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Florida Statute 73.092 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 73.092 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title VI
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Chapter 73
EMINENT DOMAIN
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 73.092
73.092 Attorney’s fees.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section and s. 73.015, the court, in eminent domain proceedings, shall award attorney’s fees based solely on the benefits achieved for the client.
(a) As used in this section, the term “benefits” means the difference, exclusive of interest, between the final judgment or settlement and the last written offer made by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an attorney. If no written offer is made by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an attorney, benefits must be measured from the first written offer after the attorney is hired.
1. In determining attorney’s fees, if business records as defined in s. 73.015(2)(c)2. and kept by the owner in the ordinary course of business were provided to the condemning authority to substantiate the business damage offer in s. 73.015(2)(c), benefits for amounts awarded for business damages must be based on the difference between the final judgment or settlement and the written counteroffer made by the condemning authority provided in s. 73.015(2)(d).
2. In determining attorney’s fees, if existing business records as defined in s. 73.015(2)(c)2. and kept by the owner in the ordinary course of business were not provided to the condemning authority to substantiate the business damage offer in s. 73.015(2)(c) and those records which were not provided are later deemed material to the determination of business damages, benefits for amounts awarded for business damages must be based upon the difference between the final judgment or settlement and the first written counteroffer made by the condemning authority within 90 days from the condemning authority’s receipt of the business records previously not provided.
(b) The court may also consider nonmonetary benefits obtained for the client through the efforts of the attorney, to the extent such nonmonetary benefits are specifically identified by the court and can, within a reasonable degree of certainty, be quantified.
(c) Attorney’s fees based on benefits achieved shall be awarded in accordance with the following schedule:
1. Thirty-three percent of any benefit up to $250,000; plus
2. Twenty-five percent of any portion of the benefit between $250,000 and $1 million; plus
3. Twenty percent of any portion of the benefit exceeding $1 million.
(2) In assessing attorney’s fees incurred in defeating an order of taking, or for apportionment, or other supplemental proceedings, when not otherwise provided for, the court shall consider:
(a) The novelty, difficulty, and importance of the questions involved.
(b) The skill employed by the attorney in conducting the cause.
(c) The amount of money involved.
(d) The responsibility incurred and fulfilled by the attorney.
(e) The attorney’s time and labor reasonably required adequately to represent the client in relation to the benefits resulting to the client.
(f) The fee, or rate of fee, customarily charged for legal services of a comparable or similar nature.
(g) Any attorney’s fee award made under subsection (1).
(3) In determining the amount of attorney’s fees to be paid by the petitioner under subsection (2), the court shall be guided by the fees the defendant would ordinarily be expected to pay for these services if the petitioner were not responsible for the payment of those fees.
(4) At least 30 days prior to a hearing to assess attorney’s fees under subsection (2), the condemnee’s attorney shall submit to the condemning authority and to the court complete time records and a detailed statement of services rendered by date, nature of services performed, time spent performing such services, and costs incurred.
(5) The defendant shall provide to the court a copy of any fee agreement that may exist between the defendant and his or her attorney, and the court must reduce the amount of attorney’s fees to be paid by the defendant by the amount of any attorney’s fees awarded by the court.
History.s. 1, ch. 76-158; s. 37, ch. 85-180; s. 3, ch. 87-148; s. 54, ch. 90-136; s. 3, ch. 90-303; s. 3, ch. 94-162; s. 1370, ch. 95-147; s. 61, ch. 99-385.

F.S. 73.092 on Google Scholar

F.S. 73.092 on Casetext

Amendments to 73.092


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 73.092
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 73.092.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

FLORIDA GAS TRANSMISSION COMPANY, LLC, v. JOHNSON,, 264 So. 3d 336 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . erred in awarding attorney's fees pursuant to subsection (2), rather than subsection (1), of section 73.092 . . . On appeal, FGT argues the trial court erred by calculating attorney's fees pursuant to section 73.092 . . . (2), the lodestar method, rather than section 73.092(1), the benefits achieved method, as there is no . . . Section 73.092(1) provides, in pertinent part: (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section and s . . . However, section 73.092 does not define what constitutes a "written offer." . . .

JOSEPH B. DOERR TRUST, v. CENTRAL FLORIDA EXPRESSWAY AUTHORITY,, 177 So. 3d 1209 (Fla. 2015)

. . . The award of such fees is governed by section 73.092, Florida Statutes (2014), which provides, in pertinent . . . The Authority sought to limit the fees to the benefits achieved formula under section 73.092(1), which . . . Applying the factors listed in section 73.092(2), the trial court awarded the Landowners $816,000 in . . . Section 73.092 The benefits achieved formula set forth in section 73.092 has encroached on this fundamental . . . For solely those hours, the trial court shall calculate a fee pursuant to section 73.092(2). . . .

