The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XIV
TAXATION AND FINANCE

Chapter 202
COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES TAX SIMPLIFICATION LAW

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F.S. 202.16

202.16 Payment.—The taxes imposed or administered under this chapter and chapter 203 shall be collected from all dealers of taxable communications services on the sale at retail in this state of communications services taxable under this chapter and chapter 203. The full amount of the taxes on a credit sale, installment sale, or sale made on any kind of deferred payment plan is due at the moment of the transaction in the same manner as a cash sale.

(1)(a) The taxes collected under this chapter and chapter 203 shall be paid by the purchaser of the communications service and shall be collected from such person by the dealer of communications services.

(b) Each dealer of communications services selling communications services in this state shall collect the taxes imposed under this chapter and chapter 203 from the purchaser of such services, and such taxes must be stated separately from all other charges on the bill or invoice. Notwithstanding the requirement in this paragraph and in s. 202.35 to separately state such taxes, a public lodging establishment licensed under chapter 509 may notify purchasers of the taxes imposed under this chapter on a notice in a guest room posted in a manner consistent with the requirements of s. 509.2015, rather than separately stating the taxes on the guest bill or invoice.

(2)(a) A sale of communications services that are used as a component part of or integrated into a communications service or prepaid calling arrangement for resale, including, but not limited to, carrier-access charges, interconnection charges paid by providers of mobile communication services or other communication services, charges paid by a video service provider for the purchase of video programming or the transmission of video or other programming by another dealer of communications services, charges for the sale of unbundled network elements, and any other intercompany charges for the use of facilities for providing communications services for resale, must be made in compliance with the rules of the department. A person who makes a sale for resale which is not in compliance with these rules is liable for any tax, penalty, and interest due for failing to comply, to be calculated pursuant to s. 202.28(2)(a).

(b)1. Any dealer who makes a sale for resale shall document the exempt nature of the transaction, as established by rules adopted by the department, by retaining a copy of the purchaser’s initial or annual resale certificate issued pursuant to s. 202.17(6). In lieu of maintaining a copy of the certificate, a dealer may document, prior to the time of sale, an authorization number provided telephonically or electronically by the department or by such other means established by rule of the department. The dealer may rely on an initial or annual resale certificate issued pursuant to s. 202.17(6), valid at the time of receipt from the purchaser, without seeking additional annual resale certificates from such purchaser, if the dealer makes recurring sales to the purchaser in the normal course of business on a continual basis. For purposes of this paragraph, the term “recurring sales to a purchaser in the normal course of business” means sales in which the dealer extends credit to the purchaser and records the debt as an account receivable, or in which the dealer sells to a purchaser who has an established cash account, similar to an open credit account. For purposes of this paragraph, purchases are made from a selling dealer on a continual basis if the selling dealer makes, in the normal course of business, sales to the purchaser no less frequently than once in every 12-month period.

2. A dealer may, through the informal conference procedures provided for in s. 213.21 and the rules of the department, provide the department with evidence of the exempt status of a sale. Exemption certificates executed by entities that were exempt at the time of sale, resale certificates provided by purchasers who were active dealers at the time of sale, and verification by the department of a purchaser’s active dealer status at the time of sale in lieu of a resale certificate shall be accepted by the department when submitted during the protest period but may not be accepted in any proceeding under chapter 120 or any circuit court action instituted under chapter 72.

(3)(a) A dealer must compute the tax due on the sale of communications services imposed pursuant to this chapter and chapter 203 based on a rounding algorithm that meets the following criteria:

1. The computation of the tax must be carried to the third decimal place.

2. The tax must be rounded to a whole cent using a method that rounds up to the next cent whenever the third decimal place is greater than four.

(b) The rounding algorithm must be applied to the local communications services tax imposed pursuant to this chapter separately from its application to the communications services taxes imposed pursuant to s. 202.12 and the gross receipts taxes imposed pursuant to s. 203.01.

