Cases from cite.case.law:

ROGERS, v. STATE, 246 So. 3d 571 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Rogers claims the trial court violated his rights under section 394.916, Florida Statutes (2017), when . . . to trial within the thirty days of the trial court's probable cause finding, as required by section 394.916 . . .

I. JACKSON, v. STATE, 166 So. 3d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . . §§ 394.914, 394.915(1), 394.916(1). . . . within thirty days to determine the question by clear and convincing evidence. §§ .394.9135(3), 394.915, 394.916 . . .

MOREL, v. STATE, 138 So. 3d 1122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . appointed counsel, Defendant agreed in both open court and in writing to waive his right under section 394.916 . . .

KAKUK, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, STATE OF FLORIDA,, 516 F. App'x 901 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 394.916. . . .

STATE v. PHILLIPS,, 119 So. 3d 1233 (Fla. 2013)

. . . . § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). In State v. . . .

S. ANDERSON, v. STATE, 93 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . See § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat. . . . Section 394.916(2), Florida Statutes, provides that a “trial may be continued once upon the request of . . . continuances may be granted unless the court finds that a manifest injustice would otherwise occur.” § 394.916 . . . trial court found probable cause that Appellant met the criteria for commitment, triggering section 394.916 . . . Specifically, section 394.916 provides: (1) Within 30 days after the determination of probable cause, . . . Instead, the invited error doctrine overcomes the mandatory time requirements set forth in section 394.916 . . . Section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (2009), states, “Within 30 days after the determination of probable . . . notably where a continuance, for good cause or in the interest of justice, has been granted under section 394.916 . . .

MOREL, v. E. WILKINS,, 84 So. 3d 226 (Fla. 2012)

. . . After consultation with counsel, Morel agreed in open court to waive his right under section 394.916( . . . At the time of Morel’s initial confinement in April 2002, section 394.916(2) provided that “[t]he trial . . . See § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat. . . . Before its revision in 2006, section 394.916(2) of the Act provided that “[t]he trial may be continued . . . When interpreting the interplay between section 394.916, subsections (1) and (2), the Second District . . . See generally §§ 394.913(2)-(3), 394.9135(3), 394.914, 394.916(5), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .

FRANTZIS, v. STATE, 80 So. 3d 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Section 394.916(1) provides the court shall conduct a trial within 30 days after the determination of . . . Section 394.916(2) states the court may grant one continuance for “not more than 120 days.” . . .

L. BOATMAN, v. STATE, 77 So. 3d 1242 (Fla. 2011)

. . . . § 394.916(l)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . . trial take place within thirty days after the determination of probable cause, unless continued. § 394.916 . . . continuances may be granted unless the court finds that a manifest injustice would otherwise occur. § 394.916 . . . See § 394.916(l)-(2), Fla. Stat. . . .

In COMMITMENT OF RICHARDS. v., 62 So. 3d 1263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . to trial within thirty days from the date of the probable cause determination as required by section 394.916 . . . bring Richards to trial within thirty days from the probable cause determination as required by section 394.916 . . . to trial within thirty days from the date of the probable cause determination as required by section 394.916 . . . State, 907 So.2d 505 (Fla.2005), noted that the requirement under section 394.916(1) that trial commence . . . The motion to dismiss for violation of section 394.916(1) was filed on March 31, 2010, which was a little . . .

TEDESCO, v. STATE, 62 So. 3d 1252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . We presume that the “statutory guidelines” to which court was referring was section 394.916(1), Florida . . . However, section 394.916(1) no longer sets the date by which trial is to commence. . . . Because rule 4.240 conflicts with section 394.916(1) as to the date by which trial is to commence, the . . . its own motion in the interests of justice, when the person will not be substantially prejudiced.” § 394.916 . . .

TAYLOR, v. STATE, 65 So. 3d 531 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . . § 394.916(2), Fla. Stat. . . . See § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . . Section 394.916(1) states that “[wjithin 30 days after the determination of probable cause, the court . . .

In COMMITMENT OF MOREL, v., 67 So. 3d 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (1999-2010), states that the court shall conduct a trial on the . . .

L. BOATMAN, v. STATE, 39 So. 3d 391 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . demonstrated good cause and that the defense did not establish substantial prejudice as required by section 394.916 . . . Section 394.916, Florida Statutes (2008), provides in pertinent part: (1) Within 30 days after the determination . . .

