CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 902115
...The LURA required that, by June 1, 2000, 20% of the units would be occupied by very low income tenants and an additional 55% by low income tenants. *684 The remaining 25% were available for rent to the general public. In February 2000, Pier Club applied for an affordable housing exemption from ad valorem taxation pursuant to section 196.1978, Florida Statutes (2000)....
...Count I was styled a "statutory cause of action to contest the denial of ad valorem tax exemption." Count II sought a declaration that the property appraiser was in violation of section
196.193(5) for failing to either grant or deny the exemption by July 1st and that Pier Club was, in fact, entitled to the section
196.1978 exemption. The property appraiser took the position that the 2000 amendments to section
196.1978 were unconstitutional as they had been enacted in violation of the single subject rule....
...The parties were unable to agree, however, on the tax exempt status of those units that were vacant on January 1, 2000, and this issue was reserved for trial. Pier Club took the position that if a unit was previously occupied by a low or very low income tenant but vacant on January 1st, it was nonetheless entitled to section 196.1978's exemption....
...cannot agree. General Principles Regarding Ad Valorem Taxation Before addressing the specifics of the trial court's ruling and the arguments raised, it is helpful to set forth some general principles regarding ad valorem taxation and the language of section 196.1978....
...PPI, Inc.,
843 So.2d 922, 925 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). "The burden is on the claimant to show clearly any entitlement to tax exemption." Volusia County v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist.,
341 So.2d 498, 502 (Fla.1976). The Language of Section
196.1978 Since all real property is subject to ad valorem taxation unless exempted, any analysis of this issue must begin with the language of the statute authorizing the exemption. Section
196.1978 reads in relevant part: Property used to provide affordable housing serving eligible persons ....
...The meaning of the word "provide" Pier Club suggests that the answer to this question is "no," relying upon the dictionary definition of the word "provide." According to Pier Club, since the word "provide" means "to make available," see Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 948 (9th ed.1988), section 196.1978's exemption applies to "the portions of the affordable housing property ....
...he LURA. On the other hand, if only 100 of the 208 remaining units were presently leased to tenants other than those with low and very low incomes, then Pier Club has 108 available units, only 88 of which must be leased to low income individuals. 2. Section
196.1978's Internal References Next, Pier Club contends that any ambiguity as to whether the unit must actually be occupied by a low or very low income tenant on January 1st to qualify for the exemption is resolved by section
196.1978's internal references to sections
159.603(7);
420.0004(9), (10), (14);
196.196, and to Revenue Procedure 96-32. We cannot agree that any of these references shed light on whether section
196.1978 requires actual occupancy on January 1st....
...Economic Development Appropriations Analysis, at 14 (Apr. 10, 2000). 3. The LURA & Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-36.006 Pier Club points to the language of the LURA and Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-36.006 to support its contention that section 196.1978 does not require actual occupancy on January 1st....
...d activities."
509 So.2d at 1320. As in Trinity Episcopal, the court was not considering circumstances where the pre-January 1st use of the land and the January 1st use of the land were at variance. Conclusion Having found that the plain language of section
196.1978, the statute's internal references and legislative history, the LURA, and Florida's actual use doctrine do not address whether actual occupancy by a low or very low income tenant on January 1st is required to trigger the tax exemptio...
...on. See Cedars of Lebanon Hosp.,
355 So.2d at 1205; Markham,
843 So.2d at 925. These principles require us to hold that occupancy by a low or very low income tenant on January 1st is necessary to trigger the affordable housing exemption set forth in section
196.1978....
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CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 42 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 254, 2017 WL 823607, 2017 Fla. LEXIS 425
...In its decision, the district court ruled upon the following
question, which the court certified to be of great public importance:
DO PILOT AGREEMENTS THAT REQUIRE PAYMENTS
EQUALING THE AD VALOREM TAXES THAT WOULD
OTHERWISE BE DUE BUT FOR A STATUTORY TAX
EXEMPTION VIOLATE SECTION 196.1978, FLORIDA
STATUTES (2000), AND ARTICLE VII, § 9(a) OF THE FLORIDA
CONSTITUTION?
