The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title VI
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

Chapter 70
RELIEF FROM BURDENS ON REAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

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F.S. 70.20

70.20 Balancing of interests.—It is a policy of this state to encourage municipalities, counties, and other governmental entities and sign owners to enter into relocation and reconstruction agreements that allow governmental entities to undertake public projects and accomplish public goals without the expenditure of public funds while allowing the continued maintenance of private investment in signage as a medium of commercial and noncommercial communication.

(1) Municipalities, counties, and all other governmental entities are specifically empowered to enter into relocation and reconstruction agreements on whatever terms are agreeable to the sign owner and the municipality, county, or other governmental entity involved and to provide for relocation and reconstruction of signs by agreement, ordinance, or resolution. As used in this section, a “relocation and reconstruction agreement” means a consensual, contractual agreement between a sign owner and a municipality, county, or other governmental entity for either the reconstruction of an existing sign or the removal of a sign and construction of a new sign to substitute for the sign removed.

(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no municipality, county, or other governmental entity may remove, or cause to be removed, any lawfully erected sign located along any portion of the interstate, federal-aid primary or other highway system, or any other road without first paying just compensation for such removal as determined by agreement between the parties or through eminent domain proceedings. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no municipality, county, or other governmental entity may cause in any way the alteration of any lawfully erected sign located along any portion of the interstate, federal-aid primary or other highway system, or any other road without first paying just compensation for such alteration as determined by agreement between the parties or through eminent domain proceedings. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any ordinance the validity, constitutionality, and enforceability of which the owner has by written agreement waived all right to challenge.

(3) In the event that a municipality, county, or other governmental entity undertakes a public project or public goal requiring alteration or removal of any lawfully erected sign, the municipality, county, or other governmental entity shall notify the owner of the affected sign in writing of the public project or goal and of the intention of the municipality, county, or other governmental entity to seek such alteration or removal. Within 30 days after receipt of the notice, the owner of the sign and the municipality, county, or other governmental entity shall attempt to meet for purposes of negotiating and executing a relocation and reconstruction agreement as provided for in subsection (1).

(4) If the parties fail to enter into a relocation and reconstruction agreement within 120 days after the initial notification by the municipality, county, or other governmental entity, either party may request mandatory nonbinding arbitration to resolve the disagreements between the parties. Each party shall select an arbitrator, and the individuals so selected shall choose a third arbitrator. The three arbitrators shall constitute the panel that shall arbitrate the dispute between the parties and, at the conclusion of the proceedings, shall present to the parties a proposed relocation and reconstruction agreement that the panel believes equitably balances the rights, interests, obligations, and reasonable expectations of the parties. If the municipality, county, or other governmental entity and the sign owner accept the proposed relocation and reconstruction agreement, the municipality, county, or other governmental entity and the sign owner shall each pay its respective costs of arbitration and shall pay one-half of the costs of the arbitration panel, unless the parties otherwise agree.

(5) If the parties do not enter into a relocation and reconstruction agreement, the municipality, county, or other governmental entity may proceed with the public project or purpose and the alteration or removal of the sign only after first paying just compensation for such alteration or removal as determined by agreement between the parties or through eminent domain proceedings.

(6) The requirement by a municipality, county, or other governmental entity that a lawfully erected sign be removed or altered as a condition precedent to the issuance or continued effectiveness of a development order constitutes a compelled removal that is prohibited without prior payment of just compensation under subsection (2). This subsection shall not apply when the owner of the land on which the sign is located is seeking to have the property redesignated on the future land use map of the applicable comprehensive plan for exclusively single-family residential use.

(7) The requirement by a municipality, county, or other governmental entity that a lawfully erected sign be altered or removed from the premises upon which it is located incident to the voluntary acquisition of such property by a municipality, county, or other governmental entity constitutes a compelled removal that is prohibited without payment of just compensation under subsection (2).

(8) Nothing in this section shall prevent a municipality, county, or other governmental entity from acquiring a lawfully erected sign through eminent domain or from prospectively regulating the placement, size, height, or other aspects of new signs within such entity’s jurisdiction, including the prohibition of new signs, unless otherwise authorized pursuant to this section. Nothing in this section shall impair any ordinance or provision of any ordinance not inconsistent with this section, including a provision that creates a ban or partial ban on new signs, nor shall this section create any new rights for any party other than the owner of a sign, the owner of the land upon which it is located, or a municipality, county, or other governmental entity as expressed in this section.

(9) This section applies only to a lawfully erected sign the subject matter of which relates to premises other than the premises on which it is located or to merchandise, services, activities, or entertainment not sold, produced, manufactured, or furnished on the premises on which the sign is located.

(10) This section shall not apply to any actions taken by the Department of Transportation that relate to the operation, maintenance, or expansion of transportation facilities, and this section shall not affect existing law regarding eminent domain relating to the Department of Transportation.

