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Florida Statute 70.45 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 70.45 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title VI
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Chapter 70
RELIEF FROM BURDENS ON REAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 70.45
70.45 Governmental exactions.
(1) As used in this section, the term:
(a) “Damages” means, in addition to the right to injunctive relief, the reduction in fair market value of the real property or the amount of the fee or infrastructure cost that exceeds what would be permitted under this section.
(b) “Governmental entity” has the same meaning as provided in s. 70.001(3)(c).
(c) “Imposed” or “imposition” as it relates to a prohibited exaction or condition of approval refers to the time at which the property owner must comply with the prohibited exaction or condition of approval.
(d) “Prohibited exaction” means any condition imposed by a governmental entity on a property owner’s proposed use of real property that lacks an essential nexus to a legitimate public purpose and is not roughly proportionate to the impacts of the proposed use that the governmental entity seeks to avoid, minimize, or mitigate.
(e) “Property owner” has the same meaning as provided in s. 70.001(3)(f).
(f) “Real property” has the same meaning as provided in s. 70.001(3)(g).
(2) In addition to other remedies available in law or equity, a property owner may bring an action in a court of competent jurisdiction under this section to declare a prohibited exaction invalid and recover damages caused by a prohibited exaction. Such action may be brought by a property owner at the property owner’s discretion when a prohibited exaction is actually imposed or when it is required in writing as a final condition of approval for the requested use of real property. The right to bring an action under this section may not be waived. This section does not apply to impact fees adopted under s. 163.31801 or non-ad valorem assessments as defined in s. 197.3632.
(3) At least 90 days before filing an action under this section, but no later than 180 days after imposition of the prohibited exaction, the property owner shall provide to the relevant governmental entity written notice of the proposed action. This written notice shall identify the exaction that the property owner believes is prohibited, briefly explain why the property owner believes the exaction is prohibited, and provide an estimate of the damages. Upon receipt of the written notice:
(a) The governmental entity shall review the notice of claim and respond in writing to the property owner by identifying the basis for the exaction and explaining why the governmental entity maintains that the exaction is proportionate to the harm created by the proposed use of real property, or by proposing to remove all or a portion of the exaction.
(b) The written response may not be used against the governmental entity in subsequent litigation other than for purposes of assessing attorney fees and costs under subsection (5).
(4) For each claim filed under this section, the governmental entity has the burden of proving that the challenged exaction has an essential nexus to a legitimate public purpose and is roughly proportionate to the impacts of the proposed use that the governmental entity is seeking to avoid, minimize, or mitigate. The property owner has the burden of proving damages that result from a prohibited exaction.
(5) The court may award attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party; however, if the court determines that the challenged exaction which is the subject of the claim lacks an essential nexus to a legitimate public purpose, the court shall award attorney fees and costs to the property owner.
(6) To ensure that courts may assess damages for claims filed under this section in accordance with s. 13, Art. X of the State Constitution, the state, for itself and its agencies or political subdivisions, waives sovereign immunity for causes of action based upon the application of this section. Such waiver is limited only to actions brought under this section.
(7) This section applies to any prohibited exaction imposed or required in writing on or after October 1, 2015, as a final condition of approval for the requested use of real property.
History.s. 2, ch. 2015-142; s. 2, ch. 2021-203.

F.S. 70.45 on Google Scholar

F.S. 70.45 on Casetext

Amendments to 70.45


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 70.45
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 70.45.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

REYES, v. FISCHER, J. X., 934 F.3d 97 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . In 1998, the New York State legislature enacted Penal Law § 70.45, which eliminated the parole system . . . Penal Law § 70.45(1) (McKinney 2005), amended by 2008 N.Y. Laws Ch. 141, § 3 (codified at N.Y. . . . Penal Law § 70.45(1) (2009) ). . . . Id. § 70.45(2). . . . Although § 70.45 required that PRS terms follow determinate prison sentences, in the years after the . . . Penal Law § 70.45(5) )). . . .