Id....
...Bay (RHF), AHF’s
predecessor in interest. AHF-Bay Fund,
169 So. 3d at 135. Under the agreement,
AHF was required to make payments that equaled the ad valorem taxes that would
have otherwise been due but for the statutory tax exemption found in section
196.1978, Florida Statutes (2000)....
...RHF
was a tax exempt 501(c)(3) organization as defined by the Internal
Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). RHF planned to
develop the property to provide affordable housing for persons with
low to moderate income pursuant to chapter 420, Florida Statutes. As
set forth in section 196.1978, Florida Statutes (2000), affordable
housing projects owned by a 501(c)(3) organization are exempt from
ad valorem taxation.
To finance the project, RHF reached an agreement with the City
wherein the C...
...use the
payments are equal to the amount of taxes that would be due if the property were
not tax-exempt. Id.
ANALYSIS
The certified question presents two issues: (1) whether the PILOT agreement
violates section 196.1978, Florida Statutes (2000), and (2) whether the PILOT
agreement violates article VII, section 9(a) of the Florida Constitution....
...ted facts, they are reviewed
de novo. Jackson-Shaw Co. v. Jacksonville Aviation Auth.,
8 So. 3d 1076, 1084-
85 (Fla. 2008).
The Second District invalidated the PILOT agreement between the City and
AHF by finding that the agreement violated section
196.1978, Florida Statutes
(2000), and violated the public policy of “promoting the provision of affordable
housing for low to moderate income families.” AHF-Bay Fund,
169 So. 3d at 138.
Specifically, the Second District held that “section
196.1978 expressly prohibits ad
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valorem taxation on properties being used for affordable housing.” Id. at 136.
Section
196.1978, Florida Statutes (2000), provides in relevant part:
Property used to provide affordable housing serving eligible persons
as defined by s....
...420.0004(9) and (14) shall
be exempt from ad valorem taxation to the extent authorized in s.
196.196. All property identified in this section shall comply with the
criteria for determination of exempt status to be applied by property
appraisers on an annual basis as defined in s.
196.195.
§
196.1978, Fla....
...Instead,
the section provides an exemption to nonprofit entities. However, the statute also
requires the nonprofit entity, here the owner of an affordable housing project, to
take affirmative steps to take advantage of the exemption. Specifically, section
196.1978 requires the owner to “comply with the criteria for determination of
exempt status to be applied by property appraisers on an annual basis as defined in
s....
...by the City
and RHF are not taxes and do not implicate article VII, section 9(a).
Consequently, the agreement does violate the Florida Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Because the PILOT agreement does not violate section 196.1978, Florida
Statues (2000), or article VII, section 9(a) of the Florida Constitution, we answer
the certified question in the negative and quash the decision of the Second District.
We do not address Respondent’s argument concernin...
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CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 41 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 249, 2016 WL 3090403, 2016 Fla. LEXIS 1149
...POLSTON, J.
In Stranburg v. Panama Commons L.P.,
160 So. 3d 160 (Fla. 1st DCA
2015), the First District Court of Appeal held that Panama Commons’ right to due
process was violated by applying the 2013 repeal of the ad valorem tax exemption
under section
196.1978, Florida Statutes (2012), to the 2013 tax year.1 However,
because Panama Commons’ interest in the tax exemption under section
196.1978
had not vested, we reverse.
1....
...BACKGROUND
As the First District explained,
[Panama Commons] is a nonprofit Florida limited partnership
that constructed a ninety-two-unit affordable housing project in
Panama City. The Bay County Property Appraiser granted the project
a full tax exemption for the 2012 tax year under section 196.1978.
[Panama Commons then timely filed its exemption application for the
2013 tax year.] After [Panama Commons] filed its application, the
Legislature passed legislation eliminating the tax exemption for
affordabl...
...3d at 162.
On appeal, the First District agreed with the trial court and held that the
statutory repeal was unconstitutionally applied to the 2013 tax year because
Panama Commons’ substantive right to the ad valorem tax exemption under
section 196.1978 had vested on January 1, 2013, before the repeal was enacted.
