The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)
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Petitioner fails to identify what testimony by C.S. was allegedly false and, thus, this claim is also conclusory. Further, at the commencement of trial, the state advised the trial court that C.S. requested to remain in the courtroom following her testimony. Resp. Ex. F at 139. Trial counsel responded they did not anticipate calling C.S. as a witness; and thus, the trial court allowed C.S. to remain in the courtroom. Id. at 139. Under section 90.616(1) and (2)(d), Florida Statutes, a victim of a crime and the parent or guardian of a minor child victim are excluded from the rule of sequestration unless the court determines such person's presence to be prejudicial. Here, C.S., as the minor child victim, had a right to be present in the courtroom and the trial court found that her presence was not so prejudicial as to burden that right. Counsel cannot be deficient for failing to make a meritless objection. Because Petitioner's allegation lacks factual support and is meritless, Petitioner's Strickland claim is unsubstantial, and Martinez does not apply to excuse his default. Ground Fourteen is due to be denied.The Florida Rule of Evidence regarding witness sequestration is codified at section 90.616, Florida Statutes (2018), and titled "Exclusion of Witnesses." Section 90.616(1) provides: "At the request of a party the court shall order, or upon its own motion the court may order, witnesses excluded from a proceeding so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses except as provided in subsection (2)." (emphasis added).AFFIRMED. See Fla. R. Evid. § 90.616(1) ("At the request of a party the court shall order, or upon its own motion the court may order, witnesses excluded from a proceeding so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses ...." (emphasis supplied)); Chamberlain v. State , 881 So. 2d 1087, 1099–1100 (Fla. 2004) (holding that a prosecutor did not violate the rule of sequestration when he met with a detective during a break and discussed his potential testimony on recall, while the detective was still under oath; noting that there was no indication that the detective "remained in the courtroom during the testimony of another witness, or that [he] discussed his testimony with another witness").In the Appellant's first claim, he argued that his attorney was ineffective for failing to seek sequestration of the witnesses pursuant to section 90.616, Florida Statutes (2013). He alleged that after one victim testified, she was overheard discussing her testimony with the victim of the other robbery. He asserted that trial counsel failed to object, inquire into the matter, and move for a mistrial. He claimed that counsel's omission allowed the witnesses to tailor their testimony to avoid impeachment.The trial judge applied section 90.616, Florida Statutes ("Rule of Sequestration") to Appellant's expert witness, neuropsychologist, Jason Demery, Ph.D., and required him to remain outside the courtroom prior to testifying. Appellant, citing section 90.616(2)(c), asserted his expert was essential to the presentation of his case and should have been permitted to remain in the courtroom prior to giving testimony.This Court reviews a trial court's ruling on whether a witness can be present in the courtroom under an abuse of discretion standard. See Gore v. State, 599 So.2d 978, 986 (Fla. 1992). And the next of kin of homicide victims have a constitutional right to be present at all stages of criminal proceedings. See art. I, § 16(b), Fla. Const. This right has been codified in section 90.616(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2017), which provides that the victim's next of kin are excluded from the rule prohibiting a witness from hearing the testimony of other witnesses unless there is a showing that the presence of the next of kin will be prejudicial. In determining whether prejudice has been shown, this Court considers whether the relative testified regarding a material issue and the witness's presence provided an opportunity to change his or her testimony and whether the relative engaged in overt emotional outbursts during the proceedings. See Beasley v. State, 774 So.2d 649, 669 (Fla. 2000).The mother could have been present for the child's testimony unless the trial court determined that her presence was prejudicial. § 90.616(2)(d), Fla. Stat.(h) Subpoena of Minor. Any minor subpoenaed for testimony has the right to be accompanied by a parent, guardian, guardian ad litem, or attorney ad litem at all times during the taking of testimony notwithstanding the invocation of the rule of sequestration of section 90.616, Florida Statutes, except on a showing that the presence of a parent or guardian is likely to have a material, negative impact on the credibility or accuracy of the minor's testimony, or that the interests of the parent or guardian are in actual or potential conflict with the interests of the minor. The provisions of this subdivision do not alter the requirements of rule 12.407 that a court order must be obtained before a minor child may be subpoenaed to appear at a hearing.The trial transcript reflects that the courtroom was closed to persons who were not family members, media, members of the attorneys' staffs, or witnesses (who were not otherwise subject to Florida's rule of sequestration of witnesses (see Fla. Stat. § 90.616)), during two instances in which images of children engaged in sexual conduct were displayed on a screen in the courtroom (see Ex. E at 2-4, 73-81, 114-27) . --------In this case, the Commission concluded that because the hearing below was an administrative proceeding, it had discretion as to whether to apply section 90.616. Accordingly, it denied the request to invoke the rule of sequestration. Whether section 90.616 applies to administrative proceedings is a pure question of law, subject to de novo review. See W. Fla. Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. See , 79 So. 3d 1, 8 (Fla. 2012) (finding statutory interpretation to be a question of law, subject to de novo review).. . . This right has been codified in section 90.616(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2017), which provides that the . . . During Lebron’s first attempt to have Osorio excluded from the courtroom pursuant to section 90.616, . . .
. . . . § 90.616(2)(d), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . during the táking of testimony notwithstanding the invocation of the rule of sequestration of section 90.616 . . . during the taking of testimony notwithstanding the invocation of the rule of sequestration of section 90.616 . . .
