Cases from cite.case.law:

C. SANCHEZ, a v. LOPEZ,, 219 So. 3d 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . We agree with the trial court that the recall petition, filed pursuant to section 100.361, Florida Statutes . . . official which would constitute one -of the seven grounds for removal,” as provided for in section 100.361 . . . Sweetwater City Charter, which allows for all elected officials to be recalled and Florida Statutes, section 100.361 . . .

GIBSON, v. KESTERSON, Sr., 188 So. 3d 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . court’s conclusion that the petition was legally insufficient under Florida’s recall statute, section 100.361 . . . Commissioner Kesterson did not resign, the chief judge set a recall election as required by section 100.361 . . . Id. § 100.361(2)(a). . . . Id. § 100.361(2)(d)(l)-(7). As the statute requires, a recall committee was formed (Ms. . . . . § 100.361(2)(c), and a petition alleging misfeasance by Commissioner Kesterson was filed. . . .

BENCH BILLBOARD COMPANY, v. CITY OF COVINGTON, KENTUCKY, 465 F. App'x 395 (6th Cir. 2012)

. . . . §§ 96A.020, 100.324, 100.361(2). . . .

E. CHALIFOUX, Jr. v. SANCHEZ Jr., 991 So. 2d 432 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . See §§ 100.361, 101.021, and 102.168, Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .

A. THOMPSON, v. NAPOTNIK,, 923 So. 2d 537 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . in office, and thus the petition failed to contain legal grounds for recall as set forth in section 100.361 . . . SAWAYA and MONACO, JJ., concur. .That statute reads: 100.361. . . . Permanent inability to perform official duties; and 7.Conviction of a felony involving moral turpitude. § 100.361 . . .

PRESBYTERIAN CHILD WELFARE AGENCY OF BUCKHORN, KENTUCKY, INC. v. NELSON COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT,, 185 F. Supp. 2d 716 (W.D. Ky. 2001)

. . . government,” immune from the decisions of local planning boards under Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 100.361 . . . KRS 100.361(2) provides: “Nothing in this chapter shall impair the sovereignty of the Commonwealth of . . . Kentucky courts characterize KRS 100.361(2) as a “legislative grant of immunity” from the decisions of . . . The KRS 100.361(2) immunity claim and the 1998 action are thus rooted in the same controversy. . . . KRS 100.361(2) itself explicitly recognizes that local governing bodies retain jurisdiction and must . . .

LEVY, v. SIMPKINS,, 782 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . fails to identify the person designated as the chair of the recall committee as required by section 100.361 . . .

T. GARVIN, v. JEROME,, 767 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 2000)

. . . See § 100.361, Fla. Stat. (1997). . . . that only one valid ground had been stated in the petition, it concluded that, pursuant to section 100.361 . . . Here, the applicable statute — section 100.361, Florida Statutes (1997) — like the Alaska recall statute . . . See § 100.361(3), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . . Section 100.361, Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part: 100.361. . . . Wolfson (and contrary to the Fourth District’s rationale in Davis), it held that pursuant to section 100.361 . . . LAW AND ANALYSIS Section 100.361(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), expressly provides that a recall petition . . . substantial number of voters before a recall election may be scheduled pursuant to that petition. § 100.361 . . . petitioner asserted), the alleged conduct did not constitute an allegation of "malfeasance” under section 100.361 . . .

T. GARVIN, v. JEROME,, 721 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . Conviction of a felony involving moral turpitude. § 100.361(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . . Galvin, 279 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1973). . § 100.361(1)(a), Fla. Stat. . § 100.361(1)(a)(3), Fla. . . . . § 100.361(1)(d), Fla. Stat. . § 100.361(1)©, (g), (h), Fla. Stat. . § 100.361(1)(h), Fla. . . . . § 100.361(1)(h), Fla. Stat. . § 100.361(2), Fla. Stat. . § 100.361(l)(a), Fla. . . . . § 100.361(1)©, (g), (h), Fla. Stat. . § 100.361(1)©, Fla. Stat. . . .

