83.59
Right of action for possession.
Find cases:
SyfertCases citing this section
FL-LEGleg.state.fl.us
JustiaFla. Statutes
CornellLII Search
CasesGoogle Scholar
83.59 Right of action for possession.—
(1) If the rental agreement is terminated and the tenant does not vacate the premises, the landlord may recover possession of the dwelling unit as provided in this section.
(2) A landlord, the landlord’s attorney, or the landlord’s agent, applying for the removal of a tenant, shall file in the county court of the county where the premises are situated a complaint describing the dwelling unit and stating the facts that authorize its recovery. A landlord’s agent is not permitted to take any action other than the initial filing of the complaint, unless the landlord’s agent is an attorney. The landlord is entitled to the summary procedure provided in s. 51.011, and the court shall advance the cause on the calendar.
(3) The landlord shall not recover possession of a dwelling unit except:
(a) In an action for possession under subsection (2) or other civil action in which the issue of right of possession is determined;
(b) When the tenant has surrendered possession of the dwelling unit to the landlord;
(c) When the tenant has abandoned the dwelling unit. In the absence of actual knowledge of abandonment, it shall be presumed that the tenant has abandoned the dwelling unit if he or she is absent from the premises for a period of time equal to one-half the time for periodic rental payments. However, this presumption does not apply if the rent is current or the tenant has notified the landlord, in writing, of an intended absence; or
(d) When the last remaining tenant of a dwelling unit is deceased, personal property remains on the premises, rent is unpaid, at least 60 days have elapsed following the date of death, and the landlord has not been notified in writing of the existence of a probate estate or of the name and address of a personal representative. This paragraph does not apply to a dwelling unit used in connection with a federally administered or regulated housing program, including programs under s. 202, s. 221(d)(3) and (4), s. 236, or s. 8 of the National Housing Act, as amended.
(4) The prevailing party is entitled to have judgment for costs and execution therefor.
History.—s. 2, ch. 73-330; s. 1, ch. 74-146; s. 24, ch. 82-66; s. 1, ch. 92-36; s. 447, ch. 95-147; s. 1, ch. 2007-136; s. 11, ch. 2013-136.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 33
cases (7 in the last 5 years), 1975–2026 · leading case: Housing Opportunities Project for Excellence, Inc. v. Spv Realty, Lc
Housing Opportunities Project for Excellence, Inc. v. Spv Realty, Lc (2016)
“, and § 83.59(2), Fla. Stat. (2016). There is neither logic nor a textual basis for imposing this burdensome, time- consuming requirement on victims of housing discrimination under state law when no such burden exists under the federal law that has been, and remains, the…”
Toledo v. Escamilla (2007)
“Specifically, section 83.59(2), Florida Statutes (2004), provides in part: A landlord .”
Mesnikoff v. Fq Backyard Trading, LLC (2018)
“Even if Backyard Trading did attempt to include in its complaint a second count for possession under section 83.59(1) of the Act, which it did not, we would nonetheless conclude that the county court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter a final judgment for eviction and…”
Springbrook Commons, Ltd. v. Brown (2000)
“We reject the landlord's argument that section 83.59(4), Florida Statutes (1999), which provides that the prevailing party in an action for possession is entitled to costs, compels a different result.”
Lane v. Brith (1975)
“Apparently the action was brought under the provisions of § 83.59, F.S. 1973, for failure to vacate the premises after termination of the rental agreement.”
Hoffman v. Ouellette (2001)
“Section 83.59 of the Quebec Automobile Insurance Act provides: Accident outside Quebec.”
