CopyCited 53 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15897, 2010 WL 2977614
...tions. To
be eligible to participate in the system, a gubernatorial candidate must submit an
application for matching funds, Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 1S-2.047(1); be an
11
opposed candidate, Fla. Stat. §
106.33; agree to abide by an expenditure limit,
which for the 2010 election is $24,901,170, id. §
106.34; raise an initial $150,000
in qualified contributions from Florida residents before receiving any public funds,
id. §
106.33(2)(a)(1); agree to limit loans or contributions from their personal
funds to $25,000, id. §
106.33(3); limit contributions from national, state, and
county executive committees of a political party to $250,000 in the aggregate (this
limit applies to all candidates participating or not), id.; submit disclosure and
reporting statements of each qualified contribution, id. §
106.35(3)(a); and submit
a post-election audit of the campaign account, id. §
106.33(4)....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 592242
...On July 18, 1994, Jim Smith, who currently serves as Florida's Secretary of State, filed his papers to qualify as a candidate for Governor pursuant to the requirements of the Florida Election Code. Candidate Jim Smith, during his campaign for Governor, participated in public election campaign financing pursuant to section 106.33 of the Act....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida
...However, a covered institution "may provide separate toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such facilities provided for students of one sex shall be comparable to such facilities provided for students of the other sex." 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 ....
...The School Board also argues that because Title IX explicitly allows "separate living facilities for the different sexes," 20 U.S.C. § 1686 , and its implementing regulations permit schools to provide "separate toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex," 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 , it cannot be a violation of the statute to provide school restrooms which are separated based on "biological sex." The Court is unpersuaded....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...tions. To
be eligible to participate in the system, a gubernatorial candidate must submit an
application for matching funds, Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 1S-2.047(1); be an
11
opposed candidate, Fla. Stat. §
106.33; agree to abide by an expenditure limit,
which for the 2010 election is $24,901,170, id. §
106.34; raise an initial $150,000
in qualified contributions from Florida residents before receiving any public funds,
id. §
106.33(2)(a)(1); agree to limit loans or contributions from his personal funds
to $25,000, id. §
106.33(3); limit contributions from national, state, and county
executive committees of a political party to $250,000 in the aggregate (this limit
applies to all candidates participating or not), id.; submit disclosure and reporting
statements of each qualified contribution, id. §
106.35(3)(a); and submit a post-
election audit of the campaign account, id. §
106.33(4)....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...The
implementing regulations clarify that institutions “may provide separate toilet,
locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such facilities provided
for students of one sex shall be comparable to such facilities provided for students
of the other sex.” 34 C.F.R. § 106.33.
Whether the Board violated Title IX turns on the answer to one question:
what does “sex” mean in Title IX? Regardless of whether separating bathrooms by
sex would otherwise constitute discrimination “on the basis of sex,” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a), the bathroom policy does not violate Title IX if it falls within the safe
harbor for “separate toilet . . . facilities on the basis of sex.” 34 C.F.R § 106.33.
And if the school policy is valid under Title IX, then Title IX also permits the
schools to require all students, including Adams, to follow that policy....
...And any guidance Bostock might
otherwise provide about whether Title VII allows for sex-separated bathrooms
does not extend to Title IX, which permits schools to act on the basis of sex
through sex-separated bathrooms. See 20 U.S.C. § 1686; 34 C.F.R. § 106.33.
Turning to the provisions at issue, this question is not close....
...sex stereotypes does not matter for this claim because that question would
determine only whether the Board acted “on the basis of sex.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
Title IX and its regulations expressly allow the Board to do so to provide separate
bathrooms. See id. § 1686; 34 C.F.R. § 106.33.
78
USCA11 Case: 18-13592 Date Filed: 07/14/2021 Page: 79 of 80
The district court also failed to grapple with the fact that Congress enacted
Title IX under its Spending Clause power....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2017 WL 625791, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 2059
...In November 2013, Thurston filed his appointment of campaign treasurer and designation of campaign depository related to his candidacy for Florida Attorney General. The primary election was scheduled for August 26, 2014. In June 2014, Thur-ston filed with the Division a request for matching funds pursuant to section 106.33, Florida Statutes....