(c) A dealer may apply the rounding algorithm to the taxes imposed pursuant to ss. 202.12 and 203.01 in one of the following ways:

1. Apply the rounding algorithm to the combined taxes imposed pursuant to ss. 202.12 and 203.01.

2. Apply the rounding algorithm to the communications services taxes imposed pursuant to s. 202.12(1), and apply the rounding algorithm separately to the combined gross receipts taxes imposed pursuant to s. 203.01(1)(b)2. and 3.

3. Apply the rounding algorithm to the combined taxes imposed pursuant to ss. 202.12(1)(a) and 203.01(1)(b)3., as allowed by ss. 202.12001 and 203.001, and apply the rounding algorithm separately to the gross receipts tax imposed pursuant to s. 203.01(1)(b)2.

(d) Under paragraph (b) or paragraph (c), a dealer may apply the rounding algorithm to the aggregate tax amount that is computed on all taxable items on an invoice or to each tax amount that is computed on one or more, but fewer than all, taxable items on an invoice. The aggregate tax amount for all items on the invoice must equal at least the result that would have been obtained if the rounding algorithm had been applied to the aggregate tax amount computed on all taxable items on the invoice. A dealer may satisfy this requirement by setting a minimum tax amount of not less than 1 cent with respect to each item, or group of items, to which the rounding algorithm is applied.

(e) The department may not require a dealer to collect the tax based on a bracket system.

(4) Each purchaser of a communications service is liable for the taxes imposed under this chapter and chapter 203. The purchaser’s liability is not extinguished until the tax has been paid to the department, except that proof of payment of the tax to a dealer of communications services engaged in business in this state is sufficient to relieve the purchaser from further liability for the tax.

History.—ss. 8, 58, ch. 2000-260; ss. 6, 38, ch. 2001-140; s. 3, ch. 2002-48; s. 3, ch. 2005-187; s. 8, ch. 2007-106; s. 1, ch. 2011-120; s. 4, ch. 2012-70.

F.S. 202.16 on Google Scholar

F.S. 202.16 on Casetext

Amendments to 202.16

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 202.16

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 202.16.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

FOURTH ESTATE PUBLIC BENEFIT CORPORATION, v. WALL- STREET. COM, LLC,, 139 S. Ct. 881 (U.S. 2019)

. . . . § 408(f)(2) ; 37 CFR § 202.16(b)(1) (2018). . . . ." § 202.16(c)(7), (c)(10). . . .

FOURTH ESTATE PUBLIC BENEFIT CORPORATION, v. WALL- STREET. COM, LLC, D., 856 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 202.16(b)(1) (defining the limited class of works capable of preregistration to include material . . .

BROWNE, v. L. ZASLOW,, 103 F. Supp. 3d 666 (E.D. Pa. 2015)

. . . . § 202.16(c)(13) for the proposition that preregistration sufficiently meets the requirements of § 411 . . . However, Plaintiffs fail to account for the plain language of 37 C.F.R. § 202.16(c)(13), wherein it states . . .

DOYLE HOMES, INC. v. SIGNATURE GROUP OF LIVINGSTON, INC., 69 F. Supp. 3d 674 (E.D. Mich. 2014)

. . . . § 202.16 (prescribing "rules pertaining to the preregistration of copyright claims in works eligible . . .

RL BB ACQUISITION, LLC, v. BRIDGEMILL COMMONS DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC,, 754 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 202.16(b), 12 C.F.R. § 1002.16(b). . . .

SWARTZ D. v. CITY MORTGAGE, INC. ABN LLC, 911 F. Supp. 2d 916 (D. Haw. 2012)

. . . . § 202.16(b)(2)).] E. . . .

MATOS v. J. ASTRUE,, 795 F. Supp. 2d 157 (D. Mass. 2011)

. . . The Grid Rule on which the ALJ relied at Step 5 — Rule 202.16 — “specifically contemplates an inability . . .

COSMETIC IDEAS, INC. a v. IAC INTERACTIVECORP, a a HSN LP, a HSN LLC, a, 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010)

. . . . § 202.16(c) (2008). . . . .

KEMA, INC. v. KOPERWHATS,, 658 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2009)

. . . . § 202.16(c) (establishing procedures for preregistration, including, inter alia, submission of "certification . . .

