CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1989 WL 48101
...ship. During the pendency of this case, the Legislature enacted Chapter 85-55, Laws of Florida, popularly known as the "Growth Management Bill". Section 36 of Chapter 85-55 created the Coastal Zone Protection Act of 1985. The provision designated as section 161.58(2) prohibited vehicular traffic on the beach unless authorized by local authorities and provided for the charging of a toll and the expenditure of toll revenue for "beach maintenance." The parties stipulated to a continuance while the City passed new ordinances enacted with reference to section 161.58....
...vehicle on weekdays *827 and $2.00 per vehicle on weekends, that the City charged an even dollar amount to avoid making change, and that the City charged $2.00 on the weekends because the weekends were busier. The Finance Director acknowledged that section 161.58 had been amended in 1986 but admitted that the City made no adjustments in accounting after the law changed and used the same accounting methods to allocate expenses to the beach toll fund....
...rs in on overtime duty. In its final judgment the trial court concluded that beach toll collection and expenditures were authorized by the City's home rule powers between March of 1968 and October 1985, that the City had violated the 1985 version of section 161.58 by its expenditure of beach toll revenue between October 1, 1985, and July 1, 1986 for purposes other than beach maintenance, and that the City had violated the 1986 version of section 161.58 by expending beach toll revenue for purposes other than beach maintenance and the beach related categories set out in the statute....
...In accordance with these determinations, the court denied relief to the State regarding revenue prior to October 1985 and denied the City's counterclaim for reimbursement of those expenses. The court also ordered the City to repay to the beach toll special fund the amount of $305,832 for its past violations of section 161.58. Both parties have challenged the final judgment. On appeal, the City contends that the trial court erred in interpreting the 1985 and 1986 versions of section 161.58 and in holding that some of the City's expenditures were not permitted under the statute, arguing that the City always had the right, under its home rule powers, to impose reasonable user fees for access to the beach and to use that revenue for the maintenance, operation and improvement of the beach....
...on the weekends *828 and holidays, was unjustified, unreasonable and discriminates between "outsiders" and residents. [4] On cross appeal, the State argues that the City had no authority to impose a toll prior to October 1985, the effective date of section 161.58, and accordingly all of the toll money should be returned to the public....
...There the state had contended that local governmental entities have no constitutional or statutory authority to regulate motor vehicle access to the beaches or to charge a motor vehicle access fee. In its opinion, the supreme court noted that the Legislature had addressed that issue by enacting 161.58....
...ble fee for the use of the beach within its municipal boundaries from 1968 *829 until October 1, 1985, the effective date of the Act. The Coastal Zone Protection Act, as its name implies, was enacted to control growth in our sensitive coastal areas. Section 161.58 originally provided for the regulation of vehicular traffic on coastal beaches as follows: (2) Vehicular traffic, except that which is necessary for cleanup, repair, or public safety, or for the purpose of maintaining existing authorized public access ways, is prohibited on coastal beaches....
...ave to shoulder the economic burden of the increased costs for law enforcement, life guards, emergency services and liability insurance. There is nothing in the Act to indicate that this outcome was intended. Moreover, the quick response in amending section 161.58 suggests that the Legislature recognized that the term "beach maintenance" could be construed in a limited manner and so more definitive legislation was enacted clearly setting forth specific categories of beach related expenditures. We therefore conclude that the 1986 amendment to section 161.58 was enacted to simply clarify the existing authority by explicitly setting forth specific categories of permissible expenditures from the beach toll revenue fund....
...ason than the amount of revenue generated. This belief does not appear unreasonable. We further conclude that it is reasonable for the City to have a surplus as long as the funds remain in the beach toll fund and are used for the purposes set out in section 161.58....
...mination that differing tolls rose to the level of "unreasonableness" was error. In conclusion, we reverse the portion of the final judgment determining that the toll was unreasonable and that the City had expended beach toll revenue in violation of section 161.58. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. On remand, the trial court should review the expenditures of beach toll revenue by the City, keeping in mind the purpose of section 161.58....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 8619, 1991 WL 173033
...on the beaches within the exclusive jurisdiction of appellee, Nassau County. Appellants now argue, as they did in the circuit court, that Nassau County Ordinance 89-23 purporting to allow beach vehicular traffic is invalid because it conflicts with section 161.58, Florida Statutes (1989), which prohibits such traffic....