UNITED STATES v. LAMBUS, K,, 897 F.3d 368 (2nd Cir. 2018)

. . . . § 70.45(3) ("conditions of post-release supervision" are required to be imposed "in the same manner . . .

CITY OF WARREN POLICE v. FOOT LOCKER, INC. A. B., 325 F. Supp. 3d 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)

. . . In response, the price of Foot Locker common stock declined from its open of $70.45 per share on May . . .

HASSELL, v. FISCHER, J. W., 879 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2018)

. . . Penal Law § 70.45(1); People v. Catu, 4 N.Y.Sd 242, 244, 792 N.Y.S.2d 887, 825 N.E.2d 1081 (2005). . . . However, section 70.45(1), as enacted, did not require state court judges to impose a term of PRS at . . . Penal Law § 70.45(5)(a)). . . . Section 70.45(1) was amended in 2008 to require that a sentencing court “shall in each case state not . . . Penal Law § 70.45(1) (2008). . . . .

BETANCES, A. a k a v. FISCHER, DOCS J., 837 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2016)

. . . Penal Law § 70.45(1). . . . Id. §70.45(2), (2-a). . . . Id. § 70.45(3). . . . Although § 70.45(1) requires sentencing courts to “state not only the term of imprisonment, but also . . . If a sentence and commitment order did not include the PRS term that §70.45 required, DOCS employees, . . .

SMITH, v. WENDERLICH,, 826 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 2016)

. . . Penal Law § 70.45(1) (McKinney 1999). . . . In 2008, § 70.45(1) was amended to provide that, when imposing a determinate sentence, the sentencing . . . Penal Law § 70.45(1) (McKinney 2009). . . . Smith — stating that although Smith had been given a determinate sentence of imprisonment, for which § 70.45 . . .

BETANCES, A, a k a v. FISCHER, DOCS J. DOCS, J. Jr. DOCS, S. DOCS, DOCS W. DOP DOP, DOP, J. DOP, G. II, DOP, B. DOP, DOP, 140 F. Supp. 3d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)

. . . Penal Law § 70.45(1). . . . Administrative Imposition of PRS In 1998, the New York Legislature enacted Penal Law Section 70.45, which . . . Defendants in Earley had argued that Section 70.45 mandated a period of PRS and therefore was necessarily . . . Penal Law § 70.45. . . . .

BETANCES, A. a k a v. FISCHER, J. J. JR. DOCS, S. DOCS, W. DOP DOP, DOP, J. DOP, G. II, DOP, B. DOP, DOP, 144 F. Supp. 3d 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)

. . . Administrative Imposition of PRS In 1998, the New York Legislature enacted Penal Law § 70.45, also known-as . . . Defendants in Earley had argued that section 70.45 mandated a period of PRS and therefore was necessarily . . . Penal Law § 70.45(1). . 451 F.3d 71 (2d Cir.2006). . See Bentley v. . . . Penal Law § 70.45. . . . .

McCALL, v. CAPRA,, 102 F. Supp. 3d 427 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)

. . . Penal Law § 70.45(2) (setting period of post release supervision for a determinate sentence as five years . . .

HASSELL, v. FISCHER, J., 96 F. Supp. 3d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)

. . . Penal Law § 70.45(1) (McKinney 2004)); see also People v. . . . New York Penal Law § 70.45(1) at the time, although requiring that a term of PRS follow a determinate . . . Penal Law § 70.45 (“When a court imposes a determinate sentence it shall in each case state not only . . . But New York Penal Law § 70.45 did not expressly require DOCS or Parole officials to add, or enforce, . . . Penal Law § 70.45 (“Each determinate sentence also includes, as a part thereof, an additional period . . .

