Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...orum. When a municipality initiates annexation, subsections (1) and (2) of section 171.0413 provide for a referendum to enable the electors of the annexing municipality and of the area proposed to be annexed to vote on the annexation issue. Further, section 171.081 provides for limited judicial review of the annexation process....

...tition for certiorari filed by Seminole County to review Casselberry's voluntary annexation. It is so ordered. BOYD, SUNDBERG, HATCHETT and KARL, JJ., concur. ADKINS, Acting C.J., concurs in result only. NOTES [1] Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. [2] § 171.081, Fla....

...§ 120.31 provided for judicial review under the 1961 administrative procedure act, which was repealed in its entirety by the 1974 enactment. The fact that § 120.31 has been repealed, however, does not render its provisions ineffective for the purposes of § 171.081....

...means by which a municipality may accomplish an annexation on its own, it is apparent that the legislature intended to provide a clearly defined and exclusive method by which an annexation could be accomplished. The legislature has also set forth in Section 171.081 [3] the method by which judicial review of any annexation by ordinance may be sought. Again, reading Section 171.081 in pari materia with the foregoing sections on preemption and the purposes of the act, it is apparent that the legislature has manifested its intent that there be a sole and exclusive procedure for challenging a municipal government's failure to comply with Chapter 171, Florida Statutes....

...ed area of Leon County. Certainly, an exclusive franchise right is a property right, see 36 Am.Jur.2d Franchises § 5 (1968), and this right exists in the unincorporated area. Thus, appellant is a "party affected" and meets the first criterion under Section 171.081....

...failure to plan for garbage services in the areas to be annexed, and that its exclusive franchise rights may be harmed by the annexation. This satisfies the second criterion, but appellant's efforts falter as to the third and fourth requirements of Section 171.081....

...djusting the boundaries of municipalities in this state. (2) The provisions of any special act or municipal charter relating to the adjusting of municipal boundaries in effect on October 1, 1974, are repealed except as otherwise provided herein. [3] Section 171.081, Florida Statutes, states: Appeal on annexation or contraction....

...Coffin, Stuart, for respondent. EN BANC KLEIN, J. After the City of Stuart adopted annexation ordinances to voluntarily annex twenty-nine parcels, Martin County filed petitions for writs of certiorari to seek review in the circuit court pursuant to section 171.081, Florida Statute (1997)....

...in violation of the compactness requirement. See definition of "compactness" in section 171.031(12) set forth above. Finally, we believe the circuit court correctly found that Broward County had standing to seek review of the ordinance in question. Section 171.081, Florida Statutes (1983), authorizes any "party affected" who believes he will suffer material injury by reason of the failure of the city to comply with the statutory procedure for annexation to seek certiorari review of the proposed ordinance....

...n over such area." Furthermore, Broward County's allegation that it believes it will suffer a material injury through the loss of tax revenue caused by the annexation of that portion of unincorporated Broward County satisfies the second criterion of section 171.081....

...City of Groveland in violation of chapter 171, struck Hart's motion to determine reasonable attorney's fees and costs. We grant the writ. The record establishes that in November 2003, Hart filed a verified petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to section 171.081, Florida Statutes (2003), challenging four annexation ordinances. He also sought an award of costs and attorney's fees, as provided by section 171.081....

...The court conducted a hearing on the motion, issued an order granting Hart's motion for enlargement of time because of excusable neglect and lack of prejudice to the City. However, it denied Hart's motion for rehearing on the merits. We grant the writ. I. AWARD OF FEES PURSUANT TO SECTION 171.081, FLORIDA STATUTES Section 171.081 provides for review by means of certiorari of a city's action taken to annex or contract its boundaries by ordinances: No later than 30 days following the passage of an annexation or contraction ordinance, any party affected who belie...