...ll file a request for such contributions with the filing officer on forms provided by the Division of Elections.” The statute further provides that a candidate for a Cabinet office must not be “an unopposed candidate as defined in s.
106.011.” §
106.33. A candidate for Cabinet office must agree to abide by the expenditure limits provided by law, and must raise $100,000. §
106.33(l)-(2). Contributions from individuals who are not state residents may not be used to meet the $100,000 threshold. §
106.33(2)(b)....
...must be cured.” It argues, however, that “it is apparent from the plain meaning of the statute that it must be cured while a person is a candidate who is not unopposed since only those candidates are eligible to be certified.” The FEC cites to section 106.33 for this propo *690 sition....
...If so, the Division shall distribute the funds. Reversed and remanded with instructions. Levine and Forst, JJ., concur. . The statute provides, among other things, for matching funds for candidates for a Cabinet office who meet certain requirements in-eluding raising $100,000. § 106.33(2)(a)2,, Fla....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...§
106.32(b), and “separate toilet, locker
room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex,” so long as the facil-
ities “provided for students of one sex [are] comparable to such fa-
cilities provided for students of the other sex,” id. §
106.33.
As such, this appeal requires us to interpret the word “sex”
in the context of Title IX and its implementing regulations....
...Therefore,
if to “provide separate toilet . . . facilities on the basis of sex” means
to provide separate bathrooms on the basis of biological sex, then
the School Board’s policy fits squarely within the carve-out. 34
C.F.R. § 106.33....
...nt to Adams’s claim because, as dis-
cussed, Title IX and its implementing regulations expressly allow
the School Board to provide separate bathrooms “on the basis of
sex.” See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a), 1686; 34 C.F.R. § 106.33....
...When we read “sex” in Title
IX to mean “biological sex,” as we must, the statutory claim re-
solves itself. Title IX’s implementing regulations explicitly allow
schools to “provide separate toilet . . . facilities on the basis of [bio-
logical] sex.” 34 C.F.R. § 106.33....
...§ 1686.
And the same regulation that authorizes schools to provide sepa-
rate bathrooms on the basis of sex also permits schools to provide
separate “locker room . . . and shower facilities on the basis of sex.”
34 C.F.R. § 106.33....
...laimed any suggestion that
its decision would apply beyond the bathroom. But Title IX is not
so limited; it applies to “living facilities,” 20 U.S.C. § 1686, “toilet,
locker room, and shower facilities,” 34 C.F.R. § 106.33, and sports
teams, id....
...nt sexes.” 20 U.S.C. § 1686.
The majority opinion also points to Title IX’s implementing regu-
lations, which allow for “separate toilet[s], locker room[s], and
shower facilities on the basis of sex.” 34 C.F.R. §
106.33.
But all the carveouts “suggest[] is that the act of creating sex-
separated [facilities] in and of itself is not discriminatory.” Grimm,
972 F.3d at 618....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...Adams does not argue that providing
separate restrooms for boys and girls violates Title IX. Nor do we think he could.
The statute’s implementing regulations specifically authorize “separate toilet,
locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex,” as long as all facilities are
“comparable.” 34 C.F.R. § 106.33.
The School Board argues Mr....
...“transgender students are entitled to access restrooms for their identified gender
rather than their biological gender at birth.” Dodds,
845 F.3d at 221. We agree
with our sister circuits.
C.
The School Board believes 34 C.F.R. §
106.33 of the Title IX implementing
regulations forecloses Mr. Adams’s discrimination claim. Section
106.33 reads:
A recipient may provide separate toilet, locker room, and
shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such facilities
provided for students of one sex shall be comparable to...
...Adams a “biological
female,” and it seeks to exclude him from the boys’ restroom on this basis.
