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Florida Statute 90.804 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 90.804 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title VII
EVIDENCE
Chapter 90
EVIDENCE CODE
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 90.804
90.804 Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable.
(1) DEFINITION OF UNAVAILABILITY.“Unavailability as a witness” means that the declarant:
(a) Is exempted by a ruling of a court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant’s statement;
(b) Persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant’s statement despite an order of the court to do so;
(c) Has suffered a lack of memory of the subject matter of his or her statement so as to destroy the declarant’s effectiveness as a witness during the trial;
(d) Is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or because of then-existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(e) Is absent from the hearing, and the proponent of a statement has been unable to procure the declarant’s attendance or testimony by process or other reasonable means.

However, a declarant is not unavailable as a witness if such exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability to be present, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the party who is the proponent of his or her statement in preventing the witness from attending or testifying.

(2) HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS.The following are not excluded under s. 90.802, provided that the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(a) Former testimony.Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.
(b) Statement under belief of impending death.In a civil or criminal trial, a statement made by a declarant while reasonably believing that his or her death was imminent, concerning the physical cause or instrumentalities of what the declarant believed to be impending death or the circumstances surrounding impending death.
(c) Statement against interest.A statement which, at the time of its making, was so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest or tended to subject the declarant to liability or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, so that a person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless he or she believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is inadmissible, unless corroborating circumstances show the trustworthiness of the statement.
(d) Statement of personal or family history.A statement concerning the declarant’s own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, parentage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history, including relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, even though the declarant had no means of acquiring personal knowledge of the matter stated.
(e) Statement by deceased or ill declarant similar to one previously admitted.In an action or proceeding brought against the personal representative, heir at law, assignee, legatee, devisee, or survivor of a deceased person, or against a trustee of a trust created by a deceased person, or against the assignee, committee, or guardian of a mentally incompetent person, when a declarant is unavailable as provided in paragraph (1)(d), a written or oral statement made regarding the same subject matter as another statement made by the declarant that has previously been offered by an adverse party and admitted in evidence.
(f) Statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused the declarant’s unavailability.A statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused, or acquiesced in wrongfully causing, the declarant’s unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result.
History.s. 1, ch. 76-237; s. 1, ch. 77-77; s. 22, ch. 78-361; s. 1, ch. 78-379; s. 3, ch. 90-139; s. 4, ch. 90-174; s. 499, ch. 95-147; s. 2, ch. 2005-46; s. 1, ch. 2012-152.

F.S. 90.804 on Google Scholar

F.S. 90.804 on Casetext

Amendments to 90.804


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 90.804
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 90.804.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

TOOLE, v. STATE, 270 So. 3d 371 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . For example, section 90.804, Florida Statutes, provides that hearsay evidence is admissible if the opposing . . . Stat. § 90.804(f) (2014). State v. Milo, 596 So.2d 722, 723 (Fla. Dist. Ct. . . .

E. NOACK, v. STATE, 260 So. 3d 1172 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . We cannot find Pugh "unavailable" due to lack of memory under section 90.804(1)(c), Florida Statutes, . . . Moreover, even had Pugh been unavailable, it does not appear any applicable exception under section 90.804 . . .

HINCK, v. STATE, 260 So. 3d 325 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . ), provides that hearsay is inadmissible unless an exception exists under section 90.803 or section 90.804 . . .

MEDINA, v. STATE, 260 So. 3d 419 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . requisite predicate) should have been deemed admissible as statements against penal interest under section 90.804 . . . include a declarant who is "unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death," see § 90.804 . . . is the proponent of his or her statement in preventing the witness from attending or testifying." § 90.804 . . .

HOWARD, v. STATE, 254 So. 3d 1188 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Howard's other argument is that these statements are non-admissible hearsay, which don't qualify under § 90.804 . . .

GEORGE, v. STATE, 251 So. 3d 262 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Dying Declaration-Section 90.804(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes Although we have concluded that the statement . . . discretion by determining that the statement qualified as a dying declaration admissible under section 90.804 . . .

FRAZIER, v. STATE, 250 So. 3d 794 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . a substantial likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm, in addition to findings pursuant to s. 90.804 . . .