BETANCES, A. a k a v. FISCHER, DOCS J. DOCS, J. Jr. DOCS,, 304 F.R.D. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)

. . . Policies of Imposition and Enforcement of PRS In 1998, the New York Legislature enacted Penal Law § 70.45 . . . orders of an individual were “silent” regarding PRS, DOCS imposed the maximum period of PRS allowed by § 70.45 . . . Penal Law § 70.45(1). . 451 F.3d 71 (2d Cir.2006). . Id. at 75-76. . See Bentley v. . . .

A. CARROLL, v. DAUGHERTY,, 764 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2014)

. . . Penal Law § 70.45(1), and although interpreted by the intermediate New York courts to make such supervision . . .

EDWARDS, v. SUPERINTENDENT, SOUTHPORT C. F., 991 F. Supp. 2d 348 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)

. . . See New York Penal Law §§ 70.02(1)(a)-(c), 70.02(2)(a), 70.02(3)(c), 70.25, 70.45(2)(f), 110.00, 120.05 . . .

VINCENT, St. B. Jr. v. S. YELICH, J. J. Jr. S. Jr. B. D. v. J. J. Jr. S. Jr. B. D., 718 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2013)

. . . Penal Law § 70.45[1] (McKinney 2004) (emphasis added)), amended by 2008 N.Y. . . . Penal Law § 70.45[1] (McKinney 2009) (requiring that the required PRS term be stated by the court when . . . imposing sentence)); see also id. § 70.45[2] (McKinney 2004), amended by 2004 N.Y. . . . Penal Law § 70.45[2] (McKinney 2009) (providing, with certain exceptions, a maximum term of five years . . . Following the 1998 effective date of Jenna’s Law and until the revision of § 70.45[1] in 2008, some judges . . .

RUFFINS, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, B., 907 F. Supp. 2d 290 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)

. . . after Earley, state courts continued to disagree as to the precise application of Earley to Penal Law § 70.45 . . .

SUDLER, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, F. NYCDOC S. DOCS W. A. S. A. C. T. C. S. I A. S. A. C. T. C. J. No. No. A. S. A. C. T. C. NYS J. Jr. I E. E. E. J. NYS A. A. P. A. P. O. W. O. s NYC DOCS DOCS DOCS K. NYS DOCS J. CC, KG, IGRC IGRC B. V. APA, I II A IGRC B. NYCDOC D. IGRC NYC DOCS NYC DOC DOCS s NYC DOC DOCS I LES LES, 689 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2012)

. . . Penal Law § 70.45. See id. at 73. . . .

VELASQUEZ, v. ERCOLE,, 878 F. Supp. 2d 387 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)

. . . Penal Law §§ 70.00(6), 70.45(2)(f); People v. Velasquez, Ind. No. 1870-2001 (Cnty. . . .

IZAGUIRRE, v. LEE,, 856 F. Supp. 2d 551 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)

. . . Penal Law § 70.45(1), (2). . . .

PENDLETON, v. S. GOORD,, 849 F. Supp. 2d 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)

. . . Legal History In 1998, the New York legislature enacted Penal Law 70.45, also known as Jenna’s Law, which . . . that the administrative imposition of a five-year PRS term by DOCS, pursuant to New York Penal Law § 70.45 . . . However, pursuant to New York Penal Law § 70.45, plaintiff was required to serve a term of PRS. . . . Penal Law § 70.45. . . . administratively imposed at the time of his sentencing in 2001 as a consequence of the operation of § 70.45 . . .

KING, St. a. k. a. v. M. CUOMO, J. J., 465 F. App'x 42 (2d Cir. 2012)

. . . Penal Law § 70.45. . . . Penal Law § 70.45 provided that “[e]ach determinate sentence also includes, as a part thereof, an additional . . . Penal Law § 70.45(1) (1998), amended by 2008 N.Y. Sess. . . . Penal Law § 70.45. . . .

