The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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Under this structure, all parties agree that JTA falls within the definition of a state agency. In fact, section 349.03(1), Florida Statutes, expressly designates JTA as “a body politic and corporate and an agency of the state.” § 349.03(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). The question, however, is whether JTM fits under the third category, which expressly includes “corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities ... of the state.” § 768.28(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). Keck argues that JTM is included because it is a corporation primarily acting as an instrumentality of JTA, a state agency. However, the trial court ruled that while JTA is an independent establishment of the State and thus is entitled to sovereign immunity, the same cannot be said as to JTM because the statutory definition in section 768.28(2) does not expressly include corporations that are acting primarily as instrumentalities or agencies of independent establishments of the State. Eminisor asserts that the trial court's construction of the statute was correct. We disagree.
The hyper-technical interpretation of section 768.28(2) adopted by the trial court is inconsistent with the principal that section 768.28 should be construed in favor of the state because sovereign immunity is the rule, rather than the exception. See generally Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 908 So.2d 459, 471-72 (Fla. 2005); Pan-Am, Tobacco Corp. v. Dep't of Corr., 471 So.2d 4, 5 (Fla. 1984); Windham v. Fla. Dep't of Transp., 476 So.2d 735, 739 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The trial court's conclusion that section 768.28(2) does not encompass corporations acting as instrumentalities of "independent establishments of the state" is also inconsistent with cases such as Pagan v. Sarasota County Public Hospital Board in which the Second District held that a corporation acting as an instrumentality of a hospital district, an independent establishment of the state, is entitled to sovereign immunity and PRIDE in which this court held that a corporation acting as an instrumentality of a state agency — the Department of Corrections — was entitled to sovereign immunity. See also Stoll v. Noel, 694 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1997) (holding that physicians who contracted with the state to…
Subsequent to JTA's entry of its notice of intent to award contract to other bidders, petitioners filed a notice of protest, thereby staying the contract award. See § 120.53(5)(c), F.S. (1983). However, pursuant to the provisions of Section 120.53(5)(c), JTA entered the "Notice Regarding Contract Award Process." This notice, if adequate under the statute, would operate to override the statutory stay provision. Petitioners assert that this notice is deficient on two grounds: (1) that it fails to state with sufficient particularity facts and circumstances showing that an immediate and serious danger to the public health, safety or welfare would exist; and (2) that it is procedurally deficient because not promulgated by the "agency head" within the meaning of Sections 120.53(5)(c), 120.52(3), and 349.03( 2), Florida Statutes (1983). We agree with petitioners that the facts and circumstances stated in the notice are insufficient to overcome the stay provisions of Section 120.53(5)(c). In so ruling we have considered the notice in the context of the proceedings in which the same was issued, as appears without dispute in the pleadings filed by the several parties before this…
Jurisdiction to entertain an original proceeding in quo warranto stems from Article V, Section 4, Florida Constitution, F.S.A. By Section 349.03, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the respondent is created and established as "a body politic and corporate and agency of the state * * *." It is a proper function of the Attorney General, in the interest of the public, to test the exercise, or threatened exercise, of power by such a corporate state agency through the process of a quo warranto proceeding. State ex rel. Moodie v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 929; State ex rel. Davis v. Rose, 97 Fla. 710, 122 So. 225.
. . . No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 49. . 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 349.03[2] at 349-14 (Alan N. . . .
. . . commencement of a case that was dismissed.’ ” (In re Ward, 511 B.R. at 918 (quoting 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 349.03 . . .
. . . positions they occupied at the commencement of a case that was dismissed”. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 349.03 . . .
. . . In fact, section 349.03(1), Florida Statutes, expressly designates JTA as “a body politic and corporate . . . and an agency of the state.” § 349.03(1), Fla. . . .
. . . See 8 Collier on Bankruptcy P 349.03 ("[S]ection 349(b) [of the Bankruptcy Code] specifies that the dismissal . . .
. . . Bankr.M.D.Fla.1997); In re Boggs, 137 B.R. 408, 411 (Bankr.W.D.Wash.1992); 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 349.03 . . .
. . . See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 349.03[1] (15th ed. rev. 2008). . . . .
. . . . § 349(b); 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 349.03[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. . . .
. . . . ¶349.03[1]. . . .
. . . case that was dismissed under one of the operative sections of Title 11.” 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 349.03 . . .
. . . 349 ordinarily means that dismissal does not affect the omitted order); 3 Collier on Bankruptcy UK 349.03 . . .
. . . Collier on Bankruptcy, vol. 3, ¶ 349.03[1] (15th rev. ed.2001). 4. . . .
. . . See generally, 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, § 349.03 (15th ed.1995); In re Lewis & Coulter, Inc., 159 B.R . . .
. . . appropriate to protect rights acquired in reliance on the title 11 case.” 3 Collier On Bankruptcy ¶349.03 . . . See In re Searles, 70 B.R. 266, 270 (D.R.I.1987); see also 3 Collier On Bankruptcy ¶ 349.03[2] at p. . . .
. . . furthers the goal of § 349(b) to undo the bankruptcy case upon dismissal. 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, § 349.03 . . .
. . . See generally, 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 349.03 (15th ed. 1995); In re Lewis & Coulter, Inc., 159 B.R . . .
. . . case that was dismissed under one of the operative sections of Title 11.” 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 349.03 . . .
. . . See 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 349.03 & nn. 4a, 4b (1993); Bankruptcy Service, L.Ed. § 3C:99 (1989). . . .
. . . See 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 349.03 & nn. 4a, 4b (1993); Bankruptcy Service, L.Ed. § 3C:99 (1989). . . .
. . . See 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, § 349.03 n. 4c (15th ed. 1992) (citing cases) (“[C]ourts have refused to . . .
. . . reinstatement effect of Section 349(b) beyond its expressly enumerated provisions.” 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 349.03 . . .
. . . referring to reinstatement of “all property rights," that does not appear in the 1988 edition under ¶ 349.03 . . .
. . . commencement of a case that was dismissed under one of the operative sections of title 11.” 2 Collier § 349.03 . . .
. . . Page two of the Schedule reveals an April 21,1987 payment to Akin, Gump in the amount of $347,-349.03 . . .
. . . , insofar as is practicable, to their positions when the case was filed. 2 Collier on Bankruptcy II 349.03 . . .
. . . commencement of a case that was dismissed under one of the operative sections of title 11.” 2 Collier ¶ 349.03 . . .
. . . because not promulgated by the “agency head” within the meaning of Sections 120.53(5)(c), 120.52(3), and 349.03 . . .
. . . No. 595, supra, at 338; 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra, at ¶ 349.03 (dismissal of a case re-vests the . . .
. . . No. 595, supra, at 338; 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra, at ¶ 349.03 (dismissal of a ease re-vests the . . .
. . . rights, ... to the positions they occupied at the commencement of a case.... ” 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 349.03 . . .
. . . The taxpayer’s bingo games were governed by Minnesota Statutes Annotated, Sections 349.01 through 349.03 . . . Minn.Stat.Annot. § 349.03 (1974). . . .
. . . Ann. secs. 349.01-349.03) exempt bingo conducted by charitable organizations from the prohibitions against . . .
. . . By Section 349.03, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the respondent is created and established as “a body politic . . .