CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 349
...ach, for respondent. OVERTON, Justice. This is a petition to review Sand Key Associates, Ltd., v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund,
458 So.2d 369 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), in which the district court upheld the constitutionality of section
161.051, Florida Statutes (1981), determined that it did not apply to the accreted land of the waterfront property owned by Sand Key Associates, and certified the following question as one of great public importance: Pursuant to section
161.051, Florida Statutes (1981), is the state entitled to accreted land of only the upland owner of the improved property or to the accreted land of all upland littoral owners, whether or not they participated in or contributed to the improvement? Id. at 371. We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution, and approve the district court decision. We answer the question by holding that section *935
161.051 applies to accreted land of an upland owner who caused the accretion and does not apply to an upland owner who did not participate in the improvements which caused the accretions....
...ts beachfront property. The Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund claimed that public beach renourishment, authorized under chapter 161, Florida Statutes, created the accreted lands out of submerged sovereignty lands, and that, pursuant to section 161.051, these accreted lands remain state property....
...accumulation of soil to [Sand Key's] upland was the result of accretion" ; (4) "neither [Sand Key] nor anyone acting on its behalf ... caused or contributed to [the] accretion." (Emphasis added.) The trial court then upheld the constitutionality of section 161.051, and construed it, in accordance with the Trustee's interpretation, to mean that the State of Florida validly holds title to all accretion to the upland, whether proximate or remote, of any person which results from works and/or proje...
...to accretion to the upland of a person who has constructed or installed such a work or project. (Emphasis added.) The trial court concluded by denying Sand Key possession of the accreted land. The district court reversed, holding: To the extent that section 161.051 applies to other upland littoral owners who neither participated in nor contributed to the improvement, the statute is in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed. The presumption is that no change in the common law is intended unless the statute explicitly so states... . Section 161.051 does not explicitly state that it applies to all upland littoral owners. Therefore, construing the statute strictly, we hold that it applies only to the upland owner of the improved property. Section 161.051 does not affect Sand Key's vested right to accretion on its property....
...ich result from natural causes, they are not entitled to accretions or relictions that result only in part from artificial causes. Second, the Trustees assert that, even if prior law granted waterfront owners title to artificially caused accretions, section 161.051 changed the law and established an exception to the right to the accretions....
...ider whether the affected waterfront owner contributed to causing the accretion. We find the Trustees' contentions are without merit. They disregard Florida case law establishing and applying common *936 law riparian and littoral rights, misconstrue section 161.051, and misinterpret Martin v....
...In that case, before determining the waterfront owner was entitled to the accreted land, the district court noted that the owner was not responsible for the placement of wooden groins which caused the accretions. Right to Artificial Accretions under Section 161.051, Florida Statutes (1981) The Trustees' second contention is that, even if the law prior to 1961 awarded waterfront owners title to artificial accretions, the enactment of section 161.051 modified that rule of law to direct that all artificially-caused accretions belong to the state....
...8537, Laws of Fla. (1921). In 1957, this public policy was changed because of concern for the rights of the public in submerged sovereignty lands and these additional statutory riparian and littoral rights were repealed. See ch. 57-362, Laws of Fla. Section 161.051 was enacted in 1965 as part of the chapter entitled "Beach, Shore and Preservation Act," and has as its intent the regulation of construction, reconstruction, and other physical improvements on waterfront properties. The Trustees contend that section 161.051 does not distinguish between owners who caused the accretions through artificial means and owners who benefited from artificial accretions but had no control over the improvements. Section 161.051 provides: 161.051 Coastal construction by persons, firms, corporations, or local authorities....
...While the statute allows the construction of improvements on submerged lands, it was intended to make clear that the original common law would apply to accretions artificially caused by the land owner, and that title to those accumulations would remain in the state. In our view, section 161.051 was intended to codify common law principles and was not intended to deprive unsuspecting waterfront owners of their rights to accretion and reliction caused by artificial improvements for which they were not responsible....
...ty lands in trust for its people. Further, our holding recognizes the principle that waterfront owners cannot claim title to accretions which they have caused. For the reasons expressed, we approve the district court decision and its construction of section 161.051, Florida Statutes....
...EHRLICH, J., dissents with an opinion, in which McDONALD, C.J., concurs. EHRLICH, Justice, dissenting. I dissent. The majority disregards or misunderstands some crucial points established by over half a century of Florida case law, misconstrues the plain language of section 161.051 and grossly misinterprets Martin v....