In COMMITMENT OF GOODE. v., 22 So. 3d 750 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . dismissed due to the State’s failure to bring Goode to trial within thirty days as required by section 394.916 . . . the State failed to bring a detainee to trial within the thirty-day time period set forth in section 394.916 . . . Section 394.916(1) provides that "[w]ithin 30 days after the determination of probable cause, the court . . . allows for the trial to be continued upon a request of either party and a showing of good cause, see § 394.916 . . .

In FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS, 13 So. 3d 1025 (Fla. 2009)

. . . As adopted, rule 4.260, Continuance of Trial, tracks the language of section 394.916(2), Florida Statutes . . .

P. NEWSOME, v. BROWARD COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS,, 304 F. App'x 814 (11th Cir. 2008)

. . . . § 394.916(1). . . . .

LARIMORE, v. STATE, 2 So. 3d 101 (Fla. 2008)

. . . by clear and convincing evidence that the person requires commitment. 831 So.2d at 105; see also §§ 394.916 . . .

In COMMITMENT OF R. MAY. R. v., 975 So. 2d 579 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . . § 394.916(3). . . .

KEPHART, v. D. HADI, D. v., 932 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 2006)

. . . . § 394.916, Fla. Stat. (2002). . . . . § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . .

KOLIN, v. STATE, 927 So. 2d 198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . for the first time, raised the thirty-day deadline in a “Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Section 394.916 . . . Further, section 394.916(2) of the Act provides for waiver of the deadline upon the trial court’s granting . . . open court that expressly and unequivocally demands a trial within thirty days pursuant to section 394.916 . . .

WHITSETT, v. STATE, 913 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . probable cause under s. 394.915 or pursuant to a commitment as a sexually violent predator under s. 394.916 . . .

MITCHELL, v. STATE, 911 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 2005)

. . . Section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that “[wjithin thirty days after the determination . . . could not ensure that the appellee will not be held beyond the thirty-day time limit set by section 394.916 . . . So.2d 817, 823 (Fla.2002), the Florida Supreme Court held that the thirty-day time limit in section 394.916 . . . For example, section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (2000), provides that “[wjithin thirty days after the . . . In addition to the provision for an adversarial probable cause determination, section 394.916(2) provides . . .

WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 909 So. 2d 939 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . . § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat. (2000). . Dr. Benoit and Dr. Pritchard. . § 394.911, Fla. Stat. (2000). . . .

OSBORNE, v. STATE, 907 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 2005)

. . . to trial within the thirty days of the trial court’s probable cause finding, as required by section 394.916 . . . We further interpreted the thirty-day time provision in section 394.916, Florida Statutes (1999), as . . . we have already concluded that dismissal is appropriate if the mandatory time standards of section 394.916 . . . As noted above, section 394.916(2), allows for a continuance, upon a showing of good cause by one of . . . See Kinder, 830 So.2d at 833 (“[A]fter the time period in section 394.916(1) has run, trial is no longer . . . See § 394.916(2), Fla. . . . there should be “scrupulous compliance” with the statutory thirty-day time limit set forth in section 394.916 . . .

In COMMITMENT OF A. ORTEGA. v. A. a k a, 891 So. 2d 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . . § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat. (2004). . § 394.915, Fla. Stal. (2004). . . .

KNOWLES, v. BEVERLY ENTERPRISES- FLORIDA, INC., 898 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2004)

. . . Id. at 514 (emphasis added) (quoting § 394.916(2), Fla. Stat. (1999)).. . . . Id. at 824 (“As noted above, section 394.916(2) allows for a continuance, upon a showing of good cause . . .

In COMMITMENT OF BRANCH. v., 890 So. 2d 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Pursuant to section 394.916(3), the trial court also appointed counsel for Branch to represent him in . . .

WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 882 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . . § 394.916(4), Fla. Stat. (2004). . . .

F. CURRY, v. STATE, 880 So. 2d 751 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Curry who stipulates to either a waiver of his right to a trial within thirty days under section 394.916 . . . (1), Florida Statutes (2002), or to a continuance of his trial pursuant to section 394.916(2), Florida . . . See § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). Mr. . . . This notice did not refer to the thirty-day time limit set forth in section 394.916(1). . . . for a continuance under section 394.916(2) are essentially equivalent. . . . .

WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 870 So. 2d 922 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . trial court’s finding of probable cause that he is a sexually violent predator, pursuant to section 394.916 . . .

ENNIS, v. REGIER,, 869 So. 2d 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . However, Ennis also asserts that he was not brought to trial within thirty days as required by section 394.916 . . .

STATE v. BURKHART,, 869 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . probable cause under s. 394.915 or pursuant to a commitment as a sexually violent predator under s. 394.916 . . .

D. D. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 849 So. 2d 473 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . See 830 So.2d at 828 The particular section under review in Goode, section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes . . .

STATE v. MITCHELL,, 848 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . Section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that “[wjithin thirty days after the determination . . . could not ensure that the appellee will not be held beyond the thirty-day time limit set by section 394.916 . . . So.2d 817, 823 (Fla.2002), the Florida Supreme Court held that the thirty-day time limit in section 394.916 . . .

In COMMITMENT OF SUTTON. v., 828 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . We note that section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (2000), provides that a sexually violent predator detainee . . .

STATE v. C. ATKINSON,, 831 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 2002)

. . . See §§ 394.915, 394.916, Fla. Stat. (2001). . . .

STATE v. GOODE,, 830 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2002)

. . . Section 394.916 states, in pertinent part: (1) Within SO days after the determination of probable cause . . . See § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat (1999). . . . See § 394.916(2). . . . As noted above, section 394.916(2), allows for a continuance, upon a showing of good cause by one of . . . In the instant case, no continuance was granted pursuant to section 394.916(2), which allows a party . . . I would find the thirty-day time period in section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (Jimmy Ryce Act) to be . . . the thirty-day time period, although it provided no consequences for the State’s failure to comply. § 394.916 . . .

STATE v. KINDER,, 830 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 2002)

. . . importance: WHETHER THE FAILURE TO COMMENCE A COMMITMENT TRIAL WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD OF SECTION 394.916 . . . Fla. 2002), and we approve the Second District’s holding herein that the time provisions of section 394.916 . . . Thus, after the time period in section 394.916(1) has run, trial is no longer pending and section 394.915 . . . See § 394.916(2). . . . See § 394.916(3), Fla. Stat. (2001). . . .

WESTERHEIDE, v. STATE, 831 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 2002)

. . . See § 394.916(3), (4), Fla. Stat. (2001). . See id. § 394.916(5). . See id. § 394.917(1), (3). . . . .

HUDSON, v. STATE, 825 So. 2d 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . . § 394.916(1). . . . Id. § 394.916(5). . . . Id. § 394.916(3). . . .

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, v. BURTON,, 802 So. 2d 467 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . Pursuant to section 394.916(3), Florida Statutes (2000), Burton is entitled to the assistance of counsel . . .

BARDO, v. STATE, 804 So. 2d 474 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See § 394.916, Fla. Stat. (2000). . . .

STATE v. ROBBINS,, 785 So. 2d 620 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . probable cause under the new standard, the matter shall proceed to trial in accordance with section 394.916 . . .

STATE v. OSBORNE,, 781 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . The motion cited to section 394.916 of the Act which provides, in relevant part: 394.916 Trial; counsel . . . its own motion in the interests of justice, when the person will not be substantially prejudiced. § 394.916 . . . the thirty-day time period, although it provided no consequences for the State’s failure to comply. § 394.916 . . .

STATE v. GOODE,, 779 So. 2d 544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . respondent to trial within thirty days of the initial probable cause determination, pursuant to section 394.916 . . . importance: WHETHER THE FAILURE TO COMMENCE A COMMITMENT TRIAL WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD OF SECTION 394.916 . . .

STATE v. REESE,, 773 So. 2d 655 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . probable cause after an adversarial hearing, the 30 day clock for commencement of trial in section 394.916 . . . Moreover, as section 394.916(2) provides that the time for commencement of trial may be extended upon . . .

KINDER, v. STATE, 779 So. 2d 512 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . . § 394.916, Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . Moreover, although section 394.916, Florida Statutes (1999), allows for the thirty-day period to be continued . . . See § 394.916(2). . . . that the legislature unconstitutionally usurped the court’s rule making authority in enacting section 394.916 . . . importance: WHETHER THE FAILURE TO COMMENCE A COMMITMENT TRIAL WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD OF SECTION 394.916 . . .

WESTERHEIDE, v. STATE, 767 So. 2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . See § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . See §§ 394.916(3), 394.920, Fla. Stat. (1999). B. . . . procedural and substantive rights include the following: (1) the right to counsel, see §§ 394.915(3), 394.916 . . . Stat. (1999); (4) trial by jury, see § 394.916, Fla. . . .

STATE v. KOBEL,, 757 So. 2d 556 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . See § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . See also § 394.916(3), Fla. Stat. . . .

AMADOR, v. STATE W., 766 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . Section 394.916(1). . . .

MEADOWS, v. KRISCHER, W. A., 763 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . Section 394.916 provides: (1) Within 30 days after the determination of probable cause, the court shall . . . See § 394.916(3), (5). . . . . See § 394.916(1). . . .