LAZU, v. J. ASTRUE,, 646 F. Supp. 2d 326 (W.D.N.Y. 2009)

. . . perform the full range of light work, and was therefore not disabled pursuant to Medical-Vocational Rule 202.16 . . .

ROSA, v. J. ASTRUE,, 603 F. Supp. 2d 662 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)

. . . P, App. 2, § 202.16 (2003) (an unskilled younger individual (18-49) who cannot speak English, but who . . .

JORDAN, Jr. v. J. ASTRUE, 617 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (M.D. Fla. 2008)

. . . P, App. 2, § 202.16. . . .

E. CANDELARIO, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,, 547 F. Supp. 2d 92 (D.P.R. 2008)

. . . limitations may have not allowed her to perform the full range of light work, using Medical-Vocational Rules 202.16 . . .

LUCKY BREAK WISHBONE CORPORATION, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO. a a, 528 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2007)

. . . . § 202.16. . . . .

E. BLOOMFIELD, v. s, 522 F. Supp. 2d 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)

. . . court judgment against MacShane and was awarded a lien on MacShane’s personal property under 22 NYCRR § 202.16 . . . of the State of New York, Putnam County (969/07), requesting a judgment foreclosing his 22 NYCRR § 202.16 . . . Bloomfield requests (1) a judgment foreclosing his 22 NYCRR § 202.16(c)(2) lien against MacShane and . . . constituting personal property of [MacShane] to which a security interest has attached and a 22 NYCRR § 202.16 . . . SO ORDERED. . 22 NYCRR § 202.16(c)(2) states, "An attorney seeking to obtain an interest in any property . . .

NEAVE, v. ASTRUE,, 507 F. Supp. 2d 948 (E.D. Wis. 2007)

. . . In the alternative, the ALJ concluded that plaintiffs claim failed at step five under Grid Rule 202.16 . . . return to past work, he was nevertheless able to perform a variety of other light jobs under Grid Rule 202.16 . . .

LOPEZ VARGAS, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,, 518 F. Supp. 2d 333 (D.P.R. 2007)

. . . reasons, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled within the framework of Medical-Vocational Rule 202.16 . . .

In DUFFY, v., 331 B.R. 137 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)

. . . expert who would testify at trial, over attorney Meyer’s objection that the applicable Rule (22 NYCRR § 202.16 . . .

PEREZ, v. Jo B. BARNHART,, 415 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 2005)

. . . Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, §§ 201.18, 202.16-.17). . . .

LAMACCHIA, v. Jo BARNHART,, 351 F. Supp. 2d 304 (E.D. Pa. 2004)

. . . education, and work experience, a finding of ‘not disabled’ is directed by medical-vocational Rule 202.16 . . .

E. DEGAN, v. Jo B. BARNHART,, 314 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Kan. 2004)

. . . work, and the claimant’s age, educational background, and work experience, Section 416.969 and Rule 202.16 . . .

V. SANCHEZ, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, s, 270 F. Supp. 2d 218 (D.P.R. 2003)

. . . The ALJ indicated that he used Rule 202.16 of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines in conjunction with Sanchez . . .

PEREZ, v. B. BARNHART,, 234 F. Supp. 2d 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)

. . . of 38 on the date of his application and illiteracy and inability to communicate in English, Section 202.16 . . . not consider the ALJ’s alternative grounds for denying Plaintiff disability insurance under Section 202.16 . . .

D. MUNCY, v. S. APFEL,, 247 F.3d 728 (8th Cir. 2001)

. . . The ALJ did not offer the testimony of a vocational expert, instead applying Rule 202.16 of the Medical-Vocational . . . As a consequence, the ALJ did not use the testimony of a vocational expert, relying instead on Rule 202.16 . . .

R. MONTEIRO, v. S. APFEL,, 153 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D. Mass. 2001)

. . . In making that determination, the ALJ applied Rule 202.16 of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R . . . Grid Rule 202.16 thus dictated a finding of “not disabled”. IV. . . .

HATCHER, v. S. APFEL,, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (D. Kan. 2001)

. . . Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 § 202.16. . . .

