Cases from cite.case.law:

AYLSWORTH, v. MUTINY ON THE BAY CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., 275 So. 3d 781 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . presumed fact was introduced, the trier of fact was required to assume the existence thereof") (citing § 90.302 . . .

HEARD, v. PERALES,, 247 So. 3d 533 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . .]" § 90.302(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .

IN INTEREST OF X. W. a Ad v. C. W., 255 So. 3d 882 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See § 90.302(1), Fla. . . . See § 90.302-.304, Fla. Stat. (2016) ; Universal Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. . . .

BREVARD COUNTY SHERIFF S OFFICE, v. BROWN,, 208 So. 3d 1281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . It shall be presumed in the manner provided in s. 90.302(2) that the vessel, motor vehicle, aircraft, . . . The presumption states in relevant part: It shall be presumed in the manner provided in s. 90.302(2) . . .

In FORFEITURE OF FORD EXPLORER, No. v. T. M., 203 So. 3d 992 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . It shall be presumed in the manner provided in s. 90.302(2) that the ... motor vehicle ... in which or . . . Under section 90.302(2), which governs presumptions affecting the burden of proof, the burden rests on . . . Tompkins, 974 So.2d 569, 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (holding that section 90.302(2) places the burden of . . .

GROSS, v. ZIMMERMAN,, 197 So. 3d 1248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .” § 90.302(2), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . .

MITCHELL, v. MIAMI DADE COUNTY MDPD, 186 So. 3d 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Section 90.302, Florida Statutes, describes two types of presumptions — presumptions affecting the burden . . .

In ESTATE OF E. MURPHY. v. E. R. III, R. II,, 184 So. 3d 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . . § 90.302. . . . Consistent with sections 90.302(2) and 733.107(2), we hold that when the doctrine’s presumption arises . . .

In COLEN, Jr. M. v. LLC,, 516 B.R. 618 (Bankr. D. Or. 2014)

. . . More particularly, it is based on ORS 90.302(1), which provides: A landlord may not charge a fee at the . . . The $5,000 is therefore not a “fee” within the contemplation of ORS 90.302(1). . . . See ORS 90.302(2) (2011); ORS 90.302(2),(3) (2013) (amending list of permitted fees, effective Jan. 1 . . .

UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, v. WARFEL,, 82 So. 3d 47 (Fla. 2012)

. . . Section 90.302 Classification of re-buttable presumptions.— Every rebuttable presumption is either: ( . . .

C. BLOCK E. Jr. v. TOSUN,, 77 So. 3d 871 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . See § 90.302(1), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .

BENNETT, v. ST. VINCENT S MEDICAL CENTER, INC. v. St. s, 71 So. 3d 828 (Fla. 2011)

. . . Pursuant to Florida Statute, section 90.302 states: Every rebuttable presumption is either: (1) A presumption . . . party against whom it operates the burden of proof concerning the nonexistence of the presumed fact. § 90.302 . . . parties agree that the statutory presumption at issue in this case is the type described in section 90.302 . . .

WARFEL, v. UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA,, 36 So. 3d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See §§ 90.302(1), 90.303. Additionally, Mr. . . . adopted a presumption relating to contempt for failure to pay alimony or child support under section 90.302 . . . provide that section 627.7073(l)(c) was to operate as a burden-shifting presumption under sections 90.302 . . . rebuttable presumptions which are not defined in s. 90.303 are presumptions affecting the burden of proof. . 90.302 . . .

RBC MINISTRIES, v. TOMPKINS, A., 974 So. 2d 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . .” § 90.302(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . .

PIPPERT, v. NIECE, LLC,, 518 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (D. Or. 2007)

. . . . § 90.302(3)(d). . . . Or.Rev.Stat. § 90.302(3)(d). . . .

MARTINO, v. WAL- MART STORES, INC., 908 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 2005)

. . . This rebuttable presumption shifted the burden of proof under section 90.302(2), Florida Statutes (1985 . . .

TABB, TABB, a v. FLORIDA BIRTH- RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION ASSOCIATION M. D. d b a, 880 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . that is appropriate. (4) Sections 90.301-90.304 are applicable only in civil actions or proceedings. 90.302 . . .

W. HACK, v. A. JANES,, 878 So. 2d 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . However, “when proof is introduced of the basic facts giving rise to a section 90.302(2) presumption . . . and Associates, 780 So.2d 45, 59 n. 20 (Fla.2001), the supreme court explained: Pursuant to section 90.302 . . . that is appropriate. (4) Sections 90.301-90.304 are applicable only in civil actions or proceedings. 90.302 . . .

FOLDS, v. J. A. JONES CONSTRUCTION COMPANY f k a d b a, 875 So. 2d 700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . See § 90.302(2), Fla. Stat, and Charles W. Eh-rhardt, Florida Evidence § 302.2 (2003 ed.). . . . .

AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA PROBATE RULES, 848 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 2003)

. . . . § 90.302, Fla. Stat. Classification of re-buttable presumptions. § 90.303, Fla. Stat. . . .

G. LEVIN, v. ETHAN ALLEN, INC., 823 So. 2d 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . of the presumed fact shall be determined from the evidence without regard to the presumption.... ” § 90.302 . . . Because section 726.103(2) functions as a section 90.302(1) presumption affecting the burden of producing . . . See § 90.302(1), Fla. . . .

OWENS v. PUBLIX SUPERMARKETS, INC. v. B B, 802 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2001)

. . . Pursuant to section 90.302(2), a presumption affecting the burden of proof "imposes upon the party against . . .

SUPER TRANSPORT, INC. AAA v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE,, 799 So. 2d 286 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . ruled that the “prima facie correct” language of section 631.331(1) creates a presumption under section 90.302 . . .

BEAL BANK, SSB, v. ALMAND AND ASSOCIATES,, 780 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2001)

. . . Pursuant to section 90.302(2), a presumption affecting the burden of proof "imposes upon the party against . . .

EPPLER, v. TARMAC AMERICA, INC., 752 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 2000)

. . . Sistrunk, 468 So.2d at 1060-61; accord § 90.302(1), Fla. . . .

MALLARDI, v. JENNE,, 721 So. 2d 380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . This presumption is adopted as a presumption under s. 90.302(2) to implement the public policy of this . . . not believe that he could be bankrupt and at the same time make a genuine $200,000 investment. . § 90.302 . . . of the presumed fact shall be determined from the evidence without regard to the presumption.”). . § 90.302 . . .

J. HEIM, Jr. v. M. HEIM,, 712 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . See §§ 90.302(2), 90.304, Fla: Stat. (1997). . . .

REIFF, D. v. NORTHEAST FLORIDA STATE HOSPITAL,, 710 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . See § 90.302(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). . . . .

MARTIN, v. STATE, 711 So. 2d 117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . See § 90.302, Fla. . . .

C. MASON, D. P. M. P. A. v. PORSCHE CARS OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., 688 So. 2d 361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . validity” referred to in those decisions with the burden-of-proof-shifting presumptions defined by section 90.302 . . . called vanishing or “bursting bubble” presumptions, and presumptions affecting the burden of proof. § 90.302 . . . the trier of fact determines that they have been overcome by the greater weight of the evidence. § 90.302 . . .

COMPAGNONI, v. M. COMPAGNONI,, 619 So. 2d 450 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . This presumption is adopted as a presumption under s. 90.302(2) to implement the public policy of this . . .

DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, v. REAL PROPERTY,, 588 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1991)

. . . It shall be presumed in the manner provided in s. 90.302(2) that the vessel, motor vehicle, aircraft, . . .

SOUTHEAST GROVE MANAGEMENT INC. Co. v. McKINESS, R. Jr. W. d b a D. d b a, 578 So. 2d 883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . Division of Retirement, 372 So.2d 438 (Fla.1979); see also § 90.302, Fla.Stat. (1989). . . .

HUNTER, v. HERNANDO COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS Co., 578 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . See § 90.302, Fla.Stat. (1989); C.W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 302.1 (2d ed. 1984). . . .

SMITH, v. GREG S CRANE SERVICE, INC. a, 576 So. 2d 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . . § 90.302(1); 90.302 Fla.Stat.; See also Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 313-352 (1898). . . . the presumption of continuing general employment has been treated as a burden shifting presumption. § 90.302 . . .

In FORFEITURE OF DIONEFF v. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES,, 571 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . It shall be presumed in the manner provided in s. 90.302(2) that the vessel, motor vehicle, aircraft, . . .

VALUE RENT- A- CAR, INC. a v. COLLECTION CHEVROLET, INC. a, 570 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . See also § 90.302(1), Fla.Stat. (1989). . . .

BURNS, v. ROBBINS,, 44 Fla. Supp. 2d 199 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1990)

. . . See §§ 90.301(2) and 90.302, Fla. . . . nonexistence of the presumed fact is determined from the evidence without regard to the presumption. § 90.302 . . .

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES, v. H. BONANNO,, 568 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1990)

. . . Section 90.302, Florida Statutes (1987), sets forth the two types of rebuttable presumptions recognized . . .

FERGUSON, v. A. WILLIAMS,, 566 So. 2d 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . It is not a "bursting bubble” or "vanishing" presumption as defined in sections 90.302(1) and 90.303. . . . Pappagallo Restaurant, Inc., 547 So.2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (pursuant to section 90.302(1), under “ . . .

