The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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. . . Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence , § 404.22(5)(b) (Mark S. Brodin, ed., 2d ed. 1997). . . .
. . . Weinstein, et al., Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 404.22[l][a], at 404-100-400-102 (2d ed. 2016) (“[E . . .
. . . b) to prove that he had the requisite intent to distribute cocaine); see also Weinstein’s, supra, § 404.22 . . . defendant must have had a mental state that is inconsistent with innocence.”); Weinstein’s, supra, § 404.22 . . . Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 404.22[2], at 404-114.8 to 404-114.11 (Joseph M. . . .
. . . Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 404.22[1][a], at 404-71 (Joseph M. . . .
. . . is inconsistent with innocence.” 2 Jack Weinstein & Margaret Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 404.22 . . .
. . . Weinstein, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 404.22[5][a] (Joseph M. . . .
. . . Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence 404.22[3] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed.2005). . . .
. . . Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 404.22[l][a] (2d ed.2005). . . .
. . . Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence, § 404.22[2] (2d ed.2003)). . . .
. . . Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 404.22[5][c], at 404-121 (Joseph M. . . . See Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 404.22[5][c], at 404-122 (“Other-crimes evidence is not permissible . . .
. . . and that tends to undermine the defendant’s innocent explanation. 2 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 404.22 . . . AG was relevant to show Long engaged in a “pattern of operation,” 2 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 404.22 . . .
. . . Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 404.22(1)(b) n. 13 (Joseph M. . . .
. . . probably the most common purpose for admitting other-crimes evidence.” 2 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 404.22 . . .
. . . Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence, § 404.22[5][b][ii] (Joseph M. . . . Wright, 573 F.2d 681, 683 (1st Cir.1978); Weinstein & Berger, supra, § 404.22[2], at 12. . . . .
. . . Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence 2d § 404.22[5][c], at 404-117 to 40^-120 (1999). . . . the latter robbery was but a part of a larger common scheme or plan.”); 2 Weinstein & Berger, supra § 404.22 . . . See 2 Weinstein & Berger, supra § 404.22[5][c], at 404-119 to 120 (“The question for the court [in admitting . . .
. . . Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 404.22[5][c], at 404-119 (Joseph M. . . .
. . . Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence, § 404.22[6][a] (Joseph M. . . . whether the defense theory renders the evidence relevant and probative); 2 Weinstein & Berger, supra, § 404.22 . . .
. . . Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence, § 404.22[4], at 404-106, and n. 5 (Joseph M. . . .
. . . Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence, §§ 404.22[1][b] and [c](Joseph M. . . . See id. at -§ 404.22[l][a] (noting that subsequent acts can be relevant to prove intent). . . .
. . . Berger, 2 Wein-stein’s Federal Evidence § 404.22[6][a] (2d ed.1997) (collecting eases). . . .
. . . . § 404.22[l][a]; see also Turley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. . . .