GENERAL COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC. v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 178 So. 3d 439 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . court erred in determining the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to the property owner under section 73.092 . . . Section 73.092(l)(a) defines “benefits” as the difference between the final judgment amount and the “ . . . an, attorney, benefits must be measured from the first written offer after the attorney is hired. § 73.092 . . . fees, and attorney’s fees pursu-tmt to section 73.092 does not apply. JEA v. . . . thus, the EAP offer cannot serve as the basis for the calculation of attorney’s fees under section 73.092 . . .

CARIBBEAN CONDOMINIUM, v. CITY OF FLAGLER BEACH,, 178 So. 3d 426 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Cox, 54 So.3d 1026, 1026-27 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), providing that "[s]ections 73.091 and 73.092 specifically . . .

RYAN, v. CITY OF BOYNTON BEACH, a, 157 So. 3d 417 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Trial Level Fees Incurred in Connection with Motions for Disbursement Florida Statutes section 73.092 . . .

ORLANDO ORANGE COUNTY EXPRESSWAY, v. TUSCAN RIDGE, LLC,, 137 So. 3d 1154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . Fla. 5th DCA 2012), we reversed Appellee landowners’ attorney’s fee award, determined under section 73.092 . . . Statutes (2006), and remanded with instructions that the trial court recalculate the fee using section 73.092 . . . (1), unless it declared section 73.092(1) unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case. . . . Appellant had been the cause of “excessive litigation,” the utilization of the formula set forth in section 73.092 . . . Having reached that conclusion, the trial court again utilized section 73.092(2) to set the fee, multiplying . . .

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES v. BOGORFF,, 132 So. 3d 249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . Statutes (2009), rather than under the multi-factor analysis of section 73.092(2), Florida Statutes . . . Section 73.092(1) requires that an attorney’s fee award be based solely on the benefits received by the . . . Section 73.092(1) provides that attorney’s fees must be calculated based upon benefits achieved: (1) . . . The statute also provides in 73.092(2) for a multi-factor analysis in cases where section 73.092(1) does . . . The Department challenges the trial court’s rejection of section 73.092(1) as the appropriate method . . .

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF ST. JOHN S WATER CONTROL DISTRICT, a f k a St. s a v. STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION N. A. a, 103 So. 3d 218 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . agreed that the District was entitled to its attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to sections 73.091 and 73.092 . . .

SOUTHWEST FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, v. J. SHEA L. R. N. A. G. CFC, M., 86 So. 3d 582 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . The District challenges the fees awarded under section 73.092(l)(b) and (2), Florida Statutes (2010). . . . On cross-appeal, the Sheas argue that the trial court erred by awarding fees under section 73.092(l)( . . . a), where it should have applied the lodestar factors listed in section 73.092(2). . . . “We review an award of attorney’s fees under section 73.092 for an abuse of discretion.” . . . $160,000 in attorney’s fees awarded to the Sheas under section 73.092(2). . . .

ORLANDO ORANGE COUNTY EXPRESSWAY AUTHORITY, v. TUSCAN RIDGE, LLC,, 84 So. 3d 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . lower court’s refusal to limit attorney’s fees awarded to the landowners to those permitted by section 73.092 . . . OOCEA sought to limit attorney’s fees to those permitted by section 73.092(1), Florida Statutes (2006 . . . Because section 73.092(1) was found inapplicable, the trial judge did not reach Landowners’ argument . . . Fees are calculated as a percentage of the “benefits achieved.” § 73.092(l)(c), Fla. Stat. . . . . § 73.092(l)(c), 1.-3., Fla. . . .

POMPANO BEACH COMMUNITY REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY, v. HOLLAND,, 82 So. 3d 1034 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . This appeal challenges the trial court’s application of section 73.092, Florida Statutes (2008), to award . . . The owner then requested attorney’s fees, pursuant to section 73.092. . . . The calculation of attorney’s fees under section 73.092 uses a benefits approach. . . . an attorney, benefits must be measured from the first written offer after the attorney is hired. § 73.092 . . . It was the “first written offer” for purposes of section 73.092. . . .

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES, v. COX,, 54 So. 3d 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Sections 73.091 and 73.092 specifically relate to condemnation proceedings, including inverse condemnation . . .

CALHOUN, DREGGORS ASSOCIATES, v. VOLUSIA COUNTY,, 26 So. 3d 624 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . The brochure referenced various attorney fee provisions in chapter 73, including sections 73.015 and 73.092 . . . domain actions in Florida, provides for attorney’s fee awards in three sections: 73.015, 73.091 and 73.092 . . . Section 73.092 primarily sets forth the methods prescribed for determining a fee award when authorized . . . Subsection 73.092(1) requires the trial court to award attorney’s fees “based solely on the benefits . . . Subsection 73.092(2) sets forth an alternative method for determining the amount of a compensable fee . . .