...Petition for Writ of Certiorari GRANTED; Order Striking Motion for Attorney's fees and Costs QUASHED. PLEUS, C.J., and ORFINGER, J., concur. NOTES [1] The final judgment provided: Respondent, City of Groveland, shall pay Petitioner Lewis Frank Hart, his reasonable costs and attorney's fees as provided by Section 171.081 of the Fla....

...This Court, in recognition of Levler's [sic] justiciable interest in this cause and in the interest of judicial *343 economy, permitted Leffler's intervention. The circuit court asserted jurisdiction to review the validity of the annexation ordinance under section 171.081. The County timely petitioned for certiorari review of the circuit court's decision. Circuit courts review annexation ordinances by certiorari under section 171.081....

...City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624 (Fla. 1982). There being no procedural due process issue raised here, our sole inquiry is whether the trial judge applied the correct principles of law. We hold that he did, and deny the City's petition. Section 171.081, Florida Statutes (1985), provides that any party affected who believes that he will suffer material injury by reason of the failure of a municipality to meet the requirements established for annexation as they apply to his property m...

...t under that section to be a de novo trial rather than an appellate review. Appellees point out that even when the Legislature has specifically provided for review by certiorari, it has referred to the review as an "action" in the very same section. § 171.081, Fla....

...y line is a county road. Therefore, Plaintiff's property is almost totally encapsulated by the proposed annexation and they are residing within the area to be annexed. This construction of section 171.031 is plainly erroneous. In annexation matters, section 171.081, Florida Statutes (1995), provides for certiorari review by the circuit court: Appeal on annexation or contraction....

...duty required by the comprehensive plan where it is clear, as here, that the City is not complying with its own plan." As the City points out, however, challenges to a municipality's annexation of property must be conducted by certiorari pursuant to section 171.081, Florida Statutes....

...ality is accomplished by passage of a municipal ordinance utilizing the procedures set forth in Chapter 171. 418 So.2d at 1149-50 (citations omitted). The court further explained that a challenge to an annexation ordinance focuses on chapter 171 and section 171.081 provides the only way by which to challenge a municipality's failure to comply with chapter 171: Because the challenged annexations at bar were accomplished by several ordinances, any assault upon those ordinances focuses upon Chapter 171....

...means by which a municipality may accomplish an annexation on its own, it is apparent that the legislature intended to provide a clearly defined and exclusive method by which an annexation could be accomplished. The legislature has also set forth in Section 171.081 the method by which judicial review of any annexation by ordinance must be sought. Again, reading Section 171.081 in pari materia with the foregoing sections on preemption and the purposes of the act, it is apparent that the legislature has manifested its intent that there be a sole and exclusive procedure for challenging a municipal government's failure to comply with Chapter 171, Florida Statutes....

...ation ordinance, and (4) seek review by certiorari in circuit court. SCA Servs., 418 So.2d at 1150 (citations and footnotes omitted). Because the Kovachs are challenging the City's annexation ordinance, any such challenge must be brought pursuant to section 171.081....

...rs, to afford them the opportunity to utilize the 30-day procedure set forth in section 163.3215."). In contrast, the Kovachs have made no such allegation in this case and, indeed, they have timely pursued the exclusive certiorari remedy provided in section 171.081. Finally, that the Kovachs do not have standing pursuant to section 171.081 does not mean that mandamus is appropriate....

...ted by competent substantial evidence because [their] own expert did not know what a pocket was for the purposes of annexation. The City and SCC seek certiorari review of this determination. Circuit courts review annexation ordinances by certiorari. § 171.081, Fla....

...f compactness or contiguity, not separation or segregation. We therefore grant the petition for certiorari and quash the order of the circuit court. Petition GRANTED; Order QUASHED. DANIEL, J. and EVANS, V.W., Jr., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] § 171.081, Fla....

...Despite the objections of Seminole County, also an appellee, that the described property could not be annexed because the property was not "reasonably compact" as required by section 171.044, the City of Lake Mary passed an ordinance annexing the property. Pursuant to section 171.081, Florida Statutes (1977), [2] the County petitioned the circuit court for a writ of certiorari quashing the annexation ordinance....

