CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...Lukis, of Gray
Robinson, P.A., Tallahassee, Amicus Curiae
for Florida League of Cities, Inc., in support of
Appellee.
NARDELLA, J.
This appeal presents the following question—whether a firefighter
diagnosed with cancer before the effective date of section 112.1816, Florida
Statutes (2019), is entitled to the benefits provided by that statute....
...Five years later, in 2017, she was diagnosed
with ovarian cancer, which she attributes to her years of service as a
firefighter. Despite this diagnosis, Appellant did not file a claim for workers’
compensation benefits.
In 2019, the Legislature passed section 112.1816, Florida Statutes,
which provides previously unavailable benefits to firefighters who meet
certain criteria and are diagnosed with certain cancers, including ovarian
cancer. These benefits include a one-time payment of $25,000 and full
coverage of the firefighter’s cancer treatment. § 112.1816, Fla. Stat. (2019).
The statute took effect on July 1, 2019. Ch. 2019-21, § 1, Laws of Fla.
2
After the passage of section 112.1816, Appellant sent a letter to the
County requesting it provide her with the benefits set forth in that statute.
The County denied the request, leading Appellant to file this declaratory
action against the County seeking a declaration of her rights under the
statute. The County moved for summary judgment, arguing, in relevant part,
that Appellant is not entitled to relief because section 112.1816 applies
prospectively....
...“The question of whether a statute applies retroactively or
prospectively is a pure question of law; thus, our standard of review is de
novo.” Bionetics Corp. v. Kenniasty,
69 So. 3d 943, 947 (Fla. 2011).
Prior to the enactment of section
112.1816, a firefighter who was
diagnosed with cancer and believed the disease was caused by his or her
employment as a firefighter could only seek benefits from their employer by
filing a workers’ compensation claim. See §
112.1816(2), Fla....
...If
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causation was established, the firefighter would receive, among other things,
a percentage of their average weekly wages while they remained disabled.
See generally §
440.15, Fla. Stat. (2019).
The passage of section
112.1816, which took effect more than two
years after Appellant’s diagnosis, provided a limited class of firefighters
diagnosed with select cancers a streamlined “alternative to pursuing workers’
compensation benefits under chapter 440.” Ch....
...create a higher risk for any cancer,” then, upon being diagnosed with one of
the twenty-one cancers listed in the statute, the firefighter is entitled to a one-
time cash payment of $25,000 and full coverage of the firefighter’s cancer
treatment. § 112.1816(2), Fla....
...of cancer or circumstances that arise out of the treatment of cancer and death
benefits through an employer’s retirement plan if the firefighter dies as a result
of cancer or circumstances that arise out of the treatment of cancer. §
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112.1816(3)–(4), Fla. Stat. (2019). The cost of all the benefits provided by
the statute are borne solely by the employer and not by the employer’s
workers’ compensation carrier. § 112.1816(5), Fla. Stat. (2019).
To determine whether section 112.1816 is retroactive, we must first
decide if it is substantive or, as Appellant argues on appeal,
procedural/remedial in nature....
...by allowing, in
most situations, the statute to be “applied to pending cases in order to fully
effectuate the legislation’s intended purpose.” Arrow Air, Inc. v. Walsh,
645
So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. 1994).
Appellant contends that section
112.1816 falls within the
procedural/remedial category because it creates a new remedy as evidenced
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by its statement that it is an “alternative to pursuing workers’ compensation
benefits...
...To the contrary, the statute carves out a limited class
of firefighters and provides them with benefits that were previously
unavailable to them, all while relieving that class of firefighters of the
obligations associated with receiving benefits under chapter 440. This is a
substantive change in law. See § 112.1816(2)(a)–(b), (5)(a), Fla....
...McFarland & Sons, Inc.,
815
So. 2d 687, 695 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (holding that an amendment to a statute
which “alters the size of [plaintiff’s] enforceable judgment against certain of
the defendants” is substantive).
We also reject Appellant’s argument that section
112.1816 is remedial
because it merely eases the requirements for a limited class of firefighters
diagnosed with cancer to get additional benefits....
...What Appellant misses in
this argument is that this “remedy” is effectuated by imposing new legal
burdens on their employers, further supporting a conclusion that the statutory
amendment is more appropriately characterized as substantive in nature. §
112.1816(2)(a)–(b), (5)(a), Fla....
...2d at 334 (“[A] statute that achieves a ‘remedial
purpose by creating substantive new rights or imposing new legal burdens’ is
treated as a substantive change in the law.” (quoting Arrow Air, Inc.,
645 So.
2d at 424)).
As a substantive law, section
112.1816 is presumed to apply
prospectively unless the text “provides for retroactive application,” and “such
application is constitutionally permissible.” See Fla. Hosp. Waterman, Inc.
v. Buster,
984 So. 2d 478, 487 (Fla. 2008). The text of section
112.1816
does not provide for retroactive application, nor does the section contain any
textual clues to support such an application....
...1977) (explaining that the court should
look to the “wording of the act itself to find possible support for its retroactive
application”); Basel,
815 So. 2d at 692 (reviewing the statute for express
language providing for retroactive application). Instead, section
112.1816 is
silent on the issue of retroactivity, and silence alone cannot support
retroactive application....
...2d 911, 914 (Fla. 1995)
(“When the legislature has used a term . . . in one section of the statute but
omits it in another section of the same statute, we will not imply it where it
has been excluded.”).
For these reasons, we find that section 112.1816 is not retroactive and,
thus, affirm the trial court’s order granting the County summary judgment....