JOSEPH, v. STATE, 250 So. 3d 113 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . exceptions to the hearsay rule in Florida are the ones recognized by statutes such as sections 90.803, 90.804 . . . wrongfully causing, the declarant's unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result. § 90.804 . . . See § 90.804(2)(f), Fla. . . .

Fr. RONCHI, v. STATE, 248 So. 3d 1265 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . a substantial likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm, in addition to findings pursuant to s. 90.804 . . .

MOSCATIELLO, v. STATE, 247 So. 3d 11 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Florida Rule of Evidence 90.804(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2013), permits the use of former testimony " . . . Therefore, the Arthur hearing satisfied the requirement of section 90.804(2)(a). . . . No such requirement is contained within section 90.804(2)(a), unlike section 90.804(2)(c), where the . . . These portions of the statements were inadmissible under section 90.804(2)(c) and Lilly [v. . . . It did not satisfy the requirements of section 90.804(2)(c) or the requirements of Brooks . . . .

STATE v. CRUMBLEY, v. Jo, 247 So. 3d 666 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See, e.g., § 90.804(2)(c), Fla. . . .

L. LARRY, v. STATE, 241 So. 3d 246 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Dely is not admissible as a hearsay exception for a declaration against penal interest under section 90.804 . . .

SOCHOR, v. STATE, 246 So. 3d 195 (Fla. 2018)

. . . State , 707 So.2d 688, 691 (Fla. 1998) ; § 90.804(2), Fla. Stat. . . .

PAYTON, v. STATE, 239 So. 3d 129 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . confession to the murders by John Bicknas as a statement against penal interest pursuant to section 90.804 . . . Section 90.804, Florida Statutes, sets forth hearsay exceptions that require a declarant's unavailability . . . fourth prong of the Dort test, as well as the trustworthiness requirement found in the text of section 90.804 . . . case, the State argues that Payton did not show whether Bicknas was "unavailable" pursuant to section 90.804 . . . whether Bicknas' statement to Byous carries the indicia of trustworthiness required by both section 90.804 . . .

BAEZ, v. STATE, 235 So. 3d 1028 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018)

. . . Section 90.804(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2012), creates a hearsay exception for statements against interest . . .

PITTMAN, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,, 871 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 90.804(2)(c) (1989). The Florida rule thus largely tracks Chambers’s holding. . . .

T. KENNER, v. STATE, 208 So. 3d 271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . . § 90.804(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016). . . .

SPROUSE, v. STATE, 208 So. 3d 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . The Legislature has defined “unavailability as a witness,” § 90.804(1), Fla. . . .

B. LAHENS, v. STATE, 204 So.3d 982 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . The post-conviction court summarily denied this claim, ruling that, under section 90.804, the testimony . . . See § 90.804, Fla. Stat. (2012). . . .

DAVIS, Jr. v. STATE, 207 So.3d 142 (Fla. 2016)

. . . See § 90.804(2)(b), Fla. Stat. . . .

DAVIS, Jr. v. STATE, 207 So.3d 177 (Fla. 2016)

. . . See § 90.804(2)(b), Fla. Stat. . . .

AGUIRRE- JARQUIN, v. STATE v. L., 202 So. 3d 785 (Fla. 2016)

. . . See § 90.804(2), Fla. Stat. . . .

JOHNSON, v. OMEGA INSURANCE COMPANY,, 200 So. 3d 1207 (Fla. 2016)

. . . sinkhole statutes do not apply to the litigation context, the trial court’s application of section 90.804 . . .

DIX, v. STATE, 196 So. 3d 547 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .” § 90.804(2)(c), Fla. . . . . • “Essentially, the test for admissibility of statements against interest under section 90.804(2)(c . . .

RIGTERINK, v. STATE, 193 So. 3d 846 (Fla. 2016)

. . . establish a foundation for William Farmer’s testimony to satisfy the requirements of sections 90.405 and 90.804 . . .

PADILLA, v. STATE, 189 So. 3d 986 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Section 90.804(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2011), provides that a witness may be declared unavailable if . . .

GARDNER, v. STATE, 194 So. 3d 385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . should be' admissible on three separate, but overlapping,- grounds: as ■ prior testimony under section 90.804 . . . (2)(a), Florida Statutes (2012), as a statement against penal interest under section 90.804(2)(c), and . . .