HLAD, Jr. v. STATE, 565 So. 2d 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . The Thayer-Wig-more-§ 90.302(1) presumption, commonly called a vanishing or “bursting bubble” presumption . . . Under the Thayer-Wigmore-§ 90.302(1) view, the presumption shifts a burden to the opponent to “produce . . . The most controversial aspect of the Thayer-Wigmore § 90.302(1) “bursting bubble” presumption, and the . . . (1) presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence to a Morgan-McCormick-§ 90.302(2) presumption . . . The word credible in section 90.302(1) means the same as the word substantial in the phrase “substantial . . .

TOMLINSON, v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES,, 558 So. 2d 62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . . § 90.302, Fla.Stat. (1987). . . .

E. KING, Jr. v. ESTATE OF E. KING, Sr. J. T. Jr. Co-, 554 So. 2d 600 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . See Section 90.302(1), Florida Statutes (1987). See also C. . . .

STATE v. CRENSHAW,, 548 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1989)

. . . It shall be presumed in the manner provided in s. 90.302(2) that the vessel, motor vehicle, aircraft, . . . However, the statute goes on to state that: It shall be presumed in the manner provided in s. 90.302( . . .

AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, v. PAPPAGALLO RESTAURANT, INC., 547 So. 2d 243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . Section 90.302, Florida Statutes (1987), provides that: [EJvery rebuttable presumption is either: (1) . . . Section 90.302(1) refers to “bursting bubble” or “vanishing” presumptions, whose function is “to compel . . . Section 90.302(1). . . .

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF WILSON, 27 Fla. Supp. 2d 108 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1988)

. . . The Court finds on the evidence that the Husband, within the meaning of F.S. 90.302(2), has proved the . . .

CRENSHAW, v. STATE, 521 So. 2d 138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . It shall be presumed in the manner provided in s. 90.302(2) that the vessel, motor vehicle, aircraft, . . . Section 90.302(2) identifies this presumption as a rebuttable presumption “affecting the burden of proof . . .

PUBLIC HEALTH TRUST OF DADE COUNTY, d b a v. VALCIN,, 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987)

. . . problem should be resolved either by applying a shift in the burden of producing evidence, section 90.302 . . . (1), Florida Statutes (1985), or a shift in the burden of proof. § 90.302(2), Fla.Stat. (1985). . . . In contrast, once the burden of proof is shifted under section 90.302(2), the presumption remains in . . . The second type of rebuttable presumption, as recognized in section 90.302(2), Florida Statutes, affects . . . A section 90.302(2) presumption shifts the burden of proof, ensuring that the issue of negligence goes . . .

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION, v. E. JIRIK,, 498 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1986)

. . . See § 90.302, Fla.Stat. (1985). We are not concerned here with the latter type. . . . .

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. ECKERT,, 472 So. 2d 807 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . . § 90.302, Fla.Stat. (1983). The trial court relied upon Realin v. . . .

SISTRUNK M. v. H. DOUGLAS, a, 468 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . See, Florida Evidence Code, Sections 90.302-304, Florida Statutes (1976). . . .

IN ESTATE OF E. DAVIS,, 462 So. 2d 12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . .1971), pre-dated the effective date, July 1, 1979, of the Florida Evidence Code, specifically sections 90.302 . . .

BERWICK, v. PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE CO., 436 So. 2d 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . See § 90.302(1), Fla.Stat. (1981); C. . . .

In ESTATE OF E. DAVIS,, 428 So. 2d 774 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . . §§ 90.302-.304, Fla. Stat. (1981). . . . Section 90.302 provides: Classification of rebuttable presumptions.— Every rebuttable presumption is . . .

ONE AMERICAN JEEP IDENTIFICATION NO. TAG FEF- W. v. STATE CITY OF LARGO, LARGO POLICE DEPARTMENT,, 427 So. 2d 364 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . It shall be presumed in the manner provided in s. 90.302(2) that the vessel, motor vehicle, aircraft, . . .

INSURANCE COMPANY OF STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, a a v. ESTATE OF GUZMAN, a, 421 So. 2d 597 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . Section 90.302, Florida Statutes (1979), provides: Every rebuttable presumption is either: (1) A presumption . . .

CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, v. In ONE YELLOW FIAT DOOR SEDAN FLORIDA TAG NO. FVN-, 414 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . Section 943.43(1), supra, then states: It shall be presumed in the manner provided in Section 90.302( . . .

F. B. BYSTROM, v. EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF UNITED STATES, a a, 416 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . Consequently, even without the historical development of the law in Florida, Sections 90.302(2) and 90.304 . . . observe, as we did with respect to the appraiser, that even in the absence of deci-sional law, Sections 90.302 . . . Tuck, supra; §§ 90.302(2) and 90.304, Fla.Stat. (1977), supra. . . .