316.130
Pedestrians; traffic regulations.
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316.130 Pedestrians; traffic regulations.—
(1) A pedestrian shall obey the instructions of any official traffic control device specifically applicable to the pedestrian unless otherwise directed by a police officer.
(2) Pedestrians shall be subject to traffic control signals at intersections as provided in s. 316.075, but at all other places pedestrians shall be accorded the privileges and be subject to the restrictions stated in this chapter.
(3) Where sidewalks are provided, no pedestrian shall, unless required by other circumstances, walk along and upon the portion of a roadway paved for vehicular traffic.
(4) Where sidewalks are not provided, any pedestrian walking along and upon a highway shall, when practicable, walk only on the shoulder on the left side of the roadway in relation to the pedestrian’s direction of travel, facing traffic which may approach from the opposite direction.
(5) No person shall stand in the portion of a roadway paved for vehicular traffic for the purpose of soliciting a ride, employment, or business from the occupant of any vehicle.
(6) No person shall stand on or in proximity to a street or highway for the purpose of soliciting the watching or guarding of any vehicle while parked or about to be parked on a street or highway.
(7)(a) The driver of a vehicle at an intersection that has a traffic control signal in place shall stop before entering the crosswalk and remain stopped to allow a pedestrian, with a permitted signal, to cross a roadway when the pedestrian is in the crosswalk or steps into the crosswalk and is upon the half of the roadway upon which the vehicle is traveling or when the pedestrian is approaching so closely from the opposite half of the roadway as to be in danger.
(b) The driver of a vehicle at any crosswalk where signage so indicates shall stop and remain stopped to allow a pedestrian to cross a roadway when the pedestrian is in the crosswalk or steps into the crosswalk and is upon the half of the roadway upon which the vehicle is traveling or when the pedestrian is approaching so closely from the opposite half of the roadway as to be in danger.
(c) When traffic control signals are not in place or in operation and there is no signage indicating otherwise, the driver of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way, slowing down or stopping if need be to so yield, to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within a crosswalk when the pedestrian is upon the half of the roadway upon which the vehicle is traveling or when the pedestrian is approaching so closely from the opposite half of the roadway as to be in danger. Any pedestrian crossing a roadway at a point where a pedestrian tunnel or overhead pedestrian crossing has been provided shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway.
(8) No pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close that it is impossible for the driver to yield.
(9) Whenever any vehicle is stopped at a marked crosswalk or at any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection to permit a pedestrian to cross the roadway, the driver of any other vehicle approaching from the rear shall not overtake and pass such stopped vehicle.
(10) Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway.
(11) Between adjacent intersections at which traffic control signals are in operation, pedestrians shall not cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk.
(12) No pedestrian shall, except in a marked crosswalk, cross a roadway at any other place than by a route at right angles to the curb or by the shortest route to the opposite curb.
(13) Pedestrians shall move, whenever practicable, upon the right half of crosswalks.
(14) No pedestrian shall cross a roadway intersection diagonally unless authorized by official traffic control devices, and, when authorized to cross diagonally, pedestrians shall cross only in accordance with the official traffic control devices pertaining to such crossing movements.
(15) Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter, every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian or any person propelling a human-powered vehicle and give warning when necessary and exercise proper precaution upon observing any child or any obviously confused or incapacitated person.
(16) No pedestrian shall enter or remain upon any bridge or approach thereto beyond the bridge signal, gate, or barrier after a bridge operation signal indication has been given. No pedestrian shall pass through, around, over, or under any crossing gate or barrier at a railroad grade crossing or bridge while such gate or barrier is closed or is being opened or closed.
(17) No pedestrian may jump or dive from a publicly owned bridge. Nothing in this provision requires the state or any political subdivision of the state to post signs notifying the public of this provision. The failure to post a sign may not be construed by any court to create liability on the part of the state or any of its political subdivisions for injuries sustained as a result of jumping or diving from a bridge in violation of this subsection.
(18) No pedestrian shall walk upon a limited access facility or a ramp connecting a limited access facility to any other street or highway; however, this subsection does not apply to maintenance personnel of any governmental subdivision.
(19) A violation of this section is a noncriminal traffic infraction, punishable pursuant to chapter 318 as either a pedestrian violation or, if the infraction resulted from the operation of a vehicle, as a moving violation.
History.—s. 1, ch. 71-135; ss. 1, 8, ch. 76-31; s. 2, ch. 83-68; ss. 1, 2, ch. 83-74; s. 3, ch. 84-309; s. 306, ch. 95-148; s. 123, ch. 99-248; s. 2, ch. 2008-33.
Note.—Former s. 316.057.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 31
cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1978–2025 · leading case: Albert Darruthy v. City of Miami
Albert Darruthy v. City of Miami (2003)
“02, but she also had probable cause to arrest him for violating Fla. Stat. § 316.130 , 2 Fla. Stat. § 316.”
Barkett v. Gomez (2005)
“At the conclusion of the trial testimony, the defendants requested a jury instruction on section 316.130(3), Florida Statutes, which prohibits pedestrians from walking on a roadway paved for vehicular traffic when a sidewalk is available.”