MIAMI HEAT LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a a v. C. LEAHY,, 682 So. 2d 198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . petition was challenged on the basis that it did not state grounds for removal in violation of section 100.361 . . .

ABREAU, v. COBB,, 670 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . one year of the July petition and the failure to contain grounds for the election as required under § 100.361 . . . Therefore, the court erred in finding that the petition was null and void for failure to comply with § 100.361 . . . the terms of the Dade County charter relating to the recall of any commissioner would prevail over § 100.361 . . . Similarly, Attorney General Opinion 079-38 concludes that § 100.361 Fla. Stat. . . . Section 100.361(l)(b) requires a recall petition to make a statement of the grounds for recall, and limits . . .

C. KRIVANEK, v. TAKE BACK TAMPA POLITICAL COMMITTEE,, 625 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1993)

. . . signatures, it submitted the petition to Krivanek to count and validate the signatures pursuant to section 100.361 . . .

C. KRIVANEK, v. TAKE BACK TAMPA POLITICAL COMMITTEE M. III,, 603 So. 2d 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . The supervisor has a duty under Section 100.361(d), Florida Statutes, to determine whether the “petition . . . Therefore, TBT argues that the Supervisor breached her duty pursuant to Section 100.361(d) and (h), Florida . . . Section 100.361, Florida Statutes, provides that “electors of a municipality” are eligible to sign the . . .

THORNBER, v. CITY OF FORT WALTON BEACH,, 568 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1990)

. . . against Thornber and Franklin were filed within one month after they were elected, in violation of § 100.361 . . .

In RECALL OF KORETSKY,, 557 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1990)

. . . review because the court certified a question of great public importance: Do the provisions of section 100.361 . . . Three (3) provisions of section 100.361 concern us here. . . . Section 100.361(1) sets out the provisions governing a recall petition and provides that any member of . . . Section 100.361(8) states that it is the intent of the legislature that recall procedures be uniform . . . The genesis of section 100.361 was chapter 74-130, Laws of Florida. . . . Subsection (1) of section 100.361, Florida Statutes (1987), provides that “[a]ny member of the governing . . . Had the legislature wanted to restrict the application of section 100.361 in the manner interpreted by . . . The title to chapter 74-130 later codified as section 100.361 provided, in part, that it was an act “ . . . your letter questions whether a different conclusion is required by reason of subsection (11) of s. 100.361 . . . Moreover, section 100.361 has been amended five times, yet there has been no change in those portions . . .

In KORETSKY,, 541 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . an order scheduling an election and attendant proceedings for a recall election pursuant to section 100.361 . . . Three (3) provisions of section 100.361 concern us here. . . . Section 100.361(1) sets out the provisions governing a recall petition and provides that any member of . . . Section 100.361(8) states that it is the intent of the legislature that recall procedures be uniform . . . Section 100.361(9) is entitled “PROVISIONS APPLICABLE” and provides: The provisions of this act shall . . .

JIVIDEN, St. v. McDONALD, J. W. Jr. B. H. L. Jr. St. T., 541 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . . § 100.361(l)(a), Fla.Stat. (1987). . . . . § 100.361(l)(b), Fla.Stat. (1987). . . . . § 100.361(l)(c), Fla.Stat. (1987). . . . . § 100.361(l)(e), Fla.Stat. (1987). . . . . § 100.361(l)(f), Fla.Stat. (1987). . . .

DELGADO, R. v. SMITH, a a U. S. U. S., 861 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1988)

. . . . § 100.361(3). . . .

DAVIS v. FRIEND J., 507 So. 2d 796 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . . § 100.361, Fla.Stat. (1985). . . .

E. MOULTRIE, v. E. DAVIS, L., 498 So. 2d 993 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . The Recall Committee obtained the necessary signatures and then pursuant to section 100.361 of the Florida . . . Section 100.361(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), provides the grounds for the removal of an elected municipal . . . alleged in the recall petition are sufficient to establish any grounds for recall pursuant to section 100.361 . . .

