Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...ld Dr. Stinson that he “didn’t remember very much at all about it.” Dr. Stinson ultimately diagnosed Turner as suffering from a “dissociative reaction,” which he described as a “type of amnesia.” Dr. 7 Florida Statute § 394.467, known as the Baker Act, allows a person to be placed involuntarily in a treatment facility if clear and convincing evidence indicates that the person is mentally ill, and, inter alia, there is a substantial likelihood that, based on recent behavior, the person will inflict serious bodily harm on himself or another person. Fla. Stat. § 394.467(1)(a). 18 Stinson based his diagnosis in large part on Turner remembering that, during the stabbing, his wife had “no face.” Dr....

...(2) If the court decides that the defendant is sane, it shall proceed to trial. (3) If the Court decides that the defendant is insane, it shall commit him or her to the Division of Mental Health for hospitalization under the provisions of Fla. Stat. § 394.467, F.S.A....

...T COMMITMENT PRIOR TO DISPOSITION OF THE APPEAL ON THE MERITS, WHAT SHOWING MUST SHE MAKE TO AVOID DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL ON GROUNDS OF MOOTNESS? We rephrase the question as follows: Does an appeal from a civil commitment order under The Baker Act, section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1989), become moot solely because the person subject to that order has already been released? We granted jurisdiction, pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution, and answer the question in the negative....

...5), provides in pertinent part: "Relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." [14] § 394.467, Fla....

...Hubbart, Public Defender, and Paul Morris, Asst. Public Defender, for Preer Beverly. Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Margarita Esquiroz, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State of Florida. ADKINS, Justice. This is a direct appeal from the Circuit Court of Dade County which held that Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1973), was constitutional. We have jurisdiction. Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution. The pertinent portions of the statute under attack read as follows: "394.467 Involuntary hospitalization (1) Criteria....

...spitalization of respondent. A hearing on the involuntary hospitalization *484 petition was held on June 26, 1975, and resulted in an order requiring respondent to be hospitalized involuntarily. The judge specifically upheld the constitutionality of Section 394.467(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1973)....

...Furthermore, once a finding of mental illness is made, it would be impossible not to find that the individual is in need of care." 339 A.2d 764 at 777-78. It is elementary that statutes may properly authorize the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill when the term "mentally ill" is given a satisfactory legal meaning. Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes, quoted above, imparts a sufficient legal meaning to the term "mental illness" by setting criteria....

...glect or refusal poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to his *486 well-being, and that he is incompetent to determine for himself whether treatment for his mental illness would be desirable." At 390-91. Standards analogous to those in Section 394.467, Florida Statutes, have been expressly sanctioned by federal and state courts and upheld when attacked on the ground of vagueness....

...that it is compatible with the best interests of the affected class and that its members are unable to act for themselves. Cf. Mormon Church v. United States, supra . " 422 U.S. 563 at 583, 95 S.Ct. 2486 at 2498, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (concurring opinion). Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1973), has withstood the attack of vagueness and overbreadth....

...nds should never be hospitalized involuntarily. The trial court denied appellant's motion to apply the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the court used the standard of clear and convincing evidence. Appellant says this was error. Section 394.467(3)(a), Florida Statutes, merely provides that if "the court concludes that the patient meets the criteria for involuntary hospitalization, the judge shall order the patient to be transferred to a treatment facility." The statute is silent regarding the burden of proof required....

...dmissible only on issues involving the patient's mental condition." Section 90.242(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1973). Prior to the examination appellant was advised that anything be said at that time could be used against him at the subsequent hearing. Section 394.467(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1973), provides that in proceedings for involuntary hospitalization one of the physicians who executed the hospitalization certificate shall be a witness at the hearing on hospitalization....

...Cottone’s Detention On March 9, 1999, Cottone was involved in a physical altercation with his father, Peter Cottone, Sr. As a result of this violent incident, Cottone involuntarily was transported to Memorial Hospital in Bro-ward County, Florida under Florida Statute § 394.467, for observation and evaluation....

...inimum medical care requirements, and availability of recreational activities. B. Charles’s Detention On March 1, 1999, Widnel Charles (“Charles”) was arrested. Prior to his arrest, Charles had been detained involuntarily under Florida Statute § 394.467 on numerous occasions due to his violent tendencies and a history of schizophrenia....

...Because we must accept the allegations of plaintiffs' amended complaint as true, what we set out in this opinion as "the facts” for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes may not be the actual facts. Cf. Swint v. City of Wadley, 51 F.3d 988, 992 (11th Cir.1995), . Florida Statute § 394.467, known as the "Baker Act,” allows a person to be placed involuntarily in a treatment facility if clear and convincing evidence indicates that the person is mentally ill, and, inter alia, there is a substantial likelihood that, based on recent behavior, the person will inflict serious bodily harm on himself or another person. Fla. Stat. § 394.467 (l)(a)....

...ikely" as "having a better chance of existing or occurring than not." [11] We turn next to the definitions in the case law. The Florida Supreme Court in In re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481 (Fla.1977) was confronted with determining the constitutionality of section 394.467, Florida Statute (1973) which provided that "[a] person may be involuntarily hospitalized if he is mentally ill and because of his illness is (a) likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty, or (b) in need of ca...

...tutionally vague. The court held that the statute was constitutional and stated: It is elementary that statutes may properly authorize the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill when the term `mentally ill' is given a satisfactory Legal meaning. Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes, quoted above, imparts a sufficient Legal meaning to the term `mental illness' by setting criteria....

...at 485 (emphasis supplied). In Hill v. State, 358 So.2d 190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), the court addressed the appropriate standard that should be applied to the release of the criminally insane. The court held that the "likely-to-injure" standard under section 394.467(1)(a) as opposed to the "manifestly dangerous to others" standard under rule 3.460, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure, is the appropriate standard....

...isting or occurring than not" as argued by the appellant would add nothing to the plain and common meaning of the term and would be unnecessary. [12] In Thomas v. State, 443 So.2d 406 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), the court noted that the Legislature amended section 394.467 to embrace the "manifestly dangerous" test....

...We have for review M.W. v. Davis, 722 So.2d 966 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), a decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal that certified the following question to be one of great public importance: IS A HEARING WHICH COMPLIES WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTIONS 39.407(4) AND 394.467(1), FLORIDA STATUTES, NECESSARY WHEN A COURT ORDERS THAT A CHILD BE PLACED IN A RESIDENTIAL FACILITY FOR MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT, WHERE THE CHILD HAS BEEN COMMITTED TO THE LEGAL CUSTODY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, AND THE DEPARTMENT IS SEEKING RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT? M.W....

...V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed in this opinion, we conclude that neither the statutory framework of Chapter 39 nor the Constitution requires an evidentiary hearing that complies with the substantive and procedural requirements of section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1997), part of the Baker Act, [1] prior to a court ordering that a dependent child in the temporary legal custody of the Department of Children and Families ("the Department") be placed in a residential mental health facility....

...argued that the dependency judge's order constituted an involuntary commitment to a mental health facility requiring an evidentiary hearing under section 39.407(4), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998), and the Baker Act, specifically sections 394.463 and 394.467, Florida Statutes (1997). In its original opinion, the Fourth District granted the writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that section 39.407(4) requires the Department to comply with the procedures required by sections 394.463 and 394.467 of the Baker Act before placing a dependent child in psychiatric residential treatment....

...The judge may also order such child to receive mental health or retardation services from a psychiatrist, psychologist, or other appropriate service provider. If it is necessary to place the child in a residential facility for such services, then the procedures and criteria established in s. 394.467 [the Baker Act] or chapter 393 shall be used, whichever is applicable....

...r Act is an entirely new proceeding separate from the dependency proceeding, where the treatment facility brings the petition, the public defender represents the patient, and the state attorney represents the State as the real party in interest. See § 394.467(3)-(4), (6)(a)1....

...sychologist or psychiatrist, the court must hold a hearing and the treatment facility must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that the patient is mentally ill and either cannot care for himself or is likely to "inflict serous bodily harm." See § 394.467(1), (6)....

...County Legal Aid Society, proper procedures exercised by the dependency court before placing a dependent child into a residential psychiatric treatment facility will better assure the child's safety and mental health than the procedures required by section 394.467(1)....

...s to place M.W. in residential treatment were motivated by anything other than concern for M.W.'s best interests. [6] Although M.W. points out that the court's signed order made explicit reference to sections 39.407, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998) and 394.467, Florida Statutes (1997), we do not deem that fact dispositive of the issue in this case....

...Cottone’s Detention On March 9, 1999, Cottone was involved in a physical altercation with his father, Peter Cottone, Sr. As a result of this violent incident, Cottone involuntarily was transported to Memorial Hospital in Broward County, Florida under Florida Statute § 394.467, for observation and evaluation.2 On March 14, 1999, Cottone was moved to the Broward County Jail and was booked, assessed, and classified. As a result of the assessment and classification, Cottone was transferred from the Broward Count...