Metropolitan Dade County v. Dansey (1990)
“ORDER ON DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS THIS CAUSE is before the court on defendant’s motion to dismiss, and the court having held a hearing on January 25, 1990 and being fully advised in the premises hereby rules as follows: *217 This is an action for possession of a dwelling…”
Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion—Nonlawyer Preparation of & Representation of Landlord in Uncontested Residential Evictio (1992)
“After the advisory opinion was filed and comments were received, the Standing Committee filed as supplemental authority a recent amendment to section 83.59(2), Florida Statutes (1991), that purports to authorize a residential landlord’s "attorney or agent” to file the initial…”
The Florida Bar v. Mickens (1987)
“Because Part II does not reference the provision in Part I for filing eviction or distress of rent actions and only addresses actions filed by the landlord, § 83.59(2), Florida Statutes, may be construed as excluding non-attorney agents from filing on behalf of a residential…”
Lawson v. Alverez (1990)
“ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and the Court having held a hearing on December 13, 1990, and being fully advised in the premises hereby rules as follows: This is an action for possession of a dwelling…”
William Hefley and Aimee J. Hefley v. Christopher Holmquist (2025)
“See §§ 83.59, 83.62(1), Fla. Stat.; Fla. R. Civ.”
Yolani Castillo v. Radames Antonio Camacho Aldahondo (2025)
“As pleaded by Camacho in the eviction action, section 83.59, Florida Statutes (2022), authorizes the county court to grant possession of a dwelling to a landlord when the tenant does not vacate the dwelling upon termination of the rental agreement.”
— 83.59(1) — 5 cases
Mesnikoff v. Fq Backyard Trading, LLC (2018)
“Even if Backyard Trading did attempt to include in its complaint a second count for possession under section 83.59(1) of the Act, which it did not, we would nonetheless conclude that the county court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter a final judgment for eviction and…”
Lawson v. Alverez (1990)
“ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and the Court having held a hearing on December 13, 1990, and being fully advised in the premises hereby rules as follows: This is an action for possession of a dwelling…”
Wayne C. Rickert D/B/A Crystal Lake Village v. Karen Valencia and Unknown Party in Possession (2026)
Labrada v. Barrios (1990)
Lawson v. Alverez (1990)
— 83.59(2) — 9 cases
Housing Opportunities Project for Excellence, Inc. v. Spv Realty, Lc (2016)
“, and § 83.59(2), Fla. Stat. (2016). There is neither logic nor a textual basis for imposing this burdensome, time- consuming requirement on victims of housing discrimination under state law when no such burden exists under the federal law that has been, and remains, the…”
Toledo v. Escamilla (2007)
“Specifically, section 83.59(2), Florida Statutes (2004), provides in part: A landlord .”
Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion—Nonlawyer Preparation of & Representation of Landlord in Uncontested Residential Evictio (1992)
“After the advisory opinion was filed and comments were received, the Standing Committee filed as supplemental authority a recent amendment to section 83.59(2), Florida Statutes (1991), that purports to authorize a residential landlord’s "attorney or agent” to file the initial…”
Lane v. Brith (1975)
“Apparently the action was brought under the provisions of § 83.59, F.S. 1973, for failure to vacate the premises after termination of the rental agreement.”
The Florida Bar v. Mickens (1987)
“Because Part II does not reference the provision in Part I for filing eviction or distress of rent actions and only addresses actions filed by the landlord, § 83.59(2), Florida Statutes, may be construed as excluding non-attorney agents from filing on behalf of a residential…”
— 83.59(3) — 2 cases
William Hefley and Aimee J. Hefley v. Christopher Holmquist (2025)
“See §§ 83.59, 83.62(1), Fla. Stat.; Fla. R. Civ.”
Beaty v. Kimerling Corp. (1978)
— 83.59(3)(c) — 2 cases
William Hefley and Aimee J. Hefley v. Christopher Holmquist (2025)
“See §§ 83.59, 83.62(1), Fla. Stat.; Fla. R. Civ.”
— 83.59(4) — 1 case
Springbrook Commons, Ltd. v. Brown (2000)
“We reject the landlord's argument that section 83.59(4), Florida Statutes (1999), which provides that the prevailing party in an action for possession is entitled to costs, compels a different result.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.