The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XI
COUNTY ORGANIZATION AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Chapter 132
GENERAL REFUNDING LAW

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F.S. 132.02

132.02 Taxing units may refund obligations.—

(1) Each county, municipality, school district, or other taxing district in this state, herein sometimes called a unit, may issue, pursuant to a resolution or resolutions of the governing body thereof (meaning thereby the board or body vested with the power of determining the amount of tax levies required for taxing the taxable property of such unit for the purpose of such unit) and either with or without the approval of such bonds at an election, except as may be required by the Constitution of the state, bonds of such unit for the purpose of refunding any or all bonds, coupons, or interest on any such bonds, now or hereafter outstanding, or any other funded debt, all of which are herein referred to as bonds, whether such unit created such indebtedness or has assumed, or may become liable therefor.

(2) In the event any such unit having outstanding bonded or other funded debt shall have been, or shall hereafter be, abolished otherwise than by annexation to, or consolidation with, a like political subdivision or district, the territory within such unit shall be deemed to be a taxing district within the meaning of this chapter, and the board of county commissioners of the county wherein such abolished unit, or any part thereof, is situate, or the governmental authority having power or authority to levy a tax for the retirement of the indebtedness to be refunded, shall be the governing body thereof, and may issue refunding bonds in behalf of such unit for the purpose of refunding its outstanding indebtedness, and may provide for the annual levy of ad valorem taxes without limitation as to rate or amount fully sufficient to pay principal of and interest on such refunding bonds, the tax to be levied on the same property which would have been taxable for payment of the outstanding indebtedness had such taxing unit not been abolished or dissolved.

(3) If the territory of such abolished unit lies in more than one county, the territory in each county shall be deemed to be a taxing district in such county and the board of county commissioners of each county within which any of such territory is situate, or the governmental authority having power or authority to levy a tax for the retirement of the indebtedness to be refunded, may issue refunding bonds as herein provided for the purpose of refunding such portion of the indebtedness of the abolished unit as shall be chargeable against the territory in said county; provided, however, that nothing in this section shall affect or limit the powers of the State Board of Administration in the issuance of refunding bonds under s. 16, Art. IX of the State Constitution of 1885 as adopted by the State Constitution or under s. 9, Art. XII of the State Constitution.

History.—s. 2, ch. 15772, 1931; CGL 1936 Supp. 2383(2); s. 1, ch. 22001, 1943; s. 18, ch. 69-216; s. 10, ch. 2004-305.

F.S. 132.02 on Google Scholar

F.S. 132.02 on Casetext

Amendments to 132.02

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 132.02

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 132.02.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

GREAT AMERICAN OPPORTUNITIES, INC. v. KENT,, 352 F. Supp. 3d 1126 (D. Colo. 2018)

. . . Lampack , 2013 CO 60, ¶ 24, 312 P.3d 1155, 1160 (citing 18 Moore's Federal Practice § 132.02[2][e] ). . . .

FOLMAR v. HARRIS,, 650 F. App'x 818 (4th Cir. 2016)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.02[2][e] (3d. ed.) . . .

BLAKE, v. SECURITAS SECURITY SERVICES, INC., 962 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D.D.C. 2013)

. . . See, e.g., § 5-132.02 (requiring new “School Safety Division” of MPD to hire, deploy, and provide oversight . . .

JOSEPH, v. LINEHAUL LOGISTICS, INC., 291 F.R.D. 511 (D. Mont. 2013)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.02[2][c] (3d ed. 2010) (“If a new legal theory or factual . . .

AMROLLAH, v. NAPOLITANO, H. Jr. U. S., 710 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2013)

. . . Practice 132.02[2][h] (3d ed. 2001)), or create a “demonstrable difference” in legal standards. . . .

QHR v., 139 T.C. 304 (T.C. 2012)

. . . 10.34(a)(3) (“Relying on information furnished by clients”) (1994) is virtually the same as TX Section 132.02 . . .