RICHARDSON, v. STATE, 182 So. 3d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See § 90.804(2)(a), Fla. . . . therefore would object to any finding that the witness was unavailable within the meaning of section ‘90.804 . . .

BOLIN, Jr. v. STATE, 184 So. 3d 492 (Fla. 2015)

. . . specific and lacks the ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,’ that seem to be required under § 90.804 . . . statements attributed to Easier are insufficiently corroborated to qualify as a hearsay exception under § 90.804 . . .

JONES, v. STATE, 189 So. 3d 853 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . 3.190(i) (“rule 3.190(i)”), but argues the deposition could have been properly admitted under section 90.804 . . . opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. § 90.804 . . . testimony of an unavailable witness as substantive, evidence pursuant to the hearsay exception in section 90.804 . . . presented with the question of whether a deposition is admissible as substantive evidence, under section 90.804 . . . .2d 1238 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (discovery deposition that qualifies as a hearsay exception under section 90.804 . . .

D. DORT, v. STATE, 175 So. 3d 836 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . an exception to the hearsay rule for statements against a declarant’s penal interest, under section 90.804 . . . Section 90.804(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2009), provides an exception to the hearsay rule for a statement . . . Essentially, the test for admissibility of statements against interest under section 90.804(2)(c) is . . . “Section 90.804(2)(c) uses the term ‘statement’ in a narrow sense to refer to a specific declaration . . . Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 136-37, 119 S.Ct; 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 -(1999), and citing § 90.804(2)(c), Fla . . .

WYATT, v. STATE, 183 So. 3d 1081 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . s testimony at the forfeiture hearing, as former testimony of an. unavailable witness under section 90.804 . . . He asserts that her testimony was admissible under section 90.804(2)(a), because the sheriffs office, . . . Section 90.804(2), Florida Statutes (2010) provides an exception to the hearsay rule, when the declarant . . . refused to testify, Garcia attempted to introduce the co-defendant’s trial testimony under section 90.804 . . . bond hearing was admissible at the defendant’s criminal trial, we explained: We do not read Section 90.804 . . .

HUNTER, v. STATE, 174 So. 3d 1011 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule as provided in s. 90.803 or s. 90.804 . . .

BEARDEN, v. STATE, 161 So. 3d 1257 (Fla. 2015)

. . . The defendant relied on section 90.804(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2010), the declaration against penal . . . regarding the statement might have been the exception for a statement against penal interest under section 90.804 . . . However, section 90.804(2)(c) provides that hearsay that constitutes' a statement against penal interest . . . Thus, Tyler’s testimony would not have been admissible under section 90.804(2)(c). . . . have consistently applied the constitutional analysis in Chambers, despite the exception in section 90.804 . . .

BLAKE, v. STATE v. H., 180 So. 3d 89 (Fla. 2014)

. . . trial, Parker’s recitation of Green’s statement would be admissible as a statement against interest, § 90.804 . . . Under section 90.804(2)(c), in order to introduce a “statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal . . . statements, the State could respond by introducing Green’s 2002 grand jury testimony under section 90.804 . . .

MORTIMER, v. STATE, 162 So. 3d 67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . In light of the Supreme Court’s adoption of section 90.804(2)(f), Florida Statutes (2012) “to the extent . . .

In AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA EVIDENCE CODE, 144 So. 3d 536 (Fla. 2014)

. . . APPENDIX Chapter 2012-152, § 1: 90.804 Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable (1) [No Change] (2) . . . In chapter 2012-152, section 1, Laws of Florida, the Legislature amended section 90.804 to include the . . . See § 90.804(2)(f), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . . Specifically, chapter 2012-152, section 1, which added a new hearsay exception to section 90.804(2), . . . With the adoption of the “forfeiture by wrongdoing” doctrine as narrowly set forth in section 90.804( . . .

STATE v. ROBERTS a k a, 174 So. 3d 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . If the declarant is unavailable pursuant to section 90.804(1), section 90.804(2) provides certain exceptions . . . (l)(b) and 90.804(2)(a). . . . 90.804(2)(a). . . . (l)(b) and 90.804(2)(a). . . . under section 90.804(2)(a). . . .

A. CALDWELL, Sr. v. STATE, 137 So. 3d 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule as provided in s. 90.803 or s. 90.804 . . .