...Because we must accept the allegations of plaintiffs’ amended complaint as true, what we set out in this opinion as “the facts” for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes may not be the actual facts. Cf. Swint v. City of Wadley, 51 F.3d 988, 992 (11th Cir. 1995). 2 Florida Statute § 394.467, known as the “Baker Act,” allows a person to be placed involuntarily in a treatment facility if clear and convincing evidence indicates that the person is mentally ill, and, inter alia, there is a substantial likelihood that, based on recent behavior, the person will inflict serious bodily harm on himself or another person. Fla. Stat. § 394.467(1)(a). 3 to a consent decree stemming from Carruthers v....

...l care requirements, and availability of recreational activities. B. Charles’s Detention On March 1, 1999, Widnel Charles (“Charles”) was arrested. Prior to his arrest, Charles had been detained involuntarily under Florida Statute § 394.467 on numerous occasions due to his violent tendencies and a history of schizophrenia. While in the booking area of the Broward County Jail on March 1, Charles struck another inmate....

...nts is to avoid tying mentally ill or deficient defendants in the criminal justice system to civil commitment procedures in the "Baker Act." Reference to commitment of a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity has been removed from Section 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...Petitioners were involuntarily committed to the Florida State Mental Hospital pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 394, Florida Statutes (1975), the Baker Act. When the hospital desired to continue petitioners' involuntary hospitalization beyond the initial six-month commitment authorized by Section 394.467(3), Florida Statutes (1975), each petitioner was granted a hearing before a hearing officer for the Department of Administration, as provided by Section 394.467(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1975). Petitioners were adjudged insolvent and, as provided by Section 394.467(4)(e), were represented by the public defender at their respective hearings....

...1428, 1435-1436, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). Commitment must be justified on the basis of a legitimate state interest, and the reasons for committing a particular individual must be established in an appropriate proceeding. A transcript of the hearing provided by Section 394.467(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), upon which an order requiring continued involuntary hospitalization is based, is necessary for meaningful appellate review....

...the appeal to be frivolous, it may affirm. If, however, it finds an arguable (i.e., nonfrivolous) issue, it orders briefing on that issue. See id. at 1074-76; see also Robbins, 528 U.S. at 265, 120 S.Ct. 746 (explaining the Wende procedure). [3] See § 394.467(4), Fla....

...n. The law enforcement officer shall execute a written report detailing the circumstances under which the person was taken into custody. The report and certificate shall be made a part of the patient's clinical record. § 394.463, Fla. Stat. (1985). Section 394.467 specifies the procedures for involuntary commitment under similar circumstances....

...l defendant is sent should not vary greatly from procedures common to the institution in the involuntary hospitalization or residential treatment of those not subject to criminal charges. The criteria for involuntary hospitalization are set forth in section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...tent to stand trial but does not meet the provisions for involuntary hospitalization. It is meant to provide as great a flexibility as possible for the trial judge in handling such defendant. *1267 As to criteria for involuntary hospitalization, see section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...ent to stand trial or in the safeguard of Florida's insurers to those subjected to involuntary commitment." Id. 106 S.Ct. at 2606 n. 4. (citing Fla.Stat.Ann. § 916.11-916.12 (West 1985 and Supplement 1986) (competency to stand trial); Fla.Stat.Ann. § 394.467 (West Supplement 1986) (involuntary commitment proceedings))....

...§§ 916.11-916.12, an evidentiary hearing is required to determine the competency of a defendant to stand trial if reasonable grounds exist to believe a defendant is incompetent. See Walker v. State, 384 So.2d 730 (Fla.App.1980). Similarly, under Fla.Stat. § 394.467(3)(a), a hearing is required to determine whether an incapacitated person is involuntarily placed in a mental health facility....

...but separates it into manageable parts, which are: First, is the determinative standard whether Hill if released would be manifestly dangerous to others, or is it rather whether he would be likely to injure another? Compare Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.460 with Section 394.467(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), and Fla.R.Crim.P....

...es in accomplishing their difficult task in these cases. Standard for release Rule 3.460 authorizes commitment of one acquitted for insanity if his release would be "manifestly dangerous to the peace and safety of the people." [2] But the Baker Act, Section 394.467(1)(a), authorizes commitment of one who, by reason of mental illness, is "[l]ikely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty." [3] The difference is more than semantic....

...such conduct and the degree of harm which may ensue"); Proctor v. Butler, 380 A.2d 673, 677 (N.H. 1977). The District of Columbia Code contains the same dichotomy — dangerousness versus likely-to-injure — that is created by criminal Rule 3.460 and Section 394.467(1)(a)....

...The Baker Act, as amended through 1975, did not simply provide a substantive standard for commitment and release different from the Rule 3.460 standard for insanity acquitees. The Act also provided independent administrative and civil court procedures for initial commitment and for commitment beyond six months. Section 394.467(2), (3)(a), (4), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...It purported to require that criminal commitment orders under Rule 3.460 "adequately document the nature and [the] extent of [the] patient's mental illness," and *197 the Act licensed hospital administrators to turn away insanity acquitees who are unaccompanied by "adequate orders and documentation." Section 394.467(3)(b), (c), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999, 97 S.Ct. 525, 50 L.Ed.2d 609 (1976). Connors also reached beyond commitment questions to reassert paramount judicial authority over periodic evaluation and release of Rule 3.460 acquitees. Legislation in 1975 had added Section 394.467(5), [11] requiring an acquitee's release after six months unless statutory grounds for continued commitment were found by a hearing examiner, or by a court overruling the hearing examiner....

...trial, Rule 3.210(b)(1), and for those acquitted on account of insanity: When a person tried for an offense shall be acquitted for the cause of insanity, if the Court shall then determine that the defendant presently meets the criteria set forth in Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1975) the Court shall commit the defendant to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for involuntary hospitalization, or shall order that he receive outpatient treatment at any other appropriate facility or service on an outpatient basis, or shall discharge the defendant....

...ction 2(a), power to repeal new Rule 3.210 almost before it became effective. [15] Chapter 77-312, Laws of Florida, extensively amended Chapter 394 and 921 to provide for trial court commitment of persons acquitted for insanity under the criteria of Section 394.467(1); for initial determination of release questions, under the same criteria, by Baker Act hearing examiners; for judicial review by the committing court of only those release orders which are contested administratively by the state attorney; and for de novo judge or jury trials, applying the same statutory criteria, in cases judicially reviewed. Sections 394.467(5), 921.131(2), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Rule 3.210, thereby insisting, as it were, that the Baker Act standard eclipsed that of its own Rule 3.460. Thus we conclude that the determinative test is whether Hill, if released, would be likely to injure himself or others. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.210, Section 394.467(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...aker Act proceedings, specifically that the state has the burden to justify his continued commitment by clear and convincing evidence. The Supreme Court held, in In re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1977), that clear and convincing evidence satisfying Section 394.467(1) standards is necessary for involuntary hospitalization under the Baker Act....

...on shall be held in custody until released by order of the committing court, or may give him into the care of his friends, on their giving satisfactory security for the proper care and protection of such person; otherwise he shall be discharged. [3] Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1977): (1) Criteria....

...s if allowed to remain at liberty, or (b) In need of care or treatment and lacks sufficient capacity to make a responsible application on his own behalf. The Baker Act standards were purportedly applicable to insanity acquitees by the implication of Section 394.467(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1973). 1975 legislation made the implication explicit, Section 394.467(5), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...released "without danger to himself or to others." Model Penal Code § 4.08(2) (1962). [10] 306 So.2d 113 (Fla. 1974). [11] Chapter 75 305, Laws of Florida. The new statute was designated in the session law, and therefore in the Connors opinion, as § 394.467 (4)(h). 332 So.2d at 339, n. 2. It was renumbered § 394.467(5) in Florida Statutes (1975)....

...[12] Rule 3.460 was amended in 1974, before Powell was decided, to make explicit that "such person shall be held in custody until released by order of the committing court." In re Rule 3.460, Fla.Rules of Crim.P., 287 So.2d 678 (Fla. 1974). [13] Chapter 75 305, Section 1, Laws of Florida, added Section 394.467(4)(h)(1), codified as Section 394.467(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), providing: (a) In the case of any patient who has been committed to a mental hospital pursuant to Rule 3.460, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, Acquittal for Cause of Insanity, the committing court shall retain jurisdiction in the case. [14] Section 394.467(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1975): If ......

...ly and without warning. In reference to Hill's 1965 admission, the staff conference report indicates that Hill's hallucinations antedated his 1964 violence by "at least three or four years." [29] The likely-to-injure issue framed by paragraph (a) of Section 394.467(1) is inseparable from the paragraph (b) concern with whether the acquitee is "[i]n need of care or treatment and lacks sufficient capacity to make a responsible application on his own behalf," supra n....