...We must therefore reverse in part and remand the cause to permit amendment of the final judgment in accordance with this opinion. The origins of this controversy can be traced to 1985 when the legislature severely restricted vehicular traffic on Florida beaches with the passage of section 161.58, F.S. As amended in 1988, section 161.58 prohibited beach traffic except to the extent such traffic was authorized by a three-fifths vote of the local governing body....
...The statute thus tied local government’s ability to authorize traffic to local need for additional off-beach parking. Parking demand and availability was to be determined according to rules promulgated by the Department of Natural Resources (DNR). See § 161.58, Fla.Stat. (1989). The Nassau County Commission met on June 1, 1989, with representatives of appellants in attendance. Commission members expressed fears that under the newly promulgated DNR rules implementing section 161.58, Nassau County would not have the requisite shortage of parking to enable the Commission to authorize vehicular traffic on County beaches....
...fic-path indicators. Section 3. A motorized tram system is hereby authorized on the Atlantic Ocean beaches within the jurisdiction of Nassau County. Ch. 89-445, Laws of Fla. (e.s.) Despite the passage of SB 1577, the Commission remained fearful that section 161.58 would have the effect of prohibiting beach vehicular traffic unless the County passed an ordinance authorizing such traffic as required under the terms of section 161.58. Consequently, on September 12, 1989, the Commission passed Nassau County Ordinance 89-23, which included the requisite finding that availability of off-beach parking was less than 50 percent of peak user demand. This finding, mandated by section 161.58, made it possible for the County to authorize beach traffic, as was done in the following provision of the ordinance: Commencing March 1, 1990, the county beach areas available to vehicular traffic shall be set forth in the Special Act referred to as Senate Bill 1577....
...When unrestricted driving continued after March 1, 1990, appellants filed a complaint for declaratory relief asking that beach traffic be deemed prohibited and that the ordinance be declared invalid for failing to make proper findings concerning parking need and availability, which findings were required by section 161.58 and the DNR rules that implement the statute....
...d availability, was properly rejected by the trial court. Without recounting the trial court’s detailed findings on this subject, we hold that there was sufficient evidence demonstrating that the ordinance applied the proper formula as required by section 161.58 and the applicable DNR rules....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...LLC; David King; Arthur Czyszczon; and Kevin McInerney (collectively, the Hoteliers).
The dispute centers on claims by the Hoteliers that the City allows and hosts driving and
parking on Treasure Island Beach in connection with festivals and public events in
violation of section 161.58(2), Florida Statutes (2014), which prohibits "[v]ehicular traffic"
on "coastal beaches" in Florida. The trial court agreed with the Hoteliers, declared that
the "City's activities of hosting and allowing vehicular parking and driving on Treasure
Island Beach" violate section 161.58(2), and permanently enjoined the City from hosting
or allowing any parking and driving on Treasure Island Beach.
As we explain below, we find no error in the trial court's decision that the
manner in which the City hosts public parking at the events that are the subject of the
Hoteliers' complaint involves vehicular traffic on a coastal beach and is therefore
prohibited by section 161.58(2)....
...See Treasure Island, Fla., Code of Ordinances of the City of Treasure Island, Fla. ch.
58, art. II, § 58.38(4) (1985).
Believing that driving and parking on the beach in connection with these
events violates state law—including section 161.58(2)'s prohibition of vehicular traffic on
coastal beaches—the Hoteliers sued the City in circuit court....
...Their amended complaint
asserted three counts: Count I sought an injunction to prohibit the driving and parking
on the beach and to require the City to strike that provision of its ordinance allowing it;
Count II sought a judgment declaring that the driving and parking on the beach violates
section 161.58(2); and Count III sought a judgment declaring that the City had violated a
decree in earlier, related litigation between the City and the Treasure Island Motel
Association.
