The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)
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Finally, Appellants argue that the trial court analyzed its motion under the incorrect statute. FAHI sought relief pursuant to sections 78.065 and 78.067, Florida Statutes. The trial court order denying FAHI's motion relies upon section 78.068, which imposes a higher standard for obtaining a writ of replevin without notice and hearing. Compare § 78.067(2), Fla. Stat. (2019)with § 78.068, Fla. Stat. (2019). Section 78.068 is inapplicable to this case because there was notice and hearing. See Brown v. Reynolds , 872 So. 2d 290, 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). The trial court should have analyzed FAHI's motion under section 78.067, not section 78.068.Replevin is a statutory remedy under Florida law that permits "[a]ny person whose personal property is wrongfully detained by any other person [to] recover said personal property and any damages sustained by reason of the wrongful taking or detention . . . . Fla. Stat. § 78.01. "Section 78.01 provides two alternative procedures for obtaining a writ of replevin under Florida law prior to entry of a final judgment awarding possession." California First Leasing Corp. v. Orlando Sun Resort & Spa, LLC, 2009 WL 2423108, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 15, 2009). "Pursuant to Sections 78.065 and 78.067, and in the absence of an effective waiver, the defendant must be given notice and a show cause hearing held before the writ of replevin may issue prior to the entry of final judgment. Pursuant to section 78.068, the prejudgment writ may issue without notice and a hearing, but the plaintiff must post a bond." Brown v. Reynolds, 872 So. 2d 290, 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). See also Gazil, Inc. v. Super Food Servs., Inc., 356 So. 2d 312, 313 (Fla. 1978) (Fla. Stat. § 78.068 "meets the five part test for minimum due process requirements").Our reversal of the partial summary judgment on Lundin's replevin claim will result in Krystal's return to the Petersons on remand; however, we observe that the trial court also erred by ordering the change of possession of Krystal because the Petersons posted a $20,000 bond. Section 78.067( 2), Florida Statutes (2013), provides that where a court has held a show cause hearing and determined that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the property pending final adjudication, it shall direct that a writ of replevin be issued. The section further provides, however, that “the order shall be stayed pending final adjudication of the claims of the parties if the defendant files with the court a written undertaking executed by a surety approved by the court in an amount equal to the value of the property.” Here, the circuit court directed, in the same order in which it granted summary judgment in favor of Lundin, that possession of Krystal be surrendered to Lundin within ten days. The Petersons moved for a stay pending appeal, which the circuit court denied. The trial court should have stayed the order and allowed the Petersons to retain possession of Krystal pending final… Our reversal of the partial summary judgment on Lundin's replevin claim will result in Krystal's return to the Petersons on remand; however, we observe that the trial court also erred by ordering the change of possession of Krystal because the Petersons posted a $20,000 bond. Section 78.067( 2), Florida Statutes (2013), provides that where a court has held a show cause hearing and determined that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the property pending final adjudication, it shall direct that a writ of replevin be issued. The section further provides, however, that “the order shall be stayed pending final adjudication of the claims of the parties if the defendant files with the court a written undertaking executed by a surety approved by the court in an amount equal to the value of the property.” Here, the circuit court directed, in the same order in which it granted summary judgment in favor of Lundin, that possession of Krystal be surrendered to Lundin within ten days. The Petersons moved for a stay pending appeal, which the circuit court denied. The trial court should have stayed the order and allowed the Petersons to retain possession of Krystal pending final… In petitioner's action seeking replevin of property, the county court issued a Replevin Order to Show Cause, directing defendant to show cause why the property should not be delivered to petitioner “pending final adjudication of the claims of the parties” under section 78.067(2), Florida Statutes (1979). After the hearing, the county court issued a Final Judgment Denying Replevin, denying petitioner's six causes of action.In this case, the final judgment resulted from a hearing triggered by the trial court's order to show cause. The “show cause” hearing was authorized by section 78.067( 2), Florida Statutes (2011). In pertinent part, the statute requires the trial court to hold a hearing and “make a determination of which party, with reasonable probability, is entitled to the possession of the claimed property pending final adjudication of the claims of the parties.” Id. Thus, the statute contemplates a temporary, pendente