The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XI
COUNTY ORGANIZATION AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Chapter 132
GENERAL REFUNDING LAW

View Entire Chapter

F.S. 132.03

132.03 Interest; maturity; payment; right to redeem in advance.—Such resolution or resolutions shall determine the rate or rates of interest to be paid, not exceeding 7.5 percent per annum, payable annually or at shorter intervals, and the maturity or maturities of the bonds which shall be at a time or times not exceeding 60 years from the date of the bonds (except that in the issuance of bonds of taxing districts where the maturities are fixed under the Constitution, then such maturities shall be in accordance with the maturities fixed in the constitutional provision), as well as determine the medium of payment and the place or places in Florida or any other state at which the principal and interest shall be payable. In the discretion of the governing body the right to redeem all or any of the bonds at par before maturity may be reserved upon terms and conditions to be fixed by resolution.

History.—s. 3, ch. 15772, 1931; CGL 1936 Supp. 2383(3); s. 2, ch. 73-302.

F.S. 132.03 on Google Scholar

F.S. 132.03 on Casetext

Amendments to 132.03

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 132.03

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 132.03.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

JANJUA, v. NEUFELD, USCIS T. USCIS K. U. S. U. S. P. U. S., 933 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 132.03(2)(a) (2018) ("The 'actually litigated' requirement simply . . .

IN RE MOORE- MCKINNEY,, 603 B.R. 855 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2019)

. . . MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 132.03[2][c] (3d ed. 1999)). . . .

DECASTRO, v. CITY OF NEW YORK,, 278 F. Supp. 3d 753 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.03 (3d ed. 2015) (“Issue preclusion generally applies when . . .

M. KHAN v. JOHNSON,, 160 F. Supp. 3d 1199 (C.D. Cal. 2016)

. . . (emphasis added); see also Moore’s Federal Practice — Civil § 132.03[3][e] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.) . . .

BREWER, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,, 105 F. Supp. 3d 74 (D.D.C. 2015)

. . . vitiate the finality required for issue preclu-sive effect’” (quoting 18 Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.03 . . .

AYUDA, INC. v. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,, 70 F. Supp. 3d 247 (D.D.C. 2014)

. . . Lockheed Martin arrived at this estimate by predicting sixty-five hours of labor at $132.03 per hour, . . .

In V. DEMPS, d b a v. V. a k a M. D., 506 B.R. 163 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2014)

. . . Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 132.03[2][c] (3d. ed. 1999)). . . .

BLAKE, v. SECURITAS SECURITY SERVICES, INC., 962 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D.D.C. 2013)

. . . Safety Division” of MPD to hire, deploy, and provide oversight for school security personnel); § 5-132.03 . . .

IN RE E. HILL v. E., 495 B.R. 646 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2013)

. . . Compare and contrast Moore’s § 132.03[2][k][iii][A] with [B]; consider In re Calvert, 105 F.3d 315 (6th . . .

SANDY LAKE BAND OF MISSISSIPPI CHIPPEWA, v. UNITED STATES, 714 F.3d 1098 (8th Cir. 2013)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.03[5][c] (3d ed. 2013) (“[A] second complaint cannot command . . .

HOHU, v. HATCH,, 940 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (N.D. Cal. 2013)

. . . Ed. (2012), § 132.03(4)(k)(iv). See, e.g., Johnson Steel St.-Rail Co. v. . . . Ed. (2012), § 132.03(4)(k)(iv) (“When a case is removed from state to federal court, and then remanded . . .

STEPHEN SLESINGER, INC. v. DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC., 702 F.3d 640 (Fed. Cir. 2012)

. . . the issue was “necessarily implicit in a larger determination,” Moore’s Federal Practice — Civil § 132.03 . . . Solum, Moore’s Federal Practice — Civil § 132.03[3][e] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.) . . .

PRECOURT, v. FAIRBANK RECONSTRUCTION CORP. d b a s, 856 F. Supp. 2d 327 (D.N.H. 2012)

. . . Maine case could] vitiate the finality required for issue preclusive effect.” 18 Moore’s, supra, § 132.03 . . .

In TURNAGE, v., 460 B.R. 341 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011)

. . . MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 132.03[2][c] (3d ed. 1999)). . . .

In PUJDAK Jo s s v. Jo s, 462 B.R. 560 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.03[2][k] (3d ed. 2008); 50 C.J.S. . . .

In LOWERY, Jr. v. Jr., 440 B.R. 914 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2010)

. . . Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 132.03[2][c] (3d. ed. 1999)). . . .

POWER INTEGRATIONS, INC. v. FAIRCHILD SEMICONDUCTOR INTERNATIONAL, INC., 763 F. Supp. 2d 671 (D. Del. 2010)

. . . Moore et. al., Moore's Federal Practice § 132.03(2)(e) (3d ed. 1997). . . . .

GENERAL ELECTRIC MEDICAL SYSTEMS EUROPE, v. PROMETHEUS HEALTH,, 394 F. App'x 280 (6th Cir. 2010)

. . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.03[2][j], at 132-89 (3d ed. 2010) (“Issue preclusion generally . . .