ASSAVEDO, v. S. APFEL,, 115 F. Supp. 2d 704 (E.D. La. 2000)

. . . . § 404, Subpt.P., App. 2, Table 2, Rules 202.16, 202.17 (an individual of plaintiffs age who is limited . . .

D. BEECH, v. S. APFEL,, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (S.D. Ala. 2000)

. . . She argues that the ALJ erroneously applied Rule 202.16 and found, within the framework of the Grid, . . . Additionally, Rule 202.16 applies to a younger individual limited to light work who is illiterate or . . .

RUIZ, v. S. APFEL,, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (C.D. Cal. 1998)

. . . P, App. 2, § 202.16). (A.R.19-20.) . . .

LAWSON, v. S. APFEL,, 46 F. Supp. 2d 941 (W.D. Mo. 1998)

. . . P, app. 2 § 202.16 (stating that a younger individual, who is illiterate or unable to communicate in . . .

BATISTA, v. S. CHATER,, 972 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)

. . . light work activity and applying the vocational profile set forth in the grids, the ALJ found that Rule 202.16 . . . light work activity and applying the vocational profile set forth in the grids, the ALJ found that Rule 202.16 . . .

TORO, v. S. CHATER,, 937 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)

. . . Under Rule 202.16 of the medical-vocational profiles set forth in the Commissioner’s residual functional . . .

ZORILLA, v. S. CHATER,, 915 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)

. . . Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, §§ 202.16, the ALJ concluded that Zorilla was not disabled. . . .

JESURUM, v. SECRETARY OF UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH HUMAN SERVICES, 48 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 1995)

. . . that Jesurum could perform the full range of light work and thus denied her benefits pursuant to Rule 202.16 . . . Applying Rule 202.16 of Table 2, Appendix 2, Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. part 404 (the “grid”), the ALJ’s . . .

ROSADO, v. E. SHALALA,, 868 F. Supp. 471 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)

. . . age, as well as his education and work experience, the plaintiff was not disabled pursuant to Rule 202.16 . . .

ROSARIO v. E. SHALALA, 836 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Pa. 1993)

. . . Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, Rule 202.16 and testimony and documents submitted at the hearing, the . . .

TRENT, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,, 788 F. Supp. 939 (E.D. Ky. 1992)

. . . DISCUSSION In the present case, the AU found that the plaintiff was not disabled by virtue of Rule 202.16 . . .

KENDRICK v. W. SULLIVAN, M. D., 784 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)

. . . P, App. 2, Table 2, Rule 202.16. . . .

F. KNIGHT, Jr. S. T. D. S. S. Jr. L. Dr. W. Y. N. S. Dr. Jr. v. STATE ALABAMA M. Jr. S. Jr. B. H. J. P. Dr. D. III, F. A. A. Sr. A. G. A M W. Dr. A M Jr. W. M. H. B. L. A. R. C. Dr. V. Dr. E. B. F. W. Jr. W. T. Jr. R. R. E. W. A. C. J. D. Jr. T. B. Jr. O. H. Jr. T. Jr. E. G. Jr. S. H. Jr. B. Dr. A. UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ALABAMA A M a a a a a a a a a a, 787 F. Supp. 1030 (N.D. Ala. 1991)

. . . Rutledge (2/20/91) 26-27; STX 202.16. . . . STX 202.16, 202.-17. 994. . . .

In EAST PEORIA HOTEL CORPORATION,, 145 B.R. 956 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1991)

. . . secured creditors totaling $10,358,492.37 and one hundred fifteen unsecured creditors totaling $897,-202.16 . . .

VARGAS, v. W. SULLIVAN, M. D., 898 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1990)

. . . If her residual functional capacity permitted her to perform light work, under Table No. 2, Rule 202.16 . . .

HUTSELL, v. W. SULLIVAN, M. D., 892 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1989)

. . . The AU then applied the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the “grid”), finding that Rules 202.16 and 202.17 . . . We note that under grid Rules 202.16 and 202.17, upon which the ALJ properly relied, it was not necessary . . .

TAVOLETTI, v. W. SULLIVAN, M. D., 732 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa. 1989)

. . . Appendix 2, Table No. 2, Sections 202.16-17. . . .