BENTLEY, v. J. DENNISON, v., 852 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)

. . . Penal Law § 70.45(1). . Earley v. Murray, 451 F.3d 71 (2d Cir.2006). . Id. at 75-76. . . . . Penal Law § 70.45. . Scott, 616 F.3d at 106. . Earley, 451 F.3d at 76. . . . .

UNITED STATES v. HILL, S,, 455 F. App'x 121 (2d Cir. 2012)

. . . Penal Law § 70.45. . . .

VINCENT, v. Mr. S. YELICH, v., 812 F. Supp. 2d 276 (W.D.N.Y. 2011)

. . . Notwithstanding the provisions of New York Penal Law § 70.45 (commonly known as “Jenna’s Law”), which . . . Upon each plaintiffs release, DOCS, construing Penal Law § 70.45 as requiring an automatic period of . . . The issue of whether Penal Law § 70.45 created a PRS requirement that could by applied only by sentencing . . . not squarely apply to DOCS’s practices, because in administratively mandating PRS under Penal Law § 70.45 . . . Notwithstanding the state-court split, the presumptive constitutionality of Penal Law § 70.45 itself, . . .

L. RIDGEWAY, v. ZON,, 424 F. App'x 58 (2d Cir. 2011)

. . . See Corrections Law § 601 — d; Penal Law §§ 70.45, 70.85. . . .

J. FACEN, v. R. CULLY,, 787 F. Supp. 2d 278 (W.D.N.Y. 2011)

. . . Penal Law § 70.45(1) (requiring an additional period of post-release supervision to be added to each . . . that in the present case, that, prior to pleading guilty, Petitioner was never informed that Section 70.45 . . .

LOCANTORE, v. B. HUNT, S. D. NYS, 775 F. Supp. 2d 680 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)

. . . Penal Law § 70.45(1). . . .

HARDY, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, No. M. D. P. A. M. D., 732 F. Supp. 2d 112 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . after Earley, state courts continued to disagree as to the precise application of Earley to Section 70.45 . . . Penal Law § 70.45(1), in 1998, certain violent felonies — including robbery — require the imposition . . . Penal Law § 70.45 (McKinney 1998). At the time Hardy was sentenced for this crime, N.Y. . . . Penal Law § 70.45 stated, in relevant part, that "[e]ach determinate sentence also includes, as a part . . . Penal Law § 70.45 (McKinney 1998) (amended 2008). . . .

SCOTT, v. FISCHER, De, 616 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2010)

. . . Penal Law § 70.45, a New York State statute that required that sentences for specified violent felonies . . . Penal Law § 70.45(1). . . . Penal Law § 70.45. . . . Penal Law § 70.45(1). .Section 70.45(1) was subsequently amended in 2008 to require that a sentencing . . . Penal Law § 70.45(1) (2008). • . . . .

CARNELL, v. A. PATERSON, R. M., 385 F. App'x 15 (2d Cir. 2010)

. . . Penal Law § 70.45(1) (“When a court imposes a determinate sentence it shall in each case state not only . . .

S. PIGNATARO, v. POOLE,, 381 F. App'x 46 (2d Cir. 2010)

. . . mandates a period of PRS whenever a determinate term of imprisonment is imposed, see New York Penal Law § 70.45 . . . Here, although § 70.45 mandated a term of PRS, PRS was not “definite, immediate, and largely automatic . . .

THEME PROMOTIONS, INC. a d b a Co- Op v. NEWS AMERICA MARKETING FSI, INC. a, 731 F. Supp. 2d 937 (N.D. Cal. 2010)

. . . $65.83 2001 0.352 $54.01 $153.44 $25.42 $72.22 2002 0.351 $70.23 $200.09 $25.64 $73.05 2003 0.356 $70.45 . . .

T. LEAR, v. POOLE,, 711 F. Supp. 2d 288 (W.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . maximum of 15 years, with a term of post-release supervision of between two and one-half to five years); 70.45 . . .