...he answer to this question is affirmative: the state does not lose title to any of its sovereignty lands under these narrow circumstances. This answer was set forth in Martin v. Busch and is clearly what was intended by the legislature when enacting section 161.051....
...to create a public benefit, would divest the state of its sovereignty lands and grant a private landowner a windfall at the expense of the public. It is exactly this absurd result which the majority embraces. I agree with the majority that, in part, section 161.051 codifies existing common law principles. The applicable common law principle, however, is *947 the rule from Martin v. Busch that under these narrow circumstances the state does not lose title to its sovereignty lands. The majority's construction of section 161.051 is that only the owner on whose property the improvement is located is deprived of the accreted land. To reach the result it desires, the majority adds language to the statute which is clearly not there and which is contrary to both Florida's common law rule of Martin v. Busch and the legislative intent in enacting section 161.051....
...ority opinion to speak of the unsuspecting public who, having paid for an improvement intended to preserve public beaches, will now be deemed to have granted away its ownership rights by its efforts. Such a result is clearly contrary to the statute: section 161.051 explicitly provides that any accretion caused by the improvement shall remain the property of the state....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...Kimpton of Case, Kimpton & Burke, P.A., Clearwater, for appellant. John W. Williams, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Dept. of Natural Resources, Tallahassee, for appellee. RYDER, Chief Judge. We are concerned here with determining the owner of accreted land and the constitutionality of section 161.051, Florida Statutes (1981)....
...The parties agree that the accretion is due to the erection of the jetty and that Sand Key neither participated in nor contributed to the jetty project. The jetty was not constructed on Sand Key's property. Both parties claim ownership of the accreted land. The state bases its claim on section 161.051, Florida Statutes (1981), which provides as follows: Coastal construction by persons, firms, corporations or local authorities....
...ight to all accretion, whether naturally or artificially caused. The trial court entered a partial summary judgment for the state, quieted title to the accreted land in the state, enjoined Sand Key from possessing the disputed property, and declared section 161.051 to be constitutional. The trial court ruled that pursuant to section 161.051 the state holds title to all accretion to the upland owned by any person when the accretion results from works or projects described in the statute....
...applied the common law rule and held that a strip of accreted land became the property of the upland littoral owner even where the accretion was the result of a lawful exercise of police power by a municipality to prevent beach erosion. We expressly did not consider section 161.051 in that case because the erosion project at issue began in 1957 while the statute was not enacted until 1965. Section 161.051 states that any accretions to the upland caused by a work or improvement pursuant to that section shall remain the property of the state. It is unclear whether the legislature intended for section 161.051 to apply only to the upland owner of the improved property or also to the upland littoral owners whose property becomes accreted because of the improvement. To the extent that section 161.051 applies to other upland littoral owners who neither participated in nor contributed to the improvement, the statute is in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed....
...The presumption is that no change in the common law is intended unless the statute explicitly so states. Inference and implication cannot be substituted for clear expression. Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Commission,
354 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1977). Section
161.051 does not explicitly state that it applies to all upland littoral owners. Therefore, construing the statute strictly, we hold that it applies only to the upland owner of the improved property. Section
161.051 does not affect Sand Key's vested right to accretion on its property. We approve the trial court's ruling that section
161.051 is constitutional but reverse the remainder of the order....
...We hold that the disputed five acres of accreted property, all future accretions on the property and all property rights incident thereof belong to Sand Key. The injunction prohibiting Sand Key from possessing its property is dissolved. Recognizing that the intent of section 161.051 is unclear, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance: PURSUANT TO SECTION 161.051, FLORIDA STATUTES (1981), IS THE STATE ENTITLED TO ACCRETED LAND OF ONLY THE UPLAND OWNER OF THE IMPROVED PROPERTY OR TO THE ACCRETED LAND OF ALL UPLAND LITTORAL OWNERS, WHETHER OR NOT THEY PARTICIPATED IN OR CONTRIBUTED TO THE IMPROVEMENT? REVERSED. CAMPBELL, Judge, concurring with opinion in result only. While I concur with the result reached by the majority, I interpret section 161.051 somewhat differently. The statute must be considered in its entirety to apprehend what I perceive to have been the intent of the legislature. The first sentence of section 161.051 operates to vest title to any works or improvements provided for therein in the entity which was permitted to construct such works or improvements....