B. HUNTER, Jr. v. AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC, B. Jr. If s s, 137 So. 3d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . See §§ 90.801(1)(c), 90.802, 90.803, 90.804, Fla. Stat. (2012). . . .

STATE v. DAVIS,, 133 So. 3d 1101 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . hearsay” we mean hearsay that is not otherwise admissible as a hearsay exception under sections 90.803, 90.804 . . .

A. BROWNE, v. STATE, 132 So. 3d 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . exceptions to the hearsay rule in Florida are the ones recognized by statutes such as sections 90.803, 90.804 . . .

A. ALLEN, v. STATE, 137 So. 3d 946 (Fla. 2013)

. . . Section 90.804(2)(c), states: Statement against interest. — A statement which, at the time of its making . . . accused is inadmissible, unless corroborating circumstances show the trustworthiness of the statement. § 90.804 . . . See § 90.804, Fla. Stat. (2005). . . . Section 90.804(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . . was expressly limited to its facts, McWatters has failed to establish a due process violation.”); § 90.804 . . .

BOLIN, Jr. v. STATE, 117 So. 3d 728 (Fla. 2013)

. . . Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354; see § 90.804(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . .

RICH, H. v. KAISER GYPSUM COMPANY, INC. R. T. Co., 103 So. 3d 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . The Riches objected to both depositions, arguing that section 90.804, Florida Statutes, requires that . . . The Legislative History of Section 90.804, Florida Statutes Prior to the enactment of section 90.804, . . . Osbum remained the law in Florida on this issue until the enactment of section 90.804(2)(a). . . . (2), Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) was enacted shortly before Florida amended section 90.804. . . . the former testimony offered against Rich was properly admitted under section 90.804(2)(a). . . .

MORTIMER, v. STATE, 100 So. 3d 99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Section 90.804(2)(f) became effective in April, 2012. . . . If section 90.804(2)(f) is applied at a retrial, Joseph’s testimony from the earlier bond hearing would . . . Because section 90.804(2)© is a procedural statute, it would apply to a retrial if we were to reverse . . . For the purpose of article V, section 2(a), we conclude that section 90.804(2)(f) is a procedural statute . . . It is almost certain that our Supreme Court will adopt section 90.804(2)(f). . . .

STATE v. CROFOOT,, 97 So. 3d 866 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . when two elements are met: first, the threshold finding of the declarant’s unavailability, section 90.804 . . . Statutes (2011); and second, that the content of statement is against the declarant’s interest, section 90.804 . . . element must be met: “corroborating circumstances showing] the trustworthiness of the statement.” § 90.804 . . . declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless he or she believed it to be true.” § 90.804 . . .

PETIT, v. STATE, 92 So. 3d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . considered “unavailable” for Confrontation Clause purposes if he fits into any of the categories in section 90.804 . . . Section 90.804, however, defines “unavailability” of the declarant for the purpose of the hearsay exceptions . . . Supreme Court has defined unavailability for Confrontation Clause purposes much more broadly than section 90.804 . . .

BENJAMIN, v. TANDEM HEALTHCARE, INC. a d b a a, 93 So. 3d 1076 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . See §§ 90.803, 90.804, Fla. Stat. (2009). One of these exceptions is at issue here. . . . the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule as provided in s. 90.803 or 90.804 . . .

MELEHAN, v. STATE, 126 So. 3d 1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . trial judge allowed evidence of the deposition testimony to be presented to the jury, citing section 90.804 . . . initially deemed A.S.’s deposition testimony to be admissible as former testimony as allowed by section 90.804 . . . substantive evidence absent compliance with Rule 3.190© was in no way modified by the adoption of section 90.804 . . . perpetuating testimony before a deposition is admissible as substantive evidence is recognized in section 90.804 . . . Section 90.804(2)(a), Florida Statutes provides: HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS. — The following are not excluded . . .

BANK OF MONTREAL N. A. v. ESTATE OF ANTOINE, C., 86 So. 3d 1262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . .” § 90.804(2)(a), Fla. Stat. . . .

PARTIN, v. STATE, 82 So. 3d 31 (Fla. 2011)

. . . See § 90.804(2), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . . is the proponent of his or her statement in preventing the witness from attending or testifying.” § 90.804 . . . Furthermore, because the trial court determined that Ulery was unavailable under section 90.804 and that . . . And even if the trial court erred in finding that Ulery was “unavailable” under section 90.804(l)(d), . . .

