193.011
Factors to consider in deriving just valuation.
Find cases:
SyfertCases citing this section
FL-LEGleg.state.fl.us
JustiaFla. Statutes
CornellLII Search
CasesGoogle Scholar
193.011 Factors to consider in deriving just valuation.—In arriving at just valuation as required under s. 4, Art. VII of the State Constitution, the property appraiser shall take into consideration the following factors:
(1) The present cash value of the property, which is the amount a willing purchaser would pay a willing seller, exclusive of reasonable fees and costs of purchase, in cash or the immediate equivalent thereof in a transaction at arm’s length;
(2) The highest and best use to which the property can be expected to be put in the immediate future and the present use of the property, taking into consideration the legally permissible use of the property, including any applicable judicial limitation, local or state land use regulation, or historic preservation ordinance, and any zoning changes, concurrency requirements, and permits necessary to achieve the highest and best use, and considering any moratorium imposed by executive order, law, ordinance, regulation, resolution, or proclamation adopted by any governmental body or agency or the Governor when the moratorium or judicial limitation prohibits or restricts the development or improvement of property as otherwise authorized by applicable law. The applicable governmental body or agency or the Governor shall notify the property appraiser in writing of any executive order, ordinance, regulation, resolution, or proclamation it adopts imposing any such limitation, regulation, or moratorium;
(3) The location of said property;
(4) The quantity or size of said property;
(5) The cost of said property and the present replacement value of any improvements thereon;
(6) The condition of said property;
(7) The income from said property; and
(8) The net proceeds of the sale of the property, as received by the seller, after deduction of all of the usual and reasonable fees and costs of the sale, including the costs and expenses of financing, and allowance for unconventional or atypical terms of financing arrangements. When the net proceeds of the sale of any property are utilized, directly or indirectly, in the determination of just valuation of realty of the sold parcel or any other parcel under the provisions of this section, the property appraiser, for the purposes of such determination, shall exclude any portion of such net proceeds attributable to payments for household furnishings or other items of personal property.
History.—s. 1, ch. 63-250; s. 1, ch. 67-167; ss. 1, 2, ch. 69-55; s. 13, ch. 69-216; s. 8, ch. 70-243; s. 20, ch. 74-234; s. 1, ch. 77-102; s. 1, ch. 77-363; s. 6, ch. 79-334; s. 1, ch. 88-101; s. 1, ch. 93-132; s. 1, ch. 97-117; s. 1, ch. 2008-197.
Note.—Former s. 193.021.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 127
cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1970–2021 · leading case: Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Howard
Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Howard (2005)
“In arriving at just valuation as required under s. 4, Art. VII of the State Constitution, the property appraiser shall take into consideration the following factors: (1) The present cash value of the property, which is the amount a willing purchaser would pay a willing seller,…”
Mazourek v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (2002)
“§ 193.011, Fla. Stat. (1997). The property appraiser's assessment is presumed correct, but such presumption is lost where the taxpayer demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the property appraiser "has failed to consider properly" the section 193.”
Straughn v. Tuck (1977)
“461, Florida Statutes (1973) and was assessed without due regard to the dictates of Section 193.011, Florida Statutes (1973).”
Florida Rock Industries v. Bystrom (1986)
“In so doing, the Property Appraiser considered and gave adequate weight to all the factors set forth in Section 193.011, Florida Statutes. Market data used in assessing the property consisted primarily of sales of substantial tracts of vacant land in the vicinity of the subject…”
Florida E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Dept. of Rev. (1993)
“ration focus upon FEC's contentions: (1) that DOR's unit rule method of railroad assessment results in a "going concern" tax on the railroad which is unauthorized by law; (2) that the trial court imposed an improper burden of proof upon FEC because DOR's valuation failed to…”
Bystrom v. Valencia Center, Inc. (1983)
“(1963), the presecessor of the present § 193.011, Fla. Stat.]. Therefore, when the seven statutory guideposts are applied to the classic formula, "the amount a purchaser willing but not obliged to buy, would pay to one willing, but not obliged to sell," the result will include…”
Schultz v. TM FLORIDA-OHIO REALTY LTD. P'SHIP (1989)
“§ 193.011, Fla. Stat. (1985). [2] When explaining what the term "consider" means to him, Schultz's expert stated: Well, when you're considering something, we go through and do an analysis on properties and consider we obviously are going to consider using a market approach,…”
Valencia Center, Inc. v. Bystrom (1989)
“§ 193.011, Fla. Stat. (1987). This Court has found that the just valuation at which property must be assessed under the constitution and section 193.”
