The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)
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Plaintiff represents that the writ of garnishment entered by this Court against the Garnishee (Docs. 23 & 24), was never served “due to a miscommunication with its process server” and automatically dissolved six months after its February 8, 2022, issuance, by operation of Fla. Stat. § 77.07. (Doc. 32 at ¶¶ 6-7). Thus, Plaintiff moved for this second post-judgment writ of garnishment.
Section 77.07(5) provides that the plaintiff can extend the writ “for an additional 6 months by serving the garnishee and the defendant a notice of extension and filing in the underlying proceeding a certification of such service.” Fla. Stat. § 77.07(5). However, no such certificate of service has been filed in the present case.
Ms. Zober has standing to dissolve the writ because she is identified in Wells Fargo's answer as one of the account holders. See Fla. Stat. § 77.07(2). See also Navon, Kopelman & O'Donnell, P.A. v. Synnex Informaion Techs. Inc., 720 So.2d 1167, 1168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (“The statutory right to move to dissolve the writ is granted only to the defendant and any other person having an ownership interest in the property, as disclosed by the garnishee's answer.” (emphasis omitted)). Ms. Zober also timely moved to dissolve the writ. See Doc. No. 28 (service on Ms. Zober by mail on November 25, 2022 (although to include typographical error of “2021” instead of “2022”)), Doc. No. 38 (motion to dissolve writ filed December 12, 2022), Fla. Stat. § 77.055 (requiring motion for dissolution of writ of garnishment to be filed within 20 days after the date indicated on the certificate of service). Given that Nationwide does not oppose the relief requested in the motion, the Court finds a hearing on the matter unnecessary.
The statutory time periods for Hector S. Rodriguez and Lilliana Gonzalez to make a claim of exemption under Section 77.041, Florida Statutes, and to dissolve the writ of garnishment under Section 77.07, Florida Statutes, have expired. To date, no claim of exemption or motion to dissolve has been filed. Because there are no disputed issues to be tried, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment on Bank of America, N.A.'s answer, in accordance with Section 77.083, Florida Statutes.
The statutory time periods for David W. Padot, Sr., and Maria Ramos Padot to make a claim of exemption under Section 77.041, Florida Statutes, and to dissolve the writ of garnishment under Section 77.07, Florida Statutes, have expired. To date, no claim of exemption or motion to dissolve has been filed. Because there are no disputed issues to be tried, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment on Vystar Credit Union's answer, in accordance with Section 77.083, Florida Statutes.
The statutory time periods for David W. Padot, Wendy Padot, and Samuel Stegall to make a claim of exemption under Section 77.041, Florida Statutes, and to dissolve the writ of garnishment under Section 77.07, Florida Statutes, have expired. To date, no claim of exemption or motion to dissolve has been filed. Because there are no disputed issues to be tried, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment on Suncoast Credit Union's answer, in accordance with Section 77.083, Florida Statutes.
There are two ways to challenge a writ of garnishment: “(1) on motion of the debtor challenging the truth of the allegations in the creditor's petition for the writ [under Fla. Stat. § 77.07]; or (2) on an affidavit of a third party claiming the garnished property belongs to the third party and not the debtor [under Fla. Stat. § 77.16].” Harborside Suites, LLC v. Rosen, 261 So.3d 664 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018).
[t]he third party can move to dissolve the writ of garnishment by “stating that any allegation in plaintiff's motion for writ is untrue.” [ See Fla. Stat. § 77.07(2)]. If the relevant allegation-here, agency or instrumentality status-is found to be untrue, the court dissolves the writ. Id. The Partnerships followed this procedure, and the district court, after due consideration of their argument, concluded that the agency or instrumentality allegation was “proved to be true.” See id. It therefore properly denied the motion to dissolve the writ. Any failure by the district court to conform to Florida's notice procedures was harmless because the Partnerships received actual notice and were able to contest the allegations as provided in § 77.07; they merely failed to succeed on the merits.