(11) Nothing in this section shall impair or affect any written agreement existing prior to the effective date of this act, including, but not limited to, any settlement agreements reliant upon the legality or enforceability of local ordinances. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any signs that are required to be removed by a date certain in areas designated by local ordinance as view corridors if the local ordinance creating the view corridors was enacted in part to effectuate a consensual agreement between the local government and two or more sign owners prior to the effective date of this act, nor shall the provisions of this section apply to any signs that are the subject of an ordinance providing an amortization period, which period has expired, and which ordinance is the subject of judicial proceedings that were commenced on or before January 1, 2001, nor shall this section apply to any municipality with an ordinance that prohibits billboards and has two or fewer billboards located within its current boundaries or its future annexed properties.

(12) Subsection (6) shall not apply when the development order permits construction of a replacement sign that cannot be erected without the removal of the lawfully erected sign being replaced.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2002-13; s. 10, ch. 2005-2.

F.S. 70.20 on Google Scholar

F.S. 70.20 on Casetext

Amendments to 70.20

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 70.20

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 70.20.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

UNITED STATES EX REL. SALDIVAR, v. FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE HOLDINGS, INC. d b a, 291 F. Supp. 3d 1345 (N.D. Ga. 2017)

. . . Upon weighing the equities, the Court finds that Defendant is not entitled to the $70.20 transcript cost . . .

NOWAKOWSKI, v. NEW YORK,, 835 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2016)

. . . . §' 70.20. These are all customary indicia of the State’s exercise of criminal jurisdiction. . . . Law § 70.20. . . .

IN RE J. MCCARTHY, 554 B.R. 866 (Bank. W.D. Wis. 2016)

. . . to receive the following property is exempt, except as specifically provided in this section and ss. 70.20 . . .

LEWIS, Sr. v. ASCENSION PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, 72 F. Supp. 3d 648 (M.D. La. 2014)

. . . 25.71 Central Primary 25.9 37.3 36.82 Duplessis Primary 36.3 40.0 71.05 Gonzales Primary 73.2 74.0 70.20 . . .

SOUTH FLORIDA EQUITABLE FUND LLC, v. CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA,, 770 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (S.D. Fla. 2011)

. . . safety or otherwise endanger public safety; WHEREAS the Florida Legislature, by enactment of Section 70.20 . . . states that “[pjursuant to the authority granted to the City by the Florida Legislature under section 70.20 . . . billboards, SFEF builds, operates or maintains outdoor signs and billboards in South Florida. .Under section 70.20 . . . Stat. § 70.20(1). (D.E. 20-1, Ex. 3). . . . .

UNITED STATES v. A. CONCA,, 635 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2011)

. . . Penal Law § 70.20(4)(a) (McKinney 2009); see N.Y. Fam. Ct. . . . Penal Law § 70.20(1) (McKinney 2009). III. . . .

UNITED STATES v. SMITH,, 376 F. App'x 140 (2d Cir. 2010)

. . . Penal Law § 70.20(4)(a), does not mitigate the seriousness of his offense, particularly where that offense . . .

PLUMBERS STEAMFITTERS LOCAL PENSION FUND, v. CANADIAN IMPERIAL BANK OF COMMERCE, D. G., 694 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . CIBC shares closed at $70.20, an approximate 20 percent decline from the start of the Class Period. . . .

BROWN, v. GREENE, M., 577 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2009)

. . . Law § 70.20 (“No conviction of an offense by verdict is valid unless based upon trial evidence which . . .

H. Jr. D. L. v., 130 T.C. 170 (T.C. 2008)

. . . 0.89 Kim General 89.16 0.89 Tom Limited 687.76 6.88 Kim Limited 687.76 6.88 Trust Limited 7,019.63 70.20 . . .

UNITED STATES v. SMITH,, 553 F. Supp. 2d 263 (W.D.N.Y. 2008)

. . . Penal Law §§ 70.20, 60.02(2), 70.00(2)(e)). United States v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. JACKSON,, 504 F.3d 250 (2d Cir. 2007)

. . . Penal Law §§ 70.20, 60.02(2), 70.00(2)(e)). . . .

WASHINGTON, v. POOLE,, 507 F. Supp. 2d 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)

. . . has found that the defendant is a persistent felony offender as defined in subdivision one of section 70.20 . . .

UNITED STATES v. JONES,, 415 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2005)

. . . Penal Law §§ 70.20, 60.02(2), 70.00(2)(e)). . . .

UNITED STATES v. CUELLO, a k a, 357 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2004)

. . . Penal Law §§ 70.20; 60.02(2), 70.00(2)(e). . . .

M. PRIOR, v. E. POTTER,, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (E.D. Mo. 2003)

. . . On October 26, 1999, Prior again took the postal exam, this time scoring 70.20. . . .