UNITED STATES v. HIGHTOWER,, 376 F. App'x 60 (2d Cir. 2010)

. . . Under New York Penal Law § 70.45, “[w]hen a court imposes a determinate sentence it shall in each case . . . Penal Law § 70.45(1). . . .

RUFFINS, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, B., 701 F. Supp. 2d 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . that the administrative imposition of a five-year PRS term by DOCS, pursuant to New York Penal Law § 70.45 . . . after Earley, state courts continued to disagree as to the precise application of Earley to Section 70.45 . . . Penal Law § 70.45, which stated that PRS was a mandatory component of his sentence (see Meier Deck, Ex . . . and up to the balance of the remaining supervision period, not to exceed five years (see Penal Law § 70.45 . . . Circuit held that the imposition of a five-year PRS term by DOCS, pursuant to New York Penal Law § 70.45 . . .

HARDY, v. FISCHER, DOCS J. DOCS, J. Jr. DOCS, S. DOCS, DOCS v. DOCS J. DOCS, J. Jr. DOCS, S. DOCS, DOCS v. DOCS J. DOCS, J. Jr. DOCS, S. DOCS, DOCS, 701 F. Supp. 2d 605 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . Penal Law § 70.45. . . . Penal Law § 70.45)). . . .

HARDY, v. FISCHER, DOCS J. DOCS, J. Jr. DOCS, S. DOCS, DOCS, 701 F. Supp. 2d 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . Penal Law § 70.45, which mandates the imposition of PRS for certain violent offenders sentenced to determinate . . .

R. BOMASUTO, v. S. PERLMAN, M. S. C. F., 680 F. Supp. 2d 449 (W.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . The applicable statutory section regarding post-release supervision is Section 70.45(2) of New York’s . . . Section 70.45(2) provides that the post-release supervision period for a determinate sentence shall be . . . Penal Law § 70.45(2)® (“The period of post-release supervision for a determinate sentence, other than . . . Penal Law § 70.45(2); People v. Ryan, 13 Misc.3d at 453, 822 N.Y.S.2d 856. . . . Penal Law § 70.45, does not appear to reduce the length of a supervised release term because of unlawful . . .

HILL, v. A. MANCE,, 598 F. Supp. 2d 371 (W.D.N.Y. 2009)

. . . accordingly, automatically subject to five years’ post-release supervision by operation of Penal Law § 70.45 . . . Penal Law § 70.45(1); see also Senate Mem. in Support, 1998 McKinney’s Session Laws of N.Y., at 1489 . . . Penal Law § 70.45(2)), imposition of supervision is mandatory and thus ‘has a definite, immediate and . . .

WALKER, v. S. PERLMAN,, 556 F. Supp. 2d 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)

. . . five-year period of post-release supervision would be imposed as a matter of law under New York Penal Law § 70.45 . . . felony offender and his crime is deemed to include a post-release sentence by operation of Penal Law § 70.45 . . . those documents “[pjerforms the ministerial function of setting forth [the PRS provision under C.P.L. § 70.45 . . .

LARWETH, v. CONWAY,, 493 F. Supp. 2d 662 (W.D.N.Y. 2007)

. . . Penal Law § 70.45(2)— which was fairly unlikely, given Larweth’s extensive criminal history. . . . Penal Law § 70.45] would make the sentence illegal.” Resp’t Ex. A at 9. . . . Penal Law § 70.45(1) (“Each determinate sentence also includes, as a part thereof, an additional period . . . Penal Law § 70.45(1); Senate Mem. in Support, 1998 McKinney's Session Laws of N.Y. at 1489 (describing . . . Penal Law § 70.45(2)), "imposition of supervision is mandatory and thus 'has a definite, immediate and . . .

ORTIZ, v. BARKLEY,, 489 F. Supp. 2d 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)

. . . five-year period of post-release supervision is automatically included, pursuant to New York Penal Law § 70.45 . . .