On August 14, 2017, the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina entered a final judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $17,349.60. (Dkt. 1-2.) Plaintiff registered the final judgment with this court on April 28, 2021. (Dkt. 1.) As such, the judgment has the same force and effect as if it were entered by this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963. On February 11, 2022, the court granted Plaintiff's first motion for a writ of garnishment after judgment directed to South State Bank, N.A. (Dkt. 9), and the Clerk of Court subsequently issued the writ (Dkt. 11). South State Bank, N.A. answered the writ on February 18, 2022. (Dkt. 13.) On September 14, 2022, South State Bank, N.A. filed a notice of statutory dissolution of the writ pursuant Fla. Stat. § 77.07( 5). (Dkt. 21.) Plaintiff now moves for the issuance of a new writ of garnishment as to South State Bank, N.A., as Garnishee. (Dkt. 22.) Plaintiff states that Defendant has not satisfied any portion of the judgment. (Id. at 2.) However, Plaintiff believes that South State Bank, N.A. has in its possession and control money or property belonging to Defendant sufficient to…
The plaintiffs, who sought garnishment under § 201(a) of the TRIA, bore the burden in the dissolution proceeding of establishing that the López appellants were agencies or instrumentalities of the FARC. This is the burden-of-proof allocation under both Florida garnishment law and the TRIA. See Fla. Stat. § 77.07(2) (on a motion to dissolve a writ of garnishment "if the allegation in the plaintiff's motion which is denied is not proved to be true, the garnishment shall be dissolved"); Kirschenbaum II , 257 F. Supp. 3d at 515 (addressing the TRIA) ; Harrison v. Republic of Sudan , Case No. 13-cv-3127 (PKC), 2017 WL 946422, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2017) (addressing the TRIA). Cf. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 810 F. Supp. 2d 402, 404 (D. Mass. 2011) (explaining that under Massachusetts law the plaintiff seeking post-judgment attachment has the burden to show entitlement to the assets in question, and concluding that "[t]here is no reason, textual or otherwise, to conclude that [the] TRIA shifts this burden of proof away from the plaintiff"), aff'd , 709 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2013).
. . . the debtor challenging the truth of the allegations in the creditor's petition for the writ, see § 77.07 . . . Either method requires a trial of the issues. §§ 77.07, 77.16. . . .
. . . Upon receipt of BDT's notice, Villamorey filed a motion to dissolve BDT's writ pursuant to section 77.07 . . . Villamorey account at Bank, Villamorey was not required to file an affidavit before exercising its section 77.07 . . . other person having an ownership interest in the property, as disclosed by the garnishee's answer . § 77.07 . . . Moreover, irrespective of which statutory procedure is invoked- section 77.07(2) or 77.16(1) -the result . . . plaintiff's motion which is denied is not proved to be true, the garnishment shall be dissolved.... § 77.07 . . .
. . . 121 So.3d 83, 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (refusing to extend the express terms of the version of section 77.07 . . .
. . . dissolved when plaintiff failed to file a motion for final judgment within 6 months, as required by section 77.07 . . . second writs, finding that allowing a second writ would “ ‘eir-cumvent[ ] the intent and meaning of § 77.07 . . . another subsequent writ of garnishment after a prior writ of garnishment was dissolved pursuant to § 77.07 . . . Third District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that “there is no basis in the language of section 77.07 . . . The language of section 222.12, like that of section 77.07(5) (at issue in Akerman), does not provide . . .
. . . parties (defendants’ wives and Rodgers Revocable Trust) to file motions to dissolve pursuant to Ch. 77.07 . . . asserting an ownership interest, but did not file a motion to dissolve the writs, in accord with F.S. § 77.07 . . . Ch. 77.07(2), Fla. . . .
. . . notice to the defendant of the right to an immediate hearing for dissolution of such writ pursuant to s. 77.07 . . .
. . . . § 77.07(2) (permitting “any other person having an ownership interest in [garnished] property” to move . . . Stat. § 77.07(2). . . . because the Partnerships received actual notice and were able to contest the allegations as provided in § 77.07 . . .
. . . notice to the defendant of the right to an immediate hearing for dissolution of such writ pursuant to s. 77.07 . . .
. . . the debtor challenging the truth of the allegations in the creditor’s petition for the writ, see § 77.07 . . . Either method requires a trial of the issues. §§ 77.07, 77.16. In this case, Ms. . . . Ujowundu’s section 77.07 challenge to the veracity of the allegations in the petition for garnishment . . . See § 77.07(1); Doug Sears Consulting, Inc. v. . . .
. . . February 2012, the Garnishees filed a Notice of Dissolution of Writ of Garnishment pursuant to section 77.07 . . . The trial court further found that it would be “circumventing the intent and meaning of § 77.07(5)” to . . . We further find that there is no basis in the language of section 77.07(5) to support the trial court . . . Section 77.07 was amended in 2005 to add subsection (5), which states as follows: If the plaintiff fails . . . We cannot extend the express terms of section 77.07(5) to hold that a subsequent writ of garnishment . . .