PINNACLE FLOOR COVERING, INC. d b a v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 16 So. 3d 919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . interpretation of section 73.091(1), which states: The petitioner shall pay attorney’s fees as provided in s. 73.092 . . .

JEA, a v. D. WILLIAMS,, 978 So. 2d 842 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . trial court erred in finding that the first letter to the appellees constituted an offer under section 73.092 . . . The JEA asserts that section 73.092 should be construed only to compute attorney’s fees based on the . . . However, such a construction is not supported by the text of section 73.092 and judicial interpretation . . . Section 73.092 states that attorney’s fees are computed based on the difference between the last written . . . Because we find that the trial court correctly applied section 73.092, the order is AFFIRMED. . . .

J. BARCO, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF PINELLAS COUNTY,, 975 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 2008)

. . . Section 73.092(1), Florida Statutes (2004), provides for calculation of statutory attorneys’ fees on . . .

MAY, v. C. BARTHET,, 934 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2006)

. . . Automatic Payment of all Attorney Fee’s, Costs by the State of Florida, Required by Florida Statutes § 73.092 . . .

CITY OF BOYNTON BEACH, v. JANOTS, P. Jr., 929 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . In this eminent domain action, we reverse an order awarding attorney’s fees under section 73.092, Florida . . . Section 73.092, Florida Statutes, provides, in part: (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section . . . property within 180 days for $107,000; the court held that this did not constitute an offer under section 73.092 . . . department’s unsigned letter to the landowner constituted an “offer” within the meaning of section 73.092 . . . Hence, it would be unreasonable to interpret the offer requirement of 73.092 to mean that the condemning . . .

In ZYPREXA PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, 424 F. Supp. 2d 488 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)

. . . . § 73.092; Leonard C. Arnold, Ltd. v. N. . . . Ann. § 73.092 (limiting contingent fees in eminent domain proceedings to 33% of any benefit up to $250,000 . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. J. LOCKHART S., 909 So. 2d 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . Section 73.092(2) speaks solely to the issue of attorney’s fees, expressly authorizing the award of such . . . reasoning: Attorney’s fees incurred in litigating entitlement to recover costs are authorized by section 73.092 . . . recover attorney’s fees and costs under section 73.091(1) is a “supplemental proceeding” under section 73.092 . . .

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. RFT PARTNERSHIP,, 906 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . NONMONETARY BENEFITS AS A BASIS FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES Section 73.092(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), states . . . Ch. 94-162, Laws of Fla.; .§ 73.092(1). . . . See § 73.092(2)(b). . . . The harder question is whether this help was a “benefit” “in eminent domain proceedings.” § 73.092(1) . . . The language of section 73.092 has not been substantially amended since 1995. . . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. NASSAU PARTNERS, LTD., 878 So. 2d 1286 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Attorney’s fees incurred in litigating entitlement to recover costs are authorized by section 73.092( . . . recover attorney’s fees and costs under section 73.091(1) is a “supplemental proceeding” under section 73.092 . . .

SCHOOL BOARD OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, v. HOPE, INC., 886 So. 2d 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Second, section 73.092(1), Florida Statutes, specifically provides that, in eminent domain proceedings . . .

WIGHT, v. WIGHT,, 880 So. 2d 692 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . & Robbins, Inc., 700 So.2d 782, 785 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (barring fees for fees under §§ 73.091 and 73.092 . . .

ENTERPRISING PROFESSIONAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 882 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Corporation (EPIC), appeals an order denying its motion for an award of attorney’s fees under section 73.092 . . . We conclude that those posttrial proceedings are supplemental proceedings under section 73.092(2) and . . . argued that the award of fees was proper because these were supplementary proceedings under section 73.092 . . . Smithbilt Industries, Inc., 715 So.2d 963, 967 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), this court recognized that section 73.092 . . .

SARASOTA COUNTY, a v. CURRY G. I. f k a NCNB W. S. J. Jr. E. f k a f k a N. A. P. D. A. Jr. P., 861 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . Because the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the fees based on section 73.092(1), Florida . . . The court awarded Curry attorney’s fees of $9900 pursuant to section 73.092(1). . . . We review an award of attorney’s fees under section 73.092 for an abuse of discretion. . . . Instead, the court should have based its attorney’s fee award on section 73.092(2). . . . (1), and we reverse and remand for reconsideration of attorney’s fees under section 73.092(2). . . .

CITY OF NORTH MIAMI BEACH, v. H. REED,, 863 So. 2d 351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . Section 73.092 provides the criteria to be used to determine the amount of the attorney’s fees award . . . Section 73.092(2) states: (2) In assessing attorney’s fees incurred in defeating an order of taking, . . . When section 73.092(2) applies, application of the Rowe risk multiplier is inappropriate to determine . . . Section 73.092(1) provides the measure to set an award of fees “based solely on the benefits achieved . . . application of section 73.092(1). . . .