The First District recognized “that claims for tax exemptions are subject to
statutory conditions” and that “the property appraiser had until July 1, 2013, to
deny [Panama Commons’] application.” Id....
...Florida case holds that the ‘right’ to a property tax exemption vests on January 1.”
Id. at 164 (Benton, J., dissenting).
II. ANALYSIS
Appellants argue that applying the 2013 repeal of the exemption under
section 196.1978 to the 2013 tax year does not violate due process because a
property owner does not have a vested right to the exemption before its exemption
application is granted and before the tax roll is certified....
...The parties
acknowledge that the de novo standard of review applies. We hold that due
process is not violated in this case by applying the 2013 repeal of the exemption
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for limited partnerships under section 196.1978 to Panama Commons for the 2013
tax year.2
As this Court explained in Maronda Homes, Inc....
...v.
]Knowles,
402 So. 2d [1155, 1158 (Fla. 1981)].
Chase Federal,
737 So. 2d at 503.
In this case, application of the repeal to Panama Commons for the 2013 tax
year passes constitutional muster because Panama Commons’ right to the
exemption under section
196.1978 had not vested before the repeal was enacted.
“A vested right has been defined as ‘an immediate, fixed right of present or future
enjoyment’ and also as ‘an immediate right of present enjoyment, or a present,
fixed right of future enjoyment.’ ” Buster, 984 So....
...Panama Commons did not
have an immediate and fixed right to the exemption, but rather an expectation.
And a statute does not operate unconstitutionally simply if it “upsets expectations
based in prior law.” Landgraf v. USI Film Products,
511 U.S. 244, 269 (1994).
Receiving an ad valorem tax exemption under section
196.1978 for a
particular tax year is contingent upon many factors....
...is received by the tax collector.” Taxes assessed on November 1
become delinquent on April 1 of the following year. See id.
Stranburg,
160 So. 3d at 164 (Benton, J., dissenting).
Here, the Legislature enacted the statutory repeal of the exemption under
section
196.1978 for limited partnerships before the certification of the tax roll,
meaning before Panama Commons’ right to the exemption had vested....
...legislation is not a promise, and a taxpayer has no vested right in the Internal
Revenue Code.” Id. at 33.
Finally, contrary to the First District’s conclusion and Panama Commons’
argument, Panama Commons’ right to the exemption under section 196.1978 for
the 2013 tax year did not vest on January 1, 2013....
...“In the present case, by contrast, [Panama
Commons’] use of its real property on January 1, 2013, was not in issue.” Id.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, because Panama Commons’ right to the tax exemption under
section 196.1978 had not vested before the Legislature repealed the exemption for
limited partnerships in 2013, we hold that applying the repeal to Panama Commons
for the 2013 tax year does not violate due process....
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CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2017 WL 4272115
...neither a party nor a beneficiary under the PILOT agreement. We summarily rejected
the first argument. AHF-Bay Fund, LLC,
169 So. 3d at 134. However, we agreed with
AHF on the second issue, concluding that the PILOT agreement not only violated public
policy but also violated section
196.1978, Florida Statutes (2000), and article VII, § 9(a)
-3-
of the Florida Constitution....
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CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...Stephen Turner and David K. Miller of Broad and Cassel, Tallahassee, for
Appellee.
SWANSON, J.
Appellants seek review of a final summary judgment concluding that
appellee was entitled to a 2013 property tax exemption for its affordable housing
project under section 196.1978, Florida Statutes (2012)....
...issue.
Appellee is a nonprofit Florida limited partnership that constructed a ninety-
two-unit affordable housing project in Panama City. The Bay County Property
Appraiser granted the project a full tax exemption for the 2012 tax year under
section 196.1978....
...In the present case, by contrast, appellee’s use of its real property on January
1, 2013, was not in issue. Appellee was not entitled to a tax exemption because,
when the Property Appraiser denied its 2013 exemption application, no exemption
was legally available to it under section 196.1978, Florida Statutes (2013). The
2013 Legislature amended section 196.1978, Florida Statutes, to eliminate the
9
exemption. The amended statute was the law in effect when the Property
Appraiser acted on the application, and was binding on him.