O. OYENIRAN, AKA AKA v. H. HOLDER Jr., 672 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2012)

. . . Practice § 132.02[2][c], [d] (3d ed. 2010) (distinguishing evidence of “changed circumstances” from evidence . . .

KANBAR, v. O MELVENY MYERS,, 849 F. Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Cal. 2011)

. . . . § 132.02[2][f][ii], Moreover, as OMM further asserts, there is a difference in material facts. . . .

PAULO, III, v. H. HOLDER Jr., 669 F.3d 911 (8th Cir. 2011)

. . . Moore et ah, Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.02[2][e] (3d ed.2010) (“If a new legal theory or factual . . .

In MARCOTTE, s s v. s, 455 B.R. 460 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011)

. . . minimize her expenses because she continued to pay for health club dues, dance classes, cable, and $132.02 . . .

SAFADI, v. NOVAK, U. S., 574 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2008)

. . . Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.02[2][3], at 27-29 (3d ed.2008) (“The basic rule, that . . .

WALTZ, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,, 251 F.R.D. 491 (E.D. Cal. 2008)

. . . factual, legal, and procedural considerations are involved. 18 Moore’s Federal Practice, 3d. ed., § 132.02 . . .

MCLAUGHLIN A. v. FISHER, 277 F. App'x 207 (3d Cir. 2008)

. . . .”); 18 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 132.02[2][d], at 132-26 (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2006) (“A party therefore . . .

GRIFFITH v. L. LANIER,, 521 F.3d 398 (D.C. Cir. 2008)

. . . . §§ 5-131.01 (2001), 5-132.02(a) (Supp.2007) (emphasis added). . . .

SENSORMATIC SECURITY CORPORATION, v. SENSORMATIC ELECTRONICS CORPORATION ADT v. v. ADT, 273 F. App'x 256 (4th Cir. 2008)

. . . point arising out of the allegations and contentions of the parties.” 18 Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.02 . . .

SIEGEL v. WARNER BROS. ENTERTAINMENT INC. DC, 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2008)

. . . Mooee, MooRe’s Federal Practioe § 132.02[2][c] at 132-25 (3rd ed.2007). . . . Id. § 132.02[2][d] at 132-25 to 132-26 (citing Yamaha Corp. v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. CASTILLO- BASA,, 478 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2007)

. . . See Moore’s Federal Practice §§ 132.02[2][d] & [e] (3d ed.2005). . . .

UNITED STATES v. CASTILLO- BASA,, 483 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2007)

. . . See Moore’s Federal Practice §§ 132.02[2][d] & [e] (3d ed. 2005). . . .

In SONUS NETWORKS, INC. SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION, 422 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D. Mass. 2006)

. . . See also 18 Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.02[2][e]; Montana v. . . . proceeding that could have been admitted, but was not, in the first.” 18 Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.02 . . . contravene the very principles on which collateral estoppel is based.” 18 Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.02 . . .

KREINIK, v. SHOWBRAN PHOTO, INC., 400 F. Supp. 2d 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)

. . . Moore et al, § 132.02(2)(j)(i) (3d ed.1997) (“No two issues are ever completely identical in every procedural . . .

PACE, v. BOGALUSA CITY SCHOOL BOARD,, 403 F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2005)

. . . Moore, et al„ Moore’s Federal Practice 3d § 132.02[2][h] (3d ed.2001). . . .

COBB v. POZZI, N. Y. J. N. Y. N. Y. N. Y. F., 363 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2003)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice, § 132.02[4][e] (3d ed.1997) (noting that “issue preclusion does . . .

COBB v. POZZI, N. Y. J. N. Y. N. Y. N. Y. F., 352 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2003)

. . . Moore et al, Moore’s Federal Practice, § 132.02[4][e] (3d ed.1997) (noting that “issue preclusion does . . .

COUNTRY ROAD MUSIC, INC. v. COM, INC., 279 F. Supp. 2d 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)

. . . United States, 961 F.2d 245, 257 (D.C.Cir.1992); 18 Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.02[2][d] at 132-26 . . .

. . . (quoting Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.02(2)(d), at 132-26 (3d ed.1998)). . . .