MEDIPLEX CONSTRUCTION OF FLORIDA, INC. v. SCHAUB, 856 So. 2d 13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . Robbins, Inc., 700 So.2d 782, 785 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (barring fees for fees under sections 73.091 and 73.092 . . .

M. WARD, a v. COLLIER COUNTY, a, 852 So. 2d 892 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . Ward did not quantify that benefit with reasonable certainty as required by section 73.092(2)(b), Florida . . . See § 73.092(l)(c), Fla. Stat. (2001). . . . Section 73.092(2)(b) permits a circuit court considering the proper award of attorneys’ fees in an eminent . . .

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. CNL INCOME FUND VIII, LTD., 823 So. 2d 147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . attorney constitutes a nonmonetary benefit for which the attorney is entitled to a fee under section 73.092 . . . Section 73.092(l)(b) states that, in considering the amount of the fees to be awarded: The court may . . . court properly found that CNL presented competent evidence to satisfy all the requirements of section 73.092 . . .

SEMINOLE COUNTY, v. R. CHANDRINOS,, 816 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . eminent domain proceedings, and provides: (1)The petitioner shall pay attorney’s fees as provided in s. 73.092 . . . Interestingly, we observe that section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1998) mandates that in most cases, attorney . . .

GOLF COURSE RESORTS, INC. E. Jr. v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 816 So. 2d 236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . Section 73.092(1), Florida Statutes (2000), provides that the trial court shall award attorney’s fees . . . Section 73.092(l)(b) states that the trial court may also consider nonmonetary benefits that were obtained . . . and they must prove the amount of their recoverable fees and costs pursuant to sections 73.091 and 73.092 . . .

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, STATE OF FLORIDA, v. D. O DONNELL,, 775 So. 2d 991 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . , DOT contends that if any fee is awarded to O’Donnell, it should be calculated pursuant to section 73.092 . . . multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate and taking into consideration the factors contained in section 73.092 . . .

AMERADA HESS CORPORATION, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 788 So. 2d 276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . See § 73.092(1), Fla. Stat. . . . .” § 73.092(l)(a), Fla. Stat. . . . specifically identified by the court and can, within a reasonable degree of certainty, be quantified.” § 73.092 . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. M. PATEL,, 768 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . the attorneys’ fees awarded should have been based on the defeat of a whole take pursuant to section 73.092 . . . Florida Statutes (1997), instead of being based on obtaining a nonmonetary benefit pursuant to section 73.092 . . . Patel’s attorneys as determined by the percentage of the benefit achieved in accordance with section 73.092 . . . ’s attorneys were entitled to an additional fee based on a non-monetary benefit pursuant to section 73.092 . . . Patel’s attorneys argued that they were entitled to an additional fee, pursuant to section 73.092(l)( . . .

AMOCO OIL COMPANY, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 765 So. 2d 111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . costs hearing does not fall within the type of “other supplemental proceedings” contemplated in section 73.092 . . . attorney’s fees and costs incurred by defendant in connection with that litigation were incurred in § 73.092 . . . the proceedings” states in pertinent part: The petitioner shall pay attorney’s fees as provided in s. 73.092 . . . provided for, the court shall consider [various factors set forth in subsections (a) through (g)]. § 73.092 . . . Although the costs hearing constituted a “supplemental proceeding,” as contemplated in section 73.092 . . .

GATLIN v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 763 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . and Gerra Gatlin appeal an order denying attorney fees, which they sought on the authority of section 73.092 . . . Fla. 1st DCA 1991), the administrative proceeding was not a “supplemental proceeding” under section 73.092 . . .

D. OWENS, R. v. ORANGE COUNTY,, 747 So. 2d 467 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . , Florida Statutes (1995), which states: The petitioner shall pay attorney’s fees as provided in s. 73.092 . . .

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. JACK S QUICK CASH, INC., 748 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . That statute provides: Except as provided in s. 73.092, the petitioner shall pay all reasonable costs . . . of fees and costs is controlled by section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1991): Except as provided in s. 73.092 . . . Except as provided in s. 73.092, the petitioner shall pay all reasonable costs of the proceedings in . . .