. . . hearing on the petition, FIPUG invoked the rule of sequestration of witnesses, pursuant to section 90.616 . . . erred in not sequestering the witnesses after FIPUG made its request for sequestration under section 90.616 . . . the hearing below was an administrative proceeding, it had discretion as to whether to apply section 90.616 . . . Whether section 90.616 applies to administrative proceedings is a pure question of law, subject to de . . . Section 90.616 reads in its entirety: 90.616 Exclusion of witnesses.— (1) At the request of a party the . . .
. . . . § 90.616(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . . person may not be excluded unless the court determines such person’s presence to be prejudicial. § 90.616 . . . The trial court ruled in accordance with section 90.616(2)(d). . . .
. . . during the taking of testimony notwithstanding the invocation of the rule of sequestration of section 90.616 . . . during the taking of testimony notwithstanding the invocation of the rule of sequestration of section 90.616 . . .
. . . Thereafter, Harris invoked the sequestration rule set forth in section 90.616 of the Florida Statutes . . .
. . . during the taking of testimony notwithstanding the invocation of the rale of sequestration of section 90.616 . . . during the taking of testimony notwithstanding the invocation of the rule of sequestration of section 90.616 . . . during the taking of testimony notwithstanding the invocation of the rule of sequestration of section 90.616 . . . during the taking of testimony notwithstanding the invocation of the rule of sequestration of section 90.616 . . . during the taking of testimony notwithstanding the invocation of the rule ol'sequeslralion ofsection 90.616 . . .
. . . Section 90.616(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1997), allows an exception when a witness’s presence is shown . . .
. . . . § 90.616(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . The sequestration rule, articulated in section 90.616, Florida Statutes (2009), provides in part: (1) . . . presence is shown by the party’s attorney to be essential to the presentation of the party’s cause. § 90.616 . . . allows courts to exclude witnesses from the trial, but does not permit the court to exclude parties. § 90.616 . . . Gagnon’s other children were parties as contemplated by section 90.616, precluding their exclusion. . . .
. . . Section 90.616, Florida Statutes (2009), provides: (1) At the request of a party the court shall order . . .
. . . Section 90.616, Florida Statutes (2009), provides: (1) At the request of a party the court shall order . . .
. . . The Evidence Code provides: 90.616 Exclusion of witnesses.— (1) At the request of a party the court shall . . . such person, unless, upon motion, the court determines such person’s presence to be prejudicial. § 90.616 . . . Id. § 90.616(2)(a). The other fact witnesses were all relatives of the parties. . . .
. . . during the taking of testimony notwithstanding the invocation of the rule of sequestration of section 90.616 . . .
. . . As the majority correctly recognizes, “section 90.616 adopts the view that sequestration is demandable . . . Although sequestration is demandable as a matter of right, section 90.616(2)(c) provides that a court . . . Rather, section 90.616(2)(c) requires the party seeking an exception from the rule for its witness to . . . McClaren’s presence was essential as required under section 90.616(2)(c). . . . to ensure that discretion is being exercised in a manner consistent with both the rule and section 90.616 . . . Section 90.616, Florida Statutes (2006), states in pertinent part: (1) At the request of a party the . . . See § 90.616(2), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . . As one of those categories, section 90.616(2)(c) provides that a court may not exclude “[a] person whose . . . Under section 90.616(2)(c), the burden is on the party seeking to avoid sequestration of a witness to . . . Id. at 541 (quoting § 90.616(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (1993)). . . .
. . . during the taking of testimony notwithstanding the invocation of the rule of sequestration of section 90.616 . . . during the taking of testimony notwithstanding the invocation of the rule of sequestration of section 90.616 . . . during the taking of testimony notwithstanding the invocation of the rule of sequestration of section 90.616 . . . during the taking of testimony notwithstanding the invocation of the rule of sequestration of section 90.616 . . . during the taking of testimony notwithstanding the invocation of the rule of sequestration of section 90.616 . . .
. . . Commonly called “the rule,” section 90.616, Florida Statutes (2004), provides: (1) At the request of . . . “If sequestration is invoked, section 90.616(2) provides that four categories of witnesses ... . . . If J.R.’s mother was a “party who is a natural person,” § 90.616(2)(a), Fla. . . . See § 90.616(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004). VI. Nor do we find authority for holding the error harmless. . . . "Section 90.616 adopts the view of Federal Rule 615 that sequestration is de-mandable as a matter of . . .
. . . Section 90.616, Florida Statutes (1995), provides an exception to the rule of sequestration for a minor . . .
. . . Addressing the second part of this claim, Rose recognizes that section 90.616, Florida Statutes (1997 . . .
. . . .; § 90.616(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . non-blood relatives can properly be considered next-of-kin under article I, section 16(b) and section 90.616 . . .
. . . Although appellant acknowledged the child’s mother to be exempt from the rule, See. 90.616(2)(d), Fla . . .
. . . Section 90.616(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1997), allows an exception to the rule of sequestration for “ . . .
. . . Section 90.616(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1997), allows an exception to the rule of sequestration for “ . . . Although Knight is correct that the 1990 enactment of section 90.616, a statutory rule of sequestration . . .
. . . .” § 90.616(2)(c), Fla.Stat. (1993). . . .
. . . First Union also cited section 90.616(2)(c) of the Florida Evidence Code that a person whose presence . . . $4,875.047.00, which is $111,440.00 less than the total mortgage indebtedness of $4,986,-487.00. . § 90.616 . . .
. . . individual, as reflected by the record, was neither an officer nor an employee of appellee, and section 90.616 . . .
. . . Florida legislature codified the case law and essentially adopted the federal rule by enacting section 90.616 . . . Section 90.616 provides that upon the request of a party the court shall exclude all witnesses unless . . .