83.53
Landlord’s access to dwelling unit.
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83.53 Landlord’s access to dwelling unit.—
(1) The tenant shall not unreasonably withhold consent to the landlord to enter the dwelling unit from time to time in order to inspect the premises; make necessary or agreed repairs, decorations, alterations, or improvements; supply agreed services; or exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers, mortgagees, tenants, workers, or contractors.
(2) The landlord may enter the dwelling unit at any time for the protection or preservation of the premises. The landlord may enter the dwelling unit upon reasonable notice to the tenant and at a reasonable time for the purpose of repair of the premises. “Reasonable notice” for the purpose of repair is notice given at least 24 hours prior to the entry, and reasonable time for the purpose of repair shall be between the hours of 7:30 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. The landlord may enter the dwelling unit when necessary for the further purposes set forth in subsection (1) under any of the following circumstances:
(a) With the consent of the tenant;
(b) In case of emergency;
(c) When the tenant unreasonably withholds consent; or
(d) If the tenant is absent from the premises for a period of time equal to one-half the time for periodic rental payments. If the rent is current and the tenant notifies the landlord of an intended absence, then the landlord may enter only with the consent of the tenant or for the protection or preservation of the premises.
(3) The landlord shall not abuse the right of access nor use it to harass the tenant.
History.—s. 2, ch. 73-330; s. 5, ch. 87-195; s. 4, ch. 93-255; s. 446, ch. 95-147; s. 3, ch. 2022-222.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 4
cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1978–2025 · leading case: Quinones v. Durkis
Quinones v. Durkis (1986)
“A count for damages alleging violations of Fla. Stat. 83.53 et seq., (Florida Landlord Tenant Act), (pendent claim) In Count III, the Plaintiffs allege that CURRY acted under color of state law and in concert with the Sheriff in infringing the Plaintiff’s property interest and…”
William Hefley and Aimee J. Hefley v. Christopher Holmquist (2025)
“§ 83.53. First, a landlord may enter “at any time for the protection or preservation of the premises.”
Patricia Kay Sublett v. State of Florida (2025)
“§ 83.53(2), Fla. Stat. (2022). The victim did not consent to or otherwise license Sublett’s entry onto the porch.”
Beaty v. Kimerling Corp. (1978)
“Enforcement of violations of Florida Statute §83.53 (3) committed by public lodging establishments required to be licensed pursuant to Florida Statute §509.”
— 83.53(1) — 1 case
William Hefley and Aimee J. Hefley v. Christopher Holmquist (2025)
“§ 83.53. First, a landlord may enter “at any time for the protection or preservation of the premises.”
— 83.53(2) — 2 cases
Patricia Kay Sublett v. State of Florida (2025)
“§ 83.53(2), Fla. Stat. (2022). The victim did not consent to or otherwise license Sublett’s entry onto the porch.”
William Hefley and Aimee J. Hefley v. Christopher Holmquist (2025)
“§ 83.53. First, a landlord may enter “at any time for the protection or preservation of the premises.”
— 83.53(3) — 1 case
William Hefley and Aimee J. Hefley v. Christopher Holmquist (2025)
“§ 83.53. First, a landlord may enter “at any time for the protection or preservation of the premises.”
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