REESE d b a a k a v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 743 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . trial court' found that there were no monetary or nonmonetary benefits to appellants under section 73.092 . . . CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 73.092, FLORIDA STATUTES (1995) Appellants argue, for the first time on . . . appeal, that section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional as applied and interpreted . . . FAILURE TO AWARD ENTITLEMENT OF ATTORNEY’S FEES Section 73.092(1), Florida Statutes (1995) provides, . . . Section 73.092(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1995) provides: The court may also consider nonmone-tary benefits . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. LAKEPOINTE ASSOCIATES,, 745 So. 2d 364 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . We begin by examining section 73.092, Florida Statutes, which governs the award of attorney’s fees in . . . Twenty percent of any portion of the benefit exceeding $1 million. § 73.092(l)(c) Fla. . . . We concluded that the option was not the equivalent of an offer under section 73.092, because it did . . . Section 73.092 states in several places that the offer by the condemning authority must be “written” . . . Section 73.092 was not enacted to provide a method of enforcing a contract for the sale of land. . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. KNAUS, 737 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . The award of the attorney’s fee in this eminent domain case was generally governed by section 73.092, . . . In determining the amount of that fee, the trial court incorrectly applied subsection 73.092(2), which . . . the trial court to determine the attorney’s fee by applying the calculation set forth in subsection 73.092 . . . Upon remand, the trial court shall calculate the award of attorney’s fees by applying subsection 73.092 . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. SKINNERS WHOLESALE NURSERY, INC., 736 So. 2d 3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . See §§ 73.092, Fla.Stat. (Supp. 1994), and 73.131(2), Fla.Stat. (1993). . . . Section 73.092(1) provides that generally an award of attorney’s fees for representation at trial in . . . Section 73.092(2) provides that in assessing attorney’s fees incurred in defeating an order of taking . . . The factors of sec. 73.092(2), Fla.Stat. (1993), were retained in the 1994 version of the statute for . . . See § 73.092(2), Fla.Stat. (1994 Supp.). . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. J. SKIDMORE,, 720 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . Methodology Section 73.092(1), Florida Statutes (1991) governs the award of attorney’s fees to a condemnee . . . Section 73.092(1) provides, “In assessing attorney’s fees in eminent domain proceedings, the court shall . . . give the greatest weight to the benefits resulting to the client from the services rendered.” § 73.092 . . . required adequately to represent the client in relation to the benefits resulting to the client. § 73.092 . . . by the attorneys for the client, determining the appropriate lodestar using the factors listed in § 73.092 . . .

TEETER, Jr. v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 713 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . hearing, the trial court granted their motions and awarded them attorney’s fees pursuant to section 73.092 . . . However, the court denied appellant’s request for additional fees pursuant to section 73.092(2), Florida . . . Section 73.092, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), provides, in part: (1) Except as otherwise provided in . . . sister court reversed the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to the property owners under section 73.092 . . . (2) and remanded for a determination of a fee pursuant to section 73.092(1). . . . I concur with the result in this case, but write because I believe that the language of section 73.092 . . . The limitation contained in section 73.092(2) prohibits recovery of attorneys fees in certain cases. . . .

SEMINOLE COUNTY, v. M. G. INVESTMENTS OF ORLANDO, INC., 714 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . The fees were awarded following a condemnation proceeding pursuant to section 73.092(l)(a), Florida Statutes . . . Appellee thereafter moved for attorney’s fees under section 73.092(l)(a). . . . The issue in this appeal is governed by this court’s interpretation of section 73.092(l)(a) which provides . . . in part the following: 73.092 Attorney’s fees.— (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the . . . Appellant contends that the trial court erred in its construction of section 73.092(l)(a) because the . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. SMITHBILT INDUSTRIES, INC. a, 715 So. 2d 963 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . We affirm the trial court’s decision to award fees pursuant to section 73.092(2), Florida Statutes (1995 . . . Thereafter, Smithbilt sought attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 73.092(2). . . . See § 73.092, Fla. Stat. (1993). . . . Section 73.092 contains no definition of “other supplemental proceeding.” . . . This award was based on the factors in section 73.092(2). . . .

F. PIERPONT, v. LEE COUNTY, A G INVESTMENTS, v. LEE COUNTY, BARNETT BANKS, INC. v. LEE COUNTY,, 710 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 1998)

. . . good-faith estimate of value in the quick-taking procedure equates to the “offer” referred to in section 73.092 . . . Equating this amount to the “offer” referred to in section 73.092 would provide a logical procedure. . . . ESTIMATE OF VALUE CAN BE CONSIDERED AN “OFFER” FOR THE CALCULATION OF ATTORNEY’S FEES UNDER SECTION 73.092 . . . The argument turned on an interpretation of section 73.092, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), which reads . . . They contend that in order to uphold the constitutionality of section 73.092, we must interpret the term . . . The language of section 73.092 does not permit us to conclude that a good-faith estimate of value is . . . However, we do not foreclose the possibility that under certain circumstances section 73.092 could be . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. E. HALL,, 707 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . Hall filed a motion pursuant to section 73.092, Florida Statutes, for attorney’s fees and costs with . . . judgment did not provide a breakdown as to the amount of business damages, it did not comply with section 73.092 . . . Section 73.092, Florida Statutes, deals with the calculation of the amount of attorney’s fees based on . . . We also fail to find any language in section 73.092, Florida Statutes, which would necessarily require . . . Section 73.092(l)(c)l. permits attorney’s fees in the amount of 33 percent of any benefit up to $250,000 . . .

