The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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Sloan points out that he was not cited or arrested for riding a bicycle without lights, apparently suggesting that the lack of a charge or citation shows that the stop was unlawful. But riding a bicycle without lights is a noncriminal traffic infraction. See § 316.2065(19), Fla. Stat. And the fact that Sloan was not issued a citation does not establish the traffic stop's unlawfulness. Finally, while Sloan asserts that Deputy Fisher never articulated an intent to arrest Sloan, he fails to show that Deputy Fisher was required to do so to render the performance of his duties lawful.During the probation violation hearing, Officer Cao testified that on the night of January 28, 2017, at approximately 7:32 p.m., he observed the petitioner on a bicycle circling a four-way intersection. PVH Transcript at 62 (DE# 12-2, 6/19/21). Officer Cao testifed that the petitioner's bicycle did not have a front or rear light on it and that he conducted a consensual encounter to tell the petitioner the importance of having a rear light. (ROA 448). Section 316.2065(7) of the Florida Statutes prescribes:Unbeknownst to Halmu, and for reasons entirely unclear, Defendant Beck got back into his car and started following Halmu while he was riding his bicycle. Id. at ¶ 20. Defendant Beck did not use his siren, horn or PA system to notify Halmu of his approach. Id. Because Halmu's bicycle did not have any rearview mirrors, he was not alerted to Defendant Beck's approach. Id. In fact, Halmu, at all times herein, was unaware that Defendant Beck was following him in his police vehicle. Id. At the 1300 block of Meridian Avenue, Halmu turned onto Meridian Court, a narrow lane road. Id. at ¶ 21. Meridian Court is a "substandard-width lane" as defined by Florida Statute § 316.2065( 5)(a)(3) as "a lane that is too narrow for a bicycle and another vehicle to travel safely side by side within the lane." Id. On information and belief, all officers within the Miami Beach Police Department ("MBPD") should be trained and informed about this provision in the Florida Statutes in order to safely navigate the roadway and effectuate their official duties. Id. Additionally, Defendant Beck should have known that MBPD Standard Operating Procedure (SOP #017), at III.D(3)(c) specifically forbids the… Two Fort Lauderdale Police Department officers set up a perimeter checkpoint about three blocks away from a reported residential burglary. The BOLO described the burglary suspect as "a black male, approximately 5’11", and wearing a grey hooded sweatshirt." One of the officers testified that he and his colleague observed someone whom they believed matched this description, riding a bicycle without a front-facing headlight, in violation of section 316.2065(7), Florida Statutes (2018). This person was later identified as Defendant. The officers further observed Defendant riding his bicycle westbound from the area of the recently reported burglary, so they conducted a traffic stop at 1:24 a.m.Contrary to Thomas's contention, the record supports a finding of probable cause to stop Thomas. Officer Mach observed Thomas riding a bicycle that lacked the registration required under local ordinance. An officer's decision to initiate a traffic stop is generally reasonable "where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). Based on his observation of Thomas, Officer Mach had sufficient probable cause to stop and detain Thomas for failing to comply with the local ordinance requiring a resident to both register a bicycle and display the registration. See, e.g., United States v. Barker, 2013 WL 6231282 at *3 (M.D. Fla. 2013) ("Thus, even if the Court accepted Defendant's testimony that he was not riding his bicycle in the middle of the road as credible, which the Court does not, the officers still had probable cause to stop and detain Defendant given that it was after sunset, and Defendant's bicycle was not properly equipped with a light in violation of Florida Statute § 316.2065( 7). Thus, the officer's stop and subsequent detention of Defendant to investigate the bicycle infractions… Two Fort Lauderdale Police Department officers set up a perimeter checkpoint about three blocks away from a reported residential burglary. The BOLO described the burglary suspect as "a black male, approximately 5'11", and wearing a grey hooded sweatshirt." One of the officers testified that he and his colleague observed someone whom they believed matched this description, riding a bicycle without a front-facing headlight, in violation of section 316.2065(7), Florida Statutes (2018). This person was later identified as Defendant. The officers further observed Defendant riding his bicycle westbound from the area of the recently reported burglary, so they conducted a traffic stop at 1:24 a.m.In his Complaint, Watson alleges that Sullivan told him that he pulled Watson over because of an improper light on his bike, but Watson maintains that "the plaintiff had no lights." Complaint at 12. In his Response to the Motion, Watson now asserts that he had a small yellow flashlight that he placed on the handlebars of his bike to illuminate his path. Response at 2. However, in resolving a motion to dismiss, the Court limits its consideration to the facts as alleged in the operative complaint. See Sticher v. Indymac Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 1:13-CV-3961-RLV, 2014 WL 12284025, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 7, 2014) (noting that "it is well-established that a party cannot amend his or her complaint via legal argument in a response brief."); Lickerish, Ltd. v. Z Lifestyle, No. 18-80572-CIV, 2018 WL 8264631, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 12, 2018) (noting that "when evaluating a motion to dismiss, this Court looks to the facts alleged in the complaint, not the arguments in the plaintiff's response."). Accordingly, for purposes of resolving the Motion, the Court accepts Watson's allegation set forth in the