Turner v. Tokai Financial Services, Inc. (2000)
“" In light of this constitutional mandate and its interpretation by the supreme court, we must consider the application and effect of section 193.011, Florida Statutes (1997), which states: 193.”
Bystrom v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States (1982)
“pproach was the only proper approach in the assessment of the property; and (2) the Taxpayers’ contention that the proper method by which to ultimately assess the property was by utilizing the income approach, the claims were singularly identical with respect to the ultimate…”
Blake v. Xerox Corp. (1984)
“Xerox filed a complaint against the property appraiser and the Dade County Tax Collector claiming that the county appraiser's method of valuation violated article VII, section 4, Florida Constitution, and section 193.011, Florida Statutes (1977).”
Vero Beach Shores, Inc. v. Nolte (1985)
“§ 193.011, Fla. Stat. (1983). Appellant complains that the cost of the property(ies) was not taken into account by the property appraiser; thus, the appraisal is invalid.”
— 193.011(1) — 7 cases
Florida E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Dept. of Rev. (1993)
“ration focus upon FEC's contentions: (1) that DOR's unit rule method of railroad assessment results in a "going concern" tax on the railroad which is unauthorized by law; (2) that the trial court imposed an improper burden of proof upon FEC because DOR's valuation failed to…”
Turner v. Tokai Financial Services, Inc. (2000)
“" In light of this constitutional mandate and its interpretation by the supreme court, we must consider the application and effect of section 193.011, Florida Statutes (1997), which states: 193.”
Mazourek v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (2002)
“§ 193.011, Fla. Stat. (1997). The property appraiser's assessment is presumed correct, but such presumption is lost where the taxpayer demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the property appraiser "has failed to consider properly" the section 193.”
Muckenfuss v. Miller (1982)
— 193.011(2) — 17 cases
Bystrom v. Valencia Center, Inc. (1983)
“(1963), the presecessor of the present § 193.011, Fla. Stat.]. Therefore, when the seven statutory guideposts are applied to the classic formula, "the amount a purchaser willing but not obliged to buy, would pay to one willing, but not obliged to sell," the result will include…”
Straughn v. Tuck (1977)
“461, Florida Statutes (1973) and was assessed without due regard to the dictates of Section 193.011, Florida Statutes (1973).”
Florida Rock Industries v. Bystrom (1986)
“In so doing, the Property Appraiser considered and gave adequate weight to all the factors set forth in Section 193.011, Florida Statutes. Market data used in assessing the property consisted primarily of sales of substantial tracts of vacant land in the vicinity of the subject…”
— 193.011(4) — 2 cases
Walker v. Trump (1989)
— 193.011(5) — 1 case
— 193.011(6) — 1 case
— 193.011(7) — 7 cases
Bystrom v. Whitman (1986)
Florida E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Dept. of Rev. (1993)
“ration focus upon FEC's contentions: (1) that DOR's unit rule method of railroad assessment results in a "going concern" tax on the railroad which is unauthorized by law; (2) that the trial court imposed an improper burden of proof upon FEC because DOR's valuation failed to…”
Schultz v. Lurie (1987)
— 193.011(8) — 11 cases
Turner v. Tokai Financial Services, Inc. (2000)
“" In light of this constitutional mandate and its interpretation by the supreme court, we must consider the application and effect of section 193.011, Florida Statutes (1997), which states: 193.”
Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Howard (2005)
“In arriving at just valuation as required under s. 4, Art. VII of the State Constitution, the property appraiser shall take into consideration the following factors: (1) The present cash value of the property, which is the amount a willing purchaser would pay a willing seller,…”
Bystrom v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States (1982)
“pproach was the only proper approach in the assessment of the property; and (2) the Taxpayers’ contention that the proper method by which to ultimately assess the property was by utilizing the income approach, the claims were singularly identical with respect to the ultimate…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.