But Mr. Adams’s discrimination claim does not contradict the implementing
regulations for two reasons. First, Mr. Adams is not challenging § 106.33’s
provision of separate restrooms for girls and boys. He is simply seeking access to
the boys’ restroom as a transgender boy. And second, the regulation does not
mandate how to determine a transgender student’s “sex.” Thus, we perceive no
conflict between the text of § 106.33 and Mr....
...Adams’s successful claim of
discrimination.
Title IX says nothing about Mr. Adams’s “sex.” To start, Title IX and its
accompanying regulations contain no definition of the term “sex.” “Also absent
from the statute is the term ‘biological.’” Whitaker,
858 F.3d at 1047. It seems
fair to say that §
106.33 tells us that restrooms may be divided by male and female.
But the plain language of the regulation sheds no light on whether Mr....
...40
Case: 18-13592 Date Filed: 08/07/2020 Page: 41 of 74
S. Ct. at 1746. Title IX and its regulations do not declare which sex should
determine a transgender student’s restroom use. Thus, the language of § 106.33
does not insulate the School Board from Mr....
...unnecessary to perform that analysis as to Title VII. We need not interpret the
term “sex” to recognize that Mr. Adams suffered discrimination at school because
he was transgender. See Bostock,
140 S. Ct. at 1746. And nothing in Bostock or
the language of §
106.33 justifies the School Board’s discrimination against Mr.
Adams. Specifically, §
106.33 does not dictate how schools should approach
transgender students’ restroom use or define a transgender student’s “sex.” Indeed,
no court of appeals has accepted the School Board’s arguments that §
106.33
requires transgender students to use the restroom of their sex assigned at birth. See
Parents for Privacy,
949 F.3d at 1227 (rejecting a strict “biological sex” reading of
§
106.33 as it applies to transgender students); Whitaker,
858 F.3d at 1047
(observing that the term “biological” does not appear in Title IX); G.G....
...strong or
popular.” Id.
42
Case: 18-13592 Date Filed: 08/07/2020 Page: 43 of 74
Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board,
822 F.3d 709, 720–21 (4th Cir. 2016)
(observing that §
106.33 does not explain how to determine an individual’s
maleness or femaleness for purposes of restroom use), vacated and remanded, 580
U.S....
...The implementing regulations clarify that institutions “may
provide separate toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex, but
such facilities provided for students of one sex shall be comparable to such
facilities provided for students of the other sex.” 34 C.F.R. § 106.33.
Whether the Board violated Title IX turns on the answer to one question:
what does “sex” mean in Title IX? Regardless of whether separating bathrooms by
sex would otherwise constitute discrimination “on the basis of sex,” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a), the bathroom policy does not violate Title IX if it falls within the safe
harbor for “separate toilet . . . facilities on the basis of sex.” 34 C.F.R § 106.33.
And if the school policy is valid under Title IX, then Title IX also permits the
schools to require all students, including Adams, to follow that policy....
...And any guidance Bostock
might otherwise provide about whether Title VII allows for sex-separated
bathrooms does not extend to Title IX, which permits schools to act on the basis of
sex through sex-separated bathrooms. See 20 U.S.C. § 1686; 34 C.F.R. § 106.33.
Turning to the provisions at issue, this question is not close....
...sex stereotypes does not matter for this claim because that question would
determine only whether the Board acted “on the basis of sex.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
Title IX and its regulations expressly allow the Board to do so to provide separate
bathrooms. See id. § 1686; 34 C.F.R. § 106.33.
Like the majority, the district court also failed to grapple with the fact that
Congress enacted Title IX under its Spending Clause power....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...Adams does not argue that providing
separate restrooms for boys and girls violates Title IX. Nor do we think he could.
The statute’s implementing regulations specifically authorize “separate toilet,
locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex,” as long as all facilities are
“comparable.” 34 C.F.R. § 106.33.
The School Board argues Mr....
...“transgender students are entitled to access restrooms for their identified gender
rather than their biological gender at birth.” Dodds,
845 F.3d at 221. We agree
with our sister circuits.
