Cases from cite.case.law:

. . . .Ӥ 394.925, Fla. Stat. (2012) (emphasis added). . . .

. . . See § 394.925, Fla. . . . .” § 394.925, Fla. Stat. (2005) (emphasis added). . . .

. . . . § 394.925. Thus, based on the applicable law, Mr. . . .

. . . .” § 394.925. . . .

. . . See § 394.925, Fla. Stat. (2008) (so-called clause one). . . . to include the legal fiction of “constructive custody” when it used the term “in custody” in section 394.925 . . . violent offense and “sentenced to total confinement in the future [i.e., post January 1, 1999].” § 394.925 . . . According to appellant, the word “sentenced,” as used in section 394.925, requires a judicial action . . . At all times relevant to the instant appeal, section 394.925, the so-called “jurisdictional” section . . . persons convicted of a sexually violent offense and sentenced to total confinement in the future. § 394.925 . . . See § 394.925, Fla. Stat.; Ward v. . . . Barber contends that he does not fall within either class of persons defined by section 394.925. . . . Hale, important to our analysis here, involved an interpretation of Clause One of section 394.925 of . . .

. . . (codified at § 394.925, Fla. Stat. (1999)). . . . Under the first clause of section 394.925, the Act applies to all persons in custody on the effective . . . Ward contends that both of the requirements in the second clause of section 394.925 must occur in the . . . statutory definition of a sexually violent offense applies to both clause one and clause two of section 394.925 . . . We agree that these other provisions of the Act, when read together with section 394.925, “lead to the . . . See § 394.925, Fla. Stat. (2004). The statute is simple, and quite clear. . . . The amendment at issue here stated: 394.925 916.45 Applicability of act. — This part applies Sections . . . (Supp.1998), as s. 394.925, F.S., and clarifies that the Act applies to all persons convicted of a sexually . . .

. . . Section 394.925, Florida Statutes, provides: “[Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators . . . persons convicted, of a sexually violent offense and sentenced to total confinement in the future.” § 394.925 . . .

. . . Greene asserts that section 394.925, Florida Statutes (1999), does not apply to him. . . . After an exhaustive review of section 394.925, our sister court concluded that section 394.925 authorizes . . .

. . . On May 26, 1999, this particular section was renumbered as section 394.925 and modified to add the words . . . As modified, section 394.925 provides that the Ryce Act applies: to all persons currently in custody . . . persons convicted of a sexually violent offense and sentenced to total confinement in the future. § 394.925 . . . . § 394.925, Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . concluding that “the word ‘custody’ is synonymous with ‘total confinement’ ” for purposes of section 394.925 . . . n. 1 (stating that while the petitioner could not be committed under the “first clause” of section 394.925 . . . The interpretation of the second clause of section 394.925 pressed by Ward would render this portion . . . Because we find that section 394.925 authorizes the State to seek to involuntarily commit Ward for care . . . See § 394.925, Fla. Stat. (2004). The statute is simple, and quite clear. . . .

. . . The Second District held that section 394.925, which states that the Act applies to all persons “currently . . . Furthermore, the court distinguished its decision in Atkinson, which construed section 916.45 (now section 394.925 . . .

. . . The meaning of “Custody” for Purposes of the Ryce Act Hale next argues, citing section 394.925, Florida . . .

. . . In that case, the district court construed section 394.925, Florida Statutes (1999), which was formerly . . . In construing section 394.925, the Second District first concluded that the terms “in custody” and “total . . . The court ultimately concluded that under section 394.925, the Act is only applicable to those persons . . . I believe the Second District’s interpretation of section 394.925 was correct and can also be applied . . . Section 394.925 reads in pertinent part, "This part applies to all persons currently in custody who have . . .

. . . currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense.’ ” Id. at 173 (quoting § 394.925 . . .

. . . He argued that a strict construction of section 394.925, Florida Statutes, allowed commitment of only . . .

. . . Section 394.925, Florida Statutes (2000) provides: Applicability of act. . . . Appellant argues that section 394.925, which makes the • act applicable to those “currently in custody . . .

. . . Section 394.925 is entitled “Applicability of act” and states: “This part applies to all persons currently . . . Thus, section 394.925 contemplates that, in order for the Act to apply, the person must be in custody . . . Accordingly, we hold that section 394.925, which states that the Act applies to all persons “currently . . . See § 394.925. . . . . Atkinson, 831 So.2d 172 (Fla.2002), our supreme court held that the custody requirement imposed by section 394.925 . . .

. . . Section 394.925, Florida Statutes (2001), provides in pertinent part that the Ryce Act “applies to all . . . It would be contrary to the basic tenets of fairness and due process if we were to interpret section 394.925 . . . Section 916.45, the predecessor statute addressed by the district court below, now appears at section 394.925 . . . I do not agree with the majority’s interpretation of the “in custody” requirement in section 394.925. . . . The custody requirement in section 394.925 falls outside the categories of subject matter and personal . . . Thus, I would interpret section 394.925 as only requiring actual custody on the date the Act took effect . . . guarantees, I would interpret the qualifying sexually violent offense conviction requirement in section 394.925 . . .

. . . See § 394.925, Fla. Stat. (2000). . . .

. . . Section 916.45 was renumbered as 394.925 and amended by Laws of Florida 1999, chapter 99-222, section . . .