...Finding that the annexation was not reasonably compact because it created at least two enclaves, [3] the circuit court declared the ordinance invalid. Appellants contend that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review this matter by certiorari. They claim section 171.081 is unconstitutional because it conflicts with Article V, Section 5 of the Florida Constitution as adopted March 14, 1972....

...tutory certiorari or writ of quo warranto, is subject to waiver if not timely raised. [6] Since no objection was raised below, we will not consider it on appeal. We think the City's argument based on the terms "appeal" and "certiorari" is misplaced. Section 171.081 shows affirmatively that the Legislature intended to create by general law a limited right of appeal to the circuit court in annexation proceedings....

...The Legislature also intended to limit the scope of review in these proceedings to that normally associated with "certiorari." [7] The use of the term "certiorari" in the statute is merely a shorthand means of articulating the standard of review intended to be afforded. In support of this interpretation we note the title of section 171.081 reads: "Appeal on Annexation or Contraction." If the Legislature has the power to create a right of appeal in the circuit court for a proceeding where none previously existed, it is incongruous to assert that it cannot limit the scope of that review....

...rt for the county in which the municipality or municipalities are located seeking review by certiorari. In any action instituted pursuant to this section, the complainant, should he prevail, shall be entitled to reasonable costs and attorney's fees. § 171.081, Fla....

...fected who believes that he or she will suffer material injury by reason of the failure of the municipal governing body to comply with the procedures set forth in this chapter for annexation ... may file a petition ... seeking review by certiorari." § 171.081, Fla....

...Since Auburndale's annexation of the subject property does not disrupt Polk City's ability to provide water and wastewater services to that property, Polk City, as a matter of law, is not affected by the annexation. Because the annexation does not "affect" Polk City as required by section 171.081, Polk City did not have standing to bring a petition for certiorari challenging Auburndale's adoption of the annexation ordinance....

...Massey of Brock, Massey, Walden & Baum, Altamonte Springs, for respondent. ON MOTION TO DISMISS DOWNEY, Judge. Seminole County has filed a petition for writ of certiorari to review an ordinance of the City of Lake Mary annexing certain property. Petitioner asserts that the petition is filed "pursuant to Sections 171.081, 120.31 and 120.68, Florida Statutes, as amended... ." The City of Lake Mary has moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that jurisdiction to review annexation ordinances is in the Circuit Court pursuant to Section 171.081, Florida Statutes (1975). Unfortunately, Section 171.081 is no model of legislative draftsmanship; its operative terms are in conflict. The section provides: "171.081 Appeal on annexation or contraction....

...ects that review take place pursuant to Section 120.31. The latter section provides that review of final actions of administrative agencies be by the district court of appeal. See Section 120.31, Florida Statutes (1973). Obviously the latter part of Section 171.081 contradicts the first part....

...0, Laws of Florida). In re-enacting a new Administrative Procedure Act, the Legislature provided for review of final agency action in the district court of appeal. This might appear to replace Section 120.31. However, the Legislature has not amended Section 171.081 by replacing "s....

voluntary annexation appeal a denial pursuant to section 171.081, Florida Statutes? Question One Chapter 171

...The Trust filed suit in circuit court seeking relief from the annexation ordinance and that order is now before us for review. The City argues that the Trust lacks standing to challenge the annexation at issue, in that it is not a “party affected” within the meaning of section 171.081, Florida Statutes (1999)....

...ea, it owns property within the annexed area. Thus, the first issue on appeal is whether the ownership of property with riparian rights in a lake which is the subject of annexation qualifies the owner as an “affected party” within the meaning of section 171.081, Florida Statutes (1999)....

...a Statutes (1999), is also misplaced, for that chapter relates to State-owned lands and the definition is restricted to “land bordering upon navigable waters.” Nevertheless, we find that the better view of “riparian rights” in the context of section 171.081 is that it is not proprietary in nature, but rather a right which inures to the benefit of the riparian owner....

