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Florida Statute 349.03 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 349.03 Case Law from Google Scholar
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Link to State of Florida Official Statute Google Search for Amendments to 349.03

The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
Title XXVI
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
Chapter 349
JACKSONVILLE TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 349.03
349.03 Jacksonville Transportation Authority.—
(1) There is hereby created and established a body politic and corporate and an agency of the state to be known as the Jacksonville Expressway Authority, redesignated as the Jacksonville Transportation Authority, and hereinafter referred to as the “authority.”
(2) The governing body of the authority shall consist of seven members. Three members shall be appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate. Three members shall be appointed by the mayor of the City of Jacksonville subject to confirmation by the council of the City of Jacksonville. The seventh member shall be the district secretary of the Department of Transportation serving in the district that contains the City of Jacksonville. Except for the seventh member, members shall be residents and qualified electors of Duval County.
(3)(a) The terms of appointed members shall be for 4 years deemed to have commenced on June 1 of the year in which they are appointed. Each member shall hold office until a successor has been appointed and has qualified. A vacancy during a term shall be filled by the respective appointing authority only for the balance of the unexpired term. Any member appointed to the authority for two consecutive full terms shall not be eligible for appointment to the next succeeding term. One of the members so appointed shall be designated annually by the members as chair of the authority, one member shall be designated annually as the vice chair of the authority, one member shall be designated annually as the secretary of the authority, and one member shall be designated annually as the treasurer of the authority. The members of the authority shall not be entitled to compensation, but shall be reimbursed for travel expenses or other expenses actually incurred in their duties as provided by law. Four voting members of the authority shall constitute a quorum, and no resolution adopted by the authority shall become effective unless with the affirmative vote of at least four members. Members of the authority shall file as their mandatory financial disclosure a statement of financial interest with the Commission on Ethics as provided in s. 112.3145.
(b) The authority shall employ an executive director, and the executive director may hire such staff, permanent or temporary, as he or she may determine and may organize the staff of the authority into such departments and units as he or she may determine. The executive director may appoint department directors, deputy directors, division chiefs, and staff assistants to the executive director, as he or she may determine. In so appointing the executive director, the authority may fix the compensation of such appointee, who shall serve at the pleasure of the authority. All employees of the authority shall be exempt from the provisions of part II of chapter 110. The authority may employ such financial advisers and consultants, technical experts, engineers, and agents and employees, permanent or temporary, as it may require and may fix the compensation and qualifications of such persons, firms, or corporations. The authority may delegate to one or more of its agents or employees such of its powers as it shall deem necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter, subject always to the supervision and control of the governing body of the authority.
History.—s. 3, ch. 29996, 1955; s. 19, ch. 63-400; s. 1, ch. 67-542; ss. 23, 35, ch. 69-106; s. 1, ch. 70-381; s. 2, ch. 71-101; s. 1, ch. 79-409; s. 209, ch. 81-259; s. 1, ch. 85-263; s. 11, ch. 88-215; s. 525, ch. 95-148; s. 50, ch. 2002-1; s. 4, ch. 2007-196; s. 2, ch. 2009-111; s. 71, ch. 2012-174.

F.S. 349.03 on Google Scholar

F.S. 349.03 on Casetext

Amendments to 349.03


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 349.03
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 349.03.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

10 Cases from Casetext:Date Descending

U.S. Supreme Court11th Cir. - Ct. App.11th Cir. - MD FL11th Cir. - ND FL11th Cir. - SD FLFed. Reg.Secondary Sources - All

  1. Keck v. Eminisor

    104 So. 3d 359 (Fla. 2012)   Cited 74 times
    Under this structure, all parties agree that JTA falls within the definition of a state agency. In fact, section 349.03(1), Florida Statutes, expressly designates JTA as “a body politic and corporate and an agency of the state.” § 349.03(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). The question, however, is whether JTM fits under the third category, which expressly includes “corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities ... of the state.” § 768.28(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). Keck argues that JTM is included because it is a corporation primarily acting as an instrumentality of JTA, a state agency. However, the trial court ruled that while JTA is an independent establishment of the State and thus is entitled to sovereign immunity, the same cannot be said as to JTM because the statutory definition in section 768.28(2) does not expressly include corporations that are acting primarily as instrumentalities or agencies of independent establishments of the State. Eminisor asserts that the trial court's construction of the statute was correct. We disagree.
    PAGE 367

  2. Keck v. Eminisor

    46 So. 3d 1065 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 5 times   1 Legal Analyses
    The hyper-technical interpretation of section 768.28(2) adopted by the trial court is inconsistent with the principal that section 768.28 should be construed in favor of the state because sovereign immunity is the rule, rather than the exception. See generally Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 908 So.2d 459, 471-72 (Fla. 2005); Pan-Am, Tobacco Corp. v. Dep't of Corr., 471 So.2d 4, 5 (Fla. 1984); Windham v. Fla. Dep't of Transp., 476 So.2d 735, 739 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The trial court's conclusion that section 768.28(2) does not encompass corporations acting as instrumentalities of "independent establishments of the state" is also inconsistent with cases such as Pagan v. Sarasota County Public Hospital Board in which the Second District held that a corporation acting as an instrumentality of a hospital district, an independent establishment of the state, is entitled to sovereign immunity and PRIDE in which this court held that a corporation acting as an instrumentality of a state agency — the Department of Corrections — was entitled to sovereign immunity. See also Stoll v. Noel, 694 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1997) (holding that physicians who contracted with the state to…