C.
The School Board believes 34 C.F.R. §
106.33 of the Title IX implementing
regulations forecloses Mr. Adams’s discrimination claim. Section
106.33 reads:
A recipient may provide separate toilet, locker room, and
shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such facilities
provided for students of one sex shall be comparable to...
...Adams a “biological
female,” and it seeks to exclude him from the boys’ restroom on this basis.
But Mr. Adams’s discrimination claim does not contradict the implementing
regulations for two reasons. First, Mr. Adams is not challenging § 106.33’s
provision of separate restrooms for girls and boys. He is simply seeking access to
the boys’ restroom as a transgender boy. And second, the regulation does not
mandate how to determine a transgender student’s “sex.” Thus, we perceive no
conflict between the text of § 106.33 and Mr....
...Adams’s successful claim of
discrimination.
Title IX says nothing about Mr. Adams’s “sex.” To start, Title IX and its
accompanying regulations contain no definition of the term “sex.” “Also absent
from the statute is the term ‘biological.’” Whitaker,
858 F.3d at 1047. It seems
fair to say that §
106.33 tells us that restrooms may be divided by male and female.
But the plain language of the regulation sheds no light on whether Mr....
...40
Case: 18-13592 Date Filed: 08/07/2020 Page: 41 of 74
S. Ct. at 1746. Title IX and its regulations do not declare which sex should
determine a transgender student’s restroom use. Thus, the language of § 106.33
does not insulate the School Board from Mr....
...unnecessary to perform that analysis as to Title VII. We need not interpret the
term “sex” to recognize that Mr. Adams suffered discrimination at school because
he was transgender. See Bostock,
140 S. Ct. at 1746. And nothing in Bostock or
the language of §
106.33 justifies the School Board’s discrimination against Mr.
Adams. Specifically, §
106.33 does not dictate how schools should approach
transgender students’ restroom use or define a transgender student’s “sex.” Indeed,
no court of appeals has accepted the School Board’s arguments that §
106.33
requires transgender students to use the restroom of their sex assigned at birth. See
Parents for Privacy,
949 F.3d at 1227 (rejecting a strict “biological sex” reading of
§
106.33 as it applies to transgender students); Whitaker,
858 F.3d at 1047
(observing that the term “biological” does not appear in Title IX); G.G....
...strong or
popular.” Id.
42
Case: 18-13592 Date Filed: 08/07/2020 Page: 43 of 74
Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board,
822 F.3d 709, 720–21 (4th Cir. 2016)
(observing that §
106.33 does not explain how to determine an individual’s
maleness or femaleness for purposes of restroom use), vacated and remanded, 580
U.S....
...The implementing regulations clarify that institutions “may
provide separate toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex, but
such facilities provided for students of one sex shall be comparable to such
facilities provided for students of the other sex.” 34 C.F.R. § 106.33.
Whether the Board violated Title IX turns on the answer to one question:
what does “sex” mean in Title IX? Regardless of whether separating bathrooms by
sex would otherwise constitute discrimination “on the basis of sex,” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a), the bathroom policy does not violate Title IX if it falls within the safe
harbor for “separate toilet . . . facilities on the basis of sex.” 34 C.F.R § 106.33.
And if the school policy is valid under Title IX, then Title IX also permits the
schools to require all students, including Adams, to follow that policy....
...And any guidance Bostock
might otherwise provide about whether Title VII allows for sex-separated
bathrooms does not extend to Title IX, which permits schools to act on the basis of
sex through sex-separated bathrooms. See 20 U.S.C. § 1686; 34 C.F.R. § 106.33.
Turning to the provisions at issue, this question is not close....
...sex stereotypes does not matter for this claim because that question would
determine only whether the Board acted “on the basis of sex.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
Title IX and its regulations expressly allow the Board to do so to provide separate
bathrooms. See id. § 1686; 34 C.F.R. § 106.33.
Like the majority, the district court also failed to grapple with the fact that
Congress enacted Title IX under its Spending Clause power....