...Freeman, 939 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (granting prohibition where the circuit court sitting in its appellate capacity improperly exercised jurisdiction because no timely notice of appeal had been filed from a money judgment in the county court). Section 171.081, Florida Statutes (2017), sets forth the procedure for challenging a municipal annexation. (1) Any party affected who believes that he or she will suffer material injury by reason of the failure of the municipal...

...2d 35, 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), the court held that a prior version of this statute allowed a petition challenging an annexation ordinance to be filed thirty days from the passage of the ordinance, not the voter referendum. “The thirty day time limitation of section 171.081 is designed for the purpose of allowing any complaint challenging the procedures leading to passage of an annexation ordinance to be brought to the attention of a municipality prior to the expense of a referendum.” Id. at 36-37 (emphasis added). Furthermore, as also noted in SCA, “the limited judicial review envisioned 2 by Section 171.081 neatly interacts with Section 171.0413(2)(a), Fla....

...Despite the objections, the City passed the ordinance. The Matlacha petitioners and the Cape Coral petitioners filed a three- count action in the circuit court to challenge the annexation. At issue here is the first count which sought certiorari review of the ordinance pursuant to section 171.081(1). -2- The petitioners challenged the ordinance on three fronts: (1) Cape Coral's use of voluntary annexation was not permitted under the plain language of the annexation statute; (...

...Edgewater Beach Owners Ass'n v. Walton County, 833 So. 2d 215, 219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), receded -3- from on other grounds, Bay Point Club, Inc. v. Bay County, 890 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Section 171.081(1) provides for review of an annexation or contraction and states, in pertinent part: Any party affected who believes that he or she will suffer material injury by reason of the failure of the municipal...

...y or any governmental unit with jurisdiction over such area." The trial court found, and the City concedes, that the Cape Coral petitioners are "parties affected" as defined by section 171.031(5). The City argued that standing under section 171.081(1) required more than being a "party affected." Not only must the petitioner be a "party affected," the petitioner must demonstrate he or she has suffered a present "material injury" as a direct result of the annexation....

...The trial court dismissed the petition after concluding the Cape Coral residents had not alleged they had suffered a present material injury. The petitioners argue that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by failing to abide by the plain language of section 171.081(1), the result of which was to deprive them of their statutory right to seek review of the annexation. We agree. -4-  Section 171.081(1) authorizes any "party affected who believes that he or she will suffer material injury by reason of the failure" of a municipality to comply with the statutory procedure for annexation to seek certiorari review of the annexation. (Emphasis added)....

...and annexation of the parcels. They fault the trial court for failing to even address this issue and argue that by failing to address the issue, it deprived them of their common law right of certiorari. The City contends, among other things, that section 171.081 is the exclusive means to challenge an annexation. We need not decide whether common law certiorari is available to the Matlacha petitioners and consequently whether the trial court deprived them of the right to proceed under a common law writ because we conclude that the issue was not properly before the trial court. The certiorari petition before the trial court alleges that it was brought pursuant to section 171.081(1). The petitioners reaffirmed that they were proceeding under the statute in their claim for attorney's fees pursuant to section 171.081(2), which entitles a party challenging an annexation under section 171.081(1) to recover fees....

...that they had standing based on what they argued was the City's unconstitutional application of the annexation statute, the only fair reading of the record is that they wanted to proceed -6- under section 171.081....

...Under these circumstances, we find no departure from the essential requirements of law in the trial court's reliance on the definition of "parties affected" in section 171.031(5) to determine whether the Matlacha petitioners had standing to proceed under section 171.081(1). Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari and quash that portion of the circuit court's order finding that the Cape Coral petitioners did not have standing to challenge the City's annexation ordina...

...McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 7.42 (3d ed. 1966). No error appears in the trial court’s application of estoppel principles to the facts in this case. No question was raised in this case concerning the propriety of plaintiffs’ choice of remedy in the circuit court. See § 171.081, Fla.Stat....