...977). [2] When read together, appellant argues, the sections provide the requisite standards and safeguards with respect to involuntary commitment. We agree. In the case of In Re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1977), we upheld the constitutionality of section 394.467(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...4th DCA 1974) (court must "fix a time" for competency hearing before defendant may be incarcerated under subsection). [29] If the defendant is found competent he proceeds to trial; if he is found incompetent, he is then committed "to the Division of Mental Health for hospitalization under the provisions of Fla.Stat. § 394.467, F.S.A.," subject to continuing review....

...as is required by the Act. [2] STEVENSON and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] We have selected five days because that is the period within which the legislature requires a probable cause hearing for civil commitment for treatment for mental illness. § 394.467(6)(a)1....

...1975), the court held that it was error for the trial court to enter a judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity at a pretrial hearing and "short circui[t] [the] provision of [Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210] directing that he commit [the defendant] to the Division of Mental Health under said § 394.467." Brown, 307 So.2d at 897....

...ts is to avoid tying mentally ill or deficient defendants in the criminal justice system to civil commitment procedures in the "Baker Act." Reference to commitment of a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity has been removed from Ssection 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), and the case of In Re: Beverly, 342 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1977). As to criteria for involuntary hospitalization, see chapter 394, Florida Statutes, or, in the case of mental retardation, see chapter 393, Florida Statutes. Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1979), prescribes criteria for involuntary hospitalization or placement....

...nts is to avoid tying mentally ill or deficient defendants in the criminal justice system to civil commitment procedures in the "Baker Act." Reference to commitment of a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity has been removed from Section 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...defendant is sent should not vary greatly from procedures common to the institution in the involuntary hospitalization or residential treatment of those not subject to criminal charges. The criteria for involuntary hospitalization isare set forth in section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...ncompetent to stand trial but does not meet the provisions for involuntary hospitalization. It is meant to provide as great a flexibility as possible for the trial judge in handling such defendant. As to criteria for involuntary hospitalization, see section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...nts is to avoid tying mentally ill or deficient defendants in the criminal justice system to civil commitment procedures in the "Baker Act." Reference to commitment of a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity has been removed from Section 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...d in the future. (c) Applicability. This sectionrule shall not apply to defendants determined to be incompetent to proceed with sentencing, which is provided in Rrule 3.214 below. Committee Notes 1980 Adoption. As to involuntary hospitalization, see section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1979); as to involuntary admission to residential services, see chapter 393, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...untarily hospitalized. It further provides that the administrator of the facility must notify the Sstate Aattorney prior to any release of a defendant committed pursuant to this sectionsubdivision. As to criteria for involuntary hospitalization, see section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1979); in case of retardation, see chapter 393, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...nts is to avoid tying mentally ill or deficient defendants in the criminal justice system to civil commitment procedures in the "Baker Act." Reference to commitment of a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity has been removed from Section 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...dments to avoid tying mentally ill or deficient defendants in the criminal justice system to civil commitment procedures in the "Baker Act." Reference to commitment of a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity has been removed from Section 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...ts is to avoid tying mentally ill or deficient defendants in the criminal justice system to civil commitment procedures in the "Baker Act." Reference to commitment of a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity has been removed from Ssection 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...nts is to avoid tying mentally ill or deficient defendants in the criminal justice system to civil commitment procedures in the "Baker Act." Reference to commitment of a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity has been removed from Section 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...ts is to avoid tying mentally ill or deficient defendants in the criminal justice system to civil commitment procedures in the "Baker Act." Reference to commitment of a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity has been removed from Ssection 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...s is to avoid trying mentally ill or deficient defendants in the criminal justice system to civil commitment procedures in the "Baker Act." Reference to commitment of a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity has been removed from Ssection 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...nts is to avoid tying mentally ill or deficient defendants in the criminal justice system to civil commitment procedures in the "Baker Act." Reference to commitment of a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity has been removed from Section 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...Prior to trial, the court and the prosecutor were apprised of the facts that appellant had been adjudicated not guilty of receiving stolen property by reason of insanity in 1978 and had been involuntarily committed to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for treatment under the provisions of section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...dures which must be followed under a variety of circumstances and conditions, including emergency admission (Section 394.463(1)), court-ordered evaluation (Section 394.463(2)), voluntary admissions (Section 394.465), and involuntary hospitalization (Section 394.467)....

...Allen, Public Defender and Maria Ines Suber, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Jeffrey M. Dikman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. BARFIELD, Judge. Appellant seeks review of an order of involuntary placement under the Baker Act, section 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...Having reviewed the record, we can find no clear and convincing evidence that appellant was a present danger to herself or to others or that she was unable to survive in the conditions she was residing in at the time she was ordered committed. Schexnayder v. State, 495 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); § 394.467(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes (1987). Even though the other criteria set out in section 394.467(1) might be met, a non-dangerous individual, capable of surviving safely in freedom by herself or with the help of others, should never be involuntarily committed....

...e was three years old, after the court found that the Mother's mental health issues put the child at risk of harm. On December 1, 2008, after the Mother was committed pursuant to the Baker Act, she consented to her child being adjudicated dependent. § 394.467, Fla....

...In Shuman, petitioners were involuntarily committed to the Florida State Mental Hospital pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 394, Part I, Florida Statutes (1975), The Baker Act. When the hospital desired to continue the petitioners' involuntary hospitalization beyond the initial six-month commitment authorized by section 394.467(3), each petitioner was granted a hearing before a hearing officer for the Department of Administration, as provided by section 394.467(4)(a)....

ALTENBERND, Judge. Marsha Kay Drummond appeals the order of involuntary placement in her Baker Act proceeding. See § 394.467, Fla....

...State, 802 So.2d 1113 (Fla. 2001). This is a case in which a magistrate presided over a contested Baker Act proceeding. There are no special rules of civil procedure for Baker Act proceedings. Many of the procedures applicable to these proceedings are actually described in section 394.467....

...338 , 540 P.2d 818, 822 (1975), for the proposition that a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof is constitutionally unacceptable in civil commitment cases because fundamental liberties are at stake). It is also reviewing a claim that the State is obligated to prove by clear and convincing evidence. See § 394.467(1)....

...tters in the court. See State v. Reese, 773 So.2d 655 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). The trial court's dismissal order is reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings. REVERSED and REMANDED. THOMPSON, C.J., and PLEUS, J., concur. NOTES [1] See § 394.467, Fla.Stat....

...Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Kathleen E. Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant was involuntarily committed to Florida State Hospital, pursuant to the provisions of section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...ial proceedings and any other proceedings at which a decision could be made which might result in a detrimental change to the subject's liberty. In re Beverly, 342 So.2d at 489. The procedure for involuntary placement here applicable is set forth in section 394.467(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...nidentified persons, which hearsay went unchallenged. Similar deficiencies occurred with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the order for involuntary placement. Involuntary placement of an individual for treatment, as set forth in section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1991), requires: a finding of the court by clear and convincing evidence that: (a) He is mentally ill and because of his mental illness: 1.a....

...ged to be inappropriate. (Emphasis supplied.) Application of the statutory criteria to the record in this case indicates an absence of the requisite "clear and convincing evidence" that due to mental illness, appellant meets the criteria outlined in section 394.467(1)....

...tary placement advanced by the psychiatrist. Even then he was hurried by the admonition that he be brief as they had "a lot of hearings". I, therefore, concur in the result reached. The appellant should be given a new hearing held in compliance with Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1991).

...Douglas Brinkmeyer, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Sean F. Callaghan, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. BROWNING, J. Appellant appeals an order of involuntary commitment entered pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1999), on grounds that the State failed to present clear and convincing evidence that she met the required statutory criteria....

...Rather, there must also be clear and convincing evidence that without treatment, the patient would pose a real and present threat of substantial harm to herself, or a substantial likelihood that in the near future she will inflict serious bodily harm on herself or another, as evidenced by recent *410 behavior. See § 394.467(1)(a)2, Fla....

...Ultimately, DCF might be responsible for Amaya's care if he is committed pursuant to the Baker Act, but the statutory procedures under that chapter must be followed and Amaya must be properly committed to DCF's custody before that agency should be burdened with providing for his treatment or care. See § 394.467, Fla....

...Russell, State's Atty., and George E. Tragos, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee. ROBERTS, Justice. This cause is before us on direct appeal from a final order of the Circuit Court, Sixth Judicial Circuit, which passes upon the constitutional validity of Section 394.467(3)(b), Florida Statutes....

...Stuart Cahoon as Director of the Division of Mental Health, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is willing and anxious to carry out and fulfill his official obligations as Director and that because of the language contained in Florida Statute 394.467(3)(b), as amended, he believes that, notwithstanding Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.460, the defendant, Christina I....

...in the Pasco County Detention Center where she has been a nuisance and danger *338 to herself and others and that continuation of the status quo cannot be further tolerated by the Court." proceeded to find: "1. That the provisions of Florida Statute 394.467(3)(b) relating to Part I, Chapter 394 are unconstitutional or otherwise ineffective as applied to this defendant and others who are committed to the Division of Mental Health of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services by Court Or...

