90.806
Attacking and supporting credibility of declarant.
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90.806 Attacking and supporting credibility of declarant.—
(1) When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time inconsistent with the declarant’s hearsay statement is admissible, regardless of whether or not the declarant has been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain it.
(2) If the party against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine the declarant on the statement as if under cross-examination.
History.—s. 1, ch. 76-237; s. 1, ch. 77-77; s. 22, ch. 78-361; s. 1, ch. 78-379; s. 500, ch. 95-147.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 37
cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1987–2026 · leading case: Huggins v. State
Huggins v. State (2004)
“The defense objected, arguing that any statement was elicited on the State's cross-examination and that introduction of the convictions would be prejudicial.”
Fitzpatrick v. State (2005)
“Further, the trial court properly admitted the statements for impeachment purposes pursuant to section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2001), which provides: When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may…”
Dontae Morris v. State of Florida (2017)
“See § 90.806(1), Fla. Stat. Specifically, the testimony Morris sought to offer was relevant to the circumstances surrounding his statement, namely his mental state at the time he made the statement, in an attempt to cast doubt on the credibility of the statement that he made.”
Kelly v. State (2003)
“We agree with the state that it was proper to admit the convictions under section 90.806. Section 90.806(1) provides: "When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that…”
Gabriel Brian Nock v. State of Florida (2018)
“§ 90.806(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). 2 "[I]n response to the State's warning that introducing the exculpatory statements would open the door to [the defendant's] prior felonies, defense counsel chose not to invoke the [statutory] rule of completeness.”
Reaves v. State (1994)
“Reaves argues to this Court that several statements made by Hinton, under oath, prior to his 1987 trial testimony, [4] were inconsistent with his 1987 trial testimony and should have been admitted pursuant to section 90.806, Florida Statutes (1991). [5] We *4 agree that Hinton's…”
Werley v. State (2002)
“4th DCA 2000)(ruling that, pursuant to § 90.806, trial court properly took judicial notice that defendant was on probation after defendant's hearsay statements, that he was sorry, were admitted into evidence upon defense counsel's cross-examination of the victim); 5 Jack B.”
Blanton v. State (2004)
“Appellant's argument overlooks, however, section 90.806, Florida Statutes, which excepts the need for this predicate when a hearsay statement is attacked by an inconsistent statement of the hearsay declarant.”
Fisher v. State (2006)
“The State argued that this exchange introduced hearsay evidence of Fisher's alibi and opened the door to impeachment through his prior convictions under section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2003).”
Llanos v. State (2000)
“Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling under section 90.806, Florida Statutes (1999). AFFIRMED.”
Kaczmar v. State (2012)
“The record shows that the State was in agreement that the rule of completeness allowed the defense to introduce exculpatory evidence; however, the State warned the defense that introducing the exculpatory statements would open the door to impeachment of those statements by…”
Desmond T. Kenner v. State (2016)
“” § 90.806(1), Fla, Stat. (2016). One method of attacking a witness’s credibility is through evidence of prior felony convictions.”
— 90.806(1) — 31 cases
Huggins v. State (2004)
“The defense objected, arguing that any statement was elicited on the State's cross-examination and that introduction of the convictions would be prejudicial.”
Fitzpatrick v. State (2005)
“Further, the trial court properly admitted the statements for impeachment purposes pursuant to section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2001), which provides: When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may…”
Dontae Morris v. State of Florida (2017)
“See § 90.806(1), Fla. Stat. Specifically, the testimony Morris sought to offer was relevant to the circumstances surrounding his statement, namely his mental state at the time he made the statement, in an attempt to cast doubt on the credibility of the statement that he made.”
Gabriel Brian Nock v. State of Florida (2018)
“§ 90.806(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). 2 "[I]n response to the State's warning that introducing the exculpatory statements would open the door to [the defendant's] prior felonies, defense counsel chose not to invoke the [statutory] rule of completeness.”
Kelly v. State (2003)
“We agree with the state that it was proper to admit the convictions under section 90.806. Section 90.806(1) provides: "When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that…”
— 90.806(6) — 1 case
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