RILEY, v. UOP LLC,, 258 F. Supp. 2d 841 (N.D. Ill. 2003)

. . . reduced by $504.50; (2) the cost of defendant’s copy of Ives’s deposition transcript is reduced by $70.20 . . .

v., 26 Ct. Int'l Trade 1334 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002)

. . . Int’l Trade LEXIS 57, at *20; EN 70.20 (“This heading covers glass articles * * * not covered by other . . .

STRUCTURAL INDUSTRIES, INC. v. UNITED STATES,, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002)

. . . Int’l Trade LEXIS 57, at *20; EN 70.20 (“This heading covers glass articles ... not covered by other . . .

UNITED STATES v. DRISKELL,, 277 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2002)

. . . Penal Law § 70.20(4)(a); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 301.2(3) (McKinney Supp.2001). . . . Penal Law § 70.20(1). . . .

SMITH, v. M. BEASLEY, C. ABLE, v. H. WILKINS, H. Jr., 946 F. Supp. 1174 (D.S.C. 1996)

. . . For example, in the Greenwood No. 1 VTD, the portion in District 12 contains 74.28% BPOP and 70.20% BVAP . . .

MABERY, v. P. KEANE,, 939 F. Supp. 193 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)

. . . He further argued that NYPL § 70.20 is unconstitutional because it subjected him to double jeopardy. . . . In this state habeas petition, petitioner argued that the 1975 Amendments to NYPL §§ 70.20, 70.25, and . . .

INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY, v. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, 88 F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

. . . . § 70.20; 10 C.F.R. § 40.21. . . .

In I. SOKOL, STATE v. I. SOKOL,, 170 B.R. 556 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994)

. . . . § 70.20 (McKinney 1992). . . .

LAW OFFICES OF C. KENDALL HARRELL, P. C. d b a v. COMMERCE SAVINGS ASSOCIATION PAC I, 824 F. Supp. 1159 (W.D. Tex. 1993)

. . . Martinez ($70.20); G. . . . Martinez ($70.20); Baily & Williams ($140); and Ramos & Toudouze ($210) [plaintiffs exhibit # 66, defendants . . . Kendall Harrell, P.C. ($210.60 for June 1989 and $210.60 for July 1989); Seasons Cafe and Bakery ($70.20 . . . for June 1989 and $70.20 for July 1989); and Jerry and Andrea Usrey, d/b/a Kwik-Kopy Kwik Kopy Printing . . . # 99 ($70.20 for June 1989 and $70.20 for July 1989) [plaintiffs exhibit # 66, defendants’ exhibits . . .

PLAYER, v. D. BERRY,, 785 F. Supp. 339 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)

. . . See N.Y.Crim.Pro.Law § 70.20 (McKinney 1981 & Supp.1991). . . .

In L. WINK, J., 137 B.R. 297 (Bank. W.D. Wis. 1992)

. . . to receive the following property is exempt, except as specifically provided in this section and ss. 70.20 . . .

SEWELL PLASTICS, INC. v. COCA- COLA COMPANY USA Co. Co. N. C. Co. Co. Co. Co., 720 F. Supp. 1196 (W.D.N.C. 1989)

. . . 64.28 64.28 Amoco 37.51 37.51 Total 559.59* 559.64 1986 SEÜ 177.42 177.42 Sewell 185.42 183.51 PSP 70.20 . . . 70.20 Carolina Packaging 74.19 74.19 Owens-Illinois 29.75 32.44 Amoco 30.14 30.14 Total 567.12 567.90 . . .

In JORDAN,, 91 B.R. 673 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988)

. . . precisely how the Claimant made its calculations of late charges, we know that it charged more than the $70.20 . . . $130.00, which would result in “late charges" of no more than $1.95 per month and a maximum total of $70.20 . . . installment, logically incorporates a progression from the $1.95 charge after the first month, to the $70.20 . . . 30 $58.50 ($3900 x .015) 31 $60.45 Month Default Charge 32 $62.40 33 $64.35 34 $66.30 35 $68.25 36 $70.20 . . .

HOLLAND, v. J. SCULLY,, 797 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1986)

. . . . § 70.20. . . .

GORDON, v. WATLEY, III, J. E. J., 624 F. Supp. 1138 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)

. . . Commentaries 1975 to N.Y.Penal Law § 70.20 (McKinney Supp. 1984) at 226. . . . Section 70.20(3) provides in relevant part: When a defendant who is subject to an undischarged term of . . . N.Y.Penal Law § 70.20(3) (McKinney Supp. 1984). . . . Hechtman explains: Subdivision 3 [of Penal Law § 70.20] was added, in conjunction with new subdivision . . . Hechtman, Supplementary Practice Commentaries 1975 to N.Y.Penal Law § 70.20 (McKinney Supp.1984) at 226 . . .