...ur discretionary certiorari jurisdiction. CERTIORARI DENIED. GRIFFIN and LAWSON, JJ., concur. EVANDER, J., dissents, with opinion. EVANDER, J., dissenting. I respectfully dissent. Circuit courts review annexation ordinances by certiorari pursuant to section 171.081, Florida Statutes....

...annexation was void ab initio. The City responded by filing a motion to dismiss, contending that SCA was required to challenge the annexation within thirty days following the passage of the annexation ordinance by the City Commission as required by Section 171.081, Fla....

...otion to dismiss on the basis that the complaint had not been filed within thirty days following the passage of the annexation ordinance by the City Commission. On March 27, 1980, appellant Timberlane Shops on the Square filed a petition pursuant to Section 171.081, requesting the lower court to declare the annexation null and void. The City moved to dismiss Timber-lane Shops’ complaint on the ground that it was untimely under Section 171.081. On June 24, 1980, the trial court granted the City’s motion to dismiss. On October 16,1980, this court consolidated these two cases for appeal. Appellants contend that the lower courts erred in dismissing the complaints for untimeliness under Section 171.081. Section 171.081 provides: No later than 30 days following the passage of an annexation or contraction ordinance, any party affected who believes that he will suffer material injury by reason of the failure of the municipal governing body to comply wi...

...l annexation requirements of Chapter 171 begins to run from the date of the referendum approving the annexation rather than from the date of the passage of the annexation ordinance by the City Commission. The lower courts are correct in holding that Section 171.081 allows thirty days from the date on which the municipal governing body passes the annexation ordinance for an affected party to challenge compliance with annexation procedures. The purpose of Chapter 171 is to provide a uniform method of effecting annexation by municipality. Section 171.021, Fla.Stat. (1979); Section 171.0413(4), Fla.Stat. (1979). Section 171.081 is designed to afford “any party affected who believes that he will suffer material injury” by failure of the municipal governing body to comply with the annexation requirements of Chapter 171 to seek review in the Circuit Court....

...(1979), defines “parties affected” as “any persons or firms owning property in, or residing in, either a municipality proposing annexation or contraction or owning property that is proposed for annexation to a municipality . . . . ” The thirty day time limitation of Section 171.081 is designed for the purpose of allowing any complaint challenging the procedures leading to passage of an annexation ordinance to be brought to the attention of a municipality prior to the expense of a *37 referendum. This is evident from the prospective language used in Section 171.081 and Section 171.031(5), i....

...(1979), which prohibits a municipality from scheduling a referendum to approve an annexation ordinance until thirty days following passage of the ordinance by the municipality. The use of the term “passage” to qualify the thirty day time period for review in Section 171.081 further supports the construction that the time period runs following passage of the annexation ordinance by the municipal governing body and prior to the referendum....

...Consequently, since appellants’ complaints were filed more than thirty days after the passage of the annexation ordinance by the Tallahassee City Commission, the lower courts were correct in dismissing the untimely complaints. Additionally, SCA argued that the thirty day time limitation in Section 171.081 should have no effect on its right to seek declaratory relief because, by its terms, the statute applies only to the remedy of certio-rari. We disagree. In substance, SCA sought judicial review under Section 171.-081. Although SCA’s complaint was styled as a declaratory judgment action rather than an action under Section 171.081, the complaint sought to invalidate the annexation because of the failure of the City Commission to comply with the procedures for annexation as set out in Chapter 171....

...This is the same issue addressed in Section 171.-081 which provides a thirty day time limitation for judicial review. Moreover, the complaint further sought attorney’s fees, should SCA prevail, under “Chapter 171.” The only provision for attorney’s fees in Chapter 171 is found in Section 171.081. Therefore, Section 171.081 was applicable to SCA’s complaint, which was required to have been filed within thirty days after passage of the annexation ordinance by the City Commission....

petitioned for certiorari in circuit court under section 171.081, and Edgewater filed a similar petition shortly