  3. Cianbro Corp. v. Jacksonville Transp

    473 So. 2d 206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 2 times
    Subsequent to JTA's entry of its notice of intent to award contract to other bidders, petitioners filed a notice of protest, thereby staying the contract award. See § 120.53(5)(c), F.S. (1983). However, pursuant to the provisions of Section 120.53(5)(c), JTA entered the "Notice Regarding Contract Award Process." This notice, if adequate under the statute, would operate to override the statutory stay provision. Petitioners assert that this notice is deficient on two grounds: (1) that it fails to state with sufficient particularity facts and circumstances showing that an immediate and serious danger to the public health, safety or welfare would exist; and (2) that it is procedurally deficient because not promulgated by the "agency head" within the meaning of Sections 120.53(5)(c), 120.52(3), and 349.03( 2), Florida Statutes (1983). We agree with petitioners that the facts and circumstances stated in the notice are insufficient to overcome the stay provisions of Section 120.53(5)(c). In so ruling we have considered the notice in the context of the proceedings in which the same was issued, as appears without dispute in the pleadings filed by the several parties before this…

  4. State v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority

    139 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1962)   Cited 11 times
    Jurisdiction to entertain an original proceeding in quo warranto stems from Article V, Section 4, Florida Constitution, F.S.A. By Section 349.03, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the respondent is created and established as "a body politic and corporate and agency of the state * * *." It is a proper function of the Attorney General, in the interest of the public, to test the exercise, or threatened exercise, of power by such a corporate state agency through the process of a quo warranto proceeding. State ex rel. Moodie v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 929; State ex rel. Davis v. Rose, 97 Fla. 710, 122 So. 225.
    PAGE 137

    Cases from cite.case.law:

    IN RE BEAIRD,, 578 B.R. 643 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2017)

    . . . No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 49. . 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 349.03[2] at 349-14 (Alan N. . . .

    In C. WARD. In R. S. C., 523 B.R. 142 (E.D. Wis. 2014)

    . . . commencement of a case that was dismissed.’ ” (In re Ward, 511 B.R. at 918 (quoting 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 349.03 . . .

    In C. WARD, D. In R., 511 B.R. 909 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2014)

    . . . positions they occupied at the commencement of a case that was dismissed”. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 349.03 . . .

    KECK, v. K. EMINISOR,, 104 So. 3d 359 (Fla. 2012)

    . . . In fact, section 349.03(1), Florida Statutes, expressly designates JTA as “a body politic and corporate . . . and an agency of the state.” § 349.03(1), Fla. . . .

    In MILLARD, Sr. v. Sr., 414 B.R. 73 (D. Md. 2009)

    . . . See 8 Collier on Bankruptcy P 349.03 ("[S]ection 349(b) [of the Bankruptcy Code] specifies that the dismissal . . .

    In M. CARELS M. M. M. v. M. M. C. M. M., 416 B.R. 153 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009)

    . . . Bankr.M.D.Fla.1997); In re Boggs, 137 B.R. 408, 411 (Bankr.W.D.Wash.1992); 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 349.03 . . .

    In PARKER,, 400 B.R. 55 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009)

    . . . See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 349.03[1] (15th ed. rev. 2008). . . . .

    In QUIGLEY, 391 B.R. 294 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2008)

    . . . . § 349(b); 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 349.03[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. . . .

    In B. FAUST, B. v., 353 B.R. 94 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006)

    . . . . ¶349.03[1]. . . .

    In A. CAMACHO A. A. A. v. f k a, 311 B.R. 186 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2004)

    . . . case that was dismissed under one of the operative sections of Title 11.” 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 349.03 . . .

    In JGC ENTERPRISES, LLC. v. JGC LLC. In JGC LLC. v. JGC LLC,, 40 F. App'x 561 (9th Cir. 2002)

    . . . 349 ordinarily means that dismissal does not affect the omitted order); 3 Collier on Bankruptcy UK 349.03 . . .

    UNITED STATES v. RAMIREZ, 291 B.R. 386 (N.D. Tex. 2002)

    . . . Collier on Bankruptcy, vol. 3, ¶ 349.03[1] (15th rev. ed.2001). 4. . . .

    In T. NAGEL, v. T., 245 B.R. 657 (D. Ariz. 1999)

    . . . See generally, 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, § 349.03 (15th ed.1995); In re Lewis & Coulter, Inc., 159 B.R . . .