GINTERS v. FRAZIER, H. Jr., 614 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2010)

. . . AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 132.03[5][c] (3d ed.1999)). . . .

WOLFE Co. v. NATIONAL MEDICAL CARE, INC. d b a, 616 F. Supp. 2d 596 (S.D.W. Va. 2009)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.03[2][h][i] (3d ed.2005)). . . .

G. A. v. OF, 131 T.C. 215 (T.C. 2008)

. . . to obtain appellate review * * * does prevent preclusion.” 18 Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, par. 132.03 . . .

ANDREWS, E. H. F. v. B. MODELL,, 636 F. Supp. 2d 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)

. . . Compare 18 James Wm Moore et al, Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.03[4][k][iv] (3d ed. 1999) ("In this . . .

P. SARTIN, Sr. P. Jr. M. G. L. A. T. v. D. MACIK,, 535 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2008)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.03[2][k] (3d ed.2008); 50 C.J.S. . . .

P. SARTIN, Sr. P. Jr. M. G. L. A. T. v. D. MACIK,, 535 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2008)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.03[2][k] (3d ed.2008); 50 C.J.S. . . .

In TULLOCH, P. v., 373 B.R. 370 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007)

. . . Moore’s at § 132.03[2][k][iii][A], Sub judice, summary judgment was entered, and though the Fifth Amendment . . .

In JAYNES,, 377 B.R. 880 (Bank. W.D. Wis. 2007)

. . . litigation, then relitigation of the issue is not precluded.” 18 Moore’s Federal Practice— Civil § 132.03 . . .

DUVALL, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,, 436 F.3d 382 (3d Cir. 2006)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice-Civil § 132.03[e] (3d ed.2001). . . . Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice-Civil § 132.03[e] (3d ed. 2001) ("Issues of fact litigated and . . .

In AHMED, USA PVT v. AHMED,, 359 B.R. 34 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005)

. . . Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.03[4][c] (3rd ed.2005). . . . R & R at 6; Moore, et al., supra, § 132.03[4][c]. 3. . . .

UZDAVINES, v. WEEKS MARINE, INC. U. S., 418 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2005)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.03[2][h][i] (3d ed.2005) (collecting cases). . . .

In KEATY, Sr. A. v. Sr., 397 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2005)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Prao-tiCE § 132.03 (3d ed.1999) (failing to state that a trial or evidentiary . . . MooRE et. al, MooRe’s FedeRal PRACTICE § 132.03 (“Issue preclusion generally applies when the prior determination . . .

In KEATY, Sr. A. v. Sr., 397 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2005)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.03 (3d ed.1999) (failing to state that a trial or evidentiary . . . Moore et. al, Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.03 (“Issue preclusion generally applies when the prior determination . . .

A. BORZYCH, v. J. FRANK, M., 340 F. Supp. 2d 955 (W.D. Wis. 2004)

. . . Cf. 18 Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.03[2][I] (3d ed.2004) (consent judgments do not satisfy the “actually . . .

In RED DOT SCENIC, INC., 313 B.R. 181 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004)

. . . See 18 Moore’s Federal Practice Sd § 132.03[2][d] at 132-82 (quoting Clark v. . . . over in a wink,” such as when a party chooses to present no evidence. 18 Moore’s Federal Practice 3d § 132.03 . . . Id. § 132.03[2][c] at 132-81; see also Wilson v. . . . having been actually litigated, unless the parties intended otherwise. 18 Moore’s Federal Practice 3d § 132.03 . . .

IN RE MICROSOFT CORPORATION ANTITRUST LITIGATION v. v. v. MDL No., 355 F.3d 322 (4th Cir. 2004)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.03[4][b][iv], at 113, § 132.03[4][k][ii], at 123-24 (3d . . .

THEOFEL A H. v. FAREY- JONES A. A H. v. A., 341 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003)

. . . Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 132.03[4][k][vii], at 132-126 (3d ed.1997) (judgment of contempt . . .

THEOFEL A H. v. FAREY- JONES A. A H. v. A., 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2003)

. . . Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 132.03[4][k][vii], at 132-126 (3d ed.1997) (judgment of contempt . . .

GOSPEL MISSIONS OF AMERICA, a II P. J. Jr. D. C. v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES E., 328 F.3d 548 (9th Cir. 2003)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.03[2][c] (3d ed.2001) (“an issue that was not litigated . . .

In WILLIAMS, v., 282 B.R. 267 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002)

. . . Moore et al, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 132.03[2][c] (3d ed.1999). . . .

GOSPEL MISSIONS OF AMERICA, a II P. J. Jr. D. C. v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES E., 298 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2002)

. . . Moore et ah, Moore’s Federal Practice §§ 132.03[2][b]-[c] (3d ed. 2001)(Moore’s), Wright & Miller § 4419 . . .

