Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...sserted' but rather to show why the witness is not trustworthy."). Therefore, the hearsay rule does not preclude admission of the statements under review. Further, the trial court properly admitted the statements for impeachment purposes pursuant to section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2001), which provides: When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness....

...ailant, as excited utterances. Romines' statements made at the hospital, nodding that "Steve" was not her assailant, was "evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant ... inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay statement," which pursuant to section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2001), "is admissible, regardless of whether or not the declarant has been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain it." Therefore, it is irrelevant that Romines, the declarant, who was dead at the time of trial, was not afforded the opportunity to deny or explain the inconsistency....

...[3] Reaves presents sixteen issues, twelve in the guilt phase and four in the penalty phase. Reaves argues to this Court that several statements made by Hinton, under oath, prior to his 1987 trial testimony, [4] were inconsistent with his 1987 trial testimony and should have been admitted pursuant to section 90.806, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...§ 921.141(5)(b), (e), (h), Fla. Stat. (1985). [3] Reaves was honorably discharged from military service, had a good reputation in his community up to the age of sixteen, was a considerate son to his mother, and was good to his siblings. [4] See supra note 1. [5] Section 90.806, Florida Statutes (1991), provides: (1) When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness....

...ab lice. The defense objected, arguing that any statement was elicited on the State's cross-examination and that introduction of the convictions would be prejudicial. The court reviewed the trial transcript and found the convictions admissible under section 90.806, Florida Statutes (2002)....

...ment attributed to Huggins and that evidence of Huggins' nine felony convictions should have been excluded under the balancing test of section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2002). The trial court admitted the fact of Huggins' convictions on the basis of section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2002), which provides in part that "[w]hen a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness." The trial court's ruling was made in accordance with First and Fourth District Court of Appeal holdings that section 90.806 permits the introduction of a defendant's felony convictions when the defendant elicits his or her own exculpatory, hearsay statement through another *756 witness at trial....

...hose statements impeached by felony convictions." 5 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 806.04(2)(b) (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed.2002). We agree with the First and Fourth Districts on that point of law. Under section 90.806(1), a hearsay declarant is treated as a "witness" and his or her credibility may be attacked in the same manner as any other witness's credibility....

...Huggins ever shave his pubic region after complaining of lice?" The State's later question, "So your answer to counsel's question was based upon what Mr. Huggins told you?," was designed merely to reveal the implication that defense counsel had already succeeded in getting before the jury. Thus, pursuant to section 90.806, as properly construed in Llanos, Werley , and Kelly, Huggins opened the door to his own impeachment....

...ce. First, it is not even clear from the testimony that the correctional officer's knowledge of Huggins' explanation for shaving came solely from what Huggins told him, which would be necessary for impeachment of Huggins as a hearsay declarant under section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...Even assuming that the testimony concerning Huggins' reason for shaving his pubic region opened the door for impeachment and that the prior record was not inadmissible under section 90.403, I nonetheless question whether the admission of Huggins' prior record is authorized by section 90.806. Section 90.806(1) provides that the credibility of a hearsay declarant "may be attacked ......

...This rationale does not apply when the "testimony" being impeached is a hearsay statement not made under oath. Section 90.610(1) further provides that a "party may attack the credibility of any witness, including an accused," with the witness's prior criminal record. (Emphasis supplied.) However, section 90.806(1), which governs impeachment of hearsay declarants rather than witnesses, authorizes admission of "[e]vidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay statement." A prior crimina...

...marijuana. [5] Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). [6] Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688 (Fla.1993). [7] In her dissent, Justice Pariente questions whether the admission of Huggins' prior record is authorized by section 90.806....

...July 1, 2004), Appellant contends that impeachment of the victim's statement by inconsistent statement is not possible because the necessary predicate of affording the witness an opportunity to review and explain the statement cannot be established. See § 90.614 Fla. Stat. (2003). Appellant's argument overlooks, however, section 90.806, Florida Statutes, which excepts the need for this predicate when a hearsay statement is attacked by an inconsistent statement of the hearsay declarant....

...And he said you will be all right. Don't breathe through your nose and it will clot up in a few minutes. In response to Mrs. Werley's testimony regarding Appellant's statements to her, the trial court allowed the admission of Appellant's six prior felony convictions, pursuant to section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2001)("When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness.")....

...Werley told her he was sorry and not to swallow her blood. That testimony was later elicited by the defense during the trial. Therefore, the trial court properly admitted the prior convictions. See Llanos v. State, 770 So.2d 725 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)(ruling that, pursuant to § 90.806, trial court properly took judicial notice that defendant was on probation after defendant's hearsay statements, that he was sorry, were admitted into evidence upon defense counsel's cross-examination of the victim); 5 Jack B....

...terrogating officer and on cross-examination of the officer defendant elicited additional statements he made to the officer. As part of its case in chief, the state then offered evidence of prior convictions involving dishonesty. The state relied on section 90.806(1), saying that the convictions impeached defendant's credibility as a declarant and addressed the self-serving nature of part of his declarations. We agree with the state that it was proper to admit the convictions under section 90.806. Section 90.806(1) provides: "When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness." § 90.806(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). We previously confronted similar impeachment of a defendant's pretrial statements under section *950 90.806 in Llanos v....