Jeanty v. City of Miami (2012)
“The defendant officer moved for summary judgment, arguing that she had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff-either for the offense charged or for other offenses — such as unjustifiably walking in a roadway paved for vehicular traffic, Fla. Stat. § 316.130 (3). The district…”
Rosenfeld v. Seltzer (2008)
“They claim that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on section 316.130(8), Florida Statutes, which provides: "No pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a *559 vehicle which is so close that it is impossible for…”
Everett v. State (1983)
“[§ 316.130(10), Fla. Stat. (1981).] Requested instruction No.”
Durruthy v. City of Miami (2002)
“As for § 316.130, Fla. Stat., the Court concludes that no arguable probable cause existed under the totality of the circumstances.”
Acree v. Hartford South Inc. (1999)
“NOTES [1] Section 316.130(10), Florida Statutes, provides: Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway.”
McNeil v. State (1995)
“§ 316.130(18), Fla. Stat. (1993). [3] McNeil's purse was large enough to carry a handgun as small as a derringer; a revolver as small as a .”
State v. Williams (2013)
“5th DCA 2010) (“[T]he arresting officer had probable cause to stop the defendant to issue him a citation because the officer could have reasonably concluded that the defendant was jaywalking” in violation of section 316.130(12)). We also find that no competent substantial…”
State v. Nichols (2010)
“And by [the defendant’s] testimony and by the officer’s testimony, he was acting in compliance with [section 316.130(10) ], which says, the passenger shall yield the right of way to vehicles upon the roadway.”
Rierson v. Deveau (2019)
“Deveau was cited for violating section 316.130(15), Florida Statutes (2018), which provides: Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter, every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian or any person propelling a human-powered…”
Craig v. School Bd. of Broward County (1996)
“The instruction based on section 316.130(8), Florida Statutes (1989), should not have been given *1224 because Jamie was not a "pedestrian," defined as "[a]ny person afoot," at the time of the accident.”
— 316.130(10) — 3 cases
Everett v. State (1983)
“[§ 316.130(10), Fla. Stat. (1981).] Requested instruction No.”
Acree v. Hartford South Inc. (1999)
“NOTES [1] Section 316.130(10), Florida Statutes, provides: Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway.”
State v. Nichols (2010)
“And by [the defendant’s] testimony and by the officer’s testimony, he was acting in compliance with [section 316.130(10) ], which says, the passenger shall yield the right of way to vehicles upon the roadway.”
— 316.130(11) — 1 case
Everett v. State (1983)
“[§ 316.130(10), Fla. Stat. (1981).] Requested instruction No.”
— 316.130(12) — 3 cases
State v. Nichols (2010)
“And by [the defendant’s] testimony and by the officer’s testimony, he was acting in compliance with [section 316.130(10) ], which says, the passenger shall yield the right of way to vehicles upon the roadway.”
Acree v. Hartford South Inc. (1999)
“NOTES [1] Section 316.130(10), Florida Statutes, provides: Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway.”
State v. Williams (2013)
“5th DCA 2010) (“[T]he arresting officer had probable cause to stop the defendant to issue him a citation because the officer could have reasonably concluded that the defendant was jaywalking” in violation of section 316.130(12)). We also find that no competent substantial…”
— 316.130(15) — 4 cases
Rierson v. Deveau (2019)
“Deveau was cited for violating section 316.130(15), Florida Statutes (2018), which provides: Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter, every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian or any person propelling a human-powered…”
Beeman v. Cosmides (2002)
Rierson v. Deveau (2019)
— 316.130(18) — 1 case
McNeil v. State (1995)
“§ 316.130(18), Fla. Stat. (1993). [3] McNeil's purse was large enough to carry a handgun as small as a derringer; a revolver as small as a .”
— 316.130(19) — 1 case
— 316.130(3) — 3 cases
Barkett v. Gomez (2005)
“At the conclusion of the trial testimony, the defendants requested a jury instruction on section 316.130(3), Florida Statutes, which prohibits pedestrians from walking on a roadway paved for vehicular traffic when a sidewalk is available.”
Jeanty v. City of Miami (2012)
“The defendant officer moved for summary judgment, arguing that she had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff-either for the offense charged or for other offenses — such as unjustifiably walking in a roadway paved for vehicular traffic, Fla. Stat. § 316.130 (3). The district…”
— 316.130(4) — 4 cases
State v. Williams (2013)
“5th DCA 2010) (“[T]he arresting officer had probable cause to stop the defendant to issue him a citation because the officer could have reasonably concluded that the defendant was jaywalking” in violation of section 316.130(12)). We also find that no competent substantial…”
McCellan v. State (1999)
Kilpatrick v. Keener (1978)
— 316.130(5) — 3 cases
Isom v. State (2002)
— 316.130(6) — 1 case
— 316.130(8) — 4 cases
Rosenfeld v. Seltzer (2008)
“They claim that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on section 316.130(8), Florida Statutes, which provides: "No pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a *559 vehicle which is so close that it is impossible for…”
Everett v. State (1983)
“[§ 316.130(10), Fla. Stat. (1981).] Requested instruction No.”
Craig v. School Bd. of Broward County (1996)
“The instruction based on section 316.130(8), Florida Statutes (1989), should not have been given *1224 because Jamie was not a "pedestrian," defined as "[a]ny person afoot," at the time of the accident.”
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