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, STATE OF FLORIDA, v. ROBBINS AND ROBBINS, INC., 700 So. 2d 782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . court erred because it failed to calculate the attorneys’ fees in conformity with sections 73.091 and 73.092 . . . The correct procedure to establish a fee consistent with section 73.092 is for the trial court to consider . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. LaBELLE PHOENIX CORPORATION,, 696 So. 2d 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . We find that the trial court erroneously applied section 73.092(2), Florida Statutes (1995), rather than . . . section 73.092(1), Florida Statutes (1995), in determining the award. . . . We, accordingly, reverse and remand for the entry of an award pursuant to section 73.092(1). . . . The exception referred to in section 73.092(1) is found in section 73.092(2). . . . Under section 73.092(2), the award is based upon a “lodestar” analysis. . . .

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, v. GIBBINS,, 696 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . On the same day, Gibbins filed a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to sections 73.091 and 73.092, Florida . . . an award of its attorney’s fees incurred in the defense of the “taking” pursuant to § 73.091 and § 73.092 . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. ABS PROPERTIES PARTNERSHIP, a d b a E. P. E. E. E. Jr. M. O. W. L. E., 693 So. 2d 703 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . and remand for further evidentiary proceedings to determine reasonable attorney’s fees under section 73.092 . . . Section 73.092(1), Florida Statutes (1995), provides: 73.092 Attorney’s fees.— (1) Except as otherwise . . . Section 73.092(1) clearly does not apply in this case because the property owners received no benefits . . . as detailed in section 73.092(l)(a). . . . See § 73.092(2), Fla. Stat. (1993). . . .

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. SPRINGS LAND INVESTMENTS LTD., 695 So. 2d 414 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . That section provides: (1) The petitioner shall pay attorney’s fees as provided in s. 73.092 as well . . .

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, a v. T. TRESCA F. T. TRESCA F. v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, a, 692 So. 2d 991 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . Tresca and Sinclair assert that the trial court erred in its interpretation of section 73.092, Florida . . . the city’s last written offer was the good-faith deposit of $50,000; therefore, pursuant to section 73.092 . . . Section 73.092, Florida Statutes, provides for attorney’s fees in eminent domain cases as follows: (1 . . . 994 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), the second district attempted to define the word “offer” as used in section 73.092 . . . appeal or in the trial court that the "good faith deposit” does not constitute an offer pursuant to § 73.092 . . .

SEMINOLE COUNTY, v. CORAL GABLES FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION,, 691 So. 2d 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . fee award to Coral Gables Federal Savings and Loan Association (“CGF”) entered pursuant to section 73.092 . . . Section 73.092 provides, in part, that attorney’s fees should be based on a percentage of the “benefit . . . Seminole County argues that section 73.092 is unconstitutional because it deprives trial courts of the . . . The trial court determined the “benefits achieved by counsel for [CGF] ... pursuant to section 73.092 . . . Section 73.092 is intended to promote settlements and to deter litigation. . . .

BREVARD COUNTY, v. CANAVERAL PROPERTIES, INC., 689 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . Under the 1993 version of section 73.092(1), Florida Statutes, applicable here, in setting the fee the . . . DCA 1996), this court enunciated the analysis applicable to an award of attorney’s fees under section 73.092 . . . striking of the 20% benefit of $151,244 which was improper anyway under the 1993 version of section 73.092 . . .

LEE COUNTY, a v. BARNETT BANKS, INC., 711 So. 2d 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . Hume’s testimony consisted only of his opinion as to the legal interpretation of section 73.092, Florida . . . ESTIMATE OF VALUE CAN BE CONSIDERED AN “OFFER” FOR THE CALCULATION OF ATTORNEY’S FEES UNDER SECTION 73.092 . . .

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. WINTER PARK GOLF CLUB, INC., 687 So. 2d 970 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . What else could section 73.092(5) mean: The amount of attorney’s fees to be paid by the defendant pursuant . . . defendant and his attorney must be reduced by the amount of any attorney’s fees awarded by the court. § 73.092 . . .

SEMINOLE COUNTY, v. CUMBERLAND FARMS, INC., 688 So. 2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . the formula suggested by Cumberland Farm’s expert and used by the court did not comply with section 73.092 . . . The final judgment awarding fees did not refer to the factors required by section 73.092, Florida Statutes . . .

LEE COUNTY, a v. F. PIERPONT J., 693 So. 2d 994 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . The principal issue in this appeal involves the application of section 73.092, Florida Statutes (Supp . . . By its terms, section 73.092, as amended in 1994, applies to all actions filed after October 1,1994. . . . The pertinent parts of section 73.092 provide as follows: 73.092 Attorney’s fees.— 1) Except as otherwise . . . If that was the intent, section 73.092 should have made reference to the good faith estimate contained . . . On the contrary, section 73.092 uses the specific term “written offer.” . . .

BROWARD COUNTY, a v. A. LaPOINTE G. A. U A, 685 So. 2d 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . .” § 73.092(1), Fla.Stat. (1989). . . . an attorney, benefits must be measured from the first written offer after the attorney is hired. § 73.092 . . .