Complaint that he did not have a light on the bike he was riding at night when he was stopped… In this case, the motor scooters at issue were within the statutory definition of a motorcycle for purposes of chapter 316, such that the City was limited to the powers in section 316.008 in dealing with traffic movement and control. On this point, the legislature recently made clear that the operation of motorized scooters is permissible and on par with bicycles in most respects such as operating on sidewalks and bicycle paths. Ch. 2019-109, § 3, Laws of Florida, ("Motor Vehicles-Micromobility Devices"); § 316.2128(1), Fla. Stat. (2019) ("The operator of a motorized scooter or micromobility device has all of the rights and duties applicable to the rider of a bicycle under s. 316.2065, except the duties imposed by s. 316.2065( 2), (3)(b), and (3)(c), which by their nature do not apply."). The recent legislation further provides that "this section [316.2128] may not be construed to prevent a local government, through the exercise of its powers under s. 316.008 , from adopting an ordinance governing the operation of micromobility devices and motorized scooters on streets, highways, sidewalks, and sidewalk areas under the local government's jurisdiction." … See § 316.2065(7), Fla. Stat. (2017) (requiring that each bicycle used between sunset and sunrise have a light visible from at least 500 feet).Florida Statue § 316.1925 requires that anyone operating a vehicle on Florida roads must do so in a "careful and prudent manner," while Florida Statute § 316.2065(1) provides that, generally, bicyclists have the same duties as drivers of other vehicles.. . . The circuit court reasoned that sections 316.0085 and 316.2065(11), Florida Statutes (2014), when read . . . The plaintiff primarily argues the circuit court erred by ruling that sections 316.0085 and 316.2065( . . . the extent he argues that section 316.0085 may be read on its own without consideration of section 316.2065 . . . In any event, to the extent the' circuit court’s ruling may have implicitly recognized that section 316.2065 . . . Section 316.2065(11) provides: No person upon roller skates, or riding in or by means of any coaster, . . . It concluded that the City was not liable as a matter of law based on section 316.2065, Florida Statutes . . . The City moved to dismiss based upon sections 316.0085 and 316.2065, Florida Statutes. . . . It argued that inline skating or rollerblading upon a roadway was prohibited under section 316.2065(11 . . . s ruling held as a matter of law that the City was not liable based upon a' reading of both section 316.2065 . . . Section 316.2065, entitled “Bicycle regulations[,]” is part of the Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law . . .
. . . . § 316.2065(19) (characterizing violations of the statute as noncriminal traffic infractions). . . .
. . . See § 316.2065(7), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .
. . . . § 316.2065 (listing regulations for bicycles); id. § 316.073 (noting regulations for animals and animal-drawn . . .
. . . . § 316.2065, which required having a visible light on his bicycle between sunset and sunrise, on the . . .
. . . . § 316.2065(5)(a). . . . .
. . . . § 316.2065 . See Fla. Stat. § 499.039. . See Fla. Stat. § 322.05. . See Fla. . . .
. . . . § 316.2065, Fla. Stat. (1997). . . .
. . . . § 316.2065(7), Fla. Stat. (1997). The officer was alone and did not draw his weapon. . . .
. . . attempting to stop ap-pellee for operating a bicycle without lights after dark in violation of section 316.2065 . . .
. . . . § 316.2065(1), Fla. Stat. (1989). . . .
. . . encompassing the following two statutes: Section 316.130(15), Florida Statutes (1989), and section 316.2065 . . . Section 316.2065(10), Florida Statutes (1989), provides as follows: A person propelling a vehicle by . . .
. . . The two disregarded a stop sign in violation of section 316.2065(1), Florida Statutes (1991). . . . Moreover, neither bicycle was equipped with lights as required by section 316.2065(8). . . .
. . . Section 316.2065, Florida Statutes, requires certain equipment (lights, reflectors, brakes) on bicycles . . .
. . . Chapter 316.2065 of the Florida Statutes is entitled “Bicycle Regulations” and contains all regulations . . .
. . . It is correct as the Appellee argues that according to F.S. 316.2065(1) the rights and duties of a bicyclist . . .
. . . In fact, section 316.2065(1), Fla.Stat. (1985), states that Every person propelling a vehicle by human . . . Since section 316.193 does not fall within the limited exceptions listed in section 316.2065, it is the . . .
. . . previously found in Section 316.111, Florida Statutes, and later transferred to and expanded in Section 316.2065 . . . criminal traffic offenses (misdemeanors) is further demonstrated by the changed language of Section 316.2065 . . . Section 316.2065 makes it clear that such devices are not “vehicles” but are subject to the statutory . . .
. . . Defendant cites 316.2065 F.S.A. which governs the operation of bicycles which does not include DUI jurisdiction . . . (c) 316.2065 F.S.A. (1985 edition) is a statute specifically provided to govern and control the use of . . . Although 316.2065 contains seventeen (17) sections mandating specific use of bicycles not one of those . . . sections addresses the problem to operate or pedal a bicycle while under the influence. 316.2065 also . . . Section 316.2065) does not include D.U.I. jurisdiction. 0) In Jimmy R. Velez v. Criterion Ins. . . .
. . . See, e.g., § 316.2065(14)-(15), Fla.Stat. (1981). . . . .
. . . violations bureau or clerk’s office: (1) One dollar for all infractions of bicycle regulations, section 316.2065 . . .
. . . Failure to have a lamp on one’s bicycle after sundown as required by section 316.2065(9), Florida Statutes . . . argument. .MacNeil was charged with a violation of § 316.111(9), Fla.Stat. (1975), now renumbered § 316.2065 . . .
. . . violations bureau or clerk’s office: (1) One dollar for all infractions of bicycle regulations, section 316.2065 . . .