneys who practice law in a partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship, limited liability company, or association; or

(b) One or more attorneys employed in a legal services organization, the legal department of a corporation or other organization, or the legal department of a governmental entity, subdivision, agency, or instrumentality.

(7) “Nonparty participant” means a person, other than a party and the party’s collaborative attorney, who participates in a collaborative law process.

(8) “Party” means a person who signs a collaborative law participation agreement and whose consent is necessary to resolve a collaborative matter.

(9) “Person” means an individual; a corporation; a business trust; an estate; a trust; a partnership; a limited liability company; an association; a joint venture; a public corporation; a government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality; or any other legal or commercial entity.

(10) “Proceeding” means a judicial, an administrative, an arbitral, or any other adjudicative process before a tribunal, including related prehearing and posthearing motions, conferences, and discovery.

(11) “Prospective party” means a person who discusses with a prospective collaborative attorney the possibility of signing a collaborative law participation agreement.

(12) “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.

(13) “Related to a collaborative matter” means involving the same parties, transaction or occurrence, nucleus of operative fact, dispute, claim, or issue as the collaborative matter.

(14) “Sign” means, with present intent to authenticate or adopt a record, to:

(a) Execute or adopt a tangible symbol; or

(b) Attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic symbol, sound, or process.

(15) “Tribunal” means a court, an arbitrator, an administrative agency, or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity which, after presentation of evidence or legal argument, has jurisdiction to render a decision affecting a party’s interests in a matter.

History.—s. 5, ch. 2016-93.

F.S. 61.56 on Google Scholar

F.S. 61.56 on Casetext

Amendments to 61.56

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 61.56

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 61.56.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

OHIO A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE v. HOUSEHOLDER, 373 F. Supp. 3d 978 (S.D. Ohio 2019)

. . . In 2012, Republican Representative Steve Stivers was elected to Congress with 61.56% of the vote. . . . vote and Republican Representatives Tiberi and Stivers winning Districts 12 and 15 with 63.47% and 61.56% . . .

J. HUND, v. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA,, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1222 (D. Kan. 2019)

. . . . § 61.56(c)(1)-(2) ("[N]o person may act as pilot in command of an aircraft unless, since the beginning . . . See 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.56(c)(1)-(2), 61.23(a)(3)(i). 235 Ga.App. 299, 508 S.E.2d 741 (1998). . . .

FIRST CHATHAM BANK, v. T. LANDERS D., 890 F. Supp. 2d 623 (D.S.C. 2011)

. . . entitled to a judgment against Landers for $316,575.00, plus interest in the amount of $18,897.77, plus $61.56 . . .

In LIPFORD, 397 B.R. 320 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2008)

. . . The Debtors testified that they pay $61.56 each month for four whole life insurance policies. . . .

NORMAN, v. UNITED STATES,, 63 Fed. Cl. 231 (Fed. Cl. 2004)

. . . In summation, under the 1999 Permit, plaintiffs were allowed to impact 61.56 acres of wetlands and 1.42 . . . The 1999 Permit allowed the filling and dredging of 61.56 acres of wetlands and 1.42 acres of waters . . .

NORMAN, v. UNITED STATES,, 56 Fed. Cl. 255 (Fed. Cl. 2003)

. . . authorized to disturb a total of 74.09 acres of wetlands and .70 acres of other waters of the United States, 61.56 . . .

UNITED STATES v. ELCOM LTD. a k a Co., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002)

. . . Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, § 1.10 [A] at 1-61.55 to 1-61.56. . . .

In BLACK, v., 260 B.R. 134 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2001)

. . . Number Two, which had 1665 square feet of living space, occurred August 24, 2000, for $102,500.00 or $61.56 . . .

AVEMCO INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v. ELLIOTT AVIATION FLIGHT SERVICES, INC., 86 F. Supp. 2d 824 (C.D. Ill. 2000)

. . . . • Paul breached his duties under FARs 91.109(a), 61.56(a), and 91.13. • Kerr breached his duty under . . . or cargo), in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another. • FAR 61.56 . . . the FARs and committed negligence by conducting the BFR in a single yoke aircraft (FARs 91.109(a) and 61.56 . . .

In R. ERICKSON, A. R. ERICKSON A. v. CITIZENS FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF PRINCETON,, 216 B.R. 938 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1998)

. . . 2270 7-15-97 $165.00 $1,052.10 7-21-97 $191.00 1,243.10 7-21-97 502.67 1,745.77 7-21-97 2272 7-17-97 61.56 . . .

NEISZ, v. PORTLAND PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT,, 684 F. Supp. 1530 (D. Or. 1988)

. . . hours reasonably expended on this case be multipliea by an hourly rate as follows: Stephen Brishetto 61.56 . . .