The law amending section 196.1978, Florida Statutes provided that the
changes be applied “retroactively to the 2013 tax roll.” Ch....
...an existing law’” that it would receive the exemption for the 2013 tax year after it
had received the exemption for the 2012 tax year under the 2012 statute. Brevda,
420 So. 2d at 891 (citation omitted). The Property Appraiser denied appellee’s
exemption application based upon section
196.1978, Florida Statutes (2013), the
law in effect when he acted....
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CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 5826, 2015 WL 1809577
...RHF was a tax
exempt 501(c)(3) organization as defined by the Internal Revenue Code. See 26
U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). RHF planned to develop the property to provide affordable
housing for persons with low to moderate income pursuant to chapter 420, Florida
Statutes. As set forth in section 196.1978, Florida Statutes (2000), affordable housing
projects owned by a 501(c)(3) organization are exempt from ad valorem taxation.
1
In the complaint, the City also raised a claim of breach of contract as...
...elfare of the public. See Miami
Battlecreek v. Lummus,
192 So. 211, 216 (Fla. 1939). Such exemptions are to be
-4-
strictly construed. See id. The exemption from ad valorem taxation as set forth in
section
196.1978 is applicable here.
Section
196.1978 was the legislature's response to Southlake Community
Foundation, Inc....
...Prior to the Havill
decision, nonprofit entities typically enjoyed exemption from ad valorem taxation without
qualification. But in Havill, the Fifth District Court of Appeal called into question that
practice. After Havill was decided, the Florida Legislature enacted section 196.1978,
making it clear that all 501(c)(3) nonprofit entities that provide affordable housing for low
to moderate income families were entitled to the exemption. The legislative history of
section 196.1978 is particularly instructive:
A recent court ruling in Florida's Fifth District Court of
Appeal[] (Southlake Community Foundation, Inc....
...on or that it
owns and operates the property as an affordable housing option for low to moderate
-5-
income families. Consequently, AHF is entitled to exemption from ad valorem taxation
pursuant to section 196.1978....
...VII, § 9(a) Fla. Const. (providing generally
that municipalities shall impose taxes as authorized by law); §
166.211(1), Fla. Stat.
(2000) (limiting power to levy ad valorem taxes "in a manner not inconsistent with
general law"),4 and because section
196.1978 expressly prohibits ad valorem taxation
on properties being used for affordable housing, a municipality cannot circumvent that
prohibition by seeking to recover ad valorem taxes merely by utilizing a different name,
see State v....
...valorem taxation and the PILOT agreement in question was merely an attempt to
recoup the ad valorem taxes that would have otherwise been due. Id. at 152.
Similarly here, the property in question is exempt from ad valorem taxation
pursuant to section 196.1978, but the PILOT agreement requires the owner of the
property to make annual payments that are the equivalent of the ad valorem taxes that
would have otherwise been due....
...See Farnham & Pfile Co., Inc., 878 A.2d at 151-52 (citing
school district's allegations in its complaint as indication that school district was seeking
to recoup ad valorem taxes).
We conclude that based on the statutory exemption from ad valorem
taxation as set forth in section 196.1978, the City did not have authority to collect ad
valorem taxes from AHF via enforcement of the PILOT agreement....
...We therefore certify to the Florida Supreme Court the following question
to be of great public importance:
DO PILOT AGREEMENTS THAT REQUIRE PAYMENTS
EQUALING THE AD VALOREM TAXES THAT WOULD
OTHERWISE BE DUE BUT FOR A STATUTORY TAX
EXEMPTION VIOLATE SECTION 196.1978, FLORIDA
STATUTES (2000), AND ARTICLE VII, § 9(a) OF THE
FLORIDA CONSTITUTION?
Reversed and remanded.
SILBERMAN and BLACK, JJ., Concur.
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CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 2008).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
exemption from ad valorem taxation pursuant to section
196.1978, Florida Statutes? 2. Are vacant lots owned
