CopyCited 104 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 15734
...on of presidential preference primary rules, as authorized by Fla.Stat.Ann. §
103.101; (2) the nomination of presidential electors, pursuant to Fla.Stat.Ann. §
103.021(1); (3) the filling of vacancies in nominations, as authorized by Fla.Stat.Ann. §
100.111; and (4) the collection of party assessments from candidates, as provided in Fla.Stat.Ann....
CopyCited 37 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2005 WL 3005562
...Thereafter, members of the Congressional District 22 Democratic Party Executive Committee (Executive Committee), the appellees in this case, sought a mandatory injunction requiring the Department to declare that a vacancy had been created by Stork's withdrawal and to comply with section 100.111(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2004)....
...has the absolute discretion under section *766 101.253(2) to grant or deny a request for withdrawal. In rejecting the Department's arguments, the trial court stated that "[t]o read Section 101.253(2) as the Department urges would essentially render Section 100.111(4)(b) meaningless." Martin v. Dep't of State, Div. of Elections, No. 04CA2400, order at 9 (Fla.2d Cir. Ct. order filed Oct. 8, 2004). Because section 100.111(4)(b) was enacted after section 101.253(2), the trial court concluded that the Legislature intended that section 100.111(4)(b) control the procedure for allowing a candidate's withdrawal and filling a vacancy in nomination....
...The First District determined that severing the offending portion of subsection (2) from the statute "would create an irreconcilable conflict between the remaining [portion] of subsection (2) and subsection (3), and possibly between subsection (2) and section 100.111(4)(b) as well." Id....
..."We review de novo a district court decision declaring a statute unconstitutional." Fla. Dep't of Children & Families v. F.L.,
880 So.2d 602, 607 (Fla.2004). In resolving this issue, we begin by reviewing whether and to what extent sections 101.253(2) and
100.111(4)(b) relate to and may be reconciled with one another....
...ticle II, section 3. We then analyze the constitutionality of section 101.253(2). Finally, we decide whether the unconstitutional portion of section 101.253(2) may be severed from the remainder of the statute. I. Interplay of Sections 101.253(2) and 100.111(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2004) In 1895, the Legislature first enacted statutory requirements governing placement of a candidate's name on an election ballot....
...The Department of State may in its discretion allow such a candidate to withdraw after the 42nd day before an election upon receipt of a written notice, sworn to under oath, that the candidate will not accept the nomination or office for which he or she qualified. (Emphasis supplied.) Section 100.111 was enacted in 1951, and relates to filling vacancies in governmental offices....
...ancies which had not been addressed previously." Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary-Civ., CS for SB 563 (1977) Staff Analysis 2 (June 2, 1977) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, State Archives, ser. 18, carton 1284, Tallahassee, Fla.). The 1977 amendment to section 100.111 resulted in the statutory language set forth in section 100.111(4)(b). [3] Section 100.111(4) governs the procedure for filling vacancies resulting from the death, resignation, withdrawal, or removal of a candidate. See § 100.111(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004). Section 100.111(4)(b) addresses vacancies that occur later than September 15 or less than twenty-one days prior to an election, and provides in full: If the vacancy in nomination occurs later than September 15, or if the vacancy in nomination occurs...
...For purposes of this paragraph, the term "district political party executive committee" means the members of the state executive committee of a political party from those counties comprising the area involving a district office. (Emphasis supplied.) Both sections 101.253(2) and 100.111(4)(b) relate to Florida's election process....
...Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist.,
604 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla.1992) ("Where possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another."). In addition, we must construe sections 101.253(2) and
100.111(4)(b) "consistent with the important constitutional rights that are involved: `[T]he right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.'" Reform Party of Florida v....
...Black,
885 So.2d 303, 311 (Fla.2004) (quoting Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, 30,
89 S.Ct. 5,
21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968)) (alteration in original). The First District determined that section 101.253(2) governs when and how a candidate may seek to withdraw, whereas section
100.111(4)(b) governs the process to be used to fill a vacancy that results when either the candidate submits a timely request to withdraw or the Department, in its discretion, grants an untimely request to withdraw....