The issues the City raises on appeal were de...
...The bottom line is that the Hoteliers voluntarily dismissed Count III, and the
parties proceeded to a decision on Counts I and II based on undisputed facts. The
Hoteliers argued that the beach parking and driving involved in the civic events on
Treasure Island Beach violate section 161.58(2) because (1) the events occur on
coastal beaches within the meaning of the statute and (2) the movement and parking at
those events constitutes vehicular traffic that is prohibited within the meaning of the
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statute. The City disputed both points, arguing that (1) the portion of Treasure Island
Beach on which its events are held is not a "coastal beach" under section 161.58
because it is not technically a "beach" as that term is defined within chapter 161 and
that even if it is a coastal beach, (2) the statute's term "[v]ehicular traffic" contemplates
the movement of vehicles as though it were occurrin...
...City's motions for summary judgment and
granted the Hoteliers' motions. It entered a judgment that declared "that the City's
activities of hosting and allowing vehicular parking and driving on Treasure Island
Beach are in violation of Fla. Stat. § 161.58" and that the City Ordinance "is null and
void to the extent that it conflicts with Fla. Stat. § 161.58 and purports to allow vehicular
parking and driving on Treasure Island Beach." Based on its summary judgment
determination that the City's activities violate section 161.58, the trial court's judgment
further permanently enjoined the City "from hosting or allowing vehicular parking and
driving on Treasure Island Beach." The City timely appealed.
The Issues On Appeal
There is one significant argument that the City raised in the trial court that
it has not raised on appeal—that the events at issue do not occur on a "coastal beach"
within the meaning of section 161.58(2)....
...statute and, further, that the relief the trial court ordered is overbroad. We address
those issues below.1
Beach And Shore Regulation And The Activities The City Hosts
Understanding the City's arguments requires understanding the statutory
context in which section 161.58 resides—chapter 161, which governs beach and shore
preservation—and how the activities involved in this case relate to it....
...beaches and coastal barrier dunes from imprudent construction. §
161.053(1)(a).
1
We reject without comment the City's remaining appellate arguments. In
addition, we note that the Hoteliers did not plead a violation of section
161.58(1)
concerning vehicular traffic on the dunes and native stabilizing vegetation of the dune
system of coastal beaches in their complaint....
...It also provides for enforcement of those
minimum standards and requires sellers of coastal properties subject to part III to make
disclosure to buyers of the regulations governing them. See §§
161.56(2), .57.
Part III also contains the provision at issue here—section
161.58....
...hicular Traffic; The Movement Of
Vehicles Incident To City-Operated Public Parking Areas Does
The final judgment invalidates and prohibits any "vehicular parking and
driving" on Treasure Island Beach, except as authorized by section 161.58....
...That
implies a definition of "vehicular traffic" that reaches any movement of vehicles across
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Treasure Island Beach. The City, however, contends that the term "[v]ehicular traffic"
as used in section 161.58 refers only to "Daytona Beach-style driving" and that the
City's events and the associated public parking do not involve that kind of activity.2 The
City does not define its term "Daytona Beach-style driving," but its argument implie...
...reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation. See License Acquisitions, LLC
v. Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC,
155 So. 3d 1137, 1146 (Fla. 2014).
We begin by noting that the term "[v]ehicular traffic" is not statutorily
defined and that nothing in section
161.58 or the related statutes indicates that it carries
particular, specialized meaning....
...Here we are talking about cars and trucks, and
everyone in this case agrees that those are types of vehicles. The interpretive problem
we must address hinges on the word "traffic."
Sources that convey the ordinary meaning of the term "traffic" support
both the notion that as used in section 161.58, traffic involves any movement of vehicles
in an area and the notion that traffic means the movement of vehicles as along a street
or highway....
...that is open to public use").3
In terms of ordinary meaning, then, the term "vehicular traffic" could
reasonably be understood to mean any movement of vehicles or the movement of
vehicles as along a public thoroughfare. Both meanings are facially consistent with the
purpose of section 161.58 conveyed by its text—the protection of the beach, dunes, and
stabilizing vegetation from harm caused by vehicles—and nothing in that text indicates
which meaning was the one adopted by the legislature....