. . . . § 77.07, Fla. Stat. (2010); see Malowney v. Fed. . . .
. . . the defendant to move to dissolve the writ within a specific time period or risk being in default, § 77.07 . . .
. . . . § 77.07(2) and Fla. . . . Stat. §§ 77.07(2), 77.16(1). Specifically, Fla. . . . . § 77.07(2) provides: “[if] any allegation in plaintiffs motion is not proven to be true, the garnishment . . .
. . . Under Robert’s combined interpretation of sections 77.041 and 77.07(2) of the garnishment statute, failing . . . He first argued that the court’s ruling misinterpreted sections 77.041 and 77.07(2). . . . Robert next argues that pursuant to section 77.07(2), Florida Statutes, the only effect of the garnishment . . .
. . . . §§ 76.24(1), 77.07(1)). . . .
. . . Though he incorrectly filed the motion pursuant to section 77.07(2), Florida Statutes, it is clear from . . .
. . . That is, $622.25 at $0.25/copy; $77.07 paid to Sir Speedy; and $116.80 paid to Doubleday. . . .
. . . . § 77.07(1), Fla. Stat. . . . Under section 77.07(2), Florida Statutes, the deadline to move to dissolve the writ is twenty days from . . . nullity by the court, and the proceedings shall be in a default posture as to the party involved.” § 77.07 . . .
. . . Section 77.07(1), Florida Statutes (1997), permits a defendant to move to dissolve the writ, apparently . . . under any legal basis, and section 77.07(2) permits “any other person having an ownership interest in . . . Moreover, section 77.07(4) allows the issues raised in a defendant’s motion for dissolution to be tried . . . As a result, nothing in section 77.07 prohibits American General from filing a motion or answer arguing . . .
. . . is entered, notice to the defendant of the right to an immediate hearing under sections 73.031 and 77.07 . . .
. . . the recipient that he or she must move to dissolve the writ within the time period set forth in s. 77.07 . . . Tech., Inc., 720 So.2d 1167, 1168 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); § 77.07(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . . See § 77.07(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . . ’s position that Rudd could never file a motion to dissolve the writ as was his right under section 77.07 . . . Rudd’s right to properly move to dissolve the writ under section 77.07(2) could not be triggered where . . .
. . . . §§ 76.24(1), 77.07(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . .
. . . served a Motion to Dissolve Prejudgment Writs of Garnishment (Motion to Dissolve) pursuant to section 77.07 . . . Section 77.07 requires the trial court to dissolve a writ of garnishment “unless the petitioner proves . . . Under section 77.07, Sears Consulting was entitled to a full evidentiary hearing and the burden was upon . . . not admissible to prove facts in issue at an evidentiary hearing such as the one required by section 77.07 . . . We also disagree with ATS’s position because it is contrary to the clear language of section 77.07 and . . .
. . . The required notice must advise the judgment debtor that he may move to dissolve the writ under § 77.07 . . . Pursuant to § 77.07 of the Florida Code, a judgment debtor may, by motion, obtain dissolution of a writ . . .
. . . the motion was “in substance, application, and effect” a motion to dissolve filed pursuant to section 77.07 . . . Section 77.07(2) contemplates that the issues and defenses raised by a defendant in a motion to dissolve . . .
. . . Stat. ch. 77.07(2) (1997). . . . Stat. ch. 77.07(2) ] is granted only to the defendant [ — i.e., the judgment debtor — ] and any other . . . Stat. ch. 77.07(2) and then asserting that it has standing to appeal the denial of that motion to this . . .
. . . . §§ 76.24(1), 77.07 (1), Florida Statutes (1997); see Ayares-Eisenberg Perrine Datsun, Inc. v. . . .
. . . See § 77.07(1), Fla. Stat. (1997); Pleasant Valley Farms & Morey Condensery Co. v. . . .
. . . . § 77.07(2). . . . specifically in the garnishee’s answer, its identity was disclosed sufficiently to meet the requirements of § 77.07 . . .
. . . . § 77.07(2), Fla. Stat.; Beardsley v. Admiral Insurance Co., 647 So.2d 327 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). . . .
. . . is entered, notice to the defendant of the right to an immediate hearing under sections 73.031 and 77.07 . . .
. . . See generally § 77.07, Fla.Stat. (1993). . . . advise the recipient that he must move to dissolve the writ within the time period set forth in s. 77.07 . . .
. . . . §§ 77.07 and 77.-16, he was entitled to a trial on the ownership of those accounts prior to the garnishment . . .
. . . Elson, 263 So.2d 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); § 77.07, Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .
