Florida Statutes
Fla. Stat. § 316.2953 (2025)
Side windows; restrictions on sunscreening material.
✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session
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316.2953 Side windows; restrictions on sunscreening material.—A person shall not operate any motor vehicle on any public highway, road, or street on which vehicle the side wings and side windows on either side forward of or adjacent to the operator’s seat are composed of, covered by, or treated with any sunscreening material or other product or covering which has the effect of making the window nontransparent or which would alter the window’s color, increase its reflectivity, or reduce its light transmittance, except as expressly permitted by this section. A sunscreening material is authorized for such windows if, when applied to and tested on the glass of such windows on the specific motor vehicle, the material has a total solar reflectance of visible light of not more than 25 percent as measured on the nonfilm side and a light transmittance of at least 28 percent in the visible light range. A violation of this section is a noncriminal traffic infraction, punishable as a nonmoving violation as provided in chapter 318.
Civil Citations under F.S. 316.2953
Driver's license points · R = revocation · S = suspension§316.2953TINT - SIDE WINDOWS - restriction on sunscreen material
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 20
cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1990–2025 · leading case: United States v. Frantz Pierre, 825 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2016).
United States v. Frantz Pierre, 825 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2016). “See Fla. Stat. § 316.2953 . The district court conducted an eviden-tiary hearing on the motions to suppress and found probable cause existed for the traffic stop.”
Dorelus v. State, 747 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1999). “Section 316.2953 provides that the side windows of an automobile may only have a coating or tinting with a "solar reflectance on visible light of not more than 25 percent as measured on the nonfilm side and a light transmittance of at least 28 percent in the visible light range.”
United States v. Larry Dwayne Leonard, 356 F. App'x 231 (11th Cir. 2009). “Fla. Stat. § 316.2953 . Here, Leonard did not raise any argument before the district court that his car windows were not excessively tinted, or that the tint of his windows, even if excessive, did not justify a traffic stop.”
State v. Petion, 992 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). “See § 316.2953, Fla. Stat. (2005). Mr. Petion explained that he had been stopped for the same violation two days earlier in Miami and showed the sergeant the citation from Miami.”
United States v. Jophaney Hyppolite, 609 F. App'x 597 (11th Cir. 2015). “2005) (citing Fla. Stat. § 316.2953 ) (unpublished but cited for persuasive value).”
United States v. Lysander Anthony Weaver, 145 F. App'x 639 (11th Cir. 2005). “” Fla. Stat. § 316.2953 . Defendant argues that the statutory language shows that an officer cannot stop a vehicle solely on the basis of the window-tint statute without knowing the vehicle’s exact light transmittance percentage.”
Vaughn v. State, 176 So. 3d 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). “See § 316.2953, Fla. Stat. (2014) (making it a noncriminal traffic infraction for operating a motor vehicle with side windows tinted beyond a .”
Lawrence v. State, 942 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). “§ 316.2953, Fla. Stat. (2005). Defendant then leaps from that observation to argue that the statutory text "behind the driver" in section 316.”
Classy Cycles, Inc. v. Bay Cnty., 201 So. 3d 779 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). “294 (mirrors), § 316,2952 (windshields), § 316.2953 (side windows), § 316.2954 (windows behind driver), § 316.”
United States v. Antwan D. Jackson, 558 F. App'x 932 (11th Cir. 2014). “Fla. Stat. § 316.2953 . There are exceptions for people with certain medical conditions, law enforcement canine units, and licensed private investigators.”
Johnson v. Broward Cnty. Sheriff (S.D. Fla. 2020). “” Fla. Stat. § 316.2953 . Taking the Amended Complaint’s factual averments as true, therefore, the Deputies had “arguable probable cause” to stop Johnson’s truck.”
Alexander v. Orlando Police Dep't (M.D. Fla. 2025). “4§ 316.2953, Fla Stat. 5 The video appears to show the meter as reading twenty-six percent when it was first inserted into the driver’s side window.”
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