...the peace and safety of the people. "2. That under these circumstances, the above finding appears to be more appropriate at this time than a continuation of contempt proceedings against Dr. Stuart Cahoon." and ordered that: "1. That Florida Statute 394.467(3)(b) is unconstitutional or otherwise ineffective and inoperative as applied to the defendant, Christina I....

...y verdict or adjudication by the trial judge of not guilty of the crime charged by reason of insanity relates to his mental condition at the time of commission of the crime which could have occurred many months or even years before the adjudication. Section 394.467(3)(b), Florida Statutes, does not purport to veto or repeal Rule 3.460, F.Cr.R.P., as contemplated by Article *339 V, Section 2, Constitution of Florida....

...563, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 decided June 26, 1975. We are not unmindful that these decisions hold that such patients are not subject to the same periodic re-examinations as are those committed who have not been charged with criminal offense. Cf. Section 394.467(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1973), Ch....

...fety of the people. Accordingly, the trial court acted in accordance with Rule 3.460, F.Cr.R.P., in requiring that Connors be committed because she is manifestly dangerous to the peace and safety of the people at the present time. To the extent that Section 394.467(3)(b), Florida Statutes, attempts to derogate the authority of the committing judge set out in Rule 3.460, F.Cr.R.P., such statutory provision is superseded thereby....

...Without doubting the importance of the question presented, I believe the Court oversteps jurisdictional boundaries in reaching the merits. While expressing the view that the legislature disregarded state constitutional limitations by enacting Fla. Stat. § 394.467(3)(b) (1974 Supp.), as amended, the Court fails to observe state constitutional restrictions on its own power, in my view....

...Stuart Cahoon, Director of the Division of Mental Health, why he should not be held in contempt of Court for failure to accept Mrs. Connors as an inmate in a mental institution. By motion to dismiss order to show cause, counsel for Dr. Cahoon brought to the trial court's attention Fla. Stat. § 394.467(3)(b) (1974 Supp.) which, as amended, had taken effect only a few months before. In response to Dr. Cahoon' motion to dismiss, the trial court entered a supplemental commitment order dated December 20, 1974, declaring that "Florida Statute 394.467(3)(b) is unconstitutional or otherwise ineffective and inoperative as applied to the defendant ... and all other defendants in like circumstances," and concluding that such a finding "appears to be more appropriate at this time than a continuation of contempt proceedings against Dr. Stuart Cahoon." In its zeal to vitiate portions of Fla. Stat. § 394.467(3)(b) (1974 Supp.), the majority loses sight of the particular case before us....

...Ironically, in the name of preserving the separation of powers, the Court has blurred the distinctions between the separate branches of government by passing on a statute as a general proposition, in much the same way the governor might, when exercising the power of the veto. NOTES [1] Section 394.467(3)(b) [Chapter 74-233], provides: "(b) In the event a person is ordered into a treatment facility under the provisions of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure or chapter 801 or chapter 917, the order shall adequately document the nature and extent of a patient's mental illness....

...If further hospitalization is necessary at the end of his authorized treatment period, the administrator shall apply to the hearing examiner for an order authorizing continued hospitalization." [2] In 1975, the Legislature of the State of Florida adopted Ch. 75-305 which added paragraph (h) to Section 394.467(4), Florida Statutes, to accord with Powell v....

...Metzger, Assistant Public Defender, Jacksonville, Attorneys for Appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Amelia L. Beisner, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Attorneys for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant appeals an order of involuntary placement entered pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1999)....

...lear and convincing evidence that the statutory criteria authorizing involuntary commitment have been met. In re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481 (Fla.1977); Salter v. State, 618 So.2d 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Without question, Appellant meets the criteria of section 394.467(1)(a)1. She is mentally ill, she has refused voluntary placement, and she may not be able to determine for herself whether placement is necessary. At issue is whether the State proved by clear and convincing evidence the criteria contained in section 394.467(1)(a)2....

...ay that established any real and present threat of substantial harm to her well-being, could not support involuntary commitment). As in Smith v. State, 508 So.2d 1292 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), we find a deficiency in the proof to meet the requirements of section 394.467(1)....

...staff. Petitioner seeks an order of this Court declaring null and void the trial court orders of May 24, 1973 and March 12, 1974, and authorizing his release pursuant to Chapter 394, F.S., known as the Baker *118 Act, and more particularly Sections 394.467 and 394.469 thereof....

...Nor do I agree with Respondents that the Baker Act is applicable only to civil proceedings. The Act by its express language shows the intent of the Legislature to apply it to civil and criminal proceedings alike, and we are bound to observe that intent. Section 394.467, generally, provides for admission criteria and procedures, hearing, and continued hospitalization of involuntary patients....

...need for medication. It was his opinion that appellant was a non-dangerous individual, even though she had trouble controlling her moods and behavior. He concluded that appellant would be able to function adequately if she would take her medication. Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1985), sets forth criteria for involuntarily confining a mentally ill person for treatment....

...taking care of himself and surviving safely in freedom. The record here is devoid of evidence clearly and convincingly supporting the conclusion that "such neglect or refusal poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to [her] well-being." § 394.467(1)(a)2.a., Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Florida’s mental illness statute contains similar provisions, by which people involuntarily committed to either inpatient or outpatient services receive periodic review from either the committing court or a hearing officer with the authority to afford release. See id. § 394.467(7); id....

...d upon psychologist's admission that test was "somewhat experimental" and questioned by some in psychological science community). [4] The statute does not specify when in the future it must be "likely" that these possible crimes might occur. Compare § 394.467(1)(a)(2)(b), Fla....

...[5] It is useful to compare a Jimmy Ryce proceeding to a Baker Act proceeding. Under the Baker Act, involuntary admission to a treatment facility must be based on the opinion of a psychiatrist, supported by a second opinion of a psychologist or psychiatrist. See § 394.467(2), Fla. Stat. (2003). The common diagnostic issue is whether the patient "in the near future" "will inflict serious bodily harm on himself or herself or another person, as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening such harm." See § 394.467(1)(a)(2)(b)....

...As reflected by the record in the first trial, appellant has had a history of mental problems. In 1976, Patten was adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity of receiving stolen property, having been involuntarily committed to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for treatment under the provisions of section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...days of the date of the opinion. See id. The court borrowed the five-day period from the Baker Act, where a probable cause hearing must be held within five days after a person is civilly confined for treatment of mental illness. Id. at n. 1 (citing § 394.467(6)(a)1., Fla....

...a petition. We further hold that if the judge finds probable cause, the judge must also appoint an attorney for the respondent, if he is not already represented by counsel. See Meadows, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D2577 n. 5, ___ So.2d at ___ n. 5, (citing section 394.467(4), Florida Statutes)....

...al institutions." Shuman v. State, 358 So.2d 1333, 1335 (Fla. 1978). The subject of an involuntary commitment has a right to the effective assistance of counsel at all judicial proceedings which could result in a limitation on the subject's liberty. § 394.467(4)(e), Fla....

...at 863, 95 S.Ct. at 2556, 45 L.Ed.2d at 601. Thus, a defendant has a right to a closing argument regardless of the length of the hearing or the apparent simplicity of the issues presented. Appellee also argues that the psychiatrist's testimony was required by section 394.467(3)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982) and, therefore, inquiry into his qualifications would not be relevant. Section 394.467(3)(a) provides that one of the mental health professionals who signed the petition for involuntary commitment must testify at the hearing for involuntary commitment....

...On October 11, 1977, the administrator of the Tallahassee Psychiatric Centre, Inc., filed a petition for the involuntary hospitalization of Neff. A hearing on the matter was held October 13, 1977, and the trial court entered its order requiring Neff's involuntary hospitalization the following day pursuant to Section 394.467(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...e would get adequate treatment with the possibility that he might be able to come back into the world with his capabilities... ." This case is controlled by In re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1977). Beverly was involuntarily hospitalized pursuant to Section 394.467(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1973). Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1973) and Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1975) are identical, and provide: "394.467 Involuntary hospitalization....

...ally ill and because of his illness is: "(a) Likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty, or "(b) In need of care or treatment and lacks sufficient capacity to make a responsible application on his own behalf." In holding that Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1973) was constitutional, the Supreme Court stated the following test to be used prior to the entering of an order requiring the involuntary hospitalization of an individual: First, the judge must conclude that the person is mentally ill....

...nnecessary, especially since this is not a standard civil case. The Baker Act, which is similar to the Ryce Act, does not require service of a summons, but merely requires that the clerk provide the person with a copy of the commitment petition. See § 394.467, Fla....

...by the court. By way of analogy, the Baker Act requires that within one working day after the filing of a petition for involuntary commitment, the court must appoint the public defender, unless the respondent is otherwise represented by counsel. See § 394.467(4).

...ial detention). By way of comparison, the Florida Baker Act, also allowing for the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill, requires the court to appoint counsel within one working day after the filing of a petition for involuntary placement. See § 394.467(4), Fla....

