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Florida Statute 61.737 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
Link to State of Florida Official Statute
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F.S. 61.737 Case Law from Google Scholar Google Search for Amendments to 61.737

The 2024 Florida Statutes

Title VI
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Chapter 61
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE; SUPPORT; TIME-SHARING
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 61.737
61.737 Effect of prior judicial order or agreement.In a proceeding for a temporary grant of custodial responsibility:
(1) A prior judicial order granting custodial responsibility in the event of deployment is binding on the court unless circumstances meet the requirements authorized by general law for modifying a judicial order regarding custodial responsibility.
(2) The court shall enforce a prior written agreement between the parents for granting custodial responsibility in the event of deployment, including an agreement for custodial responsibility during deployment, unless the court finds that the agreement is not in the best interest of the child.
History.s. 1, ch. 2018-69.

F.S. 61.737 on Google Scholar

F.S. 61.737 on Casetext

Amendments to 61.737


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 61.737
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 61.737.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases Citing Statute 61.737

Total Results: 1

Maloy v. Bristow

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida | Date Filed: 1962-03-15

Citation: 138 So. 2d 801, 1962 Fla. App. LEXIS 3453

Snippet: PER CURIAM. The appellant, who was the plaintiff below, seeks reversal of an order dismissing her suit for accounting, for want of prosecution. The cause was noticed for trial before the court on July 28, 1961. For a reason not disclosed on the record it was not tried then, but came on for final hearing before the court on August 29, 1961. On that occasion, at the request of the plaintiff, who had acted without counsel throughout, the chancellor granted a continuance to September 7. When the cause