...In this case during cross examination of the same witness, defendant also elicited the same statements, as well as other statements made during the same interrogation. His purpose was to show that in context the entire interrogation was exculpatory. Section 90.806 allows this specific use of such impeachment evidence....

...ng the penalty phase of the trial. In particular, Reaves asserted that several statements by witness Hinton, under oath, prior to Hinton's 1987 trial testimony were inconsistent with his 1987 trial testimony and should have been admitted pursuant to section 90.806, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...the fact that appellant was on probation at the time of the alleged offenses. Although this means of impeachment is not afforded by section 90.610(1), Florida Statutes (1999), [2] the declarant's credibility and possible bias may be impeached under section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...An equally plausible reason that would cast doubt on appellant's motivation and credibility is that appellant wanted the victim to remain silent about the battery because he was on probation and his arrest could lead to the revocation of his probation. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling under section 90.806, Florida Statutes (1999)....

...has been convicted of a crime if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year under the law under which the witness was convicted, or if the crime involved dishonesty or a false statement regardless of the punishment.... [3] 90.806 Attacking and supporting credibility of declarant.— (1) When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness....

...statement is admissible, regardless of whether or not the declarant has been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain it. See also United States v. Lawson, 608 F.2d 1129, 1130 (6th Cir.1979) (applying Fed. R.Evid. 806 which is almost identical to section 90.806, Florida Statutes (1999)).

...Q: Did you speak to Shavonne Chisholm? A: No. Q: That was the one name that he gave you though, true? A: Yes, sir. The State argued that this exchange introduced hearsay evidence of Fisher's alibi and opened the door to impeachment through his prior convictions under section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2003)....

...It is within the trial court's sound discretion to determine the admissibility of evidence, and its ruling on admissibility will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., LaMarr v. Lang, 796 So.2d 1208, 1209 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). The court admitted evidence of Fisher's prior felony conviction under section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2003), which provided: "When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those pu...

copies of the prior convictions and sentences. Section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2011), provides that

...nder the rule of completeness. See § 90.108, Fla. Stat. (2005). When a defendant successfully introduces his hearsay statements into evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked just as if the declarant had testified as a witness. See § 90.806(1), Fla....

if the declarant had testified as a witness.” § 90.806(1), Fla, Stat. (2016). One method of attacking

...Thompson's argument that he would have had an opportunity at trial to impeach the victim with evidence of prior felonies is unavailing. He had that chance. He raised this issue at trial, and the trial court ruled that such evidence would be admissible under section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2006). [1] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the prior testimony. Affirmed. SILBERMAN and CANADY, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] 90.806....

introducing Kaczmar’s prior felonies pursuant to section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2007), which provides:

...779 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 954, 83 S.Ct. 950, 9 L.Ed.2d 978 (1963). Attacking the credibility of prior testimony which is being introduced at a later hearing by evidence of subsequent contradictory statements seems to have been contemplated by section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (1985), which provides as follows: When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for these purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness....

...redibility resolution. This is not to say our holding renders irrelevant the testimony of Hill's investigator. The state concedes, upon the admission of Munson's former trial testimony, that Hill may introduce evidence of the post-trial recantation. § 90.806, Fla....

...he allegedly made that were related by a witness and are not to be considered as proof of guilt for the charged offense. Under the Evidence Code, one can impeach a hearsay statement with any evidence that could be used to impeach in-court testimony. § 90.806(1), Fla....

...Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and August A. Bonavita, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. TAYLOR, J. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of appellant's prior convictions in his trial for felony battery. Under section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes, the state was allowed to introduce *790 appellant's prior convictions to impeach his exculpatory out-of-court statements, which were elicited by defense counsel through another witness to suggest that appellant acted in self-defense....

statement regardless of the punishment....”); § 90.806(1), Fla.Stat. (providing that a hearsay declarant

any statements regarding aliens. Relying on section 90,806(1), Florida Statutes (2013), the trial court

with his prior felony convictions pursuant to section 90.806, Florida Statutes, there was no longer a reason

...ther relevant statements made during the -2- conversation. The trial court agreed with the State and, over defense objection, admitted the certified copies of Foster's convictions into evidence under section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2013), which allows for the introduction of a defendant's prior convictions when he elicits his own exculpatory, hearsay statement through another witness during trial. Generally, a defendant's out-of-court self-serving exculpatory statements are inadmissible hearsay....

State is permitted to impeach a defendant under section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2014)-which authorizes

T. v. State, 448 So.2d 613 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); § 90.806(1), Fla.Stat. (1989). We disagree. The owner’s

statement by appellant’s nine felony convictions. See § 90.806(1), Fla. Stat. (2017); Gonzalez v. State, 948

convicted. Such evidence is admissible under section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2004), and “should be

statement and impeach his admission. See § 90.806(1), Fla. Stat. Specifically, the testimony Morris

statement by appellant’s nine felony convictions. See § 90.806(1), Fla. Stat. (2017); Gonzalez v. State, 948

drinking, citing section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (1999). We find nothing in section 90.806(1) which would

defense cross-examined the detective, then section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2014), allowed the State

claimed injuries resulted from another accident); § 90.806(1), Fla. Stat. (2024) (“When a hearsay statement

with his prior felony convictions pursuant to section 90.806, Florida Statutes. Immediately thereafter,

admitted Fernandez's prior record under section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2021), which provides:

of his statement and impeach his admission. See § 90.806(1), Fla. Stat. Specifically, the testimony Morris