...This opinion turns upon the administration of Rule 3.210(a)(3), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 33 F.S.A. as follows: "(3) If the Court decides that the defendant is insane, it shall commit him or her to the Division of Mental Health for hospitalization under the provisions of Fla. Stat. § 394.467, F.S.A....

...into the facility within ten days. V.L., a 16-year-old child, was adjudicated dependent in 1975 at the age of nine months and was placed into the custody of her maternal grandmother. On March 23, 1988, the court ordered involuntary placement pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...(b) Mental Incompetency of Defendant Charged With a Felony. (1)If the Court decides that a defendant charged with a felony is not mentally competent to stand trial or be sentenced, and meets the criteria for involuntary hospitalization set forth in Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1975) (or, in the case of mental retardation, Section 393.11), Florida Statutes (1975), it shall order the defendant to be transferred to a treatment facility as defined in Chapter 394, Florida Statutes (1975) (o...

...sentenced, that there is no substantial probability that the defendant will become mentally competent to stand trial or be sentenced in the foreseeable future and that the defendant does meet the criteria for involuntary hospitalization set forth in Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1975), (or, in the case of retardation, Chapter 393, Florida Statutes (1975 and Supp.1976)), the Court shall commit the defendant to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for involuntary hospitaliz...

...finding of not guilty, shall state that it was given for such cause. (9) When a person tried for an offense shall be acquitted for the cause of insanity, if the Court shall then determine that the defendant presently meets the criteria set forth in Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1975) the Court shall commit the defendant to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for involuntary hospitalization, or shall order that he receive outpatient treatment at any other appropriate facility or service on an outpatient basis, or shall discharge the defendant....

...Indeed, a reading of the various statutes involved, although somewhat duplicative, indicates that it is the court's responsibility to determine if a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity is "manifestly dangerous" and if not, to determine the appropriate alternative. See §§ 916.15, .16, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1980); § 394.467, Fla....

...Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. SHIVERS, Judge. Appeals were taken from the trial court's Orders for Involuntary Placement following separate hearings on the Petitions for Involuntary Placement of the appellants, Calvin Jordan and Frank Byrwa. Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1991), sets out the procedures for involuntary placement. At issue is whether the so-called Baker Hearings were conducted in accordance with the due process rights of Jordan and Byrwa and the requirements of section *353 394.467(3)(a)....

...The Florida Evidence Code authorizes the court to call witnesses, who may be cross-examined by all parties, and to interrogate witnesses called by a party or by the court itself "[w]hen required by the interests of justice." Section 90.615, Fla. Stat. The criteria for a finding of involuntary placement are enumerated in section 394.467(1). We find that the trial judge complied with the requirements of section 394.467 in all respects other than requiring the presence of an attorney from the Office of the State Attorney. The trial judge elicited evidence on the question of appellants' mental conditions and made sufficient findings to satisfy the legal criteria of section 394.467(1)....

...If any error resulted from the absence of an attorney to represent the state, the manner in which the hearings were conducted rendered it harmless error. Accordingly, on these particular facts we affirm the Orders for Involuntary Placement. The state concedes that the language of section 394.467(3) appears to mandate the presence of a state attorney to represent the state....

...After appellant's third temporary hospitalization in a mental facility and his involvement in an altercation with the police, as a result of which he received several contusions requiring medical treatment, a petition for involuntary placement was filed pursuant to section 394.467(2), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...A hearing was held, and the trial court entered the order appealed committing appellant. The parties do not dispute that appellant, who believes he owns Amelia Island, is mentally ill. Instead, the question on appeal is whether the state proved at the hearing below that appellant is a danger to himself or others, section 394.467(1)(a)2.b., by clear and convincing evidence....

...es must be extended to appeals from involuntary civil commitments of sexually violent predators under the Jimmy Ryce Act. Our conclusion in Pullen that involuntary commitments under the Baker Act, which are limited by statute to only six months, see section 394.467(6)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), involve a sufficient curtailment of liberty to justify application of the Anders procedures dictates that those same procedures also be applied to commitment orders entered pursuant to the Jimmy Ryce Ac...

...It paints a clear picture of Kimbrough's longstanding violent behavior toward others and his lack of rehabilitation. We conclude it was sufficient to sustain the lower court's order. We reject Kimbrough's analogy to Baker Act proceedings. He cites several cases dealing with proceedings under section 394.467 Florida Statutes, not section 393.11. These cases are not controlling because these statutes have different elements of proof. Section 394.467(1)(a)2.b....

...Prior to the commission of her murder, Rosales spent seventeen years in and out of mental hospitals. The last three hospitalizations took place, respectively, one year, nine months and six months prior to the murder of his wife. On at least two occasions, Rosales was adjudicated mentally ill under the Baker Act, section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1987), and involuntarily committed....

...1968, does not require suppression of sovereign immunity to statewide hospital systems which extend services to both paying and non-paying patients, the status of the plaintiff was not that of a voluntary paying patient. He was the *534 subject of a court order of involuntary commitment under the Baker Act pursuant to F.S. 394.467....

...opting the rule. However, I write separately to express my concern that dependent children who are involuntarily placed in treatment facilities under section 39.407(5) are given less protection than a child civilly committed under the Baker Act. See § 394.467(4), Fla....

...thdrawn. In fact, a plain reading of section 394.469 would indicate that a petition could be withdrawn prior to a ruling. Also, the grant by a court of a petition for involuntary placement requires proof that a patient meets the criteria outlined in section 394.467(l)(a) and (b), 1 and the criteria must be established by clear and convincing evidence....

...1st DCA 1994), One of the findings that must be made to support an order of involuntary placement in a state mental hospital is that “all available less restrictive treatment alternatives which would offer an opportunity for improvement ... have been judged to be inappropriate.” § 394.467(l)(b) Fla....

...At the time of James Tuten’s commitment to Meridian, involuntary inpatient placement still required clear and convincing evidence that “all available less restrictive treatment alternatives which would offer an opportunity for improvement ... have been judged to be inappropriate.” § 394.467(l)(b), Fla....

...Stat. (2008). Given the professional opinion of Dr. Fariborzian, the treating physician, that Tuten was competent enough to give or withhold consent for treatment, involuntary placement *1067 in Meridian would have been inconsistent with the mandate of section 394.467(l)(b)....

...ARIENTE, J. At the heart of this case is the right of an individual to have a judicial officer physically present at hearings held to determine whether the individual may be involuntarily committed to a mental health facility or hospital pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2016) (“the Baker Act”)....

...via videoconference equipment is within the discretion of the court. There is no ministerial, indisputable legal duty clearly established in the law which requires judicial officers presiding over involuntary inpatient placement hearings pursuant to section 394.467 to be physically present with the patients, witnesses, and attorneys....

...In my view, a judge’s physical presence is simply a constituent component of his or her ministerial duty to preside over a trial or evidentiary hearing. Id. at 168 . THE BAKER ACT This case involves proceedings used to involuntarily commit mentally ill individuals under section 394.467, Florida Statutes. Section 394.467, also known as the Baker Act, governs the involuntary inpatient placement of persons with mental illness....

...dividual will inflict serious bodily harm on himself or herself or others, and that all available less-restrictive treatment alternatives that would offer an opportunity for improvement of the individual’s condition have been judged inappropriate. § 394.467(1)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2016). The Baker Act also requires an evidentiary hearing to be conducted for involuntary inpatient placement. See § 394.467(2), (6). Recognizing the need for immediate action, the statute specifies that “[t]he court shall hold the hearing on involuntary inpatient placement within 5 court working days, unless a continuance is granted.” § 394.467(6)(a)l....

...Additionally, *1025 “[w]ithin 1 court working day after the filing of a petition for involuntary inpatient placement, the court shall appoint the public defender to represent the person who is the subject of the petition, unless the person is otherwise represented by counsel.” § 394.467(4)....

...unty or the facility, as appropriate, where the patient is located, must be as convenient to the patient as is consistent with orderly procedure, and shall be conducted in physical settings not likely to be injurious to the patient’s condition.” § 394.467(6)(a)2....

...The independent expert’s report is confidential and not discoverable, unless the expert is to be called as a witness for the patient at the hearing. The testimony in the hearing must be given under oath, and the proceedings must be recorded. The patient may refuse to testify at the hearing. § 394.467(6)(a)3....

...ur society. The Baker Act has built-in safeguards, including the requirement that hearings be conducted at the institution where the patient is placed and in a manner not likely to be injurious to the patient’s condition. The State is correct that section 394.467 does not specifically require that Baker Act hearings be presided over by a judicial officer’who is physically present....

...on—on the patient. Moreover, it is no solution to the problem to allow a patient to be brought to the courthouse if he or she objects,' as the Fifteenth Circuit has proposed in its pilot program. The Legislature has expressed a clear preference in section 394.467 that hearings be conducted at the patient’s facility in a manner that would not likely be injurious to the patient’s condition....

