Florida Statute 83.681 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research

The 2024 Florida Statutes

Title VI
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

Chapter 83
LANDLORD AND TENANT

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F.S. 83.681

83.681 Orders to enjoin violations of this part.—

(1) A landlord who gives notice to a tenant of the landlord’s intent to terminate the tenant’s lease pursuant to s. 83.56(2)(a), due to the tenant’s intentional destruction, damage, or misuse of the landlord’s property may petition the county or circuit court for an injunction prohibiting the tenant from continuing to violate any of the provisions of that part.

(2) The court shall grant the relief requested pursuant to subsection (1) in conformity with the principles that govern the granting of injunctive relief from threatened loss or damage in other civil cases.

(3) Evidence of a tenant’s intentional destruction, damage, or misuse of the landlord’s property in an amount greater than twice the value of money deposited with the landlord pursuant to s. 83.49 or $300, whichever is greater, shall constitute irreparable harm for the purposes of injunctive relief.

History.—s. 8, ch. 93-255; s. 451, ch. 95-147.

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Amendments to 83.681

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 83.681

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 83.681.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases Citing Statute 83.681

Total Results: 1

Alvarez v. State

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida | Date Filed: 1984-02-22

Citation: 445 So. 2d 677, 1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 11852

Snippet: PER CURIAM. We affirm appellant’s conviction and sentence for attempted first degree murder but reverse his conviction for possession of a firearm while engaged in a felony offense. See Bell v. State, 437 So.2d 1057 (Fla.1983). We reject appellant’s claim that his sentence was improperly enhanced. See Whitehead v. State, 446 So.2d 194 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). We reject appellant’s claim of error as to the trial court’s retention of jurisdiction because we do not believe the error to be fundamental and