WILLETT, v. J. BERBARY,, 456 F. Supp. 2d 404 (W.D.N.Y. 2006)

. . . five-year period of post-release supervision is automatically included, pursuant to New York Penal Law § 70.45 . . . Penal Law § 70.45], See McKinney’s Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. TWO, T. E, Art. 70, Refs & Annos. . . . .

DUPREE, v. POUGH,, 454 F. Supp. 2d 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)

. . . Penal Law § 70.45(5)(d). . . . Penal Law § 70.45(1). (PL Opp'n at 4-5.) . . .

EARLEY, v. MURRAY,, 462 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2006)

. . . conceptualization respondent-appellee has about the function of New York Penal Law sections 70.00 and 70.45 . . .

EARLEY, v. MURRAY,, 451 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2006)

. . . Penal Law § 70.45 (“Each determinate sentence also includes, as a part thereof, an additional period . . .

K. STEELE, v. H. FILION,, 377 F. Supp. 2d 332 (W.D.N.Y. 2005)

. . . Penal Law § 70.45(1)); United States v. Truscello, 168 F.3d 61, 63 (2d Cir.1999)). . . .

ALCOCK, v. SPITZER,, 349 F. Supp. 2d 630 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)

. . . and that it has been his “unfailing practice, from, the time of the enactment of Penal Law Section 70.45 . . . Penal Law §§ 70.00(6), 70.45(1). . . . .

RHONE- POULENC, INC. v. UNITED STATES,, 951 F. Supp. 1027 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1997)

. . . Jiangsu Native Produce Import and Export Corp. 31.02% Tianjin Native Produce Import and Export Corp. 70.45% . . .

v., 21 Ct. Int'l Trade 165 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1997)

. . . Jiangsu Native Produce Import and Export Corp.31.02% Tianjin Native Produce Import and Export Corp. 70.45% . . .

In ZEDDA GAUDET, v. J. BABIN, Jr., 103 F.3d 1195 (5th Cir. 1997)

. . . Inc., 38 B.R. at 903 (quoting 4B Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 70.45 (14th ed. 1978)). . . . .

In ZEDDA GAUDET, v. J. BABIN, Jr., 103 F.3d 1195 (5th Cir. 1997)

. . . Inc., 38 B.R. at 903 (quoting 4B Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 70.45 (14th ed. 1978)). . . . .

In OTASCO, INC. WHEELS, INC. v. OTASCO, INC. a, 111 B.R. 976 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990)

. . . proceeds, 3 (Pt. 2) Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 60.01, 743 (14th ed. 1978); 4B Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 70.45 . . . expression ... to denote the status conferred upon the trustee by the strong-arm clause,” id. at ¶ 70.45 . . .

SPRANDEL, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,, 838 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1988)

. . . . § 416.502, each spouse was paid one-half of that amount, or $70.45 per month. . . . from March 1984 through August 1984, she continued to receive one-half of the SSI couple benefit ($70.45 . . . Sprandel complained administratively about receiving only $70.45 per month for the six month period. . . . In an affidavit to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), she detailed her difficulties in living on $70.45 . . . The AU upheld the administrative denial and found that the payment of $70.45 per month to each spouse . . .

ALTOBELLA, v. BOWEN,, 668 F. Supp. 1134 (N.D. Ill. 1987)

. . . have lowered the workers’ compensation benefits attributable to Altobella to just $16.26 a week (or $70.45 . . .

SPRANDEL, v. R. BOWEN, M. D., 679 F. Supp. 87 (D. Me. 1986)

. . . Each spouse was paid one-half of the benefit amount, or $70.45, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.502. . . . Sprandel’s income increased to $436.55 per month ($366.10 plus $70.45), while plaintiff’s income remained . . . at $70.45 (but down from $324 per month prior to her marriage). . . .