...ent and have not waived their physical presence at their Baker Act proceedings, the judicial officers presiding over their hearings are required to appear in person, in “physical settings not likely to be injurious to the patient’s condition.” § 394.467(6)(a)2., Fla....

...among the State’s most vulnerable citizens. The language in the Baker Act reflects the Legislature’s acknowledgment that these individuals are entitled to heightened consideration regarding the manner in which the hearing will be conducted. See § 394.467(6)(a), Fla....

...CANADY, J., concurs in result with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs. . In its decision, the Second District Court of Appeal certified the following question of great public importance: DOES A JUDICIAL OFFICER HAVE AN EXISTING INDISPUTABLE LEGAL DUTY TO PRESIDE OVER SECTION 394.467 HEARINGS IN PERSON? Doe, 210 So.3d at 159 ....

...However, after hearing oral argument, this Court vacated its earlier order and stayed the proceedings. . Circuit courts have jurisdiction over Baker Act hearings, however they are permitted by statute to either appoint a magistrate to preside over the hearings, see § 394.467(6)(a)3., Fla....

...Petitioners, Marilyn Liebman (Liebman) and Walter Jones (Jones), individually seek a writ of common law certiorari and a writ of prohibition. We consolidate their cases for opinion purposes to address the common issue. At separate times, pursuant to section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1987), the circuit court placed each petitioner in custody for treatment....

...es the initial determination. Article V of the 1968 Florida Constitution did not mention "involuntary hospitalization" as being within the jurisdiction of any particular court, although the county courts had jurisdiction of guardianship proceedings. Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1971), when originally enacted, provided for the county courts to assume jurisdiction for the original determination of involuntary hospitalization, but even then the legislature provided for a hearing officer to he...

...In 1972 the legislature passed section 26.012, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1972), which provided that the circuit court would have "exclusive original jurisdiction" of "proceedings relating to ... involuntary hospitalization [and] the determination of incompetency... ." At the same time, however, section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1971), still provided for a hearing officer to hear petitions to determine continued involuntary hospitalization. The definition of "court" was amended to mean a circuit court instead of a county court to be consistent with the statutory changes. Then in 1978, the legislature again amended section 394.467, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...inuation of involuntary hospitalization. We would also point out that in two other cases, Coppol v. Muhtar, 444 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1984) and Williams v. Davis, 459 So.2d 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) the courts considered the hearing procedure under section 394.467(4), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...d convincing evidence demonstrating that she met the criteria for involuntary placement. We reverse on the second ground. Ms. Archer was originally civilly committed by a court order that is not at issue here. On October 19, 1994, in accordance with section 394.467(4), Florida Statutes (1993), a hearing officer from the Division of Administrative Hearings conducted a hearing on the hospital administrator's request for an order of continued involuntary placement....

...st for continued involuntary placement or otherwise seek review in accordance with section 120.68, Florida Statutes (1993). Instead, on January 3, 1995, the hospital administrator filed a new petition for involuntary placement. The petition, quoting section 394.467(1)(a)2.a., Florida Statutes (1993), alleges that Ms....

...On January 26, 1995, the trial court filed the written order for involuntary placement appealed here. Appeal From Commitment Order Not Moot The order Ms. Archer is appealing committed her involuntarily for no more than six months, which have since elapsed. § 394.467(4), Fla....

...State, 478 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The supreme court's decision in Godwin overruled Taylor v. State, 536 So.2d 1050 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). For the reasons explicated in Godwin and Ozbourn, we turn to the substance of the appeal. Motion To Dismiss Denied Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1993), vests circuit courts with authority to grant petitions for initial involuntary placement. See Bentley v. State ex rel. Rogers, 398 So.2d 992 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Section 394.467(4)(f), Florida Statutes (1993), requires administrative hearing officers to authorize continued involuntary placement if a person committed by a court continues to meet the criteria. Liebman v. State, 555 So.2d 1242 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). But "if it is shown at the hearing that the patient does not meet the criteria for involuntary placement, he is entitled to be released," § 394.467(4)(a), Fla....

...s ago would necessarily result in a final decision one way or the other. We have little to add to the learned circuit judge's analysis. Even though the criteria for continued involuntary placement are identical to the criteria for initial placement, § 394.467(4)(a), Fla....

...State, 575 So.2d 756 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Welk v. State, 542 So.2d 1343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Williams v. State, 522 So.2d 983 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Smith v. State, 508 So.2d 1292 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Neff v. State, 356 So.2d 901 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1993), specifies the criteria on which involuntary placement decisions must depend: (1) CRITERIA.—A person may be involuntarily placed for treatment upon a finding of the court by clear and convincing evidence that: (a) He is mentally ill and because of his mental illness: 1.a....

...The evidence presented below did not clearly and convincingly show that Ms. Archer was "incapable of surviving alone," or that she was "likely to suffer from neglect or refuse to care for h[er]self, and [that] such neglect or refusal pose[d] a real and present threat of substantial harm to h[er] well-being." § 394.467(1)(a)2.a., Fla....

...The issue in this case is whether a court, having conducted a hearing on the merits and denied the State's Baker Act petition, may grant the State's motion for rehearing, take additional testimony, reverse its earlier denial and enter an order of involuntary placement under Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...We conclude that, in view of the authorities mentioned above, the trial court did not *761 abuse its discretion in granting rehearing. We also reject appellant's double jeopardy argument as well as her argument that the evidence was insufficient to establish the requisite criteria under Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes....

...In a report dated October 16, 1984, the examining psychiatrists concluded that — With regard to the Court's specific questions it is our opinion this patient merits adjudication of competence for trial and no longer meets the criteria for involuntary hospitalization under Florida Statute 394.467....

...[5] See Amendment to Rules of Juv. Procedure, 804 So.2d 1206, 1215 (Fla.2001) (Harding, J., concurring). While the Baker Act requires appointment of a public defender to represent a person who is the subject of an involuntary commitment petition, see § 394.467(4), Fla....

...rida Statutes, for residential mental health treatment. Any reference to hospital is to a hospital licensed under chapter 395, Florida Statutes, for residential mental health treatment. This rule does not apply to placement under sections 394.463 or 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...erson is a collateral legal consequence" rendering the issue not moot). [1] Turning to the merits of Lehrke's argument, in order to involuntarily commit an individual, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence the criteria spelled out in section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2007). Pursuant to that section, the State must show that the individual has a mental illness and has either refused voluntary placement or is unable to determine whether placement is necessary. § 394.467(1)(a)(1). Here, it is undisputed that Lehrke was diagnosed with atypical psychosis and that he refused voluntary placement. However, pursuant to subsection 394.467(1)(a)(2), the State must also show that Lehrke either is likely to suffer neglect without treatment or that "[t]here *309 is a substantial likelihood that in the near future he ......

...examples of threats Lehrke had made to others, the doctor could only point to Lehrke's threat to sue for a violation of his civil rights. Our review of the evidence presented below leads us to conclude that the State failed to meet its burden under section 394.467....

...ablish. Here the state does not contend that Mrs. Lyon posed a danger or threat to others, nor was there evidence of any recent behavior that would support a finding that in the near future she would inflict serious harm either on herself or others. Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1997), places on the state the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (a) He or she is mentally ill and because of his or her mental illness: 1.a....

...on this point. Our decision in Salter v. State, 618 So.2d 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), controls the present case. In Salter, the state relied on the testimony of one Dr. DeMoya to prove self neglect posed "a real and present threat of substantial harm." § 394.467(1), Fla....

...The first point contends that the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence that appellant suffers from a mental illness as defined in section 394.455(3). The second point contends that the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence to support the required finding under section 394.467(1)(a) that, by reason of her present condition, she would in the near future inflict serious bodily harm upon herself or others, or would suffer neglect which poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to her well-being....

...to consider the matter in more depth. Ms. Jones’ parents responded by arguing that 2 their daughter filed the petition “as a result of a recent Baker Act proceeding” they initiated against her. See § 394.467(1), (1)(a)2.a., Fla....

...Douglas Brinkmeyer, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Amelia L. Beisner, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. ALLEN, Judge. The appellant challenges a Baker Act order of involuntary placement for treatment pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...Rather, there must be clear and convincing evidence that without treatment the appellant would pose a real and present threat of substantial harm to his own well-being, or a substantial likelihood that in the near future he would inflict serious bodily harm on himself or another, as evidenced by recent behavior. § 394.467(1)(a)2....

...Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen. and James H. Greason, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Before HAVERFIELD, [*] C.J., and BARKDULL and KEHOE, JJ. KEHOE, Judge. This is an appeal of an order of involuntary hospitalization under the Baker Act, specifically Section 394.467, Florida Statutes [1977]....

...e dangerous to others. See section 202.700 Mo. Rev. Stat. The act upon which appellant was committed to a mental institution in Missouri is more appropriately compared to Florida's Baker Act involuntary placement proceedings, as provided pursuant to section 394.467 Florida Statutes....