SEMINOLE COUNTY, v. ROLLINGWOOD APARTMENTS, LTD., 678 So. 2d 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . County advances several constitutional challenges to the eminent domain attorney’s fee statute, section 73.092 . . . utilized by the trial courts in those eases did not comport with the statutory requirements of section 73.092 . . .

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, STATE FLORIDA, v. T. MORRIS C., 674 So. 2d 926 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . The fee award in this case must be affirmed but we remind the trial court that under section 73.092, . . .

HARTLEB, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 677 So. 2d 336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . Section 73.092(7), Florida Statutes (1987), the agreed applicable eminent domain provision, reads, in . . .

SEMINOLE COUNTY, v. S. BUTLER,, 676 So. 2d 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . Because the trial court failed to calculate the fees in accordance with section 73.092, Florida Statutes . . . Butler, Superwash, and Express thereafter filed motions to assess attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 73.092 . . . Section 73.092(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), defines “benefit” as: ... the difference between the final . . . We concluded that, although section 73.092 provides little guidance to practitioners and trial judges . . . See § 73.092(l)(a), Fla.Stat. (1993). . . .

SEMINOLE COUNTY, v. DELCO OIL, INC., 669 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . The County recognized its obligation to pay a reasonable fee pursuant to section 73.092, Florida Statutes . . . The statute that governs the award of attorney’s fees in this case is section 73.092, Florida Statutes . . . The legislative history indicates that the deficiency in section 73.092 sought to be corrected by the . . . Because of the structure of section 73.092, the meaning of subsection 73.092(4) is a matter of debate . . . See § 73.092(5), Fla.Stat. (1993). . Ch. 90-303, Laws of Fla. . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. DAYSTAR, INC., 674 So. 2d 754 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . The department’s offer stated that it was being made “pursuant to Florida Statutes Sections 73.032, 73.092 . . . of the order quashing the offer of judgment, lost the benefit of the following provision in section 73.092 . . . was no confusion created by the department’s offer as it was clearly substantively founded on section 73.092 . . . 73.032, it must be inferred that the offer was not intended to refer to the 1989 version of section 73.092 . . . By referring to section 73.092 in its offer of judgment, the department placed Daystar on notice of the . . .

SEMINOLE COUNTY, v. W. CLAYTON,, 665 So. 2d 363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . . — Except as provided in s. 73.092, the petitioner shall pay all reasonable costs of the proceedings . . . Section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1993) contains the factors applicable in assessing a reasonable attorney . . . The court, utilizing the provisions of section 73.092, found that a reasonable fee based on hourly rates . . . The County contends that regulation of attorney’s fees is a judicial function and that section 73.092 . . . The trial court’s interpretation of section 73.092, which effectively awards a dual fee, would render . . .

BAKER PROTECTIVE SERVICES, v. FP INCORPORATED, 659 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . whether the award is below the level which activates entitlement to fees and costs pursuant to section 73.092 . . .

DOWNTOWN SQUARE ASSOCIATES, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 648 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . We reverse as the trial court considered factors other than those enumerated in section 73.092, Florida . . . Section 73.092 provides in pertinent part: (1) In assessing attorney’s fees in eminent domain proceedings . . . amount of fees it believed were reasonable had it not considered factors outside the scope of section 73.092 . . .

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. WEISENFELD,, 617 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . See also § 73.092, Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .

FLORIDA INLAND NAVIGATION DISTRICT, v. A. HUMPHRYS, H., 616 So. 2d 494 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . Both the appellant and the appellees (Humphryses) agree the award is governed by section 73.092, Florida . . . In referring to subsection (4) of section 73.092, the court held: The guide is nonexistent in that, by . . . The factors set forth in section 73.092(2) and the benefits resulting to the landowner from the services . . . benefits to the landowner and the traditional considerations for attorney’s fees set forth in section 73.092 . . . The order of the trial court shows that it relied on section 73.092, as amended in 1990, and gave primary . . . trial court’s expressed difficulty in applying subparagraph 4 of the attorney’s fees statute, section 73.092 . . .

W. PERSONS, v. PELAEZ,, 613 So. 2d 509 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . whether the award is below the level which activates entitlement to fees and costs pursuant to section 73.092 . . .

SCHICK, v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES,, 599 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1992)

. . . DETERMINING THE REASONABLENESS OF AN ATTORNEY’S FEE AWARD MADE PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 73.092 . . . directions to determine the attorney’s fee award based solely on the factors set forth under section 73.092 . . . This is because the legislature has specifically included in section 73.092 the criteria to be considered . . . Section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1987), reads in pertinent part: Attorney’s fees. — In assessing attorney . . .