In TABALA, 48 B.R. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)

. . . , as attorneys for the interim trustee, seek an allowance of $10,957.50, together with expenses of $70.20 . . .

PENA, v. NEW YORK STATE DIVISION FOR YOUTH A. J. E. E. R. S. B. R., 708 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1983)

. . . . § 70.20(4); N.Y. Exec.Law § 515-b (McKinney 1982). . . .

In COOPERSTEIN, d b a BLECHER, v. COOPERSTEIN, 7 B.R. 618 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980)

. . . governed by the law of the situs of the realty, New Jersey law applies. 4A Collier on Bankruptcy § 70.20 . . .

In HALL MONTGOMERY WARD COMPANY, INC. v. HALL, 8 B.R. 318 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980)

. . . See 4A Collier on Bankruptcy, Paragraph 70.20 (14th Ed.). Compare Leawood National Bank v. . . .

BUGHER v. SOUTHLAND FABRICATORS AND ERECTORS, INC., 452 F. Supp. 870 (W.D. La. 1978)

. . . Malone (T) 180 70.20 45.00 9.00 Wilbur Newsome (T) 139 54.21 34.75 6.95 Donald Combs (T) 174 67.86 43.50 . . .

ZURAK v. J. REGAN, 550 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1977)

. . . New York Penal Law § 70.20. . . .

CARDINALE v. F. MATHEWS,, 399 F. Supp. 1163 (D.D.C. 1975)

. . . In April 1974, he received an SSI payment of $70.20 and then allegedly received a letter from the Social . . . $82.30 for the months of January through March and because his Social Security benefits were increased, $70.20 . . .

WHITFIELD v. J. OLIVER, 399 F. Supp. 348 (M.D. Ala. 1975)

. . . In March 1971 Alabama paid $70.20 per OA recipient. . . .

HEREFORD, IV, v. HUNTSVILLE BOARD OF EDUCATION, 504 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1974)

. . . It was 70.20 per cent black as of September 20, 1974. . . .

JEFFERY, v. MALCOLM,, 353 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)

. . . Penal Law, § 70.20. . . .

T. GEORGE, v. COMMERCIAL CREDIT CORP., 440 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1971)

. . . (See also 4A Collier on Bankruptcy, j[ 70.20 pp. 283-295). . . .

In SHINAULT LUMBER PRODUCTS, INC., 323 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Miss. 1970)

. . . See 4A Collier § 70.20, pp. 283-295. . . .

BALDWIN v. NEW YORK, 399 U.S. 66 (U.S. 1970)

. . . Penal Law §70.20 (1967). N. Y. Const., Art. I, §6; N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§22, 222 (1958); N. Y. . . .

L. A. L. Jr. v., 46 T.C. 805 (T.C. 1966)

. . . 96 Dec. 16,1963-9.18 66.78 4,340.21 12 108 Dec. 10,1964-7.49 68.47 3,527.90 12 320 Dec. 3,1965-5.76 70.20 . . .

R. KENNEALLY, a v. STANDARD ELECTRONICS CORPORATION, 364 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1966)

. . . loan office, held not to be realty under trade fixtures doctrine); 4 Collier, Bankruptcy (14th Ed.) ff 70.20 . . .

SOUTHSIDE ATLANTIC BANK, a v. F. LEWIS,, 174 So. 2d 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965)

. . . The second contract provided for 24 installment payments of $70.20 each and increased the finance charges . . .

A. G. SPALDING BROS. INC. v. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,, 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962)

. . . dozen, within the lowest AGMA category for baseball gloves; (2) “Junior Size” leather footballs at $70.20 . . .

G, 5 Cust. Ct. 327 (Cust. Ct. 1940)

. . . this point, to the effect that the relative values of the "respective materials are, plaster of pan's 70.20 . . .

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. ELMHURST CEMETERY CO. OF JOLIET, 83 F.2d 4 (7th Cir. 1936)

. . . 1910 ................ 7,003.55 sq. ft. at 71.50 per sq. ft. 1911 ................ 7,312.20 sq. ft. at 70.20 . . .

v. Co. H. R., 23 C.C.P.A. 46 (C.C.P.A. 1935)

. . . this point, to the effect that the relative values of the respective materials are, plaster of paris 70.20 . . .

v., 1 Ct. Cust. 170 (C.C.P.A. 1911)

. . . referred to the analyst in charge of the port of New York, was returned as “Mohair, 29.35 per cent; metal, 70.20 . . .

v. St. Co., 27 F. 333 (C.C.W.D. Wisc. 1885)

. . . tax assessed upon his lands according to the reassessment tax roll, which I believe is $1,839.96, or $70.20 . . .

S., 11 F. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1880)

. . . There must be a decree for the libellant for $1,000, and for its costs in the district court, $70.20, . . .