...appellant's post-war condition in light of sections 394.463(1)(b)2 and 394.463(2)(a)1 Florida Statutes (1985), with respect to appellant's eligibility for treatment with the Veterans *1170 Administration or other federal agency pursuant to sections 394.467 and 394.4672 Florida Statutes (1985)....

...On December 5, 1988, D.M.L. was involuntarily placed at Anclote Manor Hospital for a period not to exceed six months. On May 12, 1989, a petition was filed requesting an order authorizing continued involuntary placement. The petition, filed pursuant to section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1987), alleged that D.M.L....

...t of patients. We agree. Unless waived, before a person can be involuntarily placed for treatment, or have his involuntary placement continued, a hearing is held where that person can be represented by counsel. The scope of the hearing is limited by section 394.467 which provides: (1) CRITERIA....

...ovement of his condition have been judged to be inappropriate. The hearing is, therefore, for the limited purpose of determining if the patient is mentally ill and because of this illness needs to be involuntarily placed for the reasons set forth in section 394.467....

...al services... ." Id. At best we can assume only that the trial court is to utilize the criteria to be considered by the examining commission. Appellant relies on In re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1977), wherein the Florida Supreme Court found that Section 394.467, authorizing commitment of mentally ill persons, provided proper due process safeguards. In Beverly, the court found Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1973) constitutional because subsection (1) defines specific criteria for involuntary hospitalization: "(a) Likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty, or (b) In need of care or treatment and lacks sufficient capacity to make a responsible application on his own behalf." [2] The attack upon the constitutionality of Section 394.467 in Beverly was based upon the holding in Commonwealth ex rel....

...In holding this statute unconstitutional, the court noted: "`In need of care' is so broad as to be virtually meaningless." Id. at 778. In Beverly the Florida Supreme Court quoted with approval this statement made by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The court in Beverly stated that the statutory standards in Section 394.467(1) are more precise than those discussed in Commonwealth ex rel....

...251, 257, 92 S.Ct. 885, 888, 31 L.Ed.2d 184 (1971). Id. at 485. The court also quoted Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D.Ala. 1974): "Commitment on account of dangerousness to others serves the police power ..." Id. at 485. The court held that Section 394.467 is constitutional because it is a valid exercise of the state's parens patriae power and police power and the language of the statute itself limits involuntary commitment to those persons over whom the state may properly exercise thes...

...OTT and DANAHY, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Amicus curiae briefs were filed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and the Governor's Commission on Advocacy for Persons with Developmental Difficulties, which greatly helped to clarify the issues involved here. [2] Section 394.467 has subsequently been amended. Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1979) provides: (1) CRITERIA....

...program to restore her competency. She appeals from that order. Initially, she claims that the statute is facially unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection because it does not require a psychiatrist to recommend commitment, as provided under section 394.467(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), for adults for whom involuntary commitment is sought....

be used to support his continued confinement. § 394.467(6)(a) 3., Fla. Stat. (2017) ("The patient may

...[3] The City Defendants have not alleged that mentally incompetent inmates receive inadequate treatment while housed at University Hospital. Consequently, no federal constitutional question arises from the fact that such inmates are housed there. [4] Florida Statutes § 394.467(1) (1980 Supp.) sets forth the criteria for involuntary hospitalization: (1) CRITERIA.— (a) A person who is acquitted of criminal charges because of a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity may be involuntarily hospitalized pursuant...

...to ... [himself] or others." It is apparent from testimony given by representatives of HRS at the evidentiary hearing that HRS equates the second condition contained in Section 916.18(2) with the standard for involuntary hospitalization set forth in Section 394.467(1)(b)....

...t appears that HRS simply relies upon the finding made by the committing judge that the person meets the criteria for involuntary hospitalization. This is reasonable in light of the fact that the first criterion for involuntary hospitalization under Section 394.467(1)(b) parallels the second condition found in Section 916.18(2), that is, that the person is likely to cause injury to himself or others....

...Allen, Public Defender, and Andrew Thomas, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellees. BARFIELD, Judge. Appellant is administrator of the Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee. Appellees are persons involuntarily placed in that facility. Under Florida Statutes § 394.467 (1983), the administrator is required to request authorization to continue involuntarily placement six months after commitment and each six months thereafter....

...and their orders are final orders subject to appellate review in this court, id. § 394.457(6). The administrator is required to show by clear and convincing evidence that the patients meet the five statutory criteria for involuntary placement, id. § 394.467(1)(b)....

...The hearing officer held that the administrator failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing proof that appropriate and less restrictive treatment alternatives were not available and the patients therefore did not meet the criterion set forth in Fla. Stat. § 394.467(1)(b)5 (1983)....

...ement. In re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1977). We find nothing to suggest that the intent of the 1982 legislature in adding the fifth criterion to the statute differed from the construction given the requirement in Wilson. In fact, the language of § 394.467(1)(b)5 strongly suggests that the Wilson rationale should be applied here.

...Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Diane Leeds, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and DANIEL S. PEARSON and FERGUSON, JJ. FERGUSON, Judge. The question presented is whether a court, after having determined in a Baker Act proceeding, pursuant to Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1981), that a subject meets a criteria for involuntary hospitalization, but also finds at the same time that under Section 394.453 the less restrictive means of outpatient care will suffice, may subsequently revoke...

...(1981)), has, consistent with legislative intent, ordered outpatient care by a private mental health professional as an alternative to involuntary hospitalization, that least restrictive intervention can be revoked and the patient deprived of her liberty only in proceedings which substantially meet the requirements of Section 394.467....

...hospitalized because she poses a danger to herself or others, the administrator of a designated receiving facility where the patient has been examined or evaluated shall make a recommendation to the court for involuntary hospitalization pursuant to Section 394.467(2), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...The notice must specify the date, time, and place of hearing; the basis for detention (if any); the names of examining mental health professionals and other persons who will testify in support of involuntary placement, and the substance of their proposed testimony. § 394.467(3), Fla....

...NOTES [1] The state candidly concedes at the outset that the court would have no jurisdiction to simply modify its original order for outpatient treatment without a second Baker Act hearing. The question is whether the hearing may properly proceed on a contempt motion. [2] Section 394.467(1), together with the other subsections of the statute, was amended in 1982....

criteria for involuntary placement set out in section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1999), by clear and convincing

Corporation, Inc. See Dkt. 48. [5] "Florida Statute § 394.467, known as the Baker Act, allows a person to be

Circuit Court of Leon County which held that Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1973), was constitutional

an involuntary commitment proceeding under section 394.467, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982). The appealed

Children and Families [“DCF”] pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes, and the trial court ordered

criteria for commitment as set forth by statute [section 394.467, Florida Statutes]; (B) there is a substantial

hospitalization, pursuant to the Baker Act, section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1991), does not divest the

involuntary placement for treatment pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes. The order refers to the

State Hospital filed a petition pursuant to section 394.467(7), Florida Statutes, to continue Ms. Moul-iom’s

involuntarily committed pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 394.467 (the “Baker Act”) for psychiatric care in a “lock-down”

facility administrator shall be appointed. Section 394.467(4)(h), Florida Statutes (1979) provides: (4)

no longer justified. The test laid down by Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982) and Section

Circuit Court of Dade County which held that Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1973), was constitutional

involuntary hospitalization is set forth in section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1979). As to involuntary

involuntary placement for treatment pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes. We reverse the order because

and HAZOURI, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Under section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2002) (the Baker Act), a

inpatient treatment facility for three months. See § 394.467, Fla. Stat. (2016). We have jurisdiction. See

(“Order of Commitment”), entered pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2009) (“Baker Act”). We

SHAHOOD and GROSS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See § 394.467, Fla. Stat. (1998). [2] Criminal charges were

criteria for involuntary placement, as set forth in § 394.467(1) Fla. Stat. (1991), then the Administrator has

defendant meets the criteria for commitment under section 394.467, Florida Statutes, the court shall commit the

section 916.12, Florida Statutes (1999),4 and section 394.467(1), Florida *228Statutes (1999),5 also known

criteria for involuntary placement pursuant to section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes. Therefore, the circuit

released. Moreover, the alternative criteria in Section 394.467(1)(b)(4)(b) were met in this case. All of the

order of involuntary inpatient placement under section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2006). The appellant argues

hospital for involuntary placement pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes, and were transported to

394.467(1). § 394.492(6), Fla. Stat. (2005). Section 394.467(1) provides that "[a] person may be placed

trial court must hold a hearing "within 5 days." § 394.467(6)(a)1. D.M.H. seizes on the difference in language

report. Using the authority of the Baker Act, section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1991) (Involuntary Placement)

and convincing evidence. See, Florida Statutes § 394.467(1) and Florida Statutes § 394.917(1). The Department

commitment under the Baker Act. See § 394.467, Fla. Stat. (2011). By default, the only option