...cular traffic denotes the movement of vehicles
as though it were happening along a public street or highway. We reach that conclusion
because the alternative—the interpretation that vehicular traffic reaches any movement
of vehicles—would put section 161.58's regulation of vehicular traffic on coastal
beaches in substantial conflict with the authority granted the department in part I to
authorize by permit construction and other activity on those same beaches.
As we have...
...Thus, if the City
wants to host a carnival on Treasure Island Beach, it must apply for a permit authorizing
those activities and any construction they involve, and the department enjoys the
statutory authority to grant that permit if it makes the required determinations.
Section
161.58 was enacted years after part I as one section of part III
and operates, among other things, as a limit on the department's permitting authority.
Whatever construction and activities the department might be authorized to permit
seaward of the coastal construction control line in part I, it cannot permit vehicular traffic
on the dunes and native stabilizing vegetation of coastal beaches or the coastal
beaches themselves because section
161.58 bans those activities subject to a handful
of exceptions. Because the legislature did not include "as permitted by the department"
as an exception to section
161.58's prohibitions on vehicular traffic on the beaches and
dunes, we must conclude that the statute contains no such exception. See Hayes v.
State,
750 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1999) ("We are not at liberty to add words to statutes that
were not placed there by the [l]egislature.").
Interpreting section
161.58's prohibitions on vehicular traffic to reach any
movement of vehicles on the dunes or beach, however, would effectively repeal much
of the statutory authority granted to the department in part I to permit construction and
other activities seaward of the coastal construction control line....
...include the power to allow vehicles to move onto that area of the beach for purposes of
carrying tents and rides, moving equipment, providing concessions, and all other things
that go into hosting a carnival. If the term "[v]ehicular traffic" in section 161.58 reaches
any movement of vehicles, however, the department's authority to permit construction
seaward of the control line will be substantially eliminated.
Established principles of statutory construction counsel strongly against
that result....
...of Trs.
of City Pension Fund for Firefighters & Police Officers in City of Tampa,
580 So. 2d 151,
153 (Fla. 1991).
Here, we are presented with two enactments related to the same subject
matter—the protection of Florida's coastal areas. Some conflict between the two may
be inevitable because section
161.58 prohibits vehicular traffic on coastal beaches and
the dunes and native stabilizing vegetation regardless of how far the department's
coastal construction permitting authority might reach....
...But construing the term "vehicular
traffic" to mean the movement of vehicles as along a public road or highway, as
opposed to merely any movement of vehicles, is both consistent with the ordinary
meaning of the term "traffic" and limits the conflict between part I and section 161.58 to
a minimum. It gives meaningful effect to both statutes and allows both to exist
harmoniously to the maximum extent possible consistent with the ordinary meaning of
the term "vehicular traffic."
This interpretation also makes sense of section 161.58 within the overall
context of part III of chapter 161....
...2d DCA 1995) ("A statute should be construed in its
entirety and within the context provided by the related statutes within the same act.").
- 16 -
Part III establishes minimum standards for certain coastal construction and provides
that nothing in those standards—including section 161.58's prohibition on vehicular
traffic—provides for the department to continue to issue coastal construction control line
permits on terms as or more restrictive than those minimum standards....
...Thus, the Act
allows construction seaward of the coastal construction line, and it preserves the
department's permitting authority under part I so long as it is exercised in a manner
consistent with the minimum standards the act establishes. When it passed section
161.58, therefore, the legislature was aware that coastal construction would continue
and that the department would retain its permitting authority....
...Instead, vehicular traffic should be
understood as referring to the movement of vehicles as along a public street or
highway.
Applying that understanding, the trial court erred in declaring that any
"vehicular parking and driving" on Treasure Island Beach violates section 161.58, in
declaring that the City's ordinance governing driving and parking on the beach is invalid,
and in enjoining any parking or driving on the beach....
...That activity does involve the use of a portion of beach as
though it were a public street—members of the public drive across it for purposes of
getting from point A to point B on the beach—and thus does involve vehicular traffic.