M. ORTIZ, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,, 890 F.2d 520 (1st Cir. 1989)

. . . See Rule 202.16. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. . . .

TAMEZ, v. W. SULLIVAN, M. D., 888 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1989)

. . . The Administrative Law Judge found that Tamez was capable of light work and, based on Rules 202.16 and . . .

VARGAS, v. R. BOWEN, M. D., 712 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)

. . . The ALJ noted that, based upon plaintiff’s vocational profile and residual functional capacity, Rule 202.16 . . . impairments do not significantly limit her access to jobs requiring “light” work, the ALJ properly used Rule 202.16 . . .

In T. DOUGHERTY, CITIBANK SOUTH DAKOTA N. A. a v. T. DOUGHERTY,, 89 B.R. 840 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1988)

. . . The three-day, five draft total was $202.16. . . .

A. SNYDER, v. R. BOWEN, M. D., 694 F. Supp. 90 (M.D. Pa. 1988)

. . . Pursuant to Section 404.1520(f), and Rules 202.16-202.19 of Appendix 2, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4, . . .

SCOTT, v. R. BOWEN,, 652 F. Supp. 1477 (N.D. Ind. 1987)

. . . Having reviewed Rules 202.16 and 201.17 Section 404.1569 Regulation 4, Appendix 2, Subpart P, the AU . . .

L. CHANDLER, v. R. BOWEN, M. D., 646 F. Supp. 783 (S.D. Ind. 1986)

. . . the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of light work, that application of Rule 202.16 . . .

FOSTER, v. M. HECKLER,, 780 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir. 1986)

. . . Ill, App. 2, Rule 202.16 (1983). . . .

SCHWEITZER, v. HECKLER,, 612 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Wis. 1985)

. . . He found that plaintiff came within Rule 202.16 of Table 2, which directs a finding of not disabled. . . .

CITY OF NEW YORK, N. Y. S. F. N. Y. S. I II, I, II, III IV, v. M. HECKLER, A. U. S., 742 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1984)

. . . claimants aged 50 and over granted benefits), with 20 C.F.R. subpart P, app. 2, §§ 201.18, 201.23-24, 202.16 . . .

MILLNER, v. S. SCHWEIKER,, 725 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1984)

. . . See 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 2, Rule 202.16 (1983). . . .

H. VAN HUSS, v. M. HECKLER,, 572 F. Supp. 160 (W.D. Va. 1983)

. . . before him, and also based upon a directed finding under Regulation § 404.1569 and Rules 201.23 and 202.16 . . .

G. MONTGOMERY v. S. SCHWEIKER,, 529 F. Supp. 124 (D. Md. 1981)

. . . plaintiff able to perform light work, he concluded that plaintiff was not disabled, by applying Rule 202.16 . . .

NATIONAL BEEF PACKING COMPANY, v. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, 605 F.2d 1167 (10th Cir. 1979)

. . . . § 202.16(c) requires that a judge’s decision be rendered within a reasonable time. . . .

E. BACON G. v. UNITED STATES, 321 F.2d 880 (8th Cir. 1963)

. . . In the collision the Bacon car had been damaged in the sum of $202.16. . . .

E. BACON G. v. UNITED STATES, 209 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Mo. 1962)

. . . The cost of the repairing of the automobile was $202.16. . . . He also states the cost of repairing the damaged 1953 Lincoln Capri sedan was $202.16. . . .

RICO, LTD. v. HUB FLORAL MFG. CO., 206 F. Supp. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)

. . . . § 13, 202.16 Regs. C.O.). . . .

LAW v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 192 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1951)

. . . Board, .Series 6, §§ 102.13, 102.52, 102.65, 101.2, 101.3, 101.16 and 101,21 ; and Series 5, §§ 202.3, 202.16 . . .

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. GREENSBORO COCA COLA BOTTLING CO., 180 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1950)

. . . See Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, Series 5, Sections 202.3, 202.16, 202.21 . . .

AMERICAN SURETY COMPANY v. PAULY, 170 U.S. 133 (U.S. 1898)

. . . . $16,847.50, which was the .amount of the bond with interest; also for $385.73 costs and $202.16 interest . . .