The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title VI
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

Chapter 68
MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS

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F.S. 68.09

68.09 Burden of proof.—

(1) In any action brought under this act, the department or the qui tam plaintiff shall be required to prove all essential elements of the cause of action, including damages, by a preponderance of the evidence.

(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the state or the Federal Government in any criminal proceeding concerning the conduct of the defendant that forms the basis for a civil cause of action under this act, whether upon a verdict after trial or upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, shall estop the defendant in any action by the department pursuant to this act as to all matters as to which such judgment or decree would be an estoppel as if the department had been a party in the criminal proceeding.

History.—s. 10, ch. 94-316; s. 10, ch. 2013-104.

F.S. 68.09 on Google Scholar

F.S. 68.09 on Casetext

Amendments to 68.09

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 68.09

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 68.09.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

REG SYNTHETIC FUELS, LLC, v. NESTE OIL OYJ,, 841 F.3d 954 (Fed. Cir. 2016)

. . . .% 68.09 wt.% 67.54 wt.% Rapeseed Oil 210-343 °C cut 70.75% 68.86 wt.% 69.87 wt.% 68.70 wt.% Rapeseed . . .

BARATI, v. STATE, 198 So. 3d 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . event more than 10 years after the date on which the violation is committed, whichever occurs last. 68.09 . . . application of estoppel in qui tam suits brought by the Attorney General, not by private relators. § 68.09 . . .

E. OMOTOSHO, v. GIANT EAGLE, INC., 997 F. Supp. 2d 792 (N.D. Ohio 2014)

. . . The two cities were home to 62.93% and 68.09% of all voting-age African American and Hispanic populations . . .

MILESTONE, v. CITY OF MONROE, WISCONSIN,, 665 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 2011)

. . . . §§ 68.08, 68.09(1). . . . Id. § 68.09(2). . . . Id. § 68.09(5). . . .

P. CHAPMAN, Jr. J. v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, a a, 651 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2011)

. . . Powell et al., Powell on Real Property § 68.09[2][a] (Supp.2011) (describing unlawful detainer as a " . . .

DHL EXPRESS USA INC. DHL DPWN USA v. STATE GRUPP, 60 So. 3d 426 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . brought the circuit court suit in question under the Florida False Claims Act, sections 68.081 through 68.09 . . .

TAAFFE, v. LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA,, 769 F. Supp. 2d 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)

. . . issue with the 48.02 hours Riemer allegedly spent preparing the motion for attorneys’ fees and the 68.09 . . .

SMITH, v. BERGHUIS,, 543 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 2008)

. . . excluded residents of two cities that accounted for “62.93% of the voting-age Black population and 68.09% . . .

CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. ARKANSAS RIVERVIEW DEVELOPMENT, LLC,, 573 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (E.D. Ark. 2008)

. . . Powell, Powell on Real Property § 68.09[1] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2000); Black’s Law Dictionary 568 . . .

MYERS, v. STATE R. d b a Ft. d b a Ft. d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a, 866 So. 2d 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Sections 68.081-68.09, Fla. Stat. (2002). . . . .

UNITED STATES v. A. TRAFICANT, Jr., 209 F. Supp. 2d 764 (N.D. Ohio 2002)

. . . the fact that “these two cities combine to account for 62.93% of the voting-age black population and 68.09% . . .

UNITED STATES v. J. RIOUX, 930 F. Supp. 1558 (D. Conn. 1995)

. . . Osorio, Hartford and New Britain accounted for 62.93% of the voting-age African-American population and 68.09% . . .

UNITED STATES v. W. JACKMAN,, 46 F.3d 1240 (2d Cir. 1995)

. . . Because Hartford and New Britain contain 62.93% of the voting-age Black population and 68.09% of the . . .

UNITED STATES v. OSORIO, 801 F. Supp. 966 (D. Conn. 1992)

. . . significantly, these two cities combine to account for 62.93% of the voting-age black population and 68.09% . . .

BALLARD S SERVICE CENTER, INC. v. TRANSUE,, 865 F.2d 447 (1st Cir. 1989)

. . . (The plaintiff did not, and does not now, object to the remaining $68.09 in costs.) . . .

OLSEN- FRANKMAN LIVESTOCK MARKETING SERVICE, INC. v. CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK a d b a, 4 B.R. 809 (D. Minn. 1980)

. . . . § 93(g); 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 68.09 at 894-95 (14th ed. 1978). . . .

M. FEINBLATT, v. BLOCK, 456 F. Supp. 776 (D. Md. 1978)

. . . Phelps, 283 F.2d 261, 264-65 (9th Cir. 1960); see generally 4 Collier, supra, ¶¶ 68.02, 68.03, 68.08, 68.09 . . .

BERRY v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF CITY OF BENTON HARBOR, 442 F. Supp. 1280 (W.D. Mich. 1977)

. . . It appears that in the 1966-67 school year, 68.09% of all black elementary and junior high teachers were . . .

N. W. CONTROLS, INC. a v. OUTBOARD MARINE CORPORATION, a, 333 F. Supp. 493 (D. Del. 1971)

. . . At the time of O.M.C.’s first refusal to deal with NW., O.M.C. controlled 68.09% of the cable market. . . . Thus, the Court declines to infer a monopoly from the 68.09 per cent of the market O.M.C. possessed in . . .

FREEHLING, v. MICHIGAN REPACKING AND PRODUCE COMPANY,, 426 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1970)

. . . payments or transfer the original debt on which they were to be applied.” 4 Collier on Bankruptcy,¶ 68.09 . . .

C. SHAW, v. WALTER E. HELLER COMPANY,, 385 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1967)

. . . See 4 Collier, Bankruptcy §§ 68.08, 68.09 (1966). . . .

THOMAS, v. UNITED STATES, 327 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1964)

. . . . § 68.09 at 388 (1952). See also 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 946 (1962). . . .