Adoption. As to involuntary hospitalization, see section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1979); as to involuntary

harm on himself or herself or on others. See § 394.467(1), Fla. Stat. (2001). The Supreme Court in Pullen

adjudicated incompetent for all purposes. See § 394.467(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (1987). Having determined that

involuntary commitment entered pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2004). Appellee has filed

substantial evidence to satisfy the requirements of section 394.467(l)(a)l.b., Florida Statutes (2011), which is

continued involuntary placement pursuant to section 394.467(4), Florida Statutes (1991). A hearing was

Circuit Court of Dade County which held that Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1973), was constitutional

Florida State Hospital, pursuant to The Baker Act. § 394.467, Fla. Stat. (1985). On December 1, 1986, appellant

defendant, to the custody of DCF pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2011). Because the trial

and convincing evidence. See, Florida Statutes § 394.467(1) and Florida Statutes § 394.917(1). The Department

hospitalization set forth in [section] 916.15(1), and [section] 394.467(1)(a), Florida Statutes." The order committed

petition for involuntary placement pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1989) (the Baker Act), seeking

habeas corpus and order his immediate release. See § 394.467(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2016); In re Lehrke, 12 So

involuntary hospitalization under the Baker Act. [Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1975)]. Accordingly, we

Baker Act hearings held pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 394.467.[5] Plaintiffs argue that none of the specific

working days following the filing of the petition. § 394.467(6)(a)(1); see In re Involuntary Placement of Linn

Florida State Hospital, because the criteria of section 394.467(l)(a)2.a. and 394.467(l)(b), Florida Statutes

continued involuntary placement pursuant to section 394.467(7), Florida Statutes.1 Although the evidence

involuntarily in Florida State Hospital pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1991). We reverse and vacate

visited February 14, 2012). . See Fla. Stat. § 394.467 for discussion of involuntary inpatient placement

Health for hospitalization under the provisions of § 394.467, Florida Statutes. It further provides that, “The

to a general magistrate for a hearing under section 394.467. This hearing is commonly referred to as a

order of involuntary inpatient placement under section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2006). The appellant argues

appellant to Florida State Hospital as the section 394.467, Florida Statutes, criteria were not proven

for involuntary hospitalization pursuant to section 394.467(1) of the Baker Act. Id. In this case, the

bodily harm to himself or another person. See § 394.467(l)(a)2, Fla. Stat. (2009). Although the psychiatrist

451, et seq., Florida Statutes (1987). . Section 394.467(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1987). . Section

involuntary commitment entered pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2007). Because the record

involuntary placement for treatment pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes. As the appellant asserts

that will support the required criteria of section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1985). The order for

consent to treatment within the meaning of section 394.467(6)(d), Florida Statutes, and therefore determined

involuntary placement of each appellee. Pursuant to § 394.467(4)(a), Fla.Stat. (1981), such requests are to

further involuntary hospitalization pursuant to Section 394.-467(l)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1982). We affirm

Orlando. Under Florida's Mental Health Act, section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2007), the circuit court

Orlando. Under Florida’s Mental Health Act, section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2007), the circuit court

evidence, as section 394.467 requires. We agree. Under subsection (1)(a)2 of section 394.467, the State

had been “Baker-Acted several times.” See section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1997)(providing for involuntary

days? 2. Does the 5-day period contained in section 394.467(6), Florida Statutes (1996 Supplement), for

evidence, as section 394.467 requires. We agree. Under subsection (1)(a)2 of section 394.467, the State

the trial court pursuant to Florida Statute Section 394.467. Upon consideration of the state’s commendable

involuntarily placed in that facility. Under section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1987), appellant by separate

others, and he continued to meet Florida Statute § 394.-467(l)’s enterias for involuntary hospitalization

AFFIRMED. WOLF and SWANSON, JJ., concur. . See § 394.467, Fla. Stat. . AHCA asserts for the first time

Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1983) (“the Baker Act”)

commitment issued by the lower court pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2015), is improper because

involuntary commitment entered pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2007). Because the record

hospitalized by the circuit court pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 394.-467. There is no claim that appellant Gor-chov is

he was a danger to himself or others) (citing § 394.467(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2016) ; In re Lehrke, 12 So

deemed to be inappropriate or unavailable. § 394.467(2)(b)1.–3., Fla. Stat.

he was a danger to himself or others) (citing § 394.467(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2016); In re Lehrke, 12 So

involuntary commitment entered pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2004). Appellant asserts

residential mental health sendees pursuant to section 394.467(2). Acting as a friend to Johnson, Wayne Basford

commitment issued by the lower court pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2015), is improper because

appeals his involuntary commitment pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1999). We reverse. The State

involuntary commitment entered pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2004). The appellant argues

substantial evidence to satisfy the requirements of section 394.467(1)(a)1.b., Florida Statutes (2011), which is

1999 version of the Baker Act; specifically, section 394.467(1)(a)2.a., the language and requirements of

involuntary commitment entered pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2004). Because the record

phrase “competence to consent to treatment” in Section 394.-467(3)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1980), is not

commitment issued by the lower court pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2017), is improper because

commitment issued by the lower court pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2017), is improper because

defender shall be prescribed by general law. Section 394.467(4)(e), F. S., states that "[i]n the event a

appeals his involuntary placement pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2001). We reverse the order

involuntary placement for treatment pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes. However, the record does

for involuntary inpatient placement. Under section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2020), also known as the

review 1The “Baker-acted” reference is to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2013) (“the Baker Act”)

properly conceded error. Finding 1 § 394.467, Fla. Stat. (2017). that Petitioner was entitled

confining appellant under the provisions of section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1979). It was alleged appellant

criteria for commitment under the Baker Act.2 Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2011), of the Baker Act

continued involuntary placement pursuant to section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes. Specifically, the state

order of commitment pursuant to the Baker Act, section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2001). For the reasons that

treatment of mental illness, entered under section 394.467, Florida Statutes (Supp.1982), and to schedule

terminate on or about June 13, 1982. Under section 394.467(4), Florida Statutes (1981), the administrator

inpatient treatment facility for three months. See § 394.467, Fla. Stat. (2016). We have jurisdiction. See

may be involuntarily committed pursuant to Section 394.467, Florida Statutes, because her behavior or

defendant meets the criteria for commitment under section 394.467, Florida Statutes, the court shall commit the

proceedings for involuntary commitment pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes, communication technology

involuntary commitment criteria were satisfied. See § 394.467(1)(a)1.b., Fla. Stat. (1999). In order to obtain

petition and order his immediate release. See § 394.467(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2017); C.W. v. State, 214

committed, under the Baker Act, *1217Fla. Stat. § 394.467 (2016), to the Broward Health Medical Center (the

commitment. Appellant then filed this appeal. Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2021), lays out specific

causing, attempting, or threatening such harm[.]” § 394.467(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2021). The state concedes

Circuit Court of Dade County which held that Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1973), was constitutional

Circuit Court of Dade County which held that Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1973), was constitutional

on the appeal. The first point urged that Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1975), was unconstitutional

V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. Section 394.467(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1973), the statute

institute civil commitment proceedings pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2012). See Bronson v. State

for involuntary placement pursuant to Florida Statute 394.467.” In addition, the order directs that Mr

presently meets the criteria set forth in section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1975), the Court shall

he entered an order that in accordance with Section 394.467(4), Florida Statutes (1975), he was denying

(3) involuntarily placed Akins pursuant to section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1993). The administrator

remained a patient at the hospital. Pursuant to section 394.467(4)(d), Florida Statutes (1981), appellant has

remand the cause for further proceedings. Section 394.467(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), establishes

mental health facility or hospital pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2016) (“the Baker Act”)

appellant was involuntarily committed pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2001). She concedes that

Mental Health Act, also known as the Baker Act. Section 394.467(1) of the Baker Act sets forth the evidentiary

Mental Health Act, also known as the Baker Act. Section 394.467(1) of the Baker Act sets forth the evidentiary

involuntary commitment entered pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2006). Because the record

does not track the language of Florida Statutes § 394.467 (1979). However, his findings, quoted above, are

convincing evidence the criteria set forth in section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (2022) (part of “The Florida

BRIEF. ORFINGER and MONACO, JJ., concur. . See § 394.467, Fla. Stat. (2003).

criteria for involuntary placement pursuant to section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (2000). We affirm the

agree and reverse for further proceedings. Section 394.467(6)(a)2, Florida Statutes (2007), provides,

failed to satisfy a similar requirement in section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1985)). Accord In re Beverly

involuntary inpatient placement. See generally § 394.467(7), Fla. Stat. (2023). Nor does the order adopt

an order involuntarily committing him under section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1995). Williams argues,

and a timely hearing occurred the next day, Section 394.-467(3). There was no error. Abdullah was capable

civil commitment order under The Baker Act, section 394.-467, Florida Statutes (1989), become moot solely

reversed or a new hearing is required pursuant to section 394.467(4), Florida Statutes (1991). *1152Reversed

discharging the public defender's office. Section 394.467(4), Florida Statutes (2011), requires appointment

inpatient placement at the Medical Center under section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (2016). On