In A. BILZERIAN. A. v. R., 276 B.R. 285 (M.D. Fla. 2002)

. . . Moore's Federal Practice § 132.02[4][a] (3d Ed.2000). . The D.C. . . .

In A. BILZERIAN,, 264 B.R. 726 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001)

. . . Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.02[4][a] (3d Ed.2000). . The D.C. . . .

HICKERSON, Ty A X d b a II, d b a d b a d b a d b a s d b a Pt. d b a s II, s d b a d b a E A E A Ed- d b a N. Y. d b a d b a St. d b a G D d b a d b a O d b a I. S. J J d b a JGJ d b a s II, JHM JUM d b a JVR d b a d b a L T d b a D d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a N. R. S. N. Y. d b a d b a d b a R. E. J. M. d b a d b a s, s d b a LTD, d b a SPH LTD, STS d b a d b a d b a XXX d b a d b a d b a C d b a d b a W. d b a St. W. St. d b a St. d b a d b a d b a d b a TNL d b a d b a s d b a d b a d b a ILDA s II, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, W. B. a a s s, 146 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1998)

. . . Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.02(2)(e), at 132-27 to -28 (3d ed.1998) (in order to render . . . Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 132.02(2)(d), at 132-26 (3d ed.1998); see, e.g., Yamaha Corp . . .

M. K. v., 109 T.C. 235 (T.C. 1997)

. . . Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1306 (1987); 18 Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, par. 132.02, at 132-38 (3d ed. . . .

J. HERBERT v. J. REINSTEIN,, 976 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Pa. 1997)

. . . Id. at § 132.02[2][d]. . . .

UNITED STATES v. N. MOORE L., 37 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 1994)

. . . purchasers Donald and Sheila Rogers, without notice of the outstanding first mortgage, sent their $132.02 . . .

PENNZOIL COMPANY, v. TEXACO, INC., 107 S. Ct. 1519 (U.S. 1987)

. . . Dorsaneo, Texas Litigation Guide § 132.02[1], p. 132-7 (1986). . . . .

PENNZOIL CO. v. TEXACO INC., 481 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1987)

. . . Dorsaneo, Texas Litigation Guide § 132.02[1], p. 132-7 (1986). . . .

SHAYER, v. C. KIRKPATRICK, St. C. Jr. St. M. O H. OVERSCHMIDT, v. C. KIRKPATRICK, MISSOURI STATE CONFERENCE OF BRANCHES OF NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, INC. St. NAACP, St. NAACP, NAACP, NAACP, NAACP, NAACP, NAACP, NAACP, St. NAACP, v. BOND, C. MISSOURI STATE CONFERENCE OF BRANCHES OF NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, INC. NAACP, St. NAACP, NAACP, NAACP, NAACP, NAACP, NAACP, NAACP, Dr. Mr. L. v. BOND, C., 541 F. Supp. 922 (W.D. Mo. 1982)

. . . Census Tract 130.03 5,028 Census Tract 131 3,582 Census Tract 132.01 7,451 1980 POPULATION Census Tract 132.02 . . .

v. v., 64 T.C. 282 (T.C. 1975)

. . . 490.60 2,158.41 33.500 33,493.60 1,532.43 3,020.64 49,000 31 117 076 2,047.50 41.23 11.27 0 10,591.08 132.02 . . .

H. GARDNER, v. CLARK OIL REFINING CORPORATION, a, 383 F. Supp. 151 (E.D. Wis. 1974)

. . . Clark dealer, from continued alleged infringement of Clark’s state trademarks in violation of Section 132.02 . . . complaint alleges a single cause of action for infringement of a trademark created by state law, § 132.02 . . . (3) of the Wisconsin Statutes, and seeks the injunctive remedy expressly provided by § 132.02(3). . . . Section 132.02(3) i>rovides: “ * * * it shall be unlawful for any other person to make use of such * . . .

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY v. BURKE, 255 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1921)

. . . .; Ocean weight rate, 50/, Freight $132.02. . . .