PAYNE, v. STATE, 74 So. 3d 550 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . He reasoned that the testimony was not sufficiently corroborated, as required by section 90.804(2)(c) . . .

ROLON, v. STATE, 72 So. 3d 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Rolon conceded that section 90.804(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), would generally permit the State to . . .

LESTER, Jr. v. STATE, 76 So. 3d 952 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Section 90.804(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2007), provides an exception to the hearsay rule for “a statement . . . State, 24 So.3d 17 (Fla.2009), the supreme court held: Pursuant to section 90.804(2)(b), Florida Statutes . . .

HENDRIX, v. STATE, 82 So. 3d 1040 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . other evidence and thus lacked the indicia of trustworthiness necessary to be admissible under section 90.804 . . .

BROWN, v. STATE, 69 So. 3d 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Appellant next argues that Miller’s statements were not admissible under section 90.804(2)(c), Florida . . . investigator prior to his arrest under the hearsay exception “statement against interest” pursuant to section 90.804 . . . failed to make the proper objections to the admission of the statements under Crawford or sections 90.804 . . . Crawford violation occurred and that trial counsel’s objections properly preserved Appellant’s section 90.804 . . . Furthermore, because we conclude that the trial court properly admitted the statements under section 90.804 . . .

MERRITT, v. STATE, 68 So. 3d 936 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Charles could, under the proper predicate, qualify as statements against penal interest, under section 90.804 . . . The test for admissibility under 90.804(2)(c) is 1) whether the declarant is unavailable, and if so, . . . Section 90.804(1) defines "unavailability as a witness” to include situations in which the declarant . . .

WYATT, v. STATE v. G., 71 So. 3d 86 (Fla. 2011)

. . . because it was inadmissible hearsay and Bravo was never declared to be "unavailable” under section 90.804 . . .

RIGTERINK, v. STATE, 66 So. 3d 866 (Fla. 2011)

. . . that was not sufficiently corroborated to satisfy the applicable admissibility predicate under section 90.804 . . . Section 90.804(2)(c) reads as follows: A statement which, at the time of its making, was so far contrary . . .

CORONA, v. STATE, 64 So. 3d 1232 (Fla. 2011)

. . . Corona, 929 So.2d at 594 (quoting § 90.804(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2001)). . . . .” § 90.804(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . .

DEWOLFE, v. STATE, 62 So. 3d 1142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Conceding the confession was hearsay, appellant relies, here as below, on section 90.804(2)(c), the declaration-against-penal-interest . . . accused is inadmissible, unless corroborating circumstances show the trustworthiness of the statement. § 90.804 . . . But the trial court ruled the hearsay statements did not meet the criteria of section 90.804(2)(c), in . . .

BEARDEN, v. STATE, 62 So. 3d 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . .; see § 90.804(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2001). . . .

ROUSSONICOLOS, v. STATE, 59 So. 3d 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Section 90.804(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2007) provides that so long as the declarant is unavailable to . . . We do not read Section 90.804(2)(a) to require that, in order for prior testimony to be admitted as an . . . There appear to be no Florida cases addressing the applicability of section 90.804(2)(a) where the prior . . . we hold that the trial court erred in concluding that Limato’s testimony did not fall within section 90.804 . . .

NAYLOR, v. STATE, 51 So. 3d 589 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See § 90.804(2)(c), Fla. . . .

CARDENAS, Jr. v. STATE, 49 So. 3d 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Section 90.804(2)(b), Florida ’ Statutes, provides an exception to the hearsay rule for “a statement . . .

ALVARADO, v. STATE, 46 So. 3d 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . . § 90.804(2)(c), Fla. Stat. . . .

J. WILSON, v. STATE, 45 So. 3d 514 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . discretion in ruling that appellant failed to establish the unavailability of a witness under section 90.804 . . . Wilson argues that the trial judge erred in excluding Culligan’s former testimony under section 90.804 . . . All of the hearsay exceptions contained in section 90.804(2) require that the declarant be “unavailable . . . (l)(e), which provides, in pertinent part: 90.804. . . . that considered the meaning of the “unavailability of a witness” within the context of the section 90.804 . . .