lite, award and not a final adjudication on the merits. “This determination is to be based on the ‘probable validity’ of the plaintiff's claim against the defendant and is preliminary to a final adjudication of the claims of the parties.” Keybank Nat'l Ass'n v. Passport Marine, Inc., 76 So.3d 1137, 1138 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quoting JB Int'l, Inc. v. Mega Flight, Inc., 840 So.2d 1147, 1149 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)). Regardless of the result of the show cause hearing, “the case proceeds as any other civil action would, and the trial court must still make a final adjudication of the claims of the parties in accordance with the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.” Brown, 872 So.2d… At a hearing on an order to show cause, the court is directed by section 78.067( 2) to “make a determination of which party, with reasonable probability, is entitled to the possession of the claimed property pending final adjudication of the claims of the parties.” This determination is to be based on the “probable validity” of the plaintiff's claim against the defendant and is preliminary to a final adjudication of the claims of the parties. JB Int'l, Inc. v. Mega Flight, Inc., 840 So.2d 1147, 1149 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). If the plaintiff fails to establish the probable validity of the replevin claim at the hearing on the order to show cause held pursuant to section 78.067, dismissal of the complaint after the hearing is premature because the purpose of the hearing is only to determine who should have possession of the claimed property pending the final hearing. Gill v. Shively, 320 So.2d 415, 416 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). Although the trial court may consider the merits of the plaintiff's claim insofar as may be necessary to a determination of whether the writ should issue prior to final judgment, “the trial court's ruling has no bearing on the rights of the parties… In the instant case, the record before this Court reflects that Siemens did not file its Replevin Motion pursuant to section 78.068 because Siemens neither sought an ex parte writ of replevin nor posted the required bond. See§ 78.068(3), Fla. Stat. (2011) (“The petitioner must post bond in the amount of twice the value of the goods subject to the writ or twice the balance remaining due and owing, whichever is lesser as determined by the court, as security for the payment of damages the defendant may sustain when the writ is obtained wrongfully.”). Rather, the record reflects that Siemens' Replevin Motion proceeded under section 78.067 as the trial court, pursuant to section 78.067(2), directed Weinberg to show cause why the claimed property should not be taken. Therefore, we review the merits of the trial court's order pursuant to section 78.067, which provides, in part, as follows:Second, at the show cause hearing, the lender met its burden of proof. Section 78.067(2), Florida Statutes (2010), provides, in pertinent part:See, e.g., Brown v. Reynolds, 872 So.2d 290, 296 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (interpreting Florida's replevin statute, § 78.067(2), Fla. Stat. (1997), and holding that "the trial court's ruling [on the propriety of granting a prejudgment writ of possession] has no bearing on the rights of the parties when the matter is tried on the merits, nor does it bind the court at the final hearing or preclude a subsequent final adjudication dissolving the writ and ordering the return of the property") (internal quotations omitted); see also JB Int'l, Inc. v. Mega Flight, Inc., 840 So.2d 1147 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).. . . Section 78.067(2), Florida Statutes (2013), provides that where a court has held a show cause hearing . . . retain possession of Krystal pending final adjudication because they posted bond pursuant to section 78.067 . . .
. . . be delivered to petitioner “pending final adjudication of the claims of the parties” under section 78.067 . . .
. . . The “show cause” hearing was authorized by section 78.067(2), Florida Statutes (2011). . . .
. . . Section 78.067, Florida Statutes, provides the process for prejudgment possession of property. . . . states the relevant procedure: At a hearing on an order to show cause, the court is directed by section 78.067 . . . probable validity of the replevin claim at the hearing on the order to show cause held pursuant to section 78.067 . . .
. . . Rather, we conclude that section 78.067, Florida Statutes (2011), is applicable. . . . Rather, the record reflects that Siemens’ Replevin Motion proceeded under section 78.067 as the trial . . . Therefore, we review the merits of the trial court’s order pursuant to section 78.067, which provides . . . Section 78.067(2) merely provides a defendant with a mechanism for obtaining a stay of a prejudgment . . . If a replevin order was issued pursuant to section 78.067(2), and Weinberg elected to post a bond to . . .
. . . Section 78.067(2), Florida Statutes (2010), provides, in pertinent part: [T]he court shall at the hearing . . .
. . . Reynolds, 872 So.2d 290, 296 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (interpreting Florida’s replevin statute, § 78.067(2) . . .