. . . 1990 = 114.71%/14 = 8.193%. 264,727.23 New principal. 3,495,866.38 AIR 5 May 1990-28 January 1991 == 77.07% . . .
. . . notice to the defendant of his right to an immediate hearing for dissolution of such writ pursuant to s. 77.07 . . . court’s discretionary conclusion that Barbouti had a reasonable probability of success on the merits. § 77.07 . . .
. . . See § 77.07(2), Fla. Stat. (1985). . . .
. . . With respect to the provision for dissolution of the writ, section 77.07(1) now provides: The defendant . . .
. . . Section 77.07(2) Florida Statutes (1983); International Travel Card Inc. v. R.C. . . . The grounds for a defendant’s motion to dissolve are contained in Section 77.07(2). . . . Once a defendant has made a 77.07(2) challenge to the truthfulness of an allegation contained in a plaintiffs . . . Section 77.07(1) Florida Statutes (1983). . . .
. . . Tract II Plaintiffs’ Second Mortgage on Tract I Principal $281,296.08 Interest to January 13, 1983 at $77.07 . . .
. . . Based upon our interpretation of § 77.07(1) and (2), we reverse and remand for reconsideration of the . . . Instead, the Court found that the motion was untimely under § 77.07(2). . . . Hasler argues, in essence, that if a challenge under § 77.07(2) is “untimely,” then a judgment debtor . . . forfeits the right to make a later challenge on the same grounds in a motion to dissolve under § 77.07 . . . Therefore, in any case where notice is required (as in this case), the 20 day time period of § 77.07( . . .
. . . . § 77.07. The creditor has twenty-four hours to contest the debtor’s claim after receiving notice. . . .
. . . below was obligated to conduct a further inquiry as to this issue, under its authority pursuant to § 77.07 . . .
. . . . §§ 77.031, 77.04, 77.06, 77.07, Fla.Stat. (1975). . § 85.031(2), Fla.Stat. (1977): BY SALE WITHOUT . . .
. . . . § 77.07(1) (West Supp.1977). . . . See Fla.Stat.Ann. §§ 77.01, 77.03, 77.04, 77.07, 77.08 (West Supp. 1977); Brown v. . . .
. . . dissolving a writ of garnishment entered prior to judgment pursuant to Sections 77.031, 77.04, 77.06 and 77.07 . . .
. . . judicial treatment of similar prejudgment procedures, we hold that Sections 77.031, 77.04, 77.06, and 77.07 . . . that of Louisiana, provides sufficient constitutional safeguards and points specifically to Section 77.07 . . . Sections 77.031, 77.04, 77.06, and 77.07, Florida Statutes (1975), insofar as they pertain to prejudgment . . . representative capacity held by him if the fiduciary or representative capacity is specified in the writ. 77.07 . . .
. . . At the outset, however, we point out that Section 77.07(2), Florida Statutes (1974), does provide that . . .
. . . Pitney, 139 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1943); 5 Collier on Bankruptcy § 77.07. . . .
. . . RDM filed a Motion to Dissolve this garnishment and according to § 77.07, Florida Statutes Annotated, . . .
. . . . § 77.07 does provide for a prompt hearing in which the defendant may challenge the issuance of the . . .
. . . . § 77.07 provides for a trial of the issues made by the writ of garnishment, answer and reply. . . .
. . . thereby, the garnishee is entitled to an order discharging him from further liability under the writ. 77.07 . . .
. . . Under the plan proposed by the plaintiffs, the black population in District 3 would have been 77.07% . . .
. . . . § 77.07, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. . . .
. . . . § 77.07, F.S.A. provides for dissolution of garnishment by the court that entered the writ. . . . . § 77.07, F.S.A., or the posting of a bond under F.S. § 77.24, F.S.A., result in sufficient discharge . . . , the Florida Supreme Court also recognized that a garnishment may be discharged under both F.S. §§ 77.07 . . .
. . . .) ¶ 77.07; 3A Collier, ¶ 62.14. . . .
. . . Section 77.07, in chapter 77, Fla.Stat., F. . . .
. . . Sec. 77.07, F.S.A., dealing with trial of garnishment causes and dissolution of garnishments, is identical . . .
. . . . § 77.07. . . .
. . . sustain an allegation of the original affidavit when challenged by a traverse of the defendant, Sec. 77.07 . . . Sec. 77.07. . . . Sec. 77.07. Cf. Pleasant Valley Farms & Morey Condensery Co. v. Carl, 90 Fla. 420, 106 So. 427. . . .