...However, the First District concluded that the lack of standards to guide the Department's discretion concerning a request for withdrawal rendered section 101.253(2) unconstitutional. The Department agrees with the First District's conclusion as to the interplay of sections 101.253(2) and 100.111(4)(b). The Department disagrees, however, that section 101.253(2) is unconstitutional. We conclude that reading section 101.253(2) together with section 100.111(4)(b) supports the First District's interpretation of the interplay of these statutory provisions....
...Goode,
830 So.2d 817, 824 (Fla.2002) ("[A] basic rule of statutory construction provides that the Legislature does not intend to enact useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless."). The trial court interpreted section
100.111(4)(b) as eliminating the Department's discretion under section 101.253(2) to deny withdrawals after the forty-second day before an election....
...shall be printed on the ballot if such candidate has notified the Department of State . . . on or before the 42nd day before the election . . . .") (emphasis supplied). Accordingly, we conclude that section 101.253(2) clearly intended to give the Department discretion to grant or deny a request for withdrawal and that section 100.111(4)(b) comes into play only when withdrawal is allowed....
...nominated, the party by which such person was nominated shall be allowed five days after such declination to run by such person, in which to substitute another candidate. (Emphasis omitted.) [3] At that time, this statutory language was set forth in section 100.111(3)(b). See ch. 77-175, § 12, Laws of Fla. However, section 100.111 was amended in 1983 to add a new subsection. See ch. 83-15, § 4, Laws of Fla. As a result of the 1983 amendment, section 100.111(3)(b) was renumbered to section 100.111(4)(b). See id. [4] Because we conclude there is no meaningful way to sever section 101.253(2) and accomplish the Legislature's intent, we need not reach the issue of whether severance creates conflict with sections 101.253(3) or 100.111(4)(b).
CopyCited 5 times | Published | District Court, N.D. Florida | 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14377
...ident was Plaintiff, Patrick J. Lucey, and requested that Plaintiff Lucey be placed on the general election ballot to fill the vacancy created by Milton Eisenhower. 12. Defendants Glisson and Firestone have refused to apply the vacancy provisions of Section 100.111(3), Florida Statutes, to the Plaintiff Anderson's ticket, and have refused to substitute Plaintiff Lucey for the withdrawn surrogate vice-presidential candidate, Milton Eisenhower....
...CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The issue before the court is whether the plaintiffs are denied equal protection of the laws by the State's failure to provide the same or similar mechanism for filling the vacancy created by the withdrawal of an independent vice-presidential nominee as is provided in Section 100.111(3), Florida Statutes, to party candidates....
...That statute could as easily be construed to permit a designation of "whomsoever [the presidential candidate] may select" on a sufficient number of petitions as equally demonstrative of the modicum of support needed to protect the State's interest in preserving the integrity of the ballot. The failure of § 100.111 to provide for withdrawal from the ballot of the name petitioners recognized as only a surrogate for John B....
...s of these plaintiffs. In accordance with all of the above, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: 1. Sections 103.111,
103.021(2) and (3), Florida Statutes, and Defendants' prior interpretation of Section
99.0955 necessitate the extension of the provisions of §
100.111(3)(b) to independent vice-presidential candidate Patrick J....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...of Messer, Rhodes, Vickers & Hart, Tallahassee, for Democratic Executive Committee of Florida, amicus curiae. SUNDBERG, Chief Justice. By petition for writ of mandamus, the Republican State Executive Committee requests this Court to direct Governor Graham to call a special primary election as required by section 100.111(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), [1] because an alleged vacancy in nomination has occurred within the contemplation of the above statute....