YALE- NEW HAVEN HOSPITAL, INC. v. G. THOMPSON,, 162 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D. Conn. 2001)

. . . Sheepshead Nursing Home, 784 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir.1986); see also 18 Moore’s Federal Practice Sd § 132.03 . . . , 502 U.S. 1094, 112 S.Ct. 1169, 117 L.Ed.2d 415 (1992); see also 18 Moore’s Federal Practice Sd §§ 132.03 . . . and, as a consequence, is not barred from relitigating those issues. 18 Moore’s Federal Practice 3d § 132.03 . . .

DeLEON, v. LLOYD S LONDON, CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS s M., 259 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2001)

. . . Moore el al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.03[4][c] (3d ed.1998). . See Tex. . . .

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, v. GLAXOSMITHKLINE,, 202 F.R.D. 8 (D.D.C. 2001)

. . . cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Moore’s Federal Practice Sd, § 132.03 . . .

NATIONAL SATELLITE SPORTS, INC. v. ELIADIS, INC. d b a L. P. d b a, 253 F.3d 900 (6th Cir. 2001)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 132.03[4][b] at 132-111 to 132-113 (3d ed. 1997). . . .

MASCO CORPORATION, v. UNITED STATES,, 49 Fed. Cl. 337 (Fed. Cl. 2001)

. . . Moore Et Al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.03[4][b] (3rd ed.2000). . . .

In GREEN, v., 262 B.R. 557 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001)

. . . alternative ground may not be given offensive issue preclusive effect .... ” 18 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 132.03 . . . result, is not conclusive with respect to either issue standing alone. 18 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 132.03 . . .

In FISCHER,, 252 B.R. 603 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice, § 132.03[2][j] (3d ed.1997); Bloomquist v. . . .

LAROUCHE, Jr. v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,, 112 F. Supp. 2d 48 (D.D.C. 2000)

. . . cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Moore’s Federal Practice 3d, § 132.03 . . .

SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION, v. MONARCH FUNDING CORPORATION, M. R. M. O., 192 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 1999)

. . . Moore et al, Moore’s Federal Practice, § 132.03[2][g] (3d ed.1998) (citing Mitchell v. Humana Hosp. . . . . § 132.03[3][d], In light of these principles, we need not address the potentially far reaching issue . . .

MUSIC SALES CORPORATION, v. MORRIS,, 73 F. Supp. 2d 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)

. . . See 18 Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.03[2][a] (3d ed.1999). . . .

POHLMANN, v. BIL- JAX, INC., 176 F.3d 1110 (8th Cir. 1999)

. . . MooRE et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.03[5][c] (3d ed.1999). . . .

LINDSEY, v. PRIVE CORPORATION, CRC DNL YORK, v. PRIVE CORPORATION,, 161 F.3d 886 (5th Cir. 1998)

. . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice 3d, § 132.03[2][I] (“Issues that were only addressed in the trial court . . .

LINDSEY, v. PRIVE CORPORATION, CRC DNL YORK, v. PRIVE CORPORATION,, 161 F.3d 886 (5th Cir. 1998)

. . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice 3d, § 132.03[2][I] (“Issues that were only addressed in the trial court . . .

In RAYTECH CORPORATION, RAYTECH CORPORATION, v. OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS OF RAYTECH CORPORATION Ad, 217 B.R. 679 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 132.03[3][e] at 132-99 (3d ed. 1997) (“An issue that was necessarily . . . include the litigation of a connected issue by implication.” 18 Moore’s Federal Practice, supra, § 132.03 . . . Id., § 132.03[3][e] at 132-99. . . .

LEE, By LEE v. UNITED STATES,, 124 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 1997)

. . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, § 132.03[2][k] (3d ed.1997). . . .

LEE, By LEE v. UNITED STATES,, 124 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 1997)

. . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, § 132.03[2][k] (3d ed.1997). . . .

J. HERBERT v. J. REINSTEIN,, 976 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Pa. 1997)

. . . Id. at § 132.03[2][e] (footnote omitted). This Court specifically found that Mr. . . .

WISCONSIN CENTRAL LIMITED, a d b a CP a d b a CN a v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF WISCONSIN, a L. A. J., 95 F.3d 1359 (7th Cir. 1996)

. . . PSC 132.03(1), shall be applicable to all existing facilities if agreements concerning existing facilities . . . PSC 132.03 Compensation. . . . PSC 132.03(2), s. 196.04(4), Stats., or another method mutually selected by the parties. , . (2) If a . . .

LOCAL NO. OF AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TECHNICAL ENGINEERS AFL v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,, 250 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1957)

. . . 9-15-56 9-15-57 9-15-58 9-15-59 14 $130.13 $134.03 $138.05 $142.85 $147.79 13 120.27 123.88 127.60 132.03 . . .

THE STATE OF FLORIDA, v. THE CITY OF LAKELAND,, 154 Fla. 137 (Fla. 1943)

. . . interest required to be paid by the terms of the original issue, or in excess of that authorized by Sec. 132.03 . . . Section 132.03 Florida Statutes 1941. . . .

J. HUNGERFORD SMITH GRAPE JUICE CO. v. THE UNITED STATES, 63 Ct. Cl. 140 (Ct. Cl. 1927)

. . . On grape juice sold from September 1, 1921, to December 31, 1921, $132.03. . . .