90.302

Classification of rebuttable presumptions.

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90.302 Classification of rebuttable presumptions.—Every rebuttable presumption is either:

(1) A presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence and requiring the trier of fact to assume the existence of the presumed fact, unless credible evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact is introduced, in which event, the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact shall be determined from the evidence without regard to the presumption; or

(2) A presumption affecting the burden of proof that imposes upon the party against whom it operates the burden of proof concerning the nonexistence of the presumed fact.

History.—s. 1, ch. 76-237; s. 1, ch. 77-77; s. 22, ch. 78-361; s. 1, ch. 78-379.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 55 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1982–2023 · leading case: Public Health Trust of Dade Cty. v. Valcin

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Public Health Trust of Dade Cty. v. Valcin (1987) fla · cites it 8× “The instant problem should be resolved either by applying a shift in the burden of producing evidence, section 90.302(1), Florida Statutes (1985), or a shift in the burden of proof.”

Hlad v. State (1990) fladistctapp · cites it 21× “[23] To serve different purposes the Florida Evidence Code adopted both types, classifying the Thayer-Wigmore type in section 90.302(1), Florida Statutes, as "a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence" and the Morgan-McCormick type in section 90.”

Bennett v. St. Vincent's Medical Center, Inc. (2011) fla · cites it 8× “§ 90.302, Fla. Stat. (2001). All the parties agree that the statutory presumption at issue in this case is the type described in section 90.”

Martino v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (2005) fla · cites it 2× “This rebuttable presumption shifted the burden of proof under section 90.302(2), Florida Statutes (1985), so that the presumption "is not overcome until the trier of fact believes that the presumed [negligence] has been overcome by whatever degree of persuasion is required by…”

Mason v. Porsche Cars of North America (1997) fladistctapp · cites it 5× “§ 90.302, Fla. Stat. (1995). The former vanish when competent evidence to the contrary is introduced, while the latter remain throughout a proceeding unless, at the conclusion, the trier of fact determines that they have been overcome by the greater weight of the evidence.”

Warfel v. Universal Insurance Co. of North America (2010) fladistctapp · cites it 4× “See §§ 90.302(1), [5] 90.303. [6] Additionally, Mr.”

Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand and Associates (2001) fla “" Pursuant to section 90.302(2), a presumption affecting the burden of proof "imposes upon the party against whom it operates the burden of proof concerning the nonexistence of the presumed fact.”

Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc. (2001) fla “" Pursuant to section 90.302(2), a presumption affecting the burden of proof "imposes upon the party against whom it operates the burden of proof concerning the nonexistence of the presumed fact.”

DEPT. OF AGR. & CONSUMER SERV. v. Bonanno (1990) fla · cites it 2× “Section 90.302, Florida Statutes (1987), sets forth the two types of rebuttable presumptions recognized in Florida: Every rebuttable presumption is either: (1) A presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence and requiring the trier of fact to assume the existence of the…”

Universal Insurance Co. of North America v. Warfel (2012) fla “Section 90.302 Classification of re-buttable presumptions.”

Aetna Cas. & Sur. v. Pappagallo Rest. (1989) fladistctapp · cites it 4× “Section 90.302, Florida Statutes (1987), provides that: [E]very rebuttable presumption is either: (1) A presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence and requiring the trier of fact to assume the existence of the presumed fact, unless credible evidence sufficient to…”

Hack v. Janes (2004) fladistctapp · cites it 2× “) However, "when proof is introduced of the basic facts giving rise to a section 90.302(2) presumption affecting the burden of proof, the presumption operates to shift the burden of persuasion regarding the presumed fact to the opposing party.”

Show all 55 citing cases →

— 90.302(1) — 19 cases

Hlad v. State (1990) fladistctapp “[23] To serve different purposes the Florida Evidence Code adopted both types, classifying the Thayer-Wigmore type in section 90.302(1), Florida Statutes, as "a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence" and the Morgan-McCormick type in section 90.”

Public Health Trust of Dade Cty. v. Valcin (1987) fla “The instant problem should be resolved either by applying a shift in the burden of producing evidence, section 90.302(1), Florida Statutes (1985), or a shift in the burden of proof.”

Bennett v. St. Vincent's Medical Center, Inc. (2011) fla “§ 90.302, Fla. Stat. (2001). All the parties agree that the statutory presumption at issue in this case is the type described in section 90.”

Levin v. Ethan Allen, Inc. (2002) fladistctapp

Eppler v. Tarmac America, Inc. (2000) fla

— 90.302(2) — 21 cases

Martino v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (2005) fla “This rebuttable presumption shifted the burden of proof under section 90.302(2), Florida Statutes (1985), so that the presumption "is not overcome until the trier of fact believes that the presumed [negligence] has been overcome by whatever degree of persuasion is required by…”

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