...te. On July 31, 1980, the Republican Party requested that a special primary election be called. The withdrawal was reaffirmed under oath on August 22, 1980, and accepted by the secretary of state. The Governor has declined to call a special primary. Section
100.111(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), provides a method for selecting nominees for political parties when a "vacancy in nomination" has occurred prior to September 15 in the year of a general election. [2] Petitioner contends that section
100.111(3)(a) must be read in conjunction with section
101.252(1), Florida Statutes (1979), which states that when only one candidate of a political party qualifies, that candidate is the party's nominee....
...The Republican Party had a candidate qualify for the office. State v. Tyler is concerned only with a situation in which no candidate ever qualified, and a vacancy is created thereby. See also In re Opinion to the Governor,
60 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1952). Respondent points next to the statutory changes in section
100.111, Florida Statutes (1979), which eliminate any reference to the time in which a vacancy in nomination can occur....
...ch occurs "between the last date of filing" and the first primary, the legislature intended to eliminate special primaries for vacancies occurring during this time. But this contention carries little weight when *559 one looks at an earlier version, section 100.111(6)(d), Florida Statutes (1963): In the event that death, resignation, withdrawal, removal or any other cause or event should cause a vacancy in office or nomination between the last date of filing for a special or local primary electi...
...The ministerial duty lodged in the Governor could as easily have been imposed upon any other person, and indeed is presently shared with the secretary of state. See State ex rel. Bisbee v. Drew,
17 Fla. 67 (1879); see also Willits v. Askew,
279 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973). [2] Section
100.111(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), reads, in pertinent part: In the event that death, resignation, withdrawal, removal or any other cause or event should cause a party to have a vacancy in nomination which leaves no candidate for an offi...
...t for such office a nominee of such political party. The dates on which candidates may qualify for such special primary election shall be fixed by the Department of State, and the candidates shall qualify no later than noon of the last day so fixed. Section 100.111(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), sets out the procedure for a vacancy in nomination occurring after September 15....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2004 WL 2375632
...(Emphasis added.) On October 5th, appellees (who are members of the Congressional District 22 Democratic Party Executive Committee) commenced this action, seeking (among other things) a mandatory injunction requiring the Division to declare that a vacancy was created by Stork's withdrawal and to comply with section 100.111(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), so that the Democratic Party might designate a nominee to fill the vacancy. To the extent pertinent, section 100.111(4)(b) reads: If the vacancy in nomination occurs later than September 15,......
...ould have existed had the Division received Stork's notice two days earlier, but that the Division would have been required by the first sentence of section 101.253(2) to permit Stork to withdraw, and to initiate the replacement procedure set out in section 100.111(4)(b). Following the hearing, the trial court entered its "Final Order Granting Temporary and Permanent Injunction." In that order, the trial court acknowledged that the outcome of the case turned on the interplay between sections 101.253(2) and 100.111(4)(b). It noted that section 100.111(4)(a) and (b), together, provide that death, withdrawal, resignation or removal of a candidate results in a vacancy in the nomination, and that paragraph (4)(b) "then provides a detailed procedure that must be implemented when a vacan...
...n delegated to the Department and that, without expressed criteria, there was nothing to prevent the Department from basing its decision on any reason, or no reason. It concluded its analysis with the following: Here, the statutes can be harmonized. Section 100.111(4)(b) provides the procedures that must be followed when a candidate withdraws after September 15th. To read Section 101.253(2) as the Department urges would essentially render Section 100.111(4)(b) meaningless and a nullity....
...Shiavo [sic], [___ So.2d ___,]
2004 WL 2109983 (Fla.S.Ct. Sept. 23, 2004); see also Askew v. Cross Key Waterways,
372 So.2d 913 (Fla.1978).... [T]here are no such standards in Section 101.253(2). The Court must therefore find that the specific procedures set forth in Section
100.111(4)(b) govern the decision here....
..."[L]egislative intent is the polestar that guides a court's statutory construction analysis." State v. J.M.,
824 So.2d 105, 109 (Fla.2002) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we must begin our analysis by attempting to determine the intended interplay (if any) between section 101.253(2) and section
100.111(4)(b)....