ADKINSON v. MUNICIPAL RECALL COMMITTEE OF JUNE, 488 So. 2d 621 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . appellants filed a petition asking the court to declare that the recall petitions violated section 100.361 . . . of the ground(s) for removal, section 100.361(l)(b), and the “required signatures,” section 100.361( . . . Section 100.361(l)(c). . . . In that the emphasis is placed on the number of valid signatures, 100.361(l)(d), we conclude that, once . . . three circulator affidavits that were stipulated to by the parties as being in violation of section 100.361 . . .

ELLISON v. GALT, a n k a, 435 So. 2d 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . At issue is whether the provisions of section 100.361, Florida Statutes (1979), which relate to the recall . . . As to the applicability of section 100.361 we agree with the reasoning of the trial judge set out in . . . Sub-section 9 of Section 100.361, Florida Statutes, specifically states, “the provisions of this act . . . Section 100.361(1) provides: RECALL PETITION. — Any member of the governing body of a municipality or . . .

TAYLOR, v. M. THORNBER R., 418 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . Section 100.361(6), Florida Statutes (1979), provides: When petition may be filed — Except as otherwise . . . As for the merits, we find the provision of Section 100.361(7) to be straightforward and unambiguous. . . . The argument focused on the “as otherwise provided” language of Section 100.361(6) and the language of . . . Section 100.361 (1)(b). . . .

BI- PARTISAN COALITION FOR A STABLE GOVERNMENT v. GRAHAM WATT,, 1 Fla. Supp. 2d 146 (Broward Cty. Cir. Ct. 1982)

. . . are legally insufficient to constitute a “statement of grounds for removal” as required by Section 100.361 . . .

CITY OF LAUREL HILL v. SANDERS A. P., 392 So. 2d 33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . mandamus to require processing of appellees’ petition for municipal recall election according to Section 100.361 . . . charter or ordinance to recall municipal officers, so raising the false issue of whether the Section 100.361 . . . Florida Statutes, entitled “General, Primary, Special, Bond, and Referendum Elections,” and Section 100.361 . . . The circuit court correctly ordered compliance with Section 100.361. AFFIRMED. . . .

NEWTON, v. L. MARTINA,, 371 So. 2d 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)

. . . Section 100.361, Florida Statutes (1977), prescribes the right of electors of a municipality to remove . . . Such a petition was filed with the appellant City Clerk, as prescribed by Section 100.361(l)(d). . . . Section 100.361(l)(e). . . . Subsection 100.361(l)(g) affords the opportunity to all petition signatories to “demand in writing that . . . within five days of filing this Judgment, to submit a written resignation in accordance with Section 100.361 . . .

BENT, v. BALLANTYNE,, 368 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1979)

. . . the circuit court of Volusia County upheld the constitutionality of the Municipal Recall Law, section 100.361 . . . city clerk then prepared and delivered to Ballantyne the counterpart petition prescribed by section 100.361 . . . The complaint also challenged the constitutionality of section 100.361. . . . It expressly found section 100.361 to be constitutional and held that, even though only ground two of . . . Section 100.361(l)(b), Fla.Stat. (1977), provides: The grounds for removal of elected municipal officials . . .

WOLFSON, v. M. WORK,, 326 So. 2d 90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)

. . . the City Clerk the following Petition for Recall in compliance with the Municipal Recall Statute — § 100.361 . . . allegations contained in sub-paragraph (a) constituted legally sufficient grounds for recall within § 100.361 . . . Under the statute, an allegation of “malfeasance” will support recall proceedings. § 100.361(1) (b) ( . . . the trial court that subparagraph (a) thus sufficiently alleges “malfeasance” within the meaning of § 100.361 . . .

SPIEGEL, v. CITY OF HALLANDALE,, 42 Fla. Supp. 177 (Broward Cty. Cir. Ct. 1975)

. . . Stat. 100.361 (l)(f) on two legal grounds. . . . Stat. 100.361 (l)(c) and the second being, that the grounds for the recall do not meet the standard of . . . Stat. 100.361 did not change the substantive law on this subject. . . . proceeding further with the preparation of the instant recall petitions pursuant to Florida Statute 100.361 . . .