LEE COUNTY, a v. H. SAGER, d b a d b a, 595 So. 2d 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . with an offer of judgment pursuant to rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and section 73.092 . . . whether the award is below the level which activates entitlement to fees and costs pursuant to section 73.092 . . . Section 73.092(7) provides, in pertinent part, that: Where an offer of judgment made by the petitioner . . .

In ESTATE OF PLATT,, 586 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1991)

. . . That statute reads as follows: 73.092 Attorney’s fees. — In assessing attorney’s fees in eminent domain . . . defending against a claim at any time after the entry of an order of taking in any condemnation action. § 73.092 . . .

LEE COUNTY, a v. TOHARI,, 582 So. 2d 104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . . § 73.092, Fla.Stat. (1989). . . .

CITY OF ORLANDO, v. KENSINGTON, LTD,, 580 So. 2d 830 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . At the subsequent hearing for an award of attorney fees pursuant to section 73.092, Florida Statutes . . . But this misconstrues the purpose of section 73.092 in determining attorneys fees. . . .

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES, v. SCHICK,, 580 So. 2d 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . squarely into that exception, and, because manifest injustice to the state would result if section 73.092 . . . The applicable statute at bar, section 73.092, lists six specific criteria that must be considered when . . . the application of a risk multiplier would pertain only to the six factors specified under section 73.092 . . . denied, 383 So.2d 1203 (Fla.1980), the Third District not only applied the factors set forth in section 73.092 . . . DETERMINING THE REASONABLENESS OF AN ATTORNEY’S FEE AWARD MADE PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 73.092 . . .

L. CRIGLER E. v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 535 So. 2d 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . The offers were made pursuant to the newly enacted section 73.092(7)-(9), Florida Statutes (1987). . . . with DOT that the offers did not place counsel for petitioners in an ethical dilemma and that section 73.092 . . . Next, with respect to petitioner’s argument that application of section 73.092(7)-(9) will result in . . . Under section 73.092(7)-(9), if petitioners accept DOT’s offer, then attorney’s fees are paid in full . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. FORTUNE FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION,, 489 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . However, such awards are governed by sections 73.091 and 73.092, Florida Statutes (1985), and the legislature . . . When the case is concluded, the trial court may award attorney’s fees pursuant to section 73.092. . . .

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. IDEAL HOLDING COMPANY R., 480 So. 2d 243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . Section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1983), furnishes the criteria which the court shall consider in awarding . . .

CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE v. POWELL BROTHERS, INC., 15 Fla. Supp. 2d 5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1985)

. . . Court’s decision); having considered and applied all of the factors and elements established by Section 73.092 . . . Responsibility (while recognizing some dissimilarity between these and the express provisions of Section 73.092 . . . accept and be bound by the fees procured from the Petitioner or as determined by the Court under Section 73.092 . . . the Rowe decision does not arise out of an eminent domain case and does not expressly apply Section 73.092 . . .

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, v. FLICHTBEIL,, 475 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . Section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1983) governs the awarding of attorney’s fees in condemnation actions . . .

FLORIDA PATIENT S COMPENSATION FUND, v. ROWE,, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985)

. . . .-428, Fla.Stat. (1983) (attorney fees assessed against insurer), and §§ 73.091, 73.092, and 73.131, . . .

DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, v. CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG,, 12 Fla. Supp. 2d 112 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1985)

. . . Denmark, 356 So.2d 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Section 73.092, Florida Statutes. . . .

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION, STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. DECKER, J., 450 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . In assessing attorney’s fees, section 73.092 requires the court to consider the following criteria: ( . . . trial court may then award attorneys’ fees to the defendants, pursuant to the guidelines in section 73.092 . . .

v., 4 Fla. Supp. 2d 56 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1983)

. . . Section 73.092, Florida Statutes, requires that: “In assessing attorney’s fees in eminent domain proceedings . . . determinant of a reasonable fee and explicitly acknowledges that the other factors enumerated in Section 73.092 . . . Section 73.092 stated in part: “In assessing attorney’s fees in eminent domain proceedings, the Court . . . Section 73.092, Florida Statutes, disallows attorney’s fees based solely on the benefit obtained. “. . . .

SERVICE INSURANCE COMPANY, a a a v. GULF STEEL CORPORATION, a, 412 So. 2d 967 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . 3d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 330 So.2d 20 (Fla.1976) (eminent domain suit under sections 73.091 and 73.092 . . .

In ESTATE OF GRIFFIS,, 399 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . broke down to $340 per hour in an eminent domain proceeding, when such award complied with Section 73.092 . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, v. GABLES- BY- THE- SEA, INC. a, 374 So. 2d 582 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)

. . . This approach disregards the factors set forth in Section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1977), to be used . . . In applying the factors set forth in Section 73.092 to the instant case, we note: (1) The benefit to . . .

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION, STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. S. DENMARK, 354 So. 2d 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)

. . . Section 73.092 of the Florida Statutes, recently enacted, provides as follows: In assessing attorney’ . . .