. . . . § 78.067(2), which allows a petitioner to obtain possession of property during the pendency of litigation . . . Stat. § 78.067(2). . . . Stat. § 78.067(2). . . . Stat. § 78.067(2) (“the order shall be stayed pending final adjudication of the claims of the parties . . . Stat. § 78.067(2), finding that: 1.Zokaites is entitled to immediate possession of (i) all merchandise . . .
. . . issuance of a writ of replevin prior to the entry of final judgment pursuant to sections 78.065 and 78.067 . . . On March 11, 2002, Brown filed a motion pursuant to sections 78.065 and 78.067 requesting the entry of . . . As authorized by section 78.067(2), both Brown and Frank filed affidavits and “other showings” for the . . . Pursuant to' sections 78.065 and 78.067, and in the absence of an effective waiver, the defendant must . . . Brown’s motion reflects confusion about the operation of sections 78.065 and 78.067. . . .
. . . Here, JBI sought an ordinary writ of replevin pursuant to section 78.067(2), Florida Statutes (1998), . . .
. . . Stat. (2001); § 78.067(2), Fla. Stat. (2001); see also Comcoa, Inc. v. . . .
. . . and present testimony at the time of the hearing, or, on a finding by the court pursuant to section 78.067 . . .
. . . Section 78.067(2), Florida Statutes (1995), requires the trial court to consider “the affidavits and . . .
. . . and present testimony at the time of the hearing, or, on a finding by the court pursuant to section 78.067 . . .
. . . to resolve the dispute, appellant filed suit and sought replevin of the Porsche pursuant to section 78.067 . . .
. . . . § 78.067. . . .
. . . At a show cause hearing under section 78.067(2), Florida Statutes (1995) the court must determine “which . . .
. . . . § 78.067, Fla.Stat. (1993). . . . defendant’s motion to increase bond where the additional writs of replevin were issued pursuant to section 78.067 . . .
. . . Under sections 78.065 and 78.067, a show cause hearing must occur before a replevin writ is issued. . . .
. . . non-final order authorizing the issuance of a writ of replevin before final judgment under section 78.067 . . .
. . . and present testimony at the time of the hearing, or, on a finding by the court pursuant to section 78.067 . . .
. . . Brown appeals an order granting a writ of replevin pursuant to subsection 78.067(2), Florida Statutes . . . Id. § 78.067(2). . . . See id. § 78.067(2) (“However, the order shall be stayed pending final adjudication of the claims of . . .
. . . to possession of some 1,150 automobiles, after a show cause hearing pursuant to sections 78.065 and 78.067 . . . Morse elected to proceed pursuant to sections 78.065 and 78.067. . . . entered below and direct that the trial court immediately issue a writ of replevin pursuant to section 78.067 . . .
. . . Following a hearing on the matter pursuant to Section 78.067, Florida Statutes (1987), the trial court . . .
. . . subsequent hearing before the court, after notice to the defendant, as is prescribed under 78.065 and 78.067 . . . on his behalf at the time of the hearing, or that he may, upon a finding by the court pursuant to s. 78.067 . . . hearing and that in such case the court may order the clerk of the court to issue a writ of replevin. . 78.067 . . .
. . . replevin against us, we hereby waive the notice requirement pertaining thereto in accordance with F.S. 78.067 . . .
. . . . § 78.067(2), Fla.Stat. (1989). . . .
. . . of the record on appeal we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding, pursuant to section 78.067 . . .
. . . 932.703(1) and (2) the trial court’s failure to comply with the procedural requirements of section 78.067 . . . We do note, however, that section 78.067 prescribes a mandatory procedure for issuance of a writ of replev-in . . .
. . . cause hearing of August 26 resulted in a factual determination by the trial judge, pursuant to section 78.067 . . . Section 78.067(2) states in part: If the court determines that the plaintiff is entitled to take possession . . .
. . . In so doing we note the provisions of Sections 78.065 and 78.067 which clearly spell out provisions for . . . Section 78.065(2)(e), and 78.067(2). No similar language appears in Section 78.068. . . .
. . . and present testimony at the time of the hearing or, on a finding by the court pursuant to section 78.067 . . .
. . . procedures had been altered significantly, and on that date, pursuant to Florida Statute Section 78.045 and 78.067 . . .
. . . After an order to show cause was issued and served upon appellee a hearing was held pursuant to § 78.067 . . . cause of action it would appear that dismissal of the complaint after the hearing held pursuant to § 78.067 . . . the possession of the claimed property pending final adjudication of the claims of the parties.” § 78.067 . . .