    In SHEA GOULD,, 214 B.R. 739 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)

    . . . appropriate to protect rights acquired in reliance on the title 11 case.” 3 Collier On Bankruptcy ¶349.03 . . . See In re Searles, 70 B.R. 266, 270 (D.R.I.1987); see also 3 Collier On Bankruptcy ¶ 349.03[2] at p. . . .

    In O PEARSON, 214 B.R. 156 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1997)

    . . . furthers the goal of § 349(b) to undo the bankruptcy case upon dismissal. 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, § 349.03 . . .

    In STOBER, 193 B.R. 5 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1996)

    . . . See generally, 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 349.03 (15th ed. 1995); In re Lewis & Coulter, Inc., 159 B.R . . .

    S. HILDERBRAND v. UNITED STATES, 905 F. Supp. 774 (E.D. Cal. 1995)

    . . . case that was dismissed under one of the operative sections of Title 11.” 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 349.03 . . .

    In BELMONT REALTY CORPORATION, RHODE ISLAND HOSPITAL TRUST NATIONAL BANK, v. Y. BOGOSIAN,, 11 F.3d 1092 (1st Cir. 1993)

    . . . See 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 349.03 & nn. 4a, 4b (1993); Bankruptcy Service, L.Ed. § 3C:99 (1989). . . .

    In BELMONT REALTY CORPORATION, RHODE ISLAND HOSPITAL TRUST NATIONAL BANK, v. V. BOGOSIAN,, 11 F.3d 1092 (1st Cir. 1993)

    . . . See 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 349.03 & nn. 4a, 4b (1993); Bankruptcy Service, L.Ed. § 3C:99 (1989). . . .

    In LOPEZ DEVELOPMENT, INC. a In FLIPPERS MANAGEMENT, a, 154 B.R. 607 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993)

    . . . See 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, § 349.03 n. 4c (15th ed. 1992) (citing cases) (“[C]ourts have refused to . . .

    In MULBERRY CHESTERTON INN, L. P. BUCKHEAD AMERICAN CORPORATION, v. MULBERRY CHESTERTON INN, L. P., 142 B.R. 566 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1992)

    . . . reinstatement effect of Section 349(b) beyond its expressly enumerated provisions.” 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 349.03 . . .

    UNITED STATES v. STANDARD STATE BANK,, 91 B.R. 874 (W.D. Mo. 1988)

    . . . referring to reinstatement of “all property rights," that does not appear in the 1988 edition under ¶ 349.03 . . .

    In MEL- O- GOLD, INC., 88 B.R. 205 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1988)

    . . . commencement of a case that was dismissed under one of the operative sections of title 11.” 2 Collier § 349.03 . . .

    In DIAMOND LUMBER, INC. No. A- v. UNSECURED CREDITORS COMMITTEE OF DIAMOND LUMBER, INC., 88 B.R. 773 (N.D. Tex. 1988)

    . . . Page two of the Schedule reveals an April 21,1987 payment to Akin, Gump in the amount of $347,-349.03 . . .

    In A. SAFREN, I., 65 B.R. 566 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986)

    . . . , insofar as is practicable, to their positions when the case was filed. 2 Collier on Bankruptcy II 349.03 . . .

    In BSL OPERATING CORP. BSL OPERATING CORP. v. EAST TAVERNS, INC., 57 B.R. 945 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986)

    . . . commencement of a case that was dismissed under one of the operative sections of title 11.” 2 Collier ¶ 349.03 . . .

    CIANBRO CORPORATION, v. JACKSONVILLE TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, AL JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a v. STATE F., 473 So. 2d 206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

    . . . because not promulgated by the “agency head” within the meaning of Sections 120.53(5)(c), 120.52(3), and 349.03 . . .

    In J. MASON, J. MASON, v. INTEGRITY INSURANCE COMPANY, 709 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir. 1983)

    . . . No. 595, supra, at 338; 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra, at ¶ 349.03 (dismissal of a case re-vests the . . .

    In J. MASON, J. MASON, v. INTEGRITY INSURANCE COMPANY, 709 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir. 1983)

    . . . No. 595, supra, at 338; 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra, at ¶ 349.03 (dismissal of a ease re-vests the . . .

    In GROVES a k a K. a k a M., 27 B.R. 866 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983)

    . . . rights, ... to the positions they occupied at the commencement of a case.... ” 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 349.03 . . .

    CLARENCE LaBELLE POST NO. VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF UNITED STATES, v. UNITED STATES, 580 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1978)

    . . . The taxpayer’s bingo games were governed by Minnesota Statutes Annotated, Sections 349.01 through 349.03 . . . Minn.Stat.Annot. § 349.03 (1974). . . .

    s v., 65 T.C. 620 (T.C. 1975)

    . . . Ann. secs. 349.01-349.03) exempt bingo conducted by charitable organizations from the prohibitions against . . .

    STATE W. ERVIN, v. JACKSONVILLE EXPRESSWAY AUTHORITY, a L. H. C., 139 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1962)

    . . . By Section 349.03, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the respondent is created and established as “a body politic . . .