The City argues that section 161.58 was intended only to reach "Daytona
Beach-style driving," a characterization it says does not apply to cars driving over
access paths to use parking areas. Limiting the scope of vehicular traffic to Daytona
Beach-style driving is not a reasonable construction of section 161.58....
...There are a
number of atypical aspects to Daytona Beach-style driving—for example, the large
number of cars, the regularity of the use of the beach as a roadway, the existence of
established lanes of traffic, and routinized enforcement. Yet, there is nothing in the text
of section 161.58, the ordinary meaning of the term "vehicular traffic," or the context of
the Coastal Zone Protection Act to support the notion that the vehicular traffic prohibited
by the statute exists only when one or more of the conditions descriptive of Daytona
- 18 -
Beach-style driving exists. On the contrary, the purpose that the text of the section
161.58 quite plainly evinces (a purpose to avoid harm to dunes and beaches as a
consequence of vehicles being driven over them) implies that we should not narrow the
scope of its term "[v]ehicular traffic" from the scope that its ordinary meaning (the
movement of vehicles as though the beach or a portion of it was a public street)
establishes.4
Additionally, when read in the context of section 161.58 as a whole, as we
must when interpreting a statute, the City's proposed limitation on the scope of the term
"[v]ehicular traffic" does not make sense....
...between its parts.' " (quoting Lamar Outdoor Advert.-Lakeland v. Dep't of Transp., 17
4
The City argues that the legislature must have meant vehicular traffic to
mean "Daytona Beach-style driving" because a supreme court decision shortly before
section 161.58 was adopted described Daytona Beach-style driving using the term
"vehicular traffic." But the context there—a tort claim against the City of Daytona Beach
by an injured sunbather—was so different that it would be speculation to say...
..., it was not
readily apparent to sunbathers . . . that this lethal mixture of cars and reclining persons
was inadequately supervised."). The City also points to a staff analysis underlying the
Coastal Zone Protection Act that noted in one place that section 161.58 sought a
"tightening of criteria allowing driving on the beach" and in another that beach driving
was allowed in certain northeast Florida counties....
...3d 799, 802 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009))). The statute both prohibits vehicular traffic on
coastal beaches and dunes and native stabilizing vegetation and subjects to
prosecution for a second-degree misdemeanor "any person driving any vehicle on, over,
or across" them. § 161.58(1), (2), (3)....
...Try as we might, for example, we cannot conceive of what
a jury would have to find to convict a defendant of Daytona Beach-style driving.
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For these reasons, limiting the reach of section 161.58 to Daytona Beach-
style driving is not a reasonable construction of the statute.5 As used in that statute,
"[v]ehicular traffic" means the movement of vehicles as along a public street or highway.
The Injunction Is Overbroad In Other Respects
In addition to prohibiting the movement and parking of vehicles that does
not constitute vehicular traffic within the meaning of section 161.58, the final judgment's
categorical ban on hosting or allowing any vehicular driving and parking on the beach
reaches potential activity (or, in the case of "allowing," mere inactivity) that is unrelated
to the civic events that are the subject of this litigation and that may well be legal....
...particular circumstances."); see also Brower v. Hubbard,
643 So. 2d 28, 30 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1994) ("Injunctions must be specifically tailored to each case; they should not
5
Accordingly, we reject the City's argument that because section
161.58
contains penal provisions, the rule of lenity requires that it be construed in its favor....
...We find no error in the trial court's determination that the City's actions in
hosting vehicular traffic across the beach for purposes of reaching the parking areas
associated with the civic events on the central beach area of Treasure Island Beach
violate section 161.58(2).6 The trial court went too far, however, to the extent it
declared any additional conduct illegal, declared the City's ordinance invalid, and
enjoined the City from "hosting or allowing" any "vehicular parking and driving on
Trea...
...art; remanded.
KELLY and WALLACE, JJ., Concur.
6
We have not considered whether there is any way in which the City could
host parking on the beach in a manner that would not involve vehicular traffic in violation
of section 161.58....