In GREAT PLAINS WESTERN RANCH COMPANY, INC. C. R. LOUP, M. S. M. L N v. GREAT PLAINS WESTERN RANCH COMPANY, INC. In GREAT PLAINS WESTERN CORPORATION, a WILSON COUNTY LAND COMPANY a L. HILL, a v. GREAT PLAINS WESTERN CORPORATION, a GREAT PLAINS WESTERN CORPORATION, a v. WILSON COUNTY LAND COMPANY a a L. s s DOES, 38 B.R. 899 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984)

. . . See 4B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY H 70.45 (14th ed. 1978). . . .

In EURO- SWISS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, VARON, v. TRIMBLE, MARSHALL GOLDMAN, P. C., 33 B.R. 872 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)

. . . See 45 Cong.Rec. 2277 (1910); 4B Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 70.45, n. 8 and cases cited therein (14th Ed . . .

BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD CO. Co. Co. Co. B. St. Co. v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF STATE OF WISCONSIN,, 570 F. Supp. 585 (W.D. Wis. 1983)

. . . . § 70.45. . . .

In C. ROBISON, ROBISON, 665 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1981)

. . . See generally 4B Collier On Bankruptcy, ¶ 70.45 et seq. (14th Ed.). . . .

In C. ROBISON, ROBISON, 665 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1981)

. . . See generally 4B Collier On Bankruptcy, ¶ 70.45 et seq. (14th Ed.). . . .

MULLINS v. D. ANDRUS, Co., 664 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1980)

. . . So, of the total of 704 hours worked between January 9 and June 17, 496 — 70.45%—were as a roof bolter . . .

A. GRAVES v. MEYSTRIK,, 425 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Mo. 1977)

. . . average 40.22 percent of the appeals decisions were rendered within less than thirty days of filing, and 70.45 . . . In this case, an average of 70.45 percent of the appeals rendered with regard to Regular Unemployment . . .

R. MORRISON, v. ALLELUIA CUSHION CO. INC., 73 F.R.D. 70 (N.D. Miss. 1976)

. . . Dupre— $77.85; Homer Roesener — $70.45. . . .

In PARKWOOD, INC. AMERICAN SECURITY AND TRUST CO. TRUSTEE IN REORGANIZATION OF PARKWOOD, INC. v. EQUITABLE LIFE INSURANCE CO. In PARKWOOD, INC. AMERICAN SECURITY AND TRUST CO. TRUSTEE IN REORGANIZATION OF PARKWOOD, INC. v. MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE CO. In ADAMS PROPERTIES, INC. AMERICAN SECURITY AND TRUST CO. TRUSTEE IN REORGANIZATION OF ADAMS PROPERTIES, INC. v. HARTFORD LIFE INSURANCE CO., 461 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1971)

. . . In re Waynesboro Motor Co., 60 F.2d 668, 669 (S.D.Miss.1932). . 4A Collier on Bankruptcy, 70.45, at 558 . . .

In DEAN AND JEAN FASHIONS, INC., 329 F. Supp. 663 (W.D. Okla. 1971)

. . . creditor of the bankrupt could have obtained such a lien at bankruptcy.’ 4A Collier, Bankruptcy, |f 70.45 . . .

In DENNIS MITCHELL INDUSTRIES, INC. A. J. Co., 419 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1969)

. . . Id. at ¶ 70.45, p. 560. . Id. at ¶ 70.98 [15], p. 1173, citing Segrest v. . . .

In LEHNER, HOUSEHOLD FINANCE CORPORATION, v. B. KOPEL,, 303 F. Supp. 317 (D. Colo. 1969)

. . . creditor of the bankrupt could have obtained such a lien at bankruptcy.” 4A Collier, Bankruptcy jf 70.45 . . .

In TRAHAN, 283 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La. 1968)

. . . Collier, supra, Vol. 4a, § 70.45, p. 558. . . .

UNITED STATES v. FIVE COIN- OPERATED GAMING DEVICES, 246 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Va. 1965)

. . . described as follows: One (1) Bally Can-Can coin-operated gaming device, Serial Number 1576, containing $70.45 . . .