...both of whom are former Secretaries of State. We agree with their position that the legislature intended that section 101.253 would govern when and how a candidate may seek to withdraw his or her name from nomination and be removed from the ballot. Section 100.111 was intended to address the next step. If a candidate timely submits a request to *457 withdraw (or the Department, in its discretion, grants an untimely request), a vacancy arises. Section 100.111(4)(b) addresses the process to be used to fill that vacancy. (Section 100.111(4) also addresses the process to be used to fill vacancies caused by circumstances other than withdrawal, such as death or removal.) This determination does not, however, end our inquiry....
...constitution and is, therefore, unconstitutional. Were we to sever that sentence from the first, we would create an irreconcilable conflict between the remaining sentence of subsection (2) and subsection (3), and possibly between subsection (2) and section 100.111(4)(b) as well....
...Having declared section 101.253(2) unconstitutional, there is no other provision *459 which purports to limit a nominee's right to withdraw from the election. That being the case, Stork's withdrawal must be recognized, and resort must then be had to section 100.111(4)(b) for the applicable procedure to be employed for the selection of a replacement nominee....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2006 WL 3041924
...On October 2, 2006, the Republican State Executive Committee designated State Representative Joseph Negron (Negron) as its new nominee for this seat. However, because Foley's withdrawal came after the State of Florida had certified the results of the 2006 primary election, pursuant to section 100.111(4)(a), Florida Statutes, it is Foley's name, and not Negron's, which will appear on the general election ballot....
...After conducting a hearing, the trial court issued a final judgment granting injunctive relief and ordered the supervisors not to post the proposed notice or deliver the notice to individual voters posing questions about the race in question. The trial court found that section 100.111(4), Florida Statutes, controlled the result because it deals specifically with the issue raised. The trial court noted that in section 100.111(4), the Florida Legislature did not mandate the posting or delivering of notices at polling places informing electors of the replacement as has been done by the Kentucky Legislature....
...the change in the composition of the slate shall be posted at each precinct polling place. Instead, the Florida Legislature specifically directed that "the ballots shall not be changed and the former party nominee's name will appear on the ballot." § 100.111(4)(a), Fla. *642 Stat. Although section 100.111(4) does not preclude the posting of notices, it specifically requires that the person no longer seeking the office appear on the ballot....
...[4] We also find nothing in the statutes that would preclude the giving of notice as long as the notice complies with the impartiality requirements of sections
101.031(4) and
102.031(4)(a), Florida Statutes. The trial court held that the following language of section
100.111(4)(a), Florida Statutes, prohibits the proposed notice: [T]he ballots shall not be changed and the former party nominee's name will appear on the ballot. The court reasoned that: This provision . . . refutes the Defendants' argument that Section
100.111(4) is "silent" on the issue of what should be done. Although Section
100.111(4) does not specifically preclude the posting of notices, it does specifically require that the person no longer seeking the office appear on the ballot....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1954 Fla. LEXIS 1094
...ned by a certain number of voters, the Bryan Primary Law, Chapter 6469, Acts 1913, which provided for second-choice voting, and the First and Second Primary Law enacted in 1929, Chapter 13761, Acts 1929, now in effect. See Sections
100.061, 100.091,
100.111,
103.081 and 103.111 and
103.121, Florida Statutes 1953, F.S.A....
...Under the facts shown we held that if a county commissioner was to be nominated in a primary election, then all the voters of the county should have the right to participate in selecting the nominee. On the other hand, if the conditions existed as provided for in F.S. Section 100.111, F.S.A., requiring a nomination by the Executive Committee of the county, then it follows that 'all of the Democratic voters of the county would be represented by the members of such committee chosen by them....
...hrough their representatives. A majority and not a plurality vote is required.. F.S. Chapters 100 and 103, F.S.A., provide for political parties and the executive committees of such parties and'for some of' their powers and duties. A portion of F.S. Section 100.111', F.S.A., reads as follows: “ * * -* should a vacancy occur in any nomination for county office-or in any county office less than thirty days ’before a general election, or should a ^vacancy occur in any .nomination for a state of...
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 1980 Fla. LEXIS 4332
fill such alleged vacancy in nomination. “Section
100.111(3)(a), Florida Statutes, provides a method
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 1974 Fla. LEXIS 4656
...tember 10, 1974. Section 4 of the statute provides the act as a whole becomes effective on the date of a favorable referendum. It follows that on September 10, 1974 the two additional school board member offices came into existence. Florida Statutes 100.111(6) (b) provides in substance that where a vacancy in nomination exist after September 15th no special election shall be held and the Department of State shall notify the Chairman of the appropriate county political party executive committee a...
...no chance for selecting nominees in a special primary election on September 15th, a period of only 5 days, thus creating a vacancy in nomination occurring after September 15th, but more than five days prior to the general election. Therefore, under Section 100.111(6) (b), “[T]he department of state shall notify the Chairman of the ....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 1970 Fla. LEXIS 2760
...e state’s registered voters, rather than registered elector members of the party numbering more than 5% of the total state registration, should be the principal criterion for printed ballot position. We are of the opinion that the language of F.S. Section 100.111(6) (d) F.S.A., read in connection with the holding in Williams v....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1969 Fla. App. LEXIS 5556
...r to the general election. The Monroe County Democratic Executive Committee met on Friday evening, November 1, 1968, at about 8:00 P.M. and after due deliberation unanimously endorsed Harry F. Knight as its nominee to fill the vacancy. See Fla.Stat. § 100.111 (6) (b), (c), F.S.A....
...e Committee that Harry F. Knight was its nominee to fill the vacancy and it directed the Supervision of Registration to place the name of Harry F. Knight on the ballot as the Democratic candidate for the office at the general election. See Fla.Stat. § 100.111(6) (b), F.S.A....
...fice of Tax Collector. After the plaintiff rested, the defendants moved to dismiss and the trial judge dismissed the case with prejudice. Speigel has appealed. On appeal he argues essentially, that Knight has violated those requirements of Fla.Stat. § 100.111(6) (c), which provide: ****** “ * * * [WJhere a nominee or candidate is selected by a committee to fill a vacancy in nomination or office, he shall pay the same filing fee and take the same oath as he would if he had regularly qualified...
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...If the remainder of the term of elective
office is not less than twenty-eight months, the governor must still
appoint a successor, but that successor only serves "until the first
Tuesday after the first Monday following the next general election." Id.
The office is thereafter filled by election. § 100.111(1)(a), Fla....
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 1974).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
be followed for such an election? SUMMARY: Section
100.111(6), F.S., prescribing the procedure to be followed
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
election code of the State. “You have quoted Section
100.111(2) (c), Florida Statutes, 1951, F.S.A., which
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...In support of this
argument, the County Commissioners cite various definitions of "call an
election" and In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor,
60 So. 2d 285, 287
(Fla. 1952).
In the advisory opinion, the supreme court addressed whether
under section
100.111(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1951), the governor had
the authority to fix the date of an election when the statute contemplated
an election "to be called by the governor."
60 So. 2d at 286. At the time,
section
100.111(2)(c) provided:
When a vacancy occurs later than thirty days before the first
primary and before forty days prior to the general election, it
shall be subject to a special first primary and if necessary
seven days later a special second primary to be called by the
governor....
...imary shall be placed
5
on the general election ballot but in event the general election
ballots have already been printed then a separate ballot shall
be prepared.
60 So. 2d at 286 (quoting §
100.111(2)(c), Fla....
...Consequently, the court opined that the governor necessarily
had the authority to fix the date of the special election because the lack
of such authority would make it impossible for the governor to call the
election as provided for by the then-applicable version of section
100.111(2)(c).
60 So. 2d at 287.
In re Advisory Opinion does not command the outcome advocated
for by the County Commissioners. The statute at issue in that case and
the statute at issue in this case are materially distinguishable. Section
100.111(2)(c) placed the sole authority on the governor to "call" the
election....