GERALDS, v. STATE v. A., 111 So. 3d 778 (Fla. 2010)

. . . By qualifying as former testimony under section 90.804(2)(a), Danford’s and Ward’s testimony is not vulnerable . . . opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. § 90.804 . . .

L. JONES, v. STATE, 36 So. 3d 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See § 90.804(2)(b) (2009). . . .

CHAVEZ, v. STATE, 25 So. 3d 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . The only relevant provision in Florida’s Evidence Code states in section 90.804(1), Florida Statutes, . . .

T. O. E. R. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 21 So. 3d 173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . The court referenced section 90.804(l)(c), Florida Statutes, which states that a witness is unavailable . . . Similarly in this case, E.O. was unavailable under section 90.804(l)(b), Florida Statutes, which states . . .

HAYWARD, v. STATE, 24 So. 3d 17 (Fla. 2009)

. . . Pursuant to section 90.804(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2007), and this Court’s prior rulings, the deceased . . .

MAREK, v. STATE, 14 So. 3d 985 (Fla. 2009)

. . . statements would be admissible in the guilt phase as a statement against interest pursuant to section 90.804 . . . Section 90.804(2)(c) provides that where the declarant is unavailable as a witness, there is a hearsay . . . declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless he or she believed it to be true.” § 90.804 . . .

MASAKA, v. STATE, 4 So. 3d 1274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Specifically, section 90.804(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2005), provides, (c) Statement against interest . . . that Panzo was the shooter, it satisfied the relevance requirement for admissibility under section 90.804 . . . implicitly agreed, that the statements were sufficiently incriminating to be admitted under section 90.804 . . . Thus, these statements met the “self-inculpatory” requirement for admission under section 90.804(2)(e . . . Panzo’s statement was based on its erroneous view of the requirements for admissibility under section 90.804 . . .

MUEHLEMAN, v. STATE, 3 So. 3d 1149 (Fla. 2009)

. . . Section 90.804(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), similarly provided that former testimony may be received . . . not demonstrated that the procedure followed by the trial court violated the provisions of section 90.804 . . .

THOMAS, v. STATE, 993 So. 2d 105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule as provided in s. 90.803 or s. 90.804 . . .

CARDENAS, v. STATE, 993 So. 2d 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . the admission of these statements as statements under belief of impending death pursuant to section 90.804 . . .

GOSCIMINSKI, v. STATE, 994 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 2008)

. . . See §§ 90.803(l)-(24), 90.804(2), Fla. Stat. (2007); see also Stoll v. . . .

HENYARD, v. STATE v. v. A., 992 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 2008)

. . . Section 90.804(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1997), modified the ruling in Baker by requiring outside corroborating . . .

STATE v. VILLARREAL,, 990 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . if she “is required to testify in open court,” or that Andrea is unavailable, as defined by section 90.804 . . . is required to testify in open court, or that such victim or witness is unavailable as defined in s. 90.804 . . . contrary to the defendant’s assertion, the minor children are not unavailable as defined by section 90.804 . . . Section 90.804(1) provides: (1) DEFINITION OF UNAVAILABILITY. — “Unavailability as a witness” means that . . . It is interesting to note that the definition of "unavailability” in section 90.804(1) is similar to . . .

THOMPSON, v. STATE, 995 So. 2d 532 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . unavailable for trial, his preliminary hearing testimony was admissible as former testimony under section 90.804 . . .

ANTUNES- SALGADO, v. STATE, 987 So. 2d 222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Second, the statements are not admissible under section 90.804(2)(c) as statements against interest. . . . Section 90.804(2)(c) permits the admission of statements which are “so far contrary to the declarant’ . . . 594, 600-01, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994) (holding that the federal counterpart to section 90.804 . . . These portions of the statements were inadmissible under section 90.804(2)(c) and Lilly and Williamson . . .

W. DAVIS, v. STATE, 990 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 2008)

. . . counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce Valessa Robinson’s statement at trial under section 90.804 . . . have admitted Valessa’s statement because Traína did not have the corroborating evidence that section 90.804 . . . See § 90.804(2)(c), Fla. . . . information to have Valessa Robinson’s statement admitted into evidence, which Florida Statutes Section 90.804 . . .

HITCHCOCK, v. STATE E. v. A., 991 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 2008)

. . . of corroborating circumstances showing the trustworthiness of the statements as required by section 90.804 . . . whether the trial judge erred in his consideration of the admissibility of the evidence under section 90.804 . . . Assuming without deciding that the newly discovered evidence would be admissible pursuant to section 90.804 . . .

PEREZ, v. STATE, 980 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . unreliable, made under circumstances that would render them untrustworthy in contravention of section 90.804 . . . See § 90.804(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .

L. BLANTON, v. STATE, 978 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 2008)

. . . a substantial likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm, in addition to findings pursuant to s. 90.804 . . .

STATE v. CONTRERAS,, 979 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 2008)

. . . Section 90.804(l)(d), Florida Statutes (2007), defines unavailability as including a declarant who is . . . a substantial likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm, in addition to findings pursuant to s. 90.804 . . . Section 90.804(1) provides five ways in which a declarant may be unavailable as a witness, including . . .

C. LEIGHTY, v. STATE, 981 So. 2d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . State, 816 So.2d 554, 565 (Fla.2002) (saying that § 90.804(2)(a) may not be applied “mechanistically . . . I see no problem in meeting the requirements of section 90.804(2)(a). . . . not admissible at trial as substantive evidence, despite the exception for hearsay allowed by section 90.804 . . . Chambers in the context of Florida’s hearsay exception for statements against interest under section 90.804 . . . would not allow it because it did not qualify as an admission against penal interest under section 90.804 . . . Garcia argued to the trial court that Par-do’s former sworn testimony was admissible under section 90.804 . . . opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.” § 90.804 . . .

MORDENTI, v. STATE, 982 So. 2d 710 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . See § 90.804(2)(c). The other two statements would be admissible as impeachment testimony. . . .

MITCHELL, Sr. v. STATE, 965 So. 2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . Section 90.804(2)(b) establishes a “dying declaration” exception to the general rule excluding hearsay . . .

In AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA EVIDENCE CODE, 960 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 2007)

. . . In its stead, the Legislature created section 90.804(2)(e), Florida Statutes (2005), which added an exception . . . either managing his or — her property-or-earing for himself-or-herself,- or-both; Chapter 2005-46, § 2: 90.804 . . . The hearsay exception created by section 90.804(2)(e), Florida Statutes (2005), applies "[i]n an action . . .

JOHNSON, v. STATE, 969 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 2007)

. . . .” § 90.804(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2006). . . .

WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 967 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 2007)

. . . .” § 90.804(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . .

M. DAILEY, v. STATE v. R., 965 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2007)

. . . Id. at 57 (quoting § 90.804(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (1991)). . . .

PRESTON, Jr. v. STATE Jr. v. R., 970 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 2007)

. . . known at trial, it could have been used to impeach Scott Preston and perhaps introduced under section 90.804 . . .

WILLIAMSON, v. STATE, 961 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 2007)

. . . meet any of the criteria for admission of a prior statement by an unavailable witness under section 90.804 . . . decision to exclude contents of an affidavit by a deceased victim that were not admissible under section 90.804 . . .

ESSEX, v. STATE, 958 So. 2d 431 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . On appeal, Essex attacks the admissibility of the former testimony, arguing that under section 90.804 . . . Section 90.804(1) defines the concept of “[u]navailability of a witness.” . . . A finding that a witness is unavailable within the meaning of section 90.804(1) satisfies the unavailability . . . State, 929 So.2d 588, 595 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (applying section 90.804(l)(e) to decide whether a witness . . . Under section 90.804(1), one of the ways that a witness is unavailable is if she “is absent from the . . .

STATE v. HOSTY, v., 944 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 2006)

. . . of severe emotional, mental, or physical harm” that can make a declarant unavailable under section 90.804 . . . substantial likelihood of severe emotional, mental, or physical harm, in addition to findings pursuant to s. 90.804 . . . substantial likelihood of severe emotional, mental, or physical harm, in addition to findings pursuant to s. 90.804 . . . a substantial likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm, in addition to findings pursuant to s. 90.804 . . .

REAVES, v. STATE, 942 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2006)

. . . Witness Hinton was ruled unavailable to testify, [pursuant to] section 90.804(l)(b), Florida Statutes . . . but refuged to testify at the 1992 retrial and